State v. Briddell

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-750
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Judge Julee Flood

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-750

Filed 18 February 2026

Mecklenburg County, No. 20CR213169-590

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

LAREE BRIDDELL, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 10 December 2024 by Judge David

Strickland in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29

January 2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Cannon E. Lane, for the State.

Drew Nelson, for defendant-appellant.

FLOOD, Judge.

Defendant Laree Briddell appeals from her convictions following a jury trial

for one count of intentional child abuse causing serious physical injury and one count

of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. On appeal, Defendant

argues the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements under Rule 803(4) of

the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. After careful review, we hold the trial court STATE V. BRIDDELL

Opinion of the Court

erred in admitting the hearsay statements; however, Defendant has failed to show

that this error was prejudicial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Following an altercation between Defendant and her son, Kamren Walker,

Defendant was charged with one count of intentional child abuse causing serious

physical injury and one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious

injury. Evidence at Defendant’s trial tended to show that, on 15 April 2020,

Defendant, Defendant’s daughter, and Kamren, who was thirteen years old at the

time, went to their Aunt April Briddell’s house to help clean up her yard after a storm.

April’s children, Kamren’s cousins, were present as well. At some point during the

cleanup, an argument broke out between Kamren, his sister, and his cousins after a

tree branch fell on one of the cousins.

Though there are conflicting accounts of precisely what followed, April testified

at trial that, as the argument between the children escalated, she and Defendant

followed Kamren into the front yard. Kamren appeared “real agitated” about the

situation, and he became more upset when Defendant appeared to be “getting on

him[,]” but not his sister, for his role in the argument. Defendant then began raising

her voice at Kamren, “saying things to him that she shouldn’t be saying, calling him

names.” After seeing how agitated Kamren was, April tried to calm him down by

giving him her cellphone and telling “him [to] walk up the street to the stop sign[.]”

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April testified that, as Kamren was walking up the street, she saw Defendant

go into the house and return with April’s car keys and a pair of kitchen scissors. April

then watched Defendant get into April’s car and drive up the street towards Kamren.

Once Defendant reached Kamren at the end of the street, April, who was still in the

front yard, “couldn’t see exactly what [Defendant] was doing but [saw Defendant and

Kamren] going back and forth.” April could see Defendant “asking for the phone --

the phone that she gave him. I guess that was [Kamren’s] cellphone. And he threw it

to her. And that’s when it happened.” April could not tell “if [Defendant] swung first

but [saw Kamren] swing.” April then saw Defendant “do something to [Kamren] but

[] couldn’t tell exactly what happened.” April could not see whether anything was in

Defendant’s hand at the time of the altercation. April then saw Kamren’s “face cut

open,” and walked up the street to examine his injuries. Upon seeing the gash on

Kamren’s face, April called 911.

When police arrived at the scene, they observed a blood trail and found scissors

located on the floorboard of April’s car parked by the stop sign. After investigating

the incident, an officer placed Defendant under arrest and transported her to the

Mecklenburg County Jail. Kamren was transported to the hospital by ambulance. At

the hospital, Kamren was treated by emergency room physician Dr. Jessica Salzman.

While examining Kamren, Dr. Salzman noted a “large laceration” to Kamren’s

face. At trial, Dr. Salzman testified that, when she had asked Kamren what

happened, Kamren stated “that he had been arguing with his sister and that his mom

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attacked him with scissors.” Defendant objected to this testimony, but the trial court

overruled her, reasoning the testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 803(4) of the

North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Dr. Salzman created an emergency room report

(the “ER Report”) after examining Kamren, and this report was also admitted into

evidence over Defendant’s objection. The ER Report listed Kamren’s “Chief

Complaint” as “Pt1 with very larg [sic] and deep laceration to right cheek, did not go

through. Pt with multiple stab wounds and scratch marks to torso and back area.”

The ER Report’s “History of Present Illness” section documented that Kamren,

presents for laceration to cheek after assaulted with by mother with scissors. History is obtained from the patient and EMS. EMS report that the patient was assaulted by his mother with scissors, wound was oozing small amounts of blood since then, never any pulsatile bleeding. Denies any injury anywhere else. According to the patient, he was in a verbal disagreement with his sister earlier. His mom was apparently very angry about this and attacked him with scissors. He complains only of pain in his right cheek. He denies pain anywhere else. Reports he did not hit his head, was not struck in the head or fell, did not lose consciousness. No neck pain, numbness or weakness or paresthesia[].

(emphasis added). Dr. Salzman explained she decided to consult with the plastic

surgery team regarding Kamren’s injury, as the course of treatment.

1 In the context of the ER Report for Kamren, which references the “patient” multiple times,

we assess “Pt” to mean “patient.” See State v. Scott, 921 S.E.2d 209, 212 n.4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025) (“Pt means patient[.]”).

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Kamren, who was eighteen at the time of the trial, testified on behalf of

Defendant. Kamren testified that he, his sister, and his cousins were in April’s

backyard when an argument broke out. He explained that he became upset, and April

and Defendant attempted to calm him down, but he “wasn’t listening” and “was just

yelling and going on.” Kamren then turned his Air Pods “all the way up”; when

Defendant reached for the Air Pods, he punched her. Kamren then walked away from

the house towards the end of the street. By Kamren’s account, Defendant approached

him, and he hit Defendant again. Kamren could not recount precisely how his injuries

occurred, but when defense counsel asked him, “in your opinion, did your mother

purposely stab you in the face on April 15, 2020?” Kamren replied, “No, I don’t think

it was for a malicious intent. I don’t think she meant to do it.” Kamren explained that

he only realized his face was cut when he touched his face and saw blood.

At the close of trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of one count of felony child

abuse and one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.

Following the guilty verdicts, on 10 December 2024, the trial court sentenced

Defendant to 44 to 65 months of imprisonment. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal

in open court.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S.

§§ 7A-27 and 15A-1444 (2023).

III. Standard of Review

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“This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence over a

party’s hearsay objection de novo.” State v. Joyner, 284 N.C. App. 681, 690 (2022)

(citations omitted). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and

freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams,

362 N.C. 628, 632–33 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

An “evidentiary error does not necessitate a new trial unless the erroneous

admission was prejudicial.” State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 415 (2009). “A defendant

is prejudiced by evidentiary error when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the

error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at

the trial[.]” Id. (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (2007)). “The burden of showing . . .

prejudice under [N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a)] is upon the defendant.” Id. (citing State v.

Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 339–40 (1983)).

IV. Analysis

On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Salzman’s

testimony regarding Kamren’s identification of Defendant as his attacker, as well as

the ER Report, which includes Kamren’s identification of the person who caused his

injury. Specifically, Defendant argues that these statements constituted inadmissible

hearsay not subject to an exception, and requests this Court vacate her conviction.

For the reasons stated below, although we agree the testimony and ER report

constituted inadmissible hearsay not subject to an exception, Defendant has not

shown that, but for the admission, a different result would likely have been reached

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by the jury.

Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (2023). “Generally, hearsay is inadmissible at trial

unless an exception to Rule 801(c) applies.” Joyner, 284 N.C. App. at 690 (citation

omitted).

One such exception to the hearsay bar is “Statements for Purposes of Medical

Diagnosis or Treatment,” found in Rule 803(4) of the North Carolina Rules of

Evidence. N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4) (2023). Rule 803(4) allows for the admission

of “[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing

medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or

general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably

pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Id. This exception “is based on the rationale that

statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment are inherently

trustworthy and reliable because of the patient’s strong motivation to be truthful.”

State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 284 (2000).

To ensure the reliability of such statements, our Supreme Court has

established a two-part test as a prerequisite for admissibility under Rule 803(4):

First, the trial court must determine that the declarant intended to make the statements at issue in order to obtain medical diagnosis or treatment. The trial court may consider all objective circumstances of record in determining whether the declarant possessed the requisite

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intent. Second, the trial court must determine that the declarant’s statements were reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment.

Id. at 289. In other words, if a statement is not pertinent to the declarant’s medical

diagnosis or treatment, it no longer falls under the exception and reverts to being

inadmissible hearsay.

Our Supreme Court has held that, “[g]enerally, under Rule 803(4), . . .

statements as to an assailant’s identity are seldom pertinent to diagnosis and do not

ordinarily promote effective treatment”; thus, “such statements are[, ordinarily,] not

properly covered by the Rule 803(4) exception to the hearsay rule.” State v. Aguallo,

318 N.C. 590, 596–97 (1986). “If a declarant identifies the perpetrator while under

the impression that he is being asked to indicate the responsible party, the

identification may be accusatory in nature and thus would destroy any inherent

reliability.” State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 85 (1985) (citing United States v. Narciso,

446 F. Supp. 252, 289 (E.D. Mich. 1977)). “If, however, the motivation for such

statement was to disclose information to aid in medical diagnosis or treatment, the

trustworthiness remains intact.” Id.

Although North Carolina courts have not directly addressed whether the

statements of a child abuse victim to a physician identifying his or her assailant are

reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment, our Supreme Court has held

that, “in the context of a child sexual abuse or child rape, a victim’s statements to a

physician as to an assailant’s identity are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.”

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Aguallo, 318 N.C. at 597 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Renville, 779 F. 2d

430 (8th Cir. 1985)). This is because (1) “a proper diagnosis of a child’s psychological

problems resulting from sexual abuse or rape will often depend on the identity of the

abuser,” and (2) “information that a child sexual abuser is a member of the patient’s

household is reasonably pertinent to a course of treatment that includes removing

the child from the home.” Id. at 597.

Here, Defendant does not dispute that Kamren’s statement was made for the

purpose of obtaining medical treatment; thus, the first prong of the Hinnant test is

satisfied. Defendant argues, however, that Kamren’s statement to Dr. Salzman

identifying Defendant as the source of his injury was not reasonably pertinent to

medical diagnosis, thereby failing the second prong of the Hinnant test.

To support her proposition, Defendant distinguishes Aguallo from the present

case. In Aguallo, the child victim “was brought in . . . as an alleged sexual abuse case.”

318 N.C. at 593. Due to the nature of the allegations, the treating physician explained

that it was “part of [her] set routine” to speak with alleged child victims prior to her

examination. Id. at 594. The physician testified that, during her conversation with

the child, the child indicated that her stepfather had “put his hot dog up inside of

her[.]” Id. The Aguallo defendant argued that the child victim’s statements were

“hearsay and not otherwise admissible under the [] Rule 803(4)[] exception applicable

to statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment.” Id. at 593.

The Aguallo Court disagreed and held that the child victim’s statements identifying

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her stepfather as the one who raped her were pertinent to her medical treatment

because the nature of the problem suggested a need for “continued treatment of the

possible psychological and emotional problems resulting from the rape.” Id. at 597.

Here, Defendant argues the Aguallo exception does not apply in this case

because “nothing in the record demonstrates that there was a psychological aspect to

Kamren’s treatment,” and because “removal of Kamren from the household was not

part of his treatment.” We agree with Defendant that Aguallo is distinguishable from

the present case. Unlike the child victim in Aguallo, Kamren was taken to the

hospital as a potential assault victim, not a potential sexual abuse victim. Moreover,

Kamren’s statement did not indicate that he suffered, or would suffer, from

psychological or emotional problems as a result of the attack. Rather, Kamren’s

statement indicated that the cause of his injury was an attack by scissors. Dr.

Salzman testified that she decided to consult with the plastic surgery team for

Kamren’s course of treatment because, “[t]he deep laceration that we saw, we felt like

there was enough of a concern for injuries, again, to the parotid gland or possible

nerve injuries that this was something we wanted to get our plastic surgery team

involved.” Thus, as her own testimony indicates, Dr. Salzman’s diagnosis was based

on Kamren’s statement that he was attacked with scissors, as well as “[t]he deep

laceration [Dr. Salzman] saw,” but not on Kamren’s statement identifying Defendant

as his assailant.

Further, Dr. Salzman’s ER Report listed Kamren’s possible diagnoses as

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“[c]heek laceration, parotid gland herniation, parotid duct laceration, marginal

mandibular nerve laceration, head trauma.” Dr. Salzman explained at trial that these

initial diagnoses were based on a preliminary examination of the patient and were

used to assist in determining further treatment options. Dr. Salzman explained that

it was these observations that led her to consult the plastic surgery department for

potential surgical intervention. Because Dr. Salzman made the decision to consult

plastic surgery based on the physical nature of Kamren’s injuries, it follows that the

course of treatment would have been the same, regardless of whether Kamren

identified Defendant as the source of his injury. Consequently, Kamren’s

identification of Defendant as his attacker was not pertinent to his medical diagnosis

or treatment. See Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 286 (“The veracity of the declarant’s

statements to the physician is less certain where the statements need not have been

made for purposes of promoting treatment or facilitating diagnosis in preparation for

treatment.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

Ultimately, Kamren’s identification of Defendant as the person who caused the

laceration on his face does not describe his “medical history, or past or present

symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or

external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.”

See N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(4). As such, we agree with Defendant that the portion

of Kamren’s statement identifying Defendant as his assailant was not pertinent to

medical diagnosis or treatment, thereby failing the second prong of the Hinnant test.

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The trial court, therefore, erred in admitting Kamren’s statement under Rule 803(4).

Although we conclude the trial court erred in admitting Kamren’s statement,

a new trial is not required because Defendant has failed to show that she was

prejudiced by this error.

Here, assuming Kamren’s statement to Dr. Salzman identifying Defendant as

his assailant had not been admitted into evidence, Kamren identified Defendant as

his assailant when he testified at trial that he “[didn]’t think [Defendant] meant to

do it.” Without Kamren’s statement to Dr. Salzman, therefore, Defendant’s identity

as the attacker would nevertheless have been revealed by Kamren’s own testimony.

Consequently, Defendant has failed to show there is a reasonable probability that a

different result would have been reached but for the erroneous admission of Kamren’s

statement. See Wilkerson, 363 N.C. at 415.

V. Conclusion

After careful review, we hold that, although the trial court erred in admitting

Kamren’s statement to Dr. Salzman under Rule 803(4) of the North Carolina Rules

of Evidence, Defendant has not shown that a different result likely would have been

reached but for this error. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and deny

her request to vacate and remand to the trial court.

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Judges COLLINS and MURRY concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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