State v. Buckingham

2025 Ohio 1688

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: 2024CA0095-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Buckingham, 2025-Ohio-1688.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2024CA0095-M

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE DANIEL T. BUCKINGHAM WADSWORTH MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO Appellant CASE No. TRC2302703

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 12, 2025

HENSAL, Judge.

{¶1} Daniel Buckingham appeals an order of the Wadsworth Municipal Court that

denied his motion to suppress. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} On the evening of September 8, 2023, the passenger in a car traveling on Route 94

in Wadsworth called 911 because the car in front of her was swerving across the lanes of travel.

The caller and her boyfriend, who was driving, followed the car for approximately fifteen minutes

while the caller spoke with the 911 operator and provided the vehicle’s license plate. At that point,

the driver of the car turned into a driveway, stopped, and exited the vehicle. A Wadsworth police

officer responded to Mr. Buckingham’s residence. The officer noted that the license plate of a car

in the driveway matched the one that the caller had provided. He also observed that the dash lights

were still illuminated and the engine was still warm. The officer knocked on the front door, and

after a few minutes, Mr. Buckingham answered and stepped from the threshold to the front porch. 2

After he noted several indications that Mr. Buckingham was under the influence of alcohol, the

officer arrested him. Testing conducted after his arrest indicated that Mr. Buckingham had a

breath-alcohol concentration of .204.

{¶3} Mr. Buckingham was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol

and driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration. He filed a motion to suppress based on

the premise that the officer conducted a traffic stop without a reasonable articulable suspicion of

criminal activity. He also argued that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest him. The

trial court noted that “[Mr. Buckingham] was arrested at his home” and “[t]here was no actual

‘traffic stop’ . . . .” The trial court then determined that the officer acted reasonably and concluded

that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Buckingham.

{¶4} Mr. Buckingham pleaded no contest to the charges. The trial court found him guilty

and sentenced him to sixty days in jail, with fifty-seven days suspended; suspended his driver’s

license for one year; fined him $375; and assessed six points to his driver’s license. Mr.

Buckingham appealed the order that denied his motion to suppress, assigning two errors.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THE OFFICERS HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO DETAIN DEFENDANT BASED UPON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY AN IDENTIFIED INFORMANT.

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Buckingham argues that the trial court erred by

determining that the trial court had reasonable and articulable suspicion that justified an

investigatory stop.

{¶6} This Court’s review of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress presents a

mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. The trial court acts as

the trier of fact during a suppression hearing and is best equipped to evaluate the credibility of 3

witnesses and resolve questions of fact. Consequently, this Court accepts a trial court’s findings

of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. . Once this Court has determined that

the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, we consider the trial court’s legal

conclusions de novo. See id. In other words, this Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact

as true and “must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial

court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124

Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist. 1997).

{¶7} “The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures be founded upon

an objective justification, governs all seizures of the person, ‘including seizures that involve only

a brief detention short of traditional arrest.’” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551

(1980), quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Brief investigatory

stops, for example – such as traffic stops – are permitted by the Fourth Amendment “when a law

enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person

stopped of criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014), quoting United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). Nonetheless, not every interaction between police

and citizens involves a “seizure” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Mendenhall at 552,

quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 (1968). “Only when the officer, by means of physical

force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude

that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Id., quoting Terry at 19, fn. 16. See also State v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-

4866, ¶ 14. The determining factor is whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding

the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall

at 554. 4

{¶8} Mr. Buckingham has not challenged the trial court’s findings of fact. With respect

to Mr. Buckingham’s first assignment of error, the trial court found that the officer was dispatched

to respond to a report regarding a vehicle driving erratically. According to the trial court, the

officer did not observe the vehicle in operation but, instead, arrived at Mr. Buckingham’s

residence. The trial court found that after observing the car in the driveway, the officer knocked

on the front door of the residence. Mr. Buckingham answered the door and “voluntarily stepped

outside onto his front porch where he [was] questioned by the police.”

{¶9} The trial court concluded that there was no traffic stop in this case. This Court

agrees. There is no indication in the record that the officer restrained Mr. Buckingham’s liberty

through physical force or a show of authority. As the trial court noted, Mr. Buckingham

“voluntarily” answered the officer’s knock and stepped onto his front porch where he engaged in

conversation with the officer. The officer asked Mr. Buckingham to perform field sobriety tests,

but he refused. Having reached the conclusion that there was no stop, however, the trial court

went on to analyze whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. This was unnecessary

because there was no investigatory stop for purposes of the Fourth Amendment before Mr.

Buckingham was arrested. See Mendenhall at 552, quoting Terry at 19, fn. 16. Mr. Buckingham’s

first assignment of error is overruled on that basis.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST [MR. BUCKINGHAM] BASED UPON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

{¶10} Mr. Buckingham’s second assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress on the basis that his warrantless arrest was not supported by

probable cause. This Court does not agree. 5

{¶11} A police officer may make a warrantless arrest for driving under the influence even

if the offense was not committed in the officer’s presence as long as the officer “has probable cause

to believe that the suspect was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or

drugs.” State v. Buehl, 2000 WL 108877, *3 (9th Dist. Jan. 26, 2000), quoting State v. Henderson,

51 Ohio St.3d 54, 56 (1990). In general, a warrantless arrest in a public place that is based on

probable cause does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jordan, 2021-Ohio-3922, ¶ 28,

quoting State v. Brown, 2007-Ohio-4837, ¶ 66. “[A] person standing in the doorway of a house is

‘in a “public” place,’ and hence subject to arrest without a warrant permitting entry of the home.”

Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 335 (2001), quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42

(1976). The same holds true with respect to a porch adjacent to a doorway. See id. (rejecting the

position that a porch is part of a person’s home for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).

{¶12} The constitutionality of an arrest depends on whether the officers had probable

cause at the moment the arrest was made. Jordan at ¶ 19. “When a warrantless arrest is challenged

on constitutional grounds, the court must determine whether the facts known to the officers at the

time of the arrest would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that an offense has

been committed.’” Id., quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). In determining whether an

officer had probable cause for an arrest, this Court must consider the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the arrest. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-231 (1983). Probable cause in the

context of a warrantless arrest may be established through information provided in a tip. Draper

v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-314 (1959). In that situation, the basis of the informant’s

knowledge and the informant’s reliability are part of the totality of the circumstances. Gates at

233. For example,

if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we have 6

found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary. Adams v. Williams, [407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)]. Conversely, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.

Id. at 233-234. See also Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299-300 (1999) (applying these

principles in the context of determining whether an investigatory stop was supported by reasonable

suspicion).

{¶13} As with Mr. Buckingham’s first assignment of error, his second assignment of error

does not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact. The trial court found that the passenger in

another vehicle called 911 to report that the car in front of her was consistently weaving. The

caller, who provided her name to the dispatcher and testified during the suppression hearing,

described the car’s appearance and provided its make, model, and license plate number. The trial

court found that the caller stayed on the line with the 911 dispatcher and provided

contemporaneous observations of the car’s movements, noting that it almost left the road, nearly

hit a bridge, turned erratically, and swerved into the oncoming lane. The trial court observed that

the caller followed the car for approximately fifteen minutes until the car turned into a residential

driveway and the driver exited the vehicle. As the trial court noted, the caller expressed concern

that other drivers were in danger.

{¶14} With respect to the officer’s observations, the trial court found that the officer

observed that Mr. Buckingham’s car was still warm when he arrived at the residence and that the

dashboard lights were still illuminated. The trial court noted that the officer observed “that when

[Mr. Buckingham] came to the door he was disheveled, had glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,

was swaying back and forth[,] and emitted a strong odor of alcohol.” The trial court found that

Mr. Buckingham told the police that he was the only person home. 7

{¶15} Because Mr. Buckingham was standing outside his house on the front porch, he

was in a public place and a warrantless arrest was appropriate if supported by probable cause. See

McArthur, 531 U.S. at 335. The caller provided her name and a description of the vehicle, and she

described the vehicle’s erratic behavior while following it for approximately fifteen minutes. The

basis of her knowledge was her sustained, contemporaneous observations and, because she was an

“identified citizen informant,” this Court can “ascribe a high degree of reliability to the information

that [she] provided, and it need not be supported by independent observations by [the officer].”

See State v. Dellagnese, 2015-Ohio-4349, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). The officer learned that the vehicle was

registered to Mr. Buckingham and arrived at Mr. Buckingham’s residence only a short time after

the caller saw him turn into the driveway, as demonstrated by the officer’s observation that the

hood of the car was still warm and the dashboard lights were still illuminated. Mr. Buckingham

acknowledged that he was the only person at home, and the officer noted that he “was disheveled,

had glassy, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, was swaying back and forth[,] and emitted a strong

odor of alcohol.”

{¶16} The totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that Mr. Buckingham had been driving under the

influence of alcohol. See Jordan, 2021-Ohio-3922, at ¶ 19, quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 96. The

trial court, therefore, did not err by determining that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr.

Buckingham. His second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶17} Mr. Buckingham’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the

Wadsworth Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. 8

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wadsworth Municipal

Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, P. J. CARR, J. CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

LAWRENCE SPOLJARIC, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

JARED C. ROBERTS, Assistant Director of Law, for Appellee.