State v. Bragg

192 N.E. 263, 207 Ind. 246, 1934 Ind. LEXIS 252
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 12, 1934
DocketNo. 25,850.
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 192 N.E. 263 (State v. Bragg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Bragg, 192 N.E. 263, 207 Ind. 246, 1934 Ind. LEXIS 252 (Ind. 1934).

Opinion

Hughes, C. J.

This is an appeal from the Randolph circuit court wherein the appellee filed an action against the State, the State Highway Commission, the Director, certain named employees, and the contractor, in two paragraphs. The first paragraph asked for injunctive relief, and the second for an assessment of damages for the appropriation of ten feet of ground alleged to belong to the appellee. The trial court’s finding, order, and judgment rest solely on the second paragraph of complaint which asked for damages for the taking of the ten foot strip of ground.

The second paragraph of complaint is as follows:

“ ‘Plaintiff, Daniel Bragg, for his second paragraph of complaint complains of the defendants the State of Indiana, the State Highway Commission of the State of Indiana, and A. J. Wedeking, Jesse L. Mur den, George E. Hershman and Robert B. Boren, members of the State Highway Commission of the State of Indiana as such members, and John D. Williams, Director of the State Highway Commission of the State of Indiana, as such director says: That the plaintiff is the owner in fee of the following described real estate situate in Randolph County, State of Indiana, to wit:
“ ‘Sixty (60) acres off of the North side of the Northwest quarter of section twenty-eight (28), township twenty-one (21) north, range fourteen (14) east.
“ ‘That in the year 1865 a public highway exr tended from Winchester, in Randolph County, Indiana, northward through Deerfield and thence northward to the Jay County line. That said public highway had existed as such for many years *248 prior to 1865, the exact time being unknown to plaintiff and was the only public highway extending from Winchester through Deerfield to the county line. That said public highway had been and was established by user and varied in width between fences where fences existed, from approximately thirty feet to approximately forty feet. That said public highway was crooked following the higher ground, and being around low, wet places and swamps, but followed the general course and direction of said public highway above described as the Winchester and Portland or Winchester and Deerfield pike, but did not coincide therewith. That about the year 1865 to 1868, the exact time being unknown to plaintiff, an organization known as the Winchester and Deerfield Turnpike Company, under the law then in force, built a toll pike from Winchester through Deerfield to the Jay County line approximately forty feet wide from fence to fence and in so doing followed the general course and direction of said old road established by user as aforesaid, not conforming thereto however, but straightening said old road and taking out the crooks and bends of same for the most part and in places departing from said old road entirely, and in places widening it, the exact change in course and location being unknown to plaintiff. That thereafter about the year 1880 to 1885, the exact time being unknown to plaintiff said toll pike ceased to exist as such and became a part of the free gravel road system of Randolph County, and being the highway hereinbefore described as said Winchester and Portland or Winchester and Deerfield Pike, and so continued until taken over by defendant, State Highway Commission, and designated as State Highyway Number 27 as hereinafter alleged.
“ ‘That heretofore on the ....day of............. 19...., said State Highway Commission acting under and pursuant to the act of the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, creating said Commission approved March 10, 1919, and acts amendatory and supplemental thereto by appropriate action took over said highway and designated it as a part of the State Highway System of the State of Indiana, and that said State Highway Commission, acting under said Act, is engaged in improving *249 that part of said highway located in said Randolph County, including the part thereof that extends along over plaintiff’s real estate aforesaid by grading and hard surfacing and the construction of side ditches for drainage.
“ ‘That heretofore on or about the ........day of January, 1929, the defendant State Highway Commission and the said defendants, members of said commission and the defendant John D. Williams as director of said commission, claiming to act for and in behalf of and as representatives of the defendant State of Indiana, and as a part of the work of improving said public highway and without any proceeding first had to acquire the same in the name of the State of Indiana or otherwise and without the consent and over the objection and protest of plaintiff, wrongfully entered upon plaintiff’s said lands and took and appropriated for and added to said public highway the following described part of plaintiff’s said real estate to wit: A strip of ground lying immediately east of the east line of said public highway ten feet wide, east and west and the full width of plaintiff’s said lands north and south.
“ ‘That the said lands so owned by plaintiff is an improved farm and consists of sixty acres of cultivated and pasture lands which plaintiff has been using and occupying for farming and pasturing purposes for more than ten years last past. That plaintiff resides on said lands with his family, his residence and other buildings being located near the west end thereof. That along the east line of said highway plaintiff has owned and maintained ■a fence and a row of shade trees which defendants have destroyed in said appropriation of said strip of ground. That plaintiff’s access to said premises has been by a driveway from said highway which access and driveway have been destroyed by said appropriation. That the said strip of ground so taken and appropriated by defendants was at the time it was so taken of the value of $300.00, and that plaintiff’s remaining real estate has been damaged by said appropriation to the amount of $200.00.
“ ‘Wherefore, the plaintiff asks the court that a writ of assessment of damages may issue herein *250 that he may have his said damages assessed and awarded and for all other proper relief.’ ”

The appellants herein filed a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to make more specific, and then a demurrer to each paragraph of complaint. Each motion was overruled and an answer of general denial was filed.

The errors relied upon for reversal are as follows:

(1) The court erred in overruling the plea to the jurisdiction;

(2, 3) that the Randolph circuit court had no jurisdiction of appellants or of the subject matter;

(4) the trial court erred in overruling the motion to make the complaint more specific;

(5) the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s separate and several demurrer to each paragraph of the complaint;

(6) the court erred in overruling the appellant’s separate and several exceptions to the appointment of appraisers.

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Related

Stoy v. O'dell's Estate
196 N.E. 132 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1935)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
192 N.E. 263, 207 Ind. 246, 1934 Ind. LEXIS 252, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bragg-ind-1934.