State v. Brant
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HURON COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. H-15-013 Appellee Trial Court No. CRI-2015-0017 v. James D. Brant, Jr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT Appellant Decided: August 5, 2016
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Daivia S. Kasper, Huron County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Sean P. Martin, for appellant.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, James D. Brant, Jr., appeals the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas, ordering him to pay $27,060.92 in restitution without first conducting an evidentiary hearing under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1).
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On January 9, 2015, appellant was indicted on 22 counts in the Huron County Court of Common Pleas. The indictment included eight counts of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), felonies of the second degree, seven counts of breaking and entering in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A), felonies of the fifth degree, three counts of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(2), felonies of the fifth degree, and one count of theft of a firearm in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(4), a felony of the third degree.
{¶ 3} Appellant entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of burglary, one count of breaking and entering, one count of theft, and one count of theft of a firearm. The state dismissed the remaining 18 counts. As part of the plea agreement, the parties entered a joint recommendation for a total prison sentence of 13 years and payment of restitution to the victims; restitution was to be paid on all 22 counts.
{¶ 4} On March 24, 2015, the court accepted the plea agreement and the joint recommendation for sentencing. During the plea colloquy, the court informed appellant that restitution would be ordered on all 22 counts and not just the counts to which he pled guilty. At the sentencing hearing on March 31, 2015, the court ordered total restitution to be paid in the amount of $27,060.92. This amount was based on a report prepared by the state through Victim-Witness Services which included victim impact statements, insurance information, and receipts. However, the report given to appellant’s counsel at sentencing showed a lower amount, totaling $22,255.19. The court informed appellant’s counsel that the total amount of restitution was amended because information was submitted after the preparation of the initial report. The amount of $27,060.92—the amount used at sentencing—reflected the amount of restitution due to victim seven, which was missing from the initial report. Appellant’s trial counsel stated that it was his understanding that the amount to be paid in restitution was the lower figure. Nevertheless, appellant did not object to the order of restitution or to the amount of total restitution.
{¶ 5} This appeal followed. Appellant’s brief challenges the order of restitution in the amount of $27,060.92. Appellant contends that, because there were two different amounts of restitution discussed, the total amount was in dispute. Therefore, appellant argues, the court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the proper amount of restitution.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} Appellant has appealed the order of restitution and has asserted one assignment of error for our review:
I. The trial court erred by ordering restitution without conducting a hearing on the disputed amount as required by R.C. 2929.18(A)(1).
III. Standard of Review
{¶ 7} We review felony sentences pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). See State v.
Tammerine, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1081, 2014-Ohio-425, ¶ 16. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
allows an appellate court to increase, reduce, or modify a sentence if it finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 8} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) does not apply here. Therefore, we will consider whether the sentence is contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).
IV. Analysis
{¶ 9} R.C. 2929.18 sets forth financial sanctions available to a trial court for sentencing, and is the relevant statute in determining whether, in this case, the order of restitution was contrary to law.
{¶ 10} R.C. 2929.18(A) provides, in relevant part:
Financial sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to this section include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s crime or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss. If the court imposes restitution, the court shall order that the restitution be made to the victim in open court, to the adult probation department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, to the clerk of courts, or to another agency designated by the court. If the court imposes restitution, at sentencing, the court shall determine the amount of restitution to be made by the offender. If the court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other information, provided that the amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. If the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount.
{¶ 11} For the reasons discussed below, the sentencing court did not act contrary to law when it ordered restitution to be paid on all counts without first holding an evidentiary hearing.
A. Appellant Agreed to Pay Restitution on All 22 Counts
{¶ 12} Appellant did not dispute the order of restitution, as appellant, along with the state, agreed and jointly recommended that restitution was to be paid on all 22 counts.
{¶ 13} This court in State v. Burns, upheld an order of restitution when the parties jointly agreed that restitution was to be paid on all counts. State v. Burns, 2012-Ohio- 4191, 976 N.E.2d 969, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.). In Burns, the appellant was indicted on 25 counts relating to theft, stemming from his duties while serving as business manager for the
Toledo City School District. Id. at ¶ 2. Burns pled guilty to three of the counts and the state dismissed the remaining 22 counts. Id. at ¶ 3. In exchange, it was agreed that Burns would pay restitution on all 25 counts, including the counts to which he did not plead guilty. Id. Burns was ordered to pay $658,428 in restitution. Id. at ¶ 5. However, Burns argued that the restitution order should have totaled only $52,429, which represented the actual economic loss suffered by the Toledo City School District; the remaining $605,999 was disbursed to the school district by its insurance companies. Id. at ¶ 16. Upon reviewing the record, we held that Burns agreed to pay the full restitution amount. The amount of restitution in question was discussed at the plea hearing as being “somewhere around $650,000.” Id. at ¶ 23. Moreover, Burns specifically agreed to pay restitution on all 25 counts. Id. Finally, Burns acknowledged that he would be paying restitution on all 25 counts and did not object to the order of restitution or to the amount of restitution. Id.
{¶ 14} Here, the joint recommendation provided that restitution would be paid on all 22 counts, including those counts dismissed by the state. The record reveals the following from the plea hearing:
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, the defendant has agreed to plead guilty to counts 1, 12, 19, and 22. Those were burglary, breaking and entering, theft, and theft of a firearm.
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