State v. Burley

2024 Ohio 4719

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 27, 2024
• Docket: L-24-1019
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Burley, 2024-Ohio-4719.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1019

Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202301770

v.

Cameron Burley DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: September 27, 2024

*****

Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Meyer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.

***** SULEK, P.J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Cameron Burley, appeals from the December 29, 2023 judgment

of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of one count of aggravated

burglary. Burley raises a single assignment of error challenging the trial court’s

acceptance of his guilty plea. For the reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is

affirmed. I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On April 27, 2023, in case No. CR0202301633, the Lucas County Grand

Jury indicted Burley on one count of improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation in

violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) and (C), a second-degree felony (count 1); discharging

a firearm on or near prohibited premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) and (C)(2),

a third-degree felony (count 2); and criminal damaging or endangering in violation of

R.C. 2929.06(A)(1) and (B), a second-degree misdemeanor (count 3). Counts 1 and 2

each had a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.145(A). The charges arose out of an

incident on February 26, 2023.

{¶ 3} On May 22, 2023, in case No. CR0202301770, the Lucas County Grand

Jury indicted Burley on one count of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C.

2911.11(A)(1) and (B), a first-degree felony. The indictment arose from an incident that

occurred on May 16, 2023.

{¶ 4} On June 20, 2023, in case No. CR0202301906, the Lucas County Grand Jury

indicted Burley on one count of improperly handling firearms in motor vehicle in

violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) and (I) and 2923.111(A), a fourth-degree felony (count 1);

and one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2)and

(F)(1) and 2923.111(A), a fourth-degree felony (count 2). The charges in that case arose

from an incident on March 4, 2023.

{¶ 5} Burley initially entered a not guilty plea to the charges in all three cases. He

subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the state. Under the plea agreement, the

2. state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi to all three counts in case No. CR0202301633 as

well as to count 1 in case No. CR0202301906. In exchange, Burley pleaded guilty to

count 2, carrying a concealed weapon, in case No. CR0202301906 and to the single

count, aggravated burglary, in case No. CR0202301770.

{¶ 6} On December 28, 2023, Burley appeared for a change of plea hearing.

During the hearing, the state represented that Burley planned to withdraw his not-guilty

plea and enter a guilty plea to two charges, identifying the charge against Burley in case

No. CR0202301770 by name, aggravated burglary; by statute provision, R.C.

2911.11(A)(1) and (B); and by degree of offense, first-degree felony.

{¶ 7} Next, prior to accepting Burley’s guilty pleas in case Nos. CR0202301906

and CR0202301770, the trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 colloquy. Relevant for

purposes of this appeal, during the colloquy, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Now, the charges that I am told you are pleading guilty to today are as follows, in case number 2023-1770, it would be a guilty plea to Count 1, which is aggravated burglary. It is a felony of the first degree.

Is that your understanding of what you are pleading guilty to in that case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And then in case number 2023-1906, it is a guilty plea to Count 2, which is carrying concealed weapon, felony of the 4th degree. Is that your understanding of what you are pleading guilty to in that case?

THE COURT: Do you understand the nature of both of those charges and the potential penalties associated with each one?

3. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

In addition, Burley confirmed that he had time to consult with his attorney and review the

evidence against him. Burley also confirmed that he had time to go over the two plea

forms with his attorney, confirmed his signature was at the bottom of each page of the

plea form, and denied having any questions for his attorney or the court.

{¶ 8} The plea agreement stated the name of the offenses, the statutory sections of

the offenses, and the level of the offenses. In addition, the plea agreement stated, “The

charges have been explained to me by my attorney and the Court. I understand the nature

of the charges and the possible defenses I may have.”

{¶ 9} At no point during the plea hearing did the state or any other party make a

statement of the facts underlying the charges.

{¶ 10} Following the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court accepted Burley’s guilty

pleas, found Burley guilty of those two charges, dismissed the remaining charge against

Burley in case No. CR0202301906 and all charges against Burley in case No.

CR0202301633, and proceeded to sentencing. The court sentenced Burley to a minimum

definite prison term of 6 years and a maximum indefinite prison term of 9 years in case

No. CR0202301770 to be served concurrently with an 18-month prison term in case No.

CR0202301906.

{¶ 11} On January 12, 2024, Burley moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Two

weeks later, on January 26, 2024, before the state filed its response to Burley’s motion

and before the trial court ruled on the motion, Burley filed a notice of appeal in this court.

4. Accordingly, the trial court issued an order explaining that Burley’s notice of appeal

divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider his motion to withdraw his plea, and

therefore the motion would be held in abeyance pending a decision from this court.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 12} In case No. CR0202301770,1 Burley asserts the following assignment of

error for review:

The trial court erred in accepting Appellant’s guilty plea in violation of Crim. R. 11 and due process guarantees under the State and federal Constitutions, without a statement of facts in the record from which to determine the basis for a guilty plea.

III. Law and Analysis

{¶ 13} “A guilty plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to be

valid under the United States and Ohio Constitutions.” State v. Whitman, 2021-Ohio-

4510, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); State v. Engle, 74

Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). To ensure a plea’s validity, the trial court must “‘engage a

defendant in a plea colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11.’” Id., quoting State v. Petronzio,

2021-Ohio-2041, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 14} Relevantly, under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the court must determine that “the

defendant is making the plea voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charges

and the maximum penalty involved.” A trial court is not required to strictly comply with

1 Burley’s appeal is limited to his guilty plea in case No. CR0202301770 and does not concern case No. CR0202301906.

5. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), and instead substantial compliance is sufficient. State v. Bishop,

2018-Ohio-5132, ¶ 11. A trial court considers the totality of the circumstances to

determine whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges. State v. Rexroad,

2023-Ohio-356, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Hurst, 2020-Ohio-2754, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.).

{¶ 15} In support of his assignment of error, Burley contends that to substantially

comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the trial court was required to ensure that a statement

of facts underlying the charges was given at the plea hearing. Further, Burley concedes

that he did not raise this issue in the trial court, but he nevertheless asserts that the

absence of a statement of the factual basis for the charges constitutes plain error.

{¶ 16} Contrary to Burley’s argument, “[a] trial court is not required pursuant to

Crim.R. 11(C) to set forth any factual basis for a guilty plea during a plea hearing.” State

v. Burton, 2023-Ohio-1596, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Rothenbuhler, 2016-Ohio-

2869, ¶ 6 (6th Dist.). Indeed, the state’s recitation of a statement of facts underlying the

charges is not necessary for a trial court to determine that a defendant understood the

nature of the charges. State v. Phillips, 2007-Ohio-2671, ¶ 23 (6th Dist) (holding that the

trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) despite the absence of a statement of the

elements of the charge or the factual basis for the charge).

{¶ 17} Instead, the court may determine the defendant understood the nature of the

charge based on the totality of the circumstances. Phillips at ¶ 23. For example, the

defendant’s signature on a plea agreement stating that the defendant had discussed the

charges with his attorney and the defendant understood the nature of the charges and his

6. possible defenses is sufficient to establish a court’s substantial compliance with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a). Id. Likewise, if during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the defendant agreed that

“she understood the charges against her, the effect of a potential guilty plea, that she had

time to discuss the case with her attorney, and that she reviewed the discovery packet

with her attorney,” then the trial court satisfied Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). State v. Turner,

2023-Ohio-735, ¶ 13-14 (2d Dist.). A trial court may also substantially comply with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) if the name of the charges, the relevant statutory section of the

offense, and the degree of the offense are identified at the plea hearing and in the

indictment. See, e.g., State v. Rexroad, 2023-Ohio-356, ¶ 29 (4th Dist.) (holding that

totality of circumstances demonstrated that appellant understood the nature of the charges

where charges were identified in indictments and bills of particulars, appellant signed

documents detailing potential penalties and name of offenses; and at plea hearing trial

court advised appellant of the name of the offenses); State v. Vialva, 2017-Ohio-1279, ¶ 8

(8th Dist.) (holding that trial court’s statement identifying the offense, the statutory code

section, and the degree of the offense was sufficient to substantially comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a)).

{¶ 18} Here, at his arraignment, Burley acknowledged receiving a copy of the

indictment advising him of the name of the charge, the statutory section on which it was

based, and the date on which the offense was committed. Burley also was apprised of the

name of the burglary victim at the arraignment when Burley was ordered to have no

contact with the victim. At the plea hearing, both the state and the trial court expressly

7. identified the name of the offense and the degree of the offense, and that information was

also provided in the written plea agreement Burley signed. Burley confirmed, both

verbally during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy and in writing by executing the plea agreement,

that he understood that he was pleading guilty to the charge of aggravated burglary and

he understood the nature of the charge and its potential penalties. In addition, the

statutory code section for the charge was provided at the plea hearing and was contained

in the plea agreement. Burley also confirmed, both verbally and in writing, that he had

time to discuss the charge with his attorney and review the evidence against him.

{¶ 19} Accordingly, despite the absence of a statement providing the factual basis

for the offenses, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Burley understood the

nature of the offense for which he pled guilty in case No. CR0202301770, and the trial

court’s acceptance of Burley’s guilty plea was not plain error. Burley’s single

assignment of error is found not well-taken.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, the December 28, 2023 judgment of the Lucas

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Burley is ordered to pay the costs of this

appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment affirmed.

8. State of Ohio v. Cameron Burley C.A. No. L-24-1019

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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