[148]*148Justice WALLACE, JR.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, the Appellate Division held that defendant’s right to remain silent was not violated when the prosecutor questioned defendant about his pre-arrest silence. Following a violent physical altercation with another man, defendant fled. He was arrested ten months later and charged with assault, robbery, and weapons offenses. At his trial, defendant claimed he was not the aggressor, but merely defended himself when the other man pulled out a knife. The State cross-examined defendant on his pre-arrest conduct in order to challenge defendant’s self-defense testimony. The jury found defendant guilty and the Appellate Division affirmed. We now affirm. We hold that when there is no governmental compulsion involved, the State may fairly cross-examine the defendant concerning pre-arrest conduct or silence to challenge his self-defense testimony. We also conclude that the trial court should give a jury instruction that limits the use of that evidence in assessing a defendant’s credibility. ■
I.
At trial, the State presented evidence to show that on September 12, 2002, defendant, Lawrence Brown, and Paul Russell were playing cards outside of Russell’s apartment. At some point, defendant asked Russell to borrow some money. Russell refused, claiming he did not have any money. In fact, Russell had $130 in his wallet. Defendant did not believe Russell and called him a derogatory name. Russell left for his apartment where he remained for about an hour and then returned to join the group. When defendant asked for a beer, Russell retrieved a bottle of beer from his apartment, gave it to defendant, and sat down on the porch. Defendant again asked to borrow money and expressed disbelief that Russell had none. Russell turned away and was subsequently struck in the face with a beer bottle, causing Russell to fall backwards.
Defendant then slashed Russell three or four times with the broken bottle, severing a portion of his ear. Russell was stunned. [149]*149He heard defendant say “[y]ou made it like this, you make it like this” as defendant reached inside Russell’s pocket, took his money, and fled. Russell had a pocketknife in his possession, but did not use it. Unaware of the extent of his injuries, Russell removed his bloody shirt and attempted to find defendant. When Russell paused to rest, a little girl looked at him and said, “you’re really bleeding.” At that point, Russell returned to his apartment.
By that time, the police had arrived. Officer James Stettner observed Russell’s condition. At first, Russell refused medical attention, and Officer Stettner suggested that he look in a mirror. Russell did so and agreed to go to the hospital. Russell’s detached ear was located and taken to the hospital, but medical personnel were unable to reattach his ear. Russell received over 900 stitches and his face was permanently scarred and disfigured.
At trial, two of Russell’s neighbors testified. Twelve year-old N.B. stated that she heard Russell say “[s]top” and someone else say “[g]ive me money.” N.B. told her mother that someone was doing something to Russell. She and her mother opened the back door and saw a man on top of Russell. N.B. identified defendant as the man she saw on top of Russell. She said that defendant ran away and Russell followed after him. N.B.’s mother testified that when she opened the back door of her apartment, she saw defendant on top of Russell, whose face was bloody. She yelled for defendant to stop and then called the police. Officer Stettner testified that when he arrived at the scene he observed a puddle of blood near the door. He found a piece of Russell’s ear, bloody shards of green glass, a broken beer bottle, and a blood spattered fifty-dollar bill in the area of the assault.
Detective Robert Schmeltzly, one of the investigating officers, testified that he took a statement from Russell on September 25, 2002, and signed a complaint against defendant. He testified that he attempted to locate defendant but “the information on the street was that he went to Ohio.” Defense counsel objected to that comment. At sidebar, the prosecutor argued that defendant would raise self-defense and he wanted to disprove that defense. The [150]*150trial court suggested the prosecutor ask, “[d]id you ever hear from [defendant]? ... did [defendant] ever come in and say, ... I understand you’re looking for me.”.
Before the jury, the following exchange between the prosecutor and Detective Sehmeltzly took place:
Q. Detective ScKmeltzly, did you ever, from September 12th, 2002 until August of 2003, did you ever get contacted by [defendant]?
A. No, I did not, sir.
Q. Did the Phillipsburg Police Department get contacted by [defendant]?
A. No, they did not, sir.
Q. Were any charges filed by [defendant] as a victim during that time?
A. Not that I’m aware of, sir.
Defendant testified in his defense and presented a different set of facts. He stated that he was living in Ohio at the time and was visiting friends on September 12, 2002, when he attended a party in front of Russell’s apartment. At some point, he joined Russell and two other men in a card game in .the backyard. Russell became agitated after losing money in the card game and continued to be upset when defendant refused to lend him money. After they stopped playing cards, Russell approached him with a knife in his hand and grabbed his shirt. Defendant asked Russell what he was doing and Russell threatened him with the knife. Defendant testified that he reacted in self-defense by striking Russell with a beer bottle. He denied removing money from Russell’s person and claimed to have struck Russell only once with a beer bottle.
On cross-examination, defendant admitted that a week after the altercation, he learned that the incident had been reported in the newspaper. The prosecutor asked the following questions:
Q. [L]et’s say someone has hit someone with a bottle and cut someone. Would you say they’d know they’d be charged with aggravated assault or some kind of crime?
A. Yes. If you just walk up to — yes.
Q. So unless you come forward and say, he cut me, he tried to cut me first, Phillipsburg police, unless you do that, didn’t you realize that you would very possibly be charged with aggravated assault by the Phillipsburg police department?
[151]*151Defendant responded that he did not know the extent of any injury or whether Russell would report it or file charges. The prosecutor then engaged defendant in the following exchanges:
Q. You got a brother who is looking for you, right? His brother.
A. Right.
Q. You got it in the papers. Lawrence Brown does something that caused blood. Only a week after the incident, right?'
A. Right.
Q. And what do you do, Mr. Brown? Do you call the Phillipsburg police, say, hold on a minute? Do you do that?
A. No.
Q. Do you call the Phillipsburg police and say, wait a minute, this is not how it is, he tried to stab me? Did you do that?
A. I didn’t know what it said.
Q. Did you ever at any time after September 12th, 2002 call the Phillipsburg police department?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you ever, since September 12th, 2002, sign a complaint?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you at any time since September 12th, 2002 try to contact the prosecutor’s office to explain your side of the story?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you ever at any time, between September 12th, 2002 and August of '03, decide to come into Phillipsburg, either the police station or to the prosecutor’s office or anywhere, and find out if there were any charges against you or anything?
A. No, I did not.
During summation, defense counsel advanced self-defense evidence and criticized the police investigation. He asked the jury to consider why the police did not try to locate defendant sooner to obtain his side of the story. In response, the prosecutor told the jury that Russell’s version was credible, defendant’s version was not, and that the logical thing would have been for defendant to call the police. The prosecutor stated that defendant
knew what he did. [Defendant] knew what he did. He hit the guy with a bottle, slashed him, took his money out and ran. That’s what he did. And a year and a half later files a motion for self defense because the law says you’re allowed to do that and I have to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that’s not self defense. Pm happy to do that. That’s my burden. That’s the law.
[152]*152The jury found defendant guilty of second-degree aggravated assault, third-degree aggravated assault, first-degree robbery, fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of ten years in prison with eighty-five percent to be served without parole.
In an unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. The panel held that because there was no governmental compulsion involved, “defendant’s pre-arrest silence during that ten-month period was properly admitted for impeachment purposes, from which the jury could have inferred that his ‘silence was indicative of prevarication when measured against his testimonial version’ of the incident.” (Citation omitted). The panel also held that the trial court’s failure to give an instruction limiting the use of defendant’s silence to impeachment was not plain error.
We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 187 N.J. 81, 899 A.2d 304 (2006).
II.
Defendant argues that the State’s eliciting of evidence of his silence after the incident to satisfy its burden of disproving self-defense, and the substantive use of his silence, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination. He adds that he was under no obligation to volunteer his exculpatory story to the authorities at the first opportunity, and that the admissibility of pre-arrest silence is unclear after this Court’s decision in State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 868 A.2d 302 (2005). Further, defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to provide the jury sua sponte with a limiting instruction further exacerbated the error.
The State counters that it did not violate defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination because it may lawfully comment on prearrest silence that does not occur at or near the time of arrest. The State argues that State v. Brown, 118 N.J. 595, 573 A.2d 886 (1990) established that pre-arrest silence may be used for im[153]*153peachment purposes if the silence significantly precedes the arrest and no governmental compulsion is involved.
III.
A.
Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal ease to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The police are required to give a person taken into custody Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 719-23 (1966). If defendant exercises the right to remain silent, then the State may not “impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest.” Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2241, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 94 (1976) (footnote omitted). This is so because “every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous.” Id. at 617, 96 S.Ct. at 2244, 49 L.Ed.2d at 97. However, the Court noted that
the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant’s testimony as to his behavior following arrest.
[Id. at 619 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d at 98 (citation omitted).]
We do not have a provision in our State Constitution similar to the Fifth Amendment, but our “privilege against self-incrimination ... is deeply rooted in this State’s common law and codified in both statute and an evidence rule.” Muhammad, supra, 182 N.J. at 567, 868 A.2d 302; see also State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 113-14, 358 A.2d 163 (1976). Both N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and N.J.R.E. 503 provide that “every natural person has a right to refuse to disclose in an action or to a police officer or other official any matter that will incriminate him or expose him to a penalty or a forfeiture of his estate.”
[154]*154Recently, in Muhammad, supra, we held that a defendant’s “silence while in custody, under interrogation, or ‘at or near’ the time of his arrest cannot be used against him in a criminal trial.” 182 N.J. at 558, 868 A.2d 302. In Muhammad, the defendant, who was a police officer, drove M.M. to the police station and reported to the desk sergeant that M.M. “had been harassing his brother and sister.” Id. at 560, 868 A.2d 302. At that point, M.M. called the defendant a liar, accused him of raping her, and produced a condom. Ibid. The defendant sought to leave, but the desk sergeant prevented him from doing so and effectively placed him in custody. Id. at 561, 868 A.2d 302. Thereafter, the defendant remained silent. Id. at 562-63, 868 A.2d 302. At trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony and commented on the “defendant’s silence both ‘at or near’ the time of his arrest and when he was in police custody.” Id. at 573, 868 A.2d 302. The defendant did not testify. Id. at 562, 868 A.2d 302. We reversed his conviction, holding that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s silence which “arises ‘at or near’ the time of arrest, during official interrogation, or while in police custody.” Id. at 569, 868 A.2d 302 (citations omitted). We reasoned that “[b]arring the use of silence ‘at or near’ the time of arrest avoids the often murky inquiry into pinpointing the precise moment a suspect is placed in custody or under arrest.” Ibid.
In the present appeal, we must determine whether that same reasoning pertains to pre-arrest silence that does not involve government compulsion at or near the time of arrest, and in eases in which the defendant testifies at trial.
The United States Supreme Court has approved the admission of such evidence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-38, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127-29, 65 L.Ed.2d 86, 92-95 (1980). In Jenkins, the defendant was arrested for murder two weeks after the death of the victim. Id. at 232, 100 S.Ct. at 2126, 65 L.Ed.2d at 90. At his trial, the defendant testified that he committed the murder in self-defense. Ibid. On cross-examination, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendant’s credibility by questioning why the defen[155]*155dant did not speak out immediately if he had acted in self-defense. Id. at 235, 100 S.Ct. at 2127, 65 L.Ed.2d at 92. Following the defendant’s conviction, the defendant appealed, asserting that his right to remain silent was violated. Id. at 234, 100 S.Ct. at 2127, 65 L.Ed.2d at 92. The Court held that the “Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility.” Id. at 238, 100 S.Ct. at 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d at 94-95. The Court reasoned that because “impeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial,” there is no constitutional violation. Id. at 238, 100 S.Ct. at 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d at 94. Nevertheless, the Court noted that state courts need not follow its decision to allow impeachment through the use of pre-arrest silence and that “[e]ach jurisdiction remains free to formulate evidentiary rules defining the situations in which silence is viewed as more probative then [sic] prejudicial.” Id. at 240, 100 S.Ct. at 2130, 65 L.Ed.2d at 96.
B.
This Court subsequently addressed a similar issue in State v. Brown. In Brown, supra, the defendant, Emm, and co-defendant, Brown, participated in a vehicle race until Brown’s vehicle struck an innocent motorist resulting in a fatal crash. 118 N.J. at 600, 573 A.2d 886. Emm, a voluntary firefighter, then drove to the fire department, reported the accident without explaining his involvement, and returned to the scene to give assistance. Id. at 602-03, 573 A.2d 886. Several days later, Emm related his role in the accident to the police. Id. at 603, 573 A.2d 886. At trial, Emm changed his story and 'testified that he was innocent of any wrongdoing, but blamed Brown for the accident. Id. at 601, 573 A.2d 886. The prosecutor and Brown’s counsel were then permitted to question Emm about his silence at the accident scene, but were prohibited from commenting on his silence in summation. Id. at 609-10, 573 A.2d 886.
[156]*156This Court looked to the codification of the right to remain silent in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19 and Evid. R. 25 (currently N.J.R.E. 503), and found that both describe “ ‘a right to refuse to disclose’ incriminating matter ‘in an action, or to a police officer or other official.’ ” Id. at 612, 573 A.2d 886. The Court found that our law was “in general conformity with Jenkins,” and that “the probative worth of such pre-arrest silence should be considered objectively.” Id. at 613, 573 A.2d 886. The Court concluded that “pre-arrest silence may be admitted for impeachment purposes provided no governmental compulsion is involved.” Ibid. The Court explained that in assessing the admissibility of pre-arrest silence, the trial court must consider all of the surrounding circumstances. Ibid. The Court further noted:
If it can be inferred by the fact-finder that a’reasonable person situated as the defendant, prior to arrest, would naturally have come forward and mentioned his or her involvement in the criminal episode, particularly when this is assessed against the defendant’s apparent exculpatory testimony, then the failure to have done so has sufficient probative worth bearing on defendant’s credibility for purposes of impeachment.
[Id. at 613-14, 573 A.2d 886.]
Based on the surrounding circumstances, the Court found that the probative worth of Emm’s pre-arrest silence, “whether that entailed a consciousness of guilt, a desire not to become involved, a feeling that it was simply unnecessary, or a belief that he had already fulfilled whatever duty he had,” should be left to the jury “in assessing Emm’s credibility.” Id. at 615, 573 A.2d 886.
Prior to Brown, this Court approved the admissibility of prearrest silence to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial in State v. Burt, 59 N.J. 156, 279 A.2d 850 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047, 92 S.Ct. 728, 30 L.Ed.2d 735 (1972). The Court summarily affirmed the defendant’s conviction for the reasons expressed in the Appellate Division decision. Id. at 157, 279 A.2d 850. In the Appellate Division decision, the panel explained that the defendant was arrested for the murder of his friend. State v. Burt, 107 N.J.Super. 390, 391-92, 258 A.2d 711 (App.Div.1969). At trial, the State made no reference to the defendant’s silence in its case-in-chief. Id. at 393, 258 A.2d 711. The defendant testified [157]*157that he had been drinking with the victim, the victim pointed a gun at him, a struggle ensued, and the gun accidentally discharged, striking the victim. Id. at 392, 258 A.2d 711. On cross-examination the State was able to establish that the defendant never told the police that the shooting was accidental. Ibid. The Appellate Division affirmed the defendant’s conviction, declaring that when the defendant testified, he waived his right to remain silent and “thereby subjected himself to cross-examination as to the credibility of his story.” Id. at 393, 258 A.2d 711. The panel found that the testimony was relevant to “the credibility of his courtroom testimony.” Ibid.; see also Deatore, supra, 70 N.J. at 118, 358 A.2d 163 (explaining that Burt was “not a true case of silence in police custody as to an exculpatory story, but rather one of conduct, albeit non-action, after the charged crime inconsistent with defendant’s story at trial”).-
We recognize that other jurisdictions are split on whether the use of pre-arrest silence violates a defendant’s state constitutional rights. See Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 101, 129-30 (2001). Compare Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 409 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1991) (declaring that comment on pre-arrest silence “will not be allowed even where the defendant has not received Miranda warnings and where he takes the stand in his own defense”), with State v. Sorenson, 143 Wis.2d 226, 421 N.W.2d 77, 90 (1988) (noting that comment on pre-Miranda silence is allowed once defendant testifies).
To be sure, Brown and Burt are the established law in New Jersey. Regardless of whether we would agree with those cases that pre-arrest silence may be admitted for impeachment purposes when no governmental compulsion is involved if we were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to follow them under principles of stare decisis. “[E]ven in constitutional eases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, [158]*158419 (2000) (quoting United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856, 116 S.Ct. 1793, 1801, 135 L.Ed.2d 124, 137 (1996)) (internal quotations omitted). In light of the established history of Brown and Burt, we find no such special justification to overrule those cases. We continue to adhere to the view that when a defendant testifies, “pre-arrest silence may be admitted for impeachment purposes provided no governmental compulsion is involved.” Brown, supra, 118 N.J. at 613, 573 A.2d 886.
C.
Defendant has a constitutional right not to testify. The risk of cross-examination is a factor most, if not all, defendants will consider in deciding whether to take the stand. However, once the defendant elects to testify, similar to every other witness, the defendant has an obligation to tell the truth on the witness stand. State v. Burris, 145 N.J. 509, 530, 679 A.2d 121 (1996). When the pre-arrest silence does not involve governmental compulsion, the State may fairly cross-examine defendant concerning his pre-arrest conduct as it bears on his credibility.
In sum, we find no violation of defendant’s right to remain silent when the prosecutor questioned defendant concerning his prearrest silence and then continued that theme in his summation to the jury. In assessing defendant’s self-defense testimony, the jury could infer that a reasonable person in defendant’s position, “prior to arrest, would naturally have come forward and mentioned his or her involvement,” Brown, supra, 118 N.J. at 613, 573 A.2d 886, and therefore, “the failure to have done so has sufficient probative worth bearing on defendant’s credibility for purposes of impeachment.” Id. at 613-14, 573 A.2d 886. On the other hand, the jury could have believed defendant’s version of what happened and that his failure to go to the police prior to his arrest was due to his belief that either he had a right to remain silent, or simply that it was not necessary to do so.
We repeat that when there is no governmental compulsion associated with defendant’s pre-arrest conduct or silence, when [159]*159the defendant testifies at trial, and when the objective circumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have acted differently, the State may attempt to impeach defendant on that pre-arrest conduct or silence. Further, when the circumstances warrant the admission of such evidence, the trial court should instruct the jury that the evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest conduct or silence is admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant’s credibility and that it cannot be used as evidence of defendant’s guilt.1 Thus, with a proper limiting instruction, the jury may determine whether the evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest conduct or silence affects his credibility.
IV.
There remain the questions of the trial court’s failure to give a limiting instruction and the prosecutor’s submission of evidence of defendant’s pre-arrest silence in the State’s main case before defendant testified. We address the latter issue first.
The prosecutor, in questioning Detective Schmeltzly in the State’s case-in-chief, inquired if defendant ever contacted the Phillipsburg Police Department between September 12, 2002, the date of the incident, and August 2003, when he was arrested. Detective Schmeltzly replied that defendant had not contacted the police. Detective Schmeltzly also said he was not aware of any charges defendant filed as a victim during that time.
We are satisfied that it was error to admit that evidence in the State’s case-in-chief. Although defendant had indicated he would [160]*160raise self-defense as a defense, defendant still had the right not to testify. Until defendant offered his evidence of self-defense, it was inappropriate to offer that impeaching evidence. Once defendant testified, however, because the objective circumstances were such that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have acted differently, it was proper for the State to cross-examine him and offer rebuttal testimony to impeach defendant’s pre-arrest conduct or silence. Thus, Detective Schmeltzly’s testimony would have been appropriate as impeachment evidence if it had been offered in rebuttal. Further, the testimony offered by the State in its main case was brief, and the evidence against defendant was substantial. Therefore, we are satisfied that the untimely admission of the impeachment evidence in the State’s case-in-chief was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2.
Lastly, we address the failure to provide an instruction to limit the use of the pre-arrest conduct and silence evidence solely for impeachment purposes. Because defendant raised the failure to provide a limiting instruction for the first time on appeal, we consider it under the plain error rule. R. 2:10-2. We may reverse on the basis of unchallenged error if we find the error was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2.
“Plain error in the context of a jury charge is ‘[l]egal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.’ ” State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564, 874 A.2d 1084 (2005) (citation omitted). We must read the charge “as a whole in determining whether there was” plain error. Ibid.
Considering the charge as a whole, we find no plain error. Defendant testified that he hit Russell on the head with a bottle in self-defense. The prosecutor’s questions concerning defendant’s pre-arrest conduct or silence were intended to impeach defen[161]*161dant’s story and assist the jury in evaluating the credibility of defendant’s self-defense testimony. Consequently, the failure to give a charge that limited the jury’s use of defendant’s pre-arrest conduct or silence to assess defendant’s credibility was not “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2.
V.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.