State v. Buffington
This text of 743 P.2d 738 (State v. Buffington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Defendant appeals her conviction for possession of a controlled substance. ORS 475.992(1). She contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. The issue is whether the affidavit for the search warrant was sufficient. The material parts of the affidavit, made on May 30, 1986, by an Ashland police detective, are set out in the margin.1
[562]*562Defendant contends that the affidavit does not establish probable cause for issuance of the warrant.2 The state concedes, and we agree, that the information from an informant given to another officer that defendant had been frequenting Ashland Hills Inn and had a reputation there for dealing in cocaine is entitled to no weight, because there is no information about the informant’s basis of knowledge about defendant’s reputation. ORS 133.545(4);3 see Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 414-15, 89 S Ct 584, 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969); State v. Christen/Hankins, 79 Or App 774, 781, 720 P2d 1303 (1986). She argues that information supplied by the affiant’s two confidential reliable informants also lacks facts about their basis of knowledge and that the information is stale. She also asserts that the magistrate drew impermissible [563]*563inferences from information provided by police officers and recited in the affidavit. The state argues that, read in a common sense and realistic manner, the affidavit gave the magistrate probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of cocaine in her residence. Whether a particular affidavit supports the magistrate’s determination of probable cause does not depend on the existence of specific facts or information. Each affidavit must be examined in a common sense, realistic and nontechnical manner. State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 408, 657 P2d 1223 (1983); State v. Mellinger, 52 Or App 21, 25, 627 P2d 897 (1981).
The affidavit was made on May 30, 1986. It recites, after the information that the state concedes cannot be considered, that an FBI agent told the affiant 16 months earlier that “a key suspect” in a narcotics investigation had telephoned defendant’s number from a motel in the same town. Even if it would be reasonable to infer that the suspect actually talked to defendant, without more information there is no basis for any reasonable inference of what the conversation was about. The recitation that another telephone call by that suspect had been made to a business, the owner of which was arrested almost a year later in possession of cocaine in another place, says absolutely nothing about defendant. The inference that, because a suspect made two telephone calls, one of which was to a person who later was found in possession of contraband, there was something illicit about a telephone call to defendant is overdrawn and tenuous and is not reasonable. The same can be said about the discovery in the execution of another search warrant on other premises that defendant was “an associate of its occupants”: it says nothing about the conduct of defendant. Neither of those parts of the affidavit is entitled to any weight.
Most of the rest of the information in the affidavit is hearsay based on the statements of informants who may well satisfy the reliability aspect of the test for judging the propriety of issuing a warrant on the basis of information furnished by unidentified informants. They are said to base their information on first-hand knowledge, but nothing in the affidavit explains the quality or source of that information. The statements lack any detail that would permit an inference that [564]*564they were based on actual observations, rather than on hearsay or speculation. Had the informants known anything specific, such as having seen defendant selling cocaine, having bought some from her or having sold some to her, it is reasonable to infer that they would have said so. They did not, so far as the affidavit discloses.
Under State v. Hall, 79 Or App 597, 720 P2d 376, rev den 301 Or 765 (1986), it is impermissible to issue a warrant on the basis of informants’ statements which are purely “con-clusory and do[es] not explain how [the informant] reached that conclusion.” 79 Or App at 604. There is no difference between the informants’ “personal knowledge” in Hall and the informants’ “first-hand knowledge” in this case. In Hall, we refused to give the information the benefit of an inference that it was information directly obtained, and we cannot make the inference here in the absence of any factual support for it. Moreover, the information furnished by the informants was more than a month old when the affidavit was made. There was nothing available to the magistrate to close the one month gap, and the information was too stale to offer support for a warrant.
On the basis of an unusually large amount of traffic centered on defendant’s residence and the brief duration of each visitor’s stay, two of her neighbors formed a suspicion that defendant “was selling drugs on a continuous basis.” The police determined who were the owners of about 15 of 30 or so of the automobiles and found that four of them had at some unstated time been arrested on narcotics charges and that a fifth was then under investigation for narcotics activity. Two days before the affidavit was made, the neighbors had told the affiant that the amount of traffic had recently increased. Given that the number of cars over a period of 14 days was about 30 and that about a quarter of the owners of those had been found to have some history of involvement with narcotics, there was some basis for an inference about the illicit activity at the house, but the presumed innocence of the people checked and found to have no narcotics background or arrested and not convicted weighs against an inference unfavorable to defendant. Under State v. Urbach, 83 Or App 39, 730 P2d 571 (1986), and in the absence of any evidence that an unusually large number of people entering and quickly leaving a residence is in itself an indication of drug trafficking, [565]*565the magistrate was not entitled to draw an inference against defendant that would amount to probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant.
We hold that the affidavit did not support the issuance of a search warrant. The fruits of the search under the warrant should have been suppressed.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
743 P.2d 738, 87 Or. App. 559, 1987 Ore. App. LEXIS 4704, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-buffington-orctapp-1987.