State v. Bridges

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-493 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County No. 11 CRS 214643 MARCUS XAIVER BRIDGES

Appeal by the State from order entered 21 August 2012 by

Judge Carl R. Fox in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the

Court of Appeals 23 October 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kathryne E. Hathcock, for the State.

Geeta Kapur and The Law Offices of James D. Williams, Jr., by James D. Williams, Jr., for defendant-appellee.

CALABRIA, Judge.

The State of North Carolina appeals from the trial court’s

order setting aside a jury verdict finding Marcus Xaiver Bridges

(“defendant”) guilty of felony hit and run resulting in serious

injury or death (“felony hit and run”) and dismissing that

charge. We affirm. -2- On 25 June 2011, defendant was driving his mother’s Pontiac

Vibe (“the Vibe”) eastbound on Interstate 40 (“I-40”) in

Raleigh, North Carolina at approximately 65 miles per hour. He

approached Exit 301, at which point I-40 divides into two right

lanes continuing as I-40 East and two left lanes exiting onto I-

440 West. Defendant, who was unfamiliar with the area, was in

one of the left lanes.

Initially, defendant believed he was supposed to continue

on I-40 and veered sharply into one of the right lanes in order

to do so. When he veered, the Vibe entered the lane already

occupied by a Chevrolet Malibu (“the Malibu”). The Vibe came

within close proximity of the Malibu, but the vehicles never

physically touched. Defendant then determined that he actually

wanted to exit to I-440, and he quickly changed lanes to the

left. Meanwhile, the driver of the Malibu lost control of her

vehicle in an attempt to avoid defendant. She swerved to the

right and struck a tree. Seventeen-year-old Morgan McKenzie, a

passenger in the Malibu, died as a result of the crash.

Law enforcement officers investigating the crash were able

to link the Vibe with defendant. Lieutenant Kyle Wescoe (“Lt.

Wescoe”) of the Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”) then went to

defendant’s home. Defendant identified himself to Lt. Wescoe -3- and admitted that he had recently driven to the Triangle Town

Center mall in Raleigh. Lt. Wescoe informed defendant that he

was investigating an automobile accident. Defendant complied

with Lt. Wescoe’s request to come to the RPD for an interview

regarding the accident.

At the station, defendant was interviewed by RPD Officer

Jamie Rigsbee (“Officer Rigsbee”). Defendant told Officer

Rigsbee that he was attempting to travel to Crabtree Valley Mall

via I-40 when he approached the I-40/I-440 split at Exit 301 and

became confused as to which road to take. Defendant admitted

that he went from an I-440 lane to an I-40 lane and then back.

Defendant denied seeing another vehicle in the I-40 lane.

Officer Rigsbee informed defendant that a fatal car crash had

occurred as a result of his driving, and defendant became very

upset and started crying.

Defendant was indicted for felony hit and run and

misdemeanor death by motor vehicle. Beginning 13 August 2012,

defendant was tried by a jury in Wake County Superior Court. At

the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all the

evidence, defendant made a motion to dismiss both charges.

These motions were denied by the trial court. -4- On 20 August 2012, the jury returned verdicts finding

defendant guilty of both charges. After the verdicts, defendant

renewed his motion to dismiss, and on 21 August 2012, the trial

court entered an order setting aside the jury’s verdict and

dismissing the felony hit and run charge. The misdemeanor death

by vehicle conviction remained undisturbed. The State appeals.

The State’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial

court erred by granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge

of felony hit and run. We disagree.

“‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for

the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each

essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense

included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator

of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’” State

v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455

(2000)(quoting State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914,

918 (1993)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164,

169 (1980). “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a

motion to dismiss de novo.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57,

62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). -5- Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a),

The driver of any vehicle who knows or reasonably should know:

(1) That the vehicle which he or she is operating is involved in a crash; and

(2) That the crash has resulted in serious bodily injury, as defined in G.S. 14-32.4, or death to any person;

shall immediately stop his or her vehicle at the scene of the crash. The driver shall remain with the vehicle at the scene of the crash until a law-enforcement officer completes the investigation of the crash or authorizes the driver to leave and the vehicle to be removed, unless remaining at the scene places the driver or others at significant risk of injury.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a) (2013). In the instant case, the

trial court held that the State failed to provide substantial

evidence of defendant’s knowledge that (1) his vehicle was

involved in a crash and (2) the crash resulted in serious bodily

injury or death:

Here there’s no evidence that there was any collision between the vehicles. There’s no evidence that the defendant knew anybody -- that an accident occurred, and there’s absolutely no evidence that the defendant knew that death or physical injury had occurred[.] . . . Consistently, the defendant in this case has denied being -- any knowledge of being involved in an accident. There’s nothing from the -6- circumstances which would lead the Court to believe there is any evidence that he knew or reasonably should have known that this was -- that he was involved in an accident, in the evidence or actual, and that’s specifically why this statute exists, so that the Court doesn't allow a jury verdict to stand where there's no evidence to support it. There’s just no evidence to support that either of these -- either of these elements of this offense, and the Court allows the motion to set aside the jury’s verdict as to the felony hit and run charge, . . . that motion is granted and set aside . . . .

The State concedes that there was no evidence presented at

trial that defendant had actual knowledge of the crash, but

contends that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for

a jury to conclude that defendant reasonably should have known

that he caused an accident and that the accident resulted in

serious injury or death. In support of its contention that it

met its evidentiary burden as to these elements at trial, the

State cites two unpublished cases from this Court. In State v.

Barbour, this Court held that the State presented sufficient

evidence that the defendant should have known that the victim

was injured when he struck her vehicle, which was traveling at

55 miles per hour, and sent it spinning on the highway. ___

N.C. App. ___, 735 S.E.2d 452, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1320, 2012

WL 5859668 (2012)(unpublished). In State v. Williams, this -7- Court held that the evidence presented did not support an

instruction on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor hit

and run because the defendant reasonably should have known that

the victim was injured in the accident. ___ N.C. App. ___, 716

S.E.2d 90, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 1940, 2011 WL 3891983

(2011)(unpublished)(Finding that the following evidence

demonstrated that the defendant reasonably should have known

that the victim was injured: (1) defendant’s vehicle, which was

traveling at 55 miles per hour, rear ended the victim’s vehicle,

which was traveling at 45 miles per hour; (2) both vehicles went

off the road and into a ditch, with the victim’s vehicle

striking a tree; (3) both vehicles suffered extensive damage;

(4) the victim saw the defendant leave the scene with a third

person; and (5) the defendant himself was injured in the

accident.).

However, Barbour and Williams are both distinguishable from

this case because they both involved actual physical contact

between the defendant’s vehicle and the victim’s vehicle. While

contact is not required by our statutes in order for an accident

to have occurred, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(4b) (2013)(A

“crash” is defined as “[a]ny event that results in injury or

property damage attributable directly to the motion of a motor -8- vehicle or its load. The terms collision, accident, and crash

and their cognates are synonymous.”), the contact provides a

substantial basis to conclude that a defendant reasonably should

have known about an accident. Since there was no contact

between the Vibe and the Malibu in the instant case, the

evidence presented by the State at trial must have provided some

alternative basis through which defendant would reasonably have

been made aware of the accident. Additionally, this evidence

would have to demonstrate that defendant was particularly aware

of the severity of the accident such that he reasonably should

have known that it resulted in a severe injury or death. See

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-166(a).

In its brief, the State relies upon eyewitness testimony to

try to establish that there was substantial evidence that

defendant reasonably should have known about the crash of the

Malibu and its severity. The State cites testimony from

multiple individuals who witnessed the crash while traveling

several hundred feet behind it and from an individual in front

of the crash who witnessed the accident in his side-view

mirrors. However, these witnesses were at substantially

different locations from defendant such that the crash was

directly within their respective lines of sight. Their -9- testimony does not provide any information about what

defendant’s vantage point from I-440 would have been at the time

of the crash. The evidence at trial was that I-440, on which

defendant was traveling, immediately curved away from I-40,

where the crash ultimately occurred, after Exit 301. Thus,

witnesses who had either not reached Exit 301 at the time of the

crash or who were still traveling on I-40 after that exit could

not provide substantial evidence that defendant reasonably

should have seen the crash from his location at the time that it

occurred.

Finally, the State contends that defendant should

reasonably have heard the crash based upon the testimony of RPD

Officer John Michael Walls, III (“Officer Walls”). Officer

Walls testified that he “heard what [he] thought was a faint

sound of a vehicle crash” while stopped in traffic on an

overpass approximately one-eighth of a mile from Exit 301.

However, just as the eyewitness crash testimony did not provide

evidence of what defendant reasonably could have seen from his

location, the fact that Officer Walls could faintly hear a crash

from his precise location does not shed any light on what

defendant reasonably could have heard from his location at the

time of the crash. Thus, Officer Walls’s testimony does not -10- provide substantial evidence that defendant reasonably should

have known that he was involved in a crash.

Ultimately, the State did not present substantial evidence

that defendant reasonably should have known that he was involved

in an accident which resulted in a serious injury or death.

There was no evidence that defendant could have reasonably felt,

seen, heard, or otherwise been made aware of either the crash or

its severity based upon his location when the crash occurred.

Accordingly, the trial court properly set aside the jury’s

verdict and dismissed the felony hit and run charge. The trial

court’s order is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and HUNTER, Jr., Robert N. concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).