State v. Brumfield

482 So. 2d 207, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 5981
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJanuary 30, 1986
DocketNo. KA-3253
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 482 So. 2d 207 (State v. Brumfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Brumfield, 482 So. 2d 207, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 5981 (La. Ct. App. 1986).

Opinion

ARMSTRONG, Judge.

The defendants, Adrianne Brumfield and Michael Favorite, were charged with and convicted of a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:31, relative to the offense of manslaughter. Brumfield was sentenced to serve twenty-one years at hard labor and Favorite was sentenced, as a second offender, to serve forty-two years at hard labor. We reverse.

The record reflects that on February 12, 1984, at approximately 12:00 noon, the victim, Warren Taylor, and his two friends, Lorie Rockett and Susan Barrett, left the Flamingo cafe and proceeded to cross St. Charles Avenue near the middle of the block. While in the cafe the victim had a couple of drinks and left the establishment with a cup of ice.

Immediately prior to crossing the street, Barrett and Rockett noticed a truck approximately one-half block away on St. Charles Avenue proceeding in their di[208]*208rection. Because it appeared to them that there was sufficient time to cross the street before the truck reached them, they did. As the truck drew closer, the driver began honking the horn so Rockett and Barrett quickened their pace. Taylor, however, made no effort to get out of the truck’s way, and when the truck finally reached Taylor, he cursed the driver and threw the cup of ice at the truck.

While Taylor, Rockett and Barrett continued walking to the Burger King parking lot where Barrett’s car was parked, the truck, driven by Favorite and containing Brumfield and their son, made a U-turn on St. Charles Avenue and headed towards the Burger King lot. Once in the lot, Favorite exited his truck and approached Taylor. Favorite and Taylor exchanged words but no physical contact was made. Following a brief argument, Taylor got into Barrett’s car as a passenger, and Barrett began backing out of the parking lot. Favorite walked to his truck, got a container of coffee, returned to Barrett’s car and threw the coffee on the car. Taylor then jumped out of his car and approached Favorite, who in turn backed away from the oncoming Taylor.

Taylor immediately kicked Favorite, knocking the defendant to the ground. Taylor continued kicking Favorite, cutting his eye and preventing him from getting off the ground. Brumfield exited the truck carrying, with both hands, an object which looked like a pipe and began hitting the victim on the back of the head. At this point the fight began to move down St. Charles Avenue and out of view of the Burger King employees and patrons who had been observing the fight. Favorite then stabbed and killed the victim with a knife which was never recovered.

Both defendants testified in their own behalf. Brumfield was not certain where the knife had come from, but Favorite testified that the victim had pulled the knife on him. The defendants admitted that Favorite had stabbed Taylor to death but asserted that their actions had been in self-defense or in the defense of others.

None of the State’s witnesses or the other defense witnesses knew who first had the knife. One of the State’s witnesses, however, testified that she thought Brum-field had handed Favorite something during the course of the struggle. All of the witnesses observing the fight testified that the victim was larger than the defendant and that prior to Brumfield’s involvement the victim was winning the fight. In this latter regard, defense witnesses, both lay and expert, testified that the kicks utilized by the victim resembled those used by individuals trained in the martial arts. The State’s witnesses contradicted the defense on this point.

The victim and all of the State’s witnesses were white, and the defendants and all of their witnesses were black. The jury was composed of both black and white jurors, and the final verdict was 10-2.

On appeal the defense asserts seventeen assignments of error. Because we find reversible error in assignment of error number three, we need not address the remaining assignments of error. We do, however, feel compelled to express our concern over the tenor of the Trial Court’s exchanges with defense counsel and witnesses.1 Considering the trial as a whole, it is clear that the Trial Court came danger[209]*209ously close to abandoning its role as neutral arbiter.2

In their third assignment of error defendants argue that the Trial Court erred in denying them their right to full and complete voir dire as guaranteed by Art. I Section 17 of the Louisiana Constitution, Throughout voir dire by the defense, the Trial Court repeatedly told defense coun-seis that their voir dire was taking too long and that they had to speed up their questioning of prospective jurors.3 More importantly, the Trial Court refused to allow the defense to question jurors as to whether they could apply the law of self-defense fairly even though the victim was white and the defendants black.4

[210]*210“The accused’s right to intelligently exercise cause and peremptory challenges may not be curtailed by the exclusion of non-repetitious voir dire questions which reasonably explore the juror’s potential prejudices, predispositions or misunderstandings relevant to the central issues of the particular case.” State v. Duplessis, 457 So.2d 604, 606 (La.1984). Moreover, the conservation of court time does not alone justify undue restriction of voir dire examination. Duplessis, at 606 n. 4.

Given the particular circumstances of this case, we find that the Trial Court unduly restricted voir dire by the defense. This case hinged in large part on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of the various witnesses. The employees of Burger King that were called as defense witnesses were allegedly eyewitnesses to the fight and, thus, could have presumably been called as witnesses for the prosecution. The fact that the State chose not to call them as witnesses and that all of the defense witnesses were black and all of the prosecution witnesses white, unfortunately thrust the issue of race into the trial. Accordingly, we find that under the circumstances of this case the Trial Court committed reversible error in limiting the voir dire of the defense.

For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences herein are reversed and set aside, and this matter is remanded to the Trial Court for a new trial.

REVERSED, REMANDED.

BARRY, J., joins in the reversal.

BARRY, Judge, joining in the reversal:

The judicial atmosphere precluded any chance of a fair trial.

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Related

State v. Wade
508 So. 2d 114 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
482 So. 2d 207, 1986 La. App. LEXIS 5981, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-brumfield-lactapp-1986.