State v. Brinkley

889 S.E.2d 787, 316 Ga. 689

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: June 21, 2023
• Docket: S23A0507
• Status: Published

Opinion

316 Ga. 689 FINAL COPY

S23A0507. THE STATE v. BRINKLEY.

PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

Demarcus Brinkley is charged with the kidnapping, attempted

rape, and murder of Mariam Khalid Abdulrab. After the police

identified him as a suspect for those crimes, Brinkley fled, leading

officers in a high speed car chase. During the chase, Brinkley

apparently told his mother on the phone that he did not want to pull

over because he did not want to go back to prison.1 The trial court

granted Brinkley’s pretrial motion to exclude this statement under

OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), and the State appealed. See OCGA §

5-7-1 (a) (5). Because the trial court misapplied the Rule 403

standard, we vacate its order and remand for further consideration

under the correct standard.

The trial court granted Brinkley’s motion to suppress in a

written order. Its full analysis was as follows:

1 The precise statement is not clear from the record, but this does not affect our analysis here. It is “universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” The Georgia Supreme Court has often held [that] “any statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of a crime, is admissible against him upon his trial for committing it.” However, in this indictment, the Defendant is not charged with Fleeing or Attempting to Elude and the prosecution failed to make a causal connection between this alleged statement and the present allegations against the defendant. Further, under Rule 403, the Court finds that absent a causal connection between the statement and the SPECIFIC allegations against the defendant, the probative value of the statement is outweighed by both the prejudicial effect and the risk of confusion of issues. Accordingly, the defense’s motion is GRANTED. (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)

“A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence

is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” Martinez-Arias v.

State, 313 Ga. 276, 285 (3) (869 SE2d 501) (2022). A trial court

abuses that discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard. See

State v. Harris, 316 Ga. 272, 277-278 (3) (888 SE2d 50) (2023).

Rule 403 provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by” several dangers,

including “unfair prejudice” and “confusion of the issues[.]” OCGA §

2 24-4-403. As illustrated above, the court’s order did not measure

admissibility by that standard — it said only that the “prejudicial

effect” of the evidence and the risk of confusing the issues

“outweighed” the probative value of the evidence. It did not

determine that the probative value was “substantially” outweighed

by those dangers, or limit its focus on prejudice to only the “unfair”

prejudice, as the Rule requires. Harris, 316 Ga. at 279 (3) (“the

proper standard requires the trial court to determine whether the

probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice”) (cleaned up). The trial court thus

misapplied the Rule 403 standard and therefore abused its

discretion. See id. (vacating and remanding a trial court order

excluding evidence under the same circumstances). Accordingly, we

remand for the trial court to apply the correct standard in the first

instance.

Given that disposition, we also point out one additional error

to ensure that it does not affect the trial court’s determination on

remand. The trial court’s order asserted that the State had not

shown a “causal connection between this alleged statement and the 3 present allegations,” and found it significant that “[Brinkley] is not

charged with Fleeing or Attempting to Elude.” It is not clear whether

the trial court believed all this minimized the statement’s probative

value or increased its prejudicial effect. In any case, we have said

that evidence of flight is generally relevant and supports an

inference of consciousness of guilt of the underlying crime regardless

of whether any flight-related crime is also charged. See Harris v.

State, 313 Ga. 225, 231 (3) (869 SE2d 461) (2022); Rowland v. State,

306 Ga. 59, 65 (3) n.4 (829 SE2d 81) (2019) (“Evidence showing that

a defendant attempted to evade arrest . . . may be admissible as

evidence of flight[,] and statements about flight are generally

admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt.” (emphasis added)).

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

Decided June 21, 2023.

Murder; evidence. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Cox. 4 Fani T. Willis, District Attorney, Michael S. Carlson, Kevin C.

Armstrong, Burke O. Doherty, Juliana Y. Sleeper, Bruce P. Dutcher,

Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.

Stephen R. Scarborough, Richard W. Marks, Stacy S. Levy, for

appellee.