State v. Bryce

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. Bryce

422 So. 2d 1069, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21846

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 3, 1982

DocketNo. 82-1043

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 422 So. 2d 1069 (State v. Bryce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Bryce, 422 So. 2d 1069, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21846 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982).

Pincite

Opinion

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

The state appeals from the dismissal of its information for bookmaking, arguing that the lower court erred in finding section 849.25, Florida Statutes (1981), to be unconstitutional. We reverse.

The state charged appellee with violation of the RICO Act, section 943.462, Florida Statutes, and five counts of bookmaking in violation of section 849.25, Florida Statutes. Appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that section 849.25. was unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and ambiguous. The lower court granted the motion, noting that the statute did not define the term “taking or receiving.” Thus, the court found that even if the term distinguished accepting and offering of bets, it was unconstitutional because it established different classes.

We hold this case to be governed by our reasoning and holding in the recent opinion of State v. Tate, 420 So.2d 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We therein hold, in similar circumstances, that section 849.25 does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions and is not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute’s meaning and differ as to its application.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

RYDER, Acting Chief Judge.

The state appeals from the dismissal of its information for bookmaking, arguing that the lower court erred in finding section 849.25, Florida Statutes (1981), to be unconstitutional. We reverse.

The state charged appellee with violation of the RICO Act, section 943.462, Florida Statutes, and five counts of bookmaking in violation of section 849.25, Florida Statutes. Appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that section 849.25. was unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, and ambiguous. The lower court granted the motion, noting that the statute did not define the term “taking or receiving.” Thus, the court found that even if the term distinguished accepting and offering of bets, it was unconstitutional because it established different classes.

We hold this case to be governed by our reasoning and holding in the recent opinion of State v. Tate, 420 So.2d 116 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). We therein hold, in similar circumstances, that section 849.25 does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions and is not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute’s meaning and differ as to its application.

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

422 So. 2d 1069, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21846, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bryce-fladistctapp-1982.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack