State v. Bray

35 N.C. 289
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided June 15, 1852·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

Ruffin, J.

The Court considers the first instruction right. The offence consists in the second marriage, and therefore it must be truly laid, in respect of the place, and the indictment must be in the same county. The first marriage must, indeed, be set forth; because the second marriage is criminal, by reason only, that the first wife was living. But, if she was living, the crime is complete, without regard to the place where the first marriage was had. Therefore, although time and placeare, according to the precedents, usually annexed to every fact alleged in an indictment, yet, in this instance, neither is material, and the one need not be proved, as laid, more than the other; but it is sufficient to show, that, at some time before the alleged second marriage, there was at some place the alleged first marriage.

The second point depends upon the meaning to be given to the marriage act, Rev. St. c. 71. It enacts that all regular ministers of the Gospel, of every denomination, having the cure of souls, shall be authorized to solemnize the rites of matrimony, according to the rites and ceremonies of their respective churches, and agreeably to the rules in the act prescribed. It then prescribes that marriage shall be by license, or by publication of bans by any minister of the Gospel, qualified as in the act before prescribed. It was not directly stated, by the witness in this case, that he was such a minister as had power, according to the rules of his church, to join in wedlock, nor in what grade of the ministry of that church he was. He called himself a ‘(licensed preacher,” and then “a regular minister,” and said he occasionally preached in Methodist churches, but had not the charge of any church or congregation in particular; and he did not set forth that he had ever performed any other ministerial act besides that of preaching, or had the authority of the church to do so» It seems to the Court, it did not sufficiently appear, that the-[292] witness was qualified to marry persons, by being a regular minister of the Gospel of the Methodist denomination, having the cure of souls. It is not supposed by the Court, that the cure of souls, as used in the act, implies a necessity, that the minister should be the incumbent of a church living, or the pastor of any congregation, or congregations in particular. But those terms import, that the person is to be something more than a minister or preacher merely ; and that he has faculty, according to the constitution of his church, to celebrate matrimony, and to some extent, at least, has the power to administer the Christian sacraments, as acknowledged and held by his church. We know not how less force can be allowed to those terms, if any meaning is to be given to them; and a comparison of those terms, with those read in the previous statutes, and with the state of the common law, on this subject, shows it to be, probably, the true meaning of them.

By the marriage act of 1741, Davis’ Rev. 56, the rites of matrimony might be celebrated by ‘‘every clergyman of the Church of England,” and for want of such, by any lawful magistrate within this government, by license or “ by the publication of bans as prescribed in the Rubrick in the book of Common Prayerthe magistrate, however, not to marry, under a penalty, “in any parish where a minister shall reside and have a cure,” without permission from such minister, and the minister having the cure of any parish,” and not refusing to perform the ceremony, to have the fees for marriages, in the parish, by any other person. In an act in 1765, for establishing an orthodox clergy, provision of a salary and also of fees, including fees for marrying by license or bans, was made for “ every minister prepared to or received into any parish, as incumbent thereof,” but any clergyman presented to a parochial living” was for crime or immorality made subject to suspension by the Governor from “serving the cure of such parish, whereof he was [293] incumbent,” and from the salary, until the Bishop of London should resl ore him, or by sentence deprive him. Davis’ Rev. 338. By an act of 1766, to amend the marriage act of 1741,. it was recited, that the “Presbyterian, or Dissenting Clergy,” conceiving themselves not to be included in the restriction in that act, in respect to license, or bans, had joined persons in matrimony without either license or publication, whereby the payment of the fees had been eluded, and the validity of marriages endangered: and thereupon it was declared, that, the previous marriages by any of the Dissenting, or Presbyterian Clergy, in their accustomed manner,, should be as effectual as if performed by any minister of the Church of England; and also enacted, that after the 1st of January 1767, it should be lawful for any “Presbyterian minister, regularly called to- any Congregation in the Province, to celebrate the rites of matrimony between persons in their usual accustomed manner,” under the same rules as any magistrate might celebrate them, by license or bans, with a proviso, that the minister o.f the Church, of England, serving the cure of the parish, “ should have the fees, if he did not refuse to do the service thereof” Davis’ Rev. 350 Next came the act of 1778, which recited, that, it is absolutely necessary, that rules should be observed concerning the celebrating the rites of matrimony, and then enacted in the words, re-enacted in 1836, and already quoted from the Revised Statutes, with a proviso, “ that the People, called Quakers, shall still retain their former rules and privileges in solemnizing the rites of matrimony in their own Church It is thus seen, that at the first the Clergy of the established Church, only, could celebrate matrimony. But the power was not confined to an)r portion of them. It was vested in “ every Clergyman of the Church of England,” though the fee belonged to “ the minister serving the cure of the parish,’’ or “ the incumbent of the parish,” as he is indifferently called in the several parts of the Statutes. That [294] church was then established here by law, and therefore it is judicially known, that each of the three orders of its ministry was conferred by ordination, and that one in the lowest of them, that oí deacon, could be the rector of a parish, and celebrate the rites of matrimony, according to the Rubrick of the church, and, therefore, according to the provincial Statutes. Each of them had, by ordination, the faculty of baptism and the cure of souls and was a clergyman, though not presented to a parochial living,” or, not “ serving the cure of any parish,” or, not “having the cure of a parish,” or not being “ the incumbent of a parish,” that is, in possession of a benefice or church preferment. The acts clearly recognize in that church the distinction between the cure oí souls, and the cure of a parish; for the authority to perform the ceremony belonged to every Clergyman, whether Bishop. Priest, or Deacon. When extended to the Presbyterian ministers, it was conferred, not on all, but on those “ regularly called to congregation,” that is, called according to the rules ot that church ; and they were to celebrate the rites, “ in their usual, and accustomed manner,” that is, according to the power and authority to perform the office; and of the actual settlement of the minister as pastor of some congregation. It did not prevent the celebration by any dissenting ministers, as they were called by the church of England, but the Presbyterians. At that time there were but few others here; and the society, now denominated the Methodist Church, was hardly known here, and the small body then existing had not, either in England, or this county,

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State v. Bray, 35 N.C. 289 (N.C. 1852).

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