State v. Braxton

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: April 14, 2025
• Docket: 1802005743
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 1802005743 ) KIARYE BRAXTON, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: April 7, 2025 Decided: April 14, 2025

Upon Defendant’s Motion and Amended Motion for Correction of Illegal Sentence DENIED.

ORDER

Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Chief of Appeals, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State.

Kiayre Braxton, Smyrna, DE, pro se.

WHARTON, J. This 14th day of April 2025, upon consideration of Defendant Kiayre

Braxton’s (“Braxton”) pro se Motion 1 (“Motion”) and Amended Motion for

Correction of Illegal Sentence2 (“Amended Motion”) and the record in this matter,

it appears to the Court that:

1. Braxton pled guilty on February 11, 2019 to five charges – conspiracy

to commit racketeering, drug dealing in heroin, and three counts of possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) involving three different

handguns. The plea agreement contemplated an agreed upon sentence of 49.5 years

at level 5, suspended after 26.5 years at level 5 for 23 years at level 4, suspended

after 6 months at level 4 for 2 years at level 3 probation. All 26.5 years at level 5,

including 12.5 years as a habitual offender on one of the PFDCF charges represent

minimum mandatory sentences. The Court imposed the agreed upon recommended

sentences the same day. Braxton did not appeal his convictions and sentences.

2. Braxton filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior

Court Criminal Rule 61 pro se on February 10, 2020,3 accompanied by a motion for

appointment of counsel. 4 The Court granted the request for appointment of counsel

1 D.I. 64. 2 D.I. 65. 2 D..I. 45. 3 D.I. 45C. 4 D.I. 52.

2 on February 14, 2020.5 Postconviction counsel moved to withdraw after she

reviewed the record and the applicable law, and concluded that none of Braxton’s

postconviction claims “have enough merit to be ethically advocated, and that there

are no other potential meritorious grounds for relief that can be raised on behalf of

Mr. Braxton.”6 Braxton did not submit any points he wished the Court to consider.

The Court denied the motion on September 28, 2021.7 Braxton did not appeal.

3. Now, Braxton moves for correction of an illegal sentence. The Motion

sets out the grounds for relief, while the Amended Motion supplements the Motion

with his Plea Agreement and Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Forms, attached to the

Amended Motion as Exhibits “A” and “B” respectively.8 Braxton contends that the

Court “erred in unilaterally determining: (i) Braxton’s eligibility for an habitual

offender enhancement under Section 4214(b) on one PFDCF offense; and (ii)

Braxton’s eligibility for enhanced minimum mandatory sentencing under 1447A(c)

on the other two PFDCF offenses.”9 Citing Erlinger v. United States,10 he argues that

any fact that increases his exposure to enhanced punishment must be submitted to a

jury and found unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt.11

6 D.I. 58. 7 State v. Braxton, 2021 WL 4462593 (Del. Super. Ct. Sep. 28, 2021). 8 D.I. 65. 9 D.I. 64 at ⁋ 6. 10 602 U.S. 821 (2024). 11 D.I. 64 at ⁋ 6. 3 4. Pursuant to Criminal Rule 35(a), the Court may correct an illegal

sentence at any time. 12 A sentence is illegal if it violates double jeopardy, is

ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is

internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain

as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence that the judgment of conviction

did not authorize. 13 The Court may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner

within the time provided for the reduction of sentence which is 90 days of the

imposition of sentence. 14

5. Here, the Court need not determine whether the motion more properly

is one to correct an illegal sentence, and thus cognizable, or a time barred motion to

correct a sentence illegally imposed. The Court need only consult the Plea

Agreement, the Immediate Sentencing Form, and the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty

Plea Form, all of which were signed by Braxton, to determine he is not entitled to

relief under either interpretation of the motion. Braxton pled guilty to three counts

of PFDCF, Counts 62, 63, and 64. The Plea Agreement reads:

The STATE AND DEFENDANT AGREE to recommend:

…Count 62: 5 Years at level 5 (min/mand), pursuant to 11 Del. C. Sec 1447A(c), with no probation to follow.

Count 63: 5 Years at Level 5 (min/mand), pursuant to 11 Del. C. Sec. 1447A(c), with no probation to follow.

12 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a). 13 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 14 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a) and (b). 4 Count 64 12.5 Years at Level 5 (min/mand), pursuant to 11 Del. C. Sec. 4214(b). 15

Braxton also agreed in the Plea Agreement agrees he “is a Habitual Offender and

therefore subject to sentencing pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) due to the following

prior convictions: Escape After Conviction, 2010 (formerly a violent felony),

Possession within 1000 Feet of a School, 2008 (formerly a violent felony), and Poss.

With Intent to Deliver, 2009 (a Title 16 violent felony under 11 Del. C. Sec.

4201(c)).16 He acknowledged those three convictions in the Immediate Sentencing

Form he signed just below a statement reading, “Any false statements made on this

paper are punishable under 11 Del. C. § 1233.”17 Similarly, the Truth-in-Sentencing

Guilty Plea Form specifies five year minimum mandatory sentences for two of the

PFDCF charges and 12.5 years for the other. 18

6. Sec. 1447A(c) provides for an enhanced five year minimum mandatory

sentence instead of the standard three years for defendants “who [have] been at least

twice convicted of a felony in this State or elsewhere.” 19 Sec. 4214(b) states:,

Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State…, and who thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony, which is the person’s first Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title shall

15 D.I. 42. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 11 Del. C. § 1447C(c). 5 receive a minimum sentence of ½ of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title… 20

Just as Braxton waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt when he entered his guilty plea, so too did he waive his right to

have a jury determine the enhancements for two of the PFDCF charges and his status

as a habitual offender for the third. He admitted to all of the facts a jury would need

to find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt for the enhancements to apply.

Accordingly, Erlinger and its predecessors provide no relief to Braxton.

THEREFORE, Braxton’s Motion and Amended Motion for Correction of

Illegal Sentence are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.

20 11 Del. C. § 4214(b). 6