State v. Brink

Ohio Court of Appeals·Decided May 20, 2026·No. 25 CO 0036; 25 CO 0037; 25 CO 0038; 25 CO 0039·Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Brink, 2026-Ohio-1934.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COLUMBIANA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER M. BRINK,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case Nos. 25 CO 0036; 25 CO 0037; 25 CO 0038; 25 CO 0039

Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio Case Nos. 2023 CR 610; 2024 CR 60; 2024 CR 148; 2024 CR 678

BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

JUDGMENT: Affirmed.

Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor, and Atty. Steven V. Yacovone, Assistant Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Atty. R. Aaron Miller, Belmont County Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant

Dated: May 20, 2026 –2–

WAITE, P.J.

{¶1} Appellant Christopher M. Brink pleaded guilty in four separate cases in the

Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas to four charges of aggravated possession

of drugs. He argues on appeal that the trial court failed to fully explain the meaning and

significance of postrelease control, thereby invalidating his guilty pleas. The record

reflects that the court did follow the proper procedure for notifying Appellant about

postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) and 2967.28. Appellant's assignment

of error has no merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} In each of the four cases that have been consolidated in this appeal,

Appellant was charged in the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas with

aggravated possession of drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A). On August 28, 2025, the

court held a change of plea hearing in which Appellant agreed to plead guilty in each of

the four cases. In Case Nos. 23 CR 610 and 24 CR 678 he agreed to plead guilty to third

degree felonies. In Case Nos. 24 CR 148 and 24 CR 60 he agreed to plead guilty to fifth

degree felonies. The court informed Appellant that he could be subject to up to two years

of postrelease control, to be supervised by the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) that could

include a new prison term of up to one-half the prison term originally imposed. (8/28/25

Tr., p. 23.)

{¶3} The sentencing hearing took place on October 8, 2025. The court notified

Appellant at the hearing that he could be subject to up to two years of postrelease control

pursuant to R.C. 2967.28, supervised by the APA, and that a violation could include a

new prison term of up to one-half the prison term originally imposed. (10/8/25 Tr., p. 18.)

Case Nos. 25 CO 0036; 25 CO 0037; 25 CO 0038; 25 CO 0039 –3–

{¶4} The sentencing judgment entries in each of four cases were filed on October

16, 2025. Each entry stated that Appellant was notified of postrelease control as required

by R.C. 2929.19, that he would be subject to up to two years of postrelease control

administered by the APA as set forth in R.C. 2967.68, that a violation would be subject to

the terms of the statute, and that a new prison term could be imposed of up to one-half of

his original sentence. Timely appeals were filed on October 30, 2025.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO PROPERLY ADVISE THE

APPELLANT FULLY OF POST-RELEASE CONTROL.

{¶5} Appellant contends a trial court judge must inform a defendant about

postrelease control prior to accepting a guilty plea, and that the notice about postrelease

control must be included in the sentencing entry. Appellant cites as authority R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c)-(e) and 2967.28. Appellant claims that the failure to properly notify him

about postrelease control renders his plea and conviction void. He argues the trial judge

was required to notify him that a violation of parole would or could result in a sanction of

up to nine months of imprisonment for each violation, but no longer than one-half the

sentence imposed by the trial court. He also argues that the court failed to tell him that if

he commits a new felony while on postrelease control, he risked having additional time

added to his sentence: one-year, or the amount remaining on his postrelease control,

whichever would be greater. Appellant concludes that the effect of these alleged errors

is to entitle him to a new sentencing hearing.

Case Nos. 25 CO 0036; 25 CO 0037; 25 CO 0038; 25 CO 0039 –4–

{¶6} As a preliminary matter, Appellant is incorrect that his alleged error, if

sustained on appeal, means his plea and conviction are void. Any error in imposing

postrelease control renders a judgment voidable rather than void, only allowing the error

to be set aside upon a successful challenge in a direct appeal. State v. Harper, 2020-

Ohio-2913, ¶ 4. Appellant’s citations asserting that his judgment is void due to a

postrelease control notification error have been overruled, and are no longer good law.

{¶7} Appellant did not object to the advisements given by the court regarding

postrelease control. An error regarding postrelease control not objected to during the trial

court proceedings forfeits all error on appeal except for plain error. State v. Frazier, 2024-

Ohio-518, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.); State v. Burgos, 2022-Ohio-3919, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).

{¶8} A trial court is only required to notify a defendant at sentencing of three

aspects of postrelease control: “The trial court must advise the offender at the sentencing

hearing of the term of supervision, whether postrelease control is discretionary or

mandatory, and the consequences of violating postrelease control.” State v. Bates, 2022-

Ohio-475, ¶ 11, citing State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 11. See R.C. 2929.19(B)(2).

In order to comply with the third aspect, a trial court must provide some notice that if the

offender violates postrelease control:

[T]he parole board may impose a prison term, as part of the

sentence, of up to one-half of the definite prison term originally imposed

upon the offender as the offender's stated prison term or up to one-half of

the minimum prison term originally imposed upon the offender as part of the

offender's stated non-life felony indefinite prison term.

Case Nos. 25 CO 0036; 25 CO 0037; 25 CO 0038; 25 CO 0039 –5–

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f).

{¶9} The court must also include a postrelease control notice in the sentencing

entry. The judgment entry of sentencing must include the following:

(1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the

duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect

that the [APA] will administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C.

2967.28 and that any violation by the offender of the conditions of

postrelease control will subject the offender to the consequences set forth

in that statute.

Bates at ¶ 12.

{¶10} Grimes held that the following advisement in the sentencing entry was

sufficient to satisfy the notification requirements of R.C. 2967.28:

The Court further notified the Defendant that “Post Release Control”

is mandatory in this case for three (03) years as well as the consequences

for violating conditions of post release control imposed by Parole Board

under Revised Code § 2967.28. The Defendant is ordered to serve as part

of this sentence any term for violation of that post release control.

(Emphasis deleted.)

Grimes at ¶ 2. A reference to R.C. 2967.28 in the sentencing entry allows the defendant

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Related

State v. Grimes (Slip Opinion)
2017 Ohio 2927 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2017)
State v. Burgos
2022 Ohio 3919 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2022)