SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
State v. Bradley C. Thompson (A-41-20) (085260)
Argued November 9, 2021 -- Decided June 2, 2022
PIERRE-LOUIS, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) states that in cases involving DNA evidence, the time for prosecuting an offense under a statute of limitations “does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA . . . evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.” (emphasis added). The question before the Court in this matter of statutory interpretation is whether the limitation period begins to run when the State is in physical possession of the two items noted, or when the State obtains a match between the DNA evidence from the crime and the defendant’s DNA sample.
In July 2001, victim C.S. was sexually assaulted by an unknown assailant. The New Jersey State Police Lab (the Lab) created a profile for the suspect’s DNA sample, Specimen 12A, retrieved from C.S.’s body. In 2002, the Lab entered the DNA profile into CODIS, the Combined DNA Index System, which is a national DNA database maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The DNA profile entered into CODIS did not include certain exclusionary data -- data the Lab believed was inconclusive based on its interpretation of the FBI’s DNA database polices. Without that data, it would have been impossible for Specimen 12A to generate a match with another DNA profile entered into CODIS. In 2004, defendant’s DNA sample was collected in an unrelated matter and his DNA profile was entered into CODIS in 2006. As a result of the manner in which the DNA profile for Specimen 12A was entered into CODIS, no match resulted.
The National DNA Index System (NDIS) is part of CODIS and contains the DNA profiles contributed by participating forensic laboratories. In 2010, the FBI updated the NDIS Operational Procedures Manual to explicitly allow the exclusionary data withheld from Specimen 12A to be entered into the system. The Lab did not update its policy to reflect this change in guidance until 2016. In 2016, the Lab entered the subject exclusionary data for Specimen 12A into CODIS and was alerted that Specimen 12A matched defendant’s DNA sample that had been entered into CODIS years earlier.
1 Based on that match, defendant was indicted in May 2017 for several offenses related to the July 2001 sexual assault. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, arguing that the five-year statute of limitations began to run in 2004, when the State possessed both the physical evidence from the crime and defendant’s DNA sample. The trial court denied his motion and concluded that the statute of limitations started running when the State had evidence of a match. At trial, defendant was convicted of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact and fourth-degree criminal trespass. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction, finding that the statute of limitations began to run in 2016 when the State received a DNA match.
The Court granted defendant’s petition for certification. 245 N.J. 457 (2021).
HELD: A plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals that the Legislature intended the statute of limitations to begin to run once the State was in possession of both the physical evidence from the crime and the suspect’s DNA. To hold otherwise would contradict the language of the statute which directs the statute of limitations to begin when the State is in possession of both items needed to generate a match. To find that the statute of limitations begins when a match is confirmed would render the second half of the provision superfluous. Here, the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, when the FBI’s updated scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match based on the DNA samples in its possession.
1. The statute of limitations in a criminal statute is a complete defense to the prosecution of the crime. It is designed to protect a defendant from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. The five-year statute of limitation for most crimes begins “to run on the day after the offense is committed.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) carves out an exception for circumstances in which the prosecution includes DNA or fingerprint evidence. In those cases, “time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.” --- Ibid. (pp. 21-22)
2. A plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals that the statute of limitations, in cases involving DNA evidence, begins to run when “the State is in possession of” two things: (1) the physical evidence from the crime and (2) the DNA of the suspect. Those are the two items “necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison” because the two DNA samples can be compared to determine whether they match. It is unlikely that the Legislature contemplated a situation in which the State would possess both items necessary to generate a match but that the DNA match would not occur given the systems in place to coordinate, maintain, and compare DNA samples both locally and nationally. Any other reading of the statute would permit the State to be in possession of physical evidence from a crime scene 2 and DNA evidence from a suspect and yet allow that evidence to go untested for an inordinate amount of time, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. That was certainly not the Legislature’s expectation when it created the carve out to the five- year statute of limitations for cases involving DNA evidence. (pp. 24-26)
3. Were the Court to substitute the word “match” for the terms “physical evidence and DNA,” then the statute would prescribe that the statute of limitations begins when the State is in possession of a match necessary to generate a match. That reading leads to an illogical interpretation of the statute and renders the second half of that clause superfluous. If the Legislature contemplated that a match would trigger the start of the statute of limitations, it undoubtedly could have easily said so. Furthermore, that interpretation completely ignores the language that states the time does not begin “until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA.” In using the term “both,” the Legislature signaled that the two items that follow the term are the items the State must be in possession of in order to start the clock. (pp. 27-28)
4. Although N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) requires the statute of limitations to begin when the State is in possession of the physical evidence and the DNA sample, there may be situations in which the science or the generally accepted scientific guidance at the moment those items come into the State’s possession has not advanced so far as to allow for that evidence to actually generate a match. If the State possessed a sample but the technology had yet to evolve to allow a usable DNA profile to be created, or if the method of analysis that would lead to a match has not been officially adopted within the scientific community, then regardless of whether the State possesses the evidence, the statute of limitations does not start to run. (p. 30)
5. Here, there was a lack of clarity at the Lab, and perhaps the scientific community at large regarding the utility of including exclusionary data within DNA profiles. However, there was no uncertainty regarding the use of that data by 2010 when the FBI updated the NDIS manual. Once the NDIS manual gave the go-ahead for including the exact information in a DNA profile that the Lab previously excluded for Specimen 12A, the Lab was on notice and effectively had all the evidence it needed as well as the scientific capability and guidance to generate a match. Consequently, the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, and defendant’s 2017 indictment was well beyond the five-year limitations period. (pp. 31-32)
REVERSED and REMANDED for defendant’s convictions to be vacated.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. JUDGE FUENTES (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-41 September Term 2020 085260
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Bradley C. Thompson, a/k/a Brad Thompson and Barton C. Thompson,
Defendant-Appellant.
On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division.
Argued Decided November 9, 2021 June 2, 2022
Stephen W. Kirsch, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, on the briefs).
Lauren Bonfiglio, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lauren Bonfiglio, of counsel and on the briefs).
Michael J. Zoller argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Michael J. Zoller, and CJ Griffin, on the brief).
1 JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the twenty-first century, the use of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) to
identify perpetrators of crime has become commonplace. Indeed, many
laypersons are familiar with the fact that traces of genetic material retrieved
from crime scenes can lead law enforcement to the offender if that person’s
DNA matches the DNA found at the scene.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) states that in cases involving DNA evidence, the time
for prosecuting an offense under a statute of limitations “does not start to run
until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA . . .
evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of
comparison to the physical evidence.” (emphasis added). The question before
the Court in this matter of statutory interpretation is whether the limitation
period begins to run when the State is in physical possession of the two items
noted, or when the State obtains a match between the DNA evidence from the
crime and the defendant’s DNA sample.
In July 2001, victim C.S. was sexually assaulted in her home by an
unknown assailant. Traces of the suspect’s DNA were retrieved from C.S.’s
body and sent to the New Jersey State Police Lab (the Lab or the State Lab).
There, scientists created a DNA profile for the sample, Specimen 12A, and in
2 2002 entered it into CODIS, the Combined DNA Index System, which is a
national DNA database maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). The DNA profile created by the Lab and entered into CODIS did not
include certain exclusionary data -- data the Lab believed was inconclusive
based on its interpretation of the FBI’s DNA database polices. Without that
data, however, it would have been impossible for Specimen 12A to generate a
match with another DNA profile entered into CODIS. In January 2004,
defendant’s DNA was entered into CODIS on an unrelated matter. As a result
of the manner in which the DNA profile for Specimen 12A was entered into
CODIS, no match resulted.
In 2010, the FBI updated its guidance to explicitly allow the
exclusionary data withheld from Specimen 12A to be entered for DNA
profiles. The Lab did not update its policy to reflect this change in guidance
until 2016. In 2016, an internal Lab audit revealed that Specimen 12A was
entered without the subject exclusionary data. Upon entering the data for
Specimen 12A, a match occurred, alerting the Lab that Specimen 12A matched
defendant’s DNA sample that had been entered into CODIS years earlier.
Based on that match, defendant was indicted in May 2017 for several offenses
related to the July 2001 sexual assault.
3 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss several counts on
statute of limitations grounds. He argued that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c),
the five-year statute of limitations for the criminal offenses began to run in
2004, when the State possessed both the physical evidence from the crime and
defendant’s DNA sample. The trial court denied his motion and the case
proceeded to trial. At trial, defendant was convicted of fourth-degree criminal
sexual contact and fourth-degree criminal trespass. Defendant appealed and
the Appellate Division affirmed his conviction and sentence finding that the
statute of limitations began to run not in 2004, but in 2016 when the State
received a DNA match between the DNA sample collected from the victim and
defendant’s DNA sample.
We hold that a plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) reveals that the
Legislature intended the statute of limitations to begin to run once the State
was in possession of both the physical evidence from the crime and the
suspect’s DNA. To hold otherwise would contradict the language of the
statute which directs the statute of limitations to begin when the State is in
possession of both items needed to generate a match. To find that the statute
of limitations begins when a match is confirmed would render the second half
of the provision superfluous.
4 In this case, although the State was in possession of both the physical
evidence from the crime and defendant’s DNA by 2004, the science regarding
the utility or ability to enter certain exclusionary data in the FBI database was
unclear. Clarity was achieved, however, in 2010 when the FBI updated its
guidance to note that such data could be included on a DNA profile. At that
time, the State was in possession of all it needed to generate a match and the
scientific guidance on the treatment of DNA profiles and exclusionary data had
been updated.
We therefore find that the statute of limitations began to run in 2010,
when the scientific guidance rendered the Lab capable of generating a match
based on the DNA samples in its possession. By the time defendant was
indicted in 2017, the five-year statute of limitations had expired. We therefore
reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and remand the matter for
defendant’s convictions to be vacated.
I.
A.
On the night of July 21, 2001, C.S.1 was home with her four-month-old
baby. An unknown male entered the home through an unlocked back door and
sexually assaulted C.S. The intruder grabbed C.S. from behind, covered her
1 Initials are used to protect the identity of the victim in this matter. 5 eyes with his hand, gripped her throat, and pulled her hair as he dragged her
down the hallway, eventually throwing her on the bathroom floor. In the
bathroom, the man covered C.S.’s head with a towel and took off her clothes
and bra. The assailant proceeded to touch C.S.’s breasts with his hands and
mouth, and he touched her genital area with his fingers and his stomach. He
then forced C.S. to perform oral sex on him. The assailant did not ejaculate
during the encounter. Before leaving, he told C.S. to count to ten and
instructed her not to call the police.
The next day, on July 22, 2001, C.S. reported the sexual assault to the
police and underwent an examination by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(SANE), who collected specimen swabs from C.S.’s body.
B.
Federal Operational Guidelines and DNA
Before detailing the background of the procedures that eventually led to
the DNA match in this case, we provide the following summary of the federal
operational guidelines for DNA identification.
The Federal DNA Identification Act sets out detailed participation
requirements for state and local forensic DNA laboratories to participate in
CODIS. See DNA Identification Act of 1994, 34 U.S.C. § 12592. CODIS, the
Combined DNA Index System, refers to a national identification index of
6 criminal justice DNA databases and the software used to run these databases to
compare a target DNA record against the DNA records in the database. FBI,
CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet CODIS,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-
ndis-fact-sheet#CODIS (last visited May 11, 2022). CODIS enables the
storage, exchange, and comparison of DNA records among forensic DNA
laboratories in participating states. Ibid. The National DNA Index System
(NDIS) is one part of CODIS and simply contains the DNA profiles
contributed by participating federal, state, and local forensic laboratories.
Ibid.
In 1997, a consortium of twenty-one laboratories determined the best
thirteen short tandem repeats (STR) locations within a DNA sample/sequence
to use in the CODIS databank; those thirteen markers are commonly referred
to as the “CODIS core loci.” Ming W. Chin et al., Forensic DNA Evidence:
Science and the Law § 2.4 (2021).
Visually, loci appear as “peaks” within a studied DNA sample, with “the
height of the peak” being “directly proportional to the amount of DNA
7 amplified.” See Chin, § 3.4.2 Because the size of a peak correlates to the
amount of DNA, a peak must meet an analytical threshold set by the laboratory
to be included among the loci for a particular sample, and “[p]eaks that do not
cross the analytical threshold are considered indistinguishable from
background fluorescence and are not labeled by the software.” Ibid. Thus,
peaks below the analytical threshold are not labeled as loci and “are typically
not used for data interpretation.” Ibid. Simply put, peaks below the analytical
threshold that each laboratory sets are considered exclusionary data; those
peaks are omitted from the database’s index as loci.3
Once a laboratory possesses a DNA sample, it must have a second DNA
sample “composed of the same markers [or loci] with which to compare it” to
make an identification. Ibid. A “match” occurs “when CODIS links two or
more DNA profiles and a confirmation process is started by designated
laboratory personnel from each affected laboratory.” NDIS Operational
Procedures Manual Glossary (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). In the process of comparing
DNA samples, a “hit” is “[a] confirmed match that aids an investigation.”
2 Once DNA is amplified, scientists capture the “intensity of the fluorescence, and ultimately the height of the peak,” which “is measured in relative fluorescence units (RFUs).” Ibid. 3 When we use the term “exclusionary data,” we are referring to the DNA peaks below the analytical threshold set by laboratories that are excluded from the database. 8 Ibid. Significantly, a sample cannot yield a match or ensuing hit in the system
if the DNA profile as a whole contains fewer than seven testable CODIS Core
loci.
According to Ayva Sammel, the New Jersey State Lab’s CODIS
administrator, once CODIS generates a hit, the laboratory must “do an
administrative check of the case file to make sure that [the] specimen ID goes
with that case.” Sammel also testified that a laboratory will confirm a “hit”
after “making sure . . . that the offender sample has been re-run to determine
that the profile is concordant with the one that was in the database that
matched.” Sammel stated that New Jersey laboratories require a confirmatory
buccal swab to establish a chain of custody for use at trial; once that chain is
established, a laboratory analyst can testify at trial as to the confirmed identity
of the individual that produced a match and a subsequent hit in CODIS.
C.
Specimen 12A
On July 26, 2001, the New Jersey State Police Lab received the samples
that had been collected during C.S.’s examination by the SANE nurse. On
January 23, 2002, the Lab released its report. Specimen 12A, a breast swab
sample, was of particular interest because it contained dried saliva and C.S.
was not a contributor.
9 In 2002, the Lab entered the DNA profile of the contributor of Specimen
12A into CODIS.4 From Specimen 12A, Lab analysts retrieved 5 loci with
peak heights of at least 100 RFUs. Between at least 2001 and 2006, the State
Lab had an internal, unwritten policy that when entering “any peaks in a DNA
profile that could be considered conclusive for match purposes,” the RFU peak
height had to be 100 at minimum.5 Consequently, loci with peaks below 100
RFUs were not included in the Lab’s report. Specimen 12A’s DNA profile
was entered into CODIS with the 5 loci that had peak heights of at least 100
RFUs, but according to Sammel, it would have been impossible to generate a
match because at least “[7] locations [we]re needed for a forensic hit.”
On January 29, 2004, the Juvenile Justice Commission, acting in an
unrelated matter, collected a buccal swab with defendant Bradley Thompson’s
DNA and submitted it to the Lab for analysis and entry into CODIS. After a
two-year backlog, on April 20, 2006, the Lab finally entered defendant’s DNA
profile into CODIS. The entry did not result in a match. Because the State
4 In New Jersey, “[w]hen the Forensics Office receives a DNA sample, it analyzes the sample to create a DNA profile and then forwards that profile to the FBI to be uploaded to CODIS.” In re Investigation of Burglary & Theft, 240 N.J. 436, 441 (2020) (citing N.J.S.A. 53:1-20.21)). 5 In 2002, the policy to exclude from DNA profiles RFU peak heights below 100 was not written in the NDIS manual or the Lab’s own procedural manual, but analysts entering information into CODIS interpreted the NDIS policy to exclude such data. 10 Lab analysts entered only five loci into CODIS for Specimen 12A -- and not
the exclusionary data (peak heights under 100 RFUs) that would have
produced the minimum seven loci necessary to produce a match -- defendant’s
DNA profile did not generate a match with any profile in the system when
entered in 2006.
In 2010, the FBI updated the NDIS Operational Procedures Manual
(NDIS manual) to reflect that exclusionary data could be entered into the
system.6 But the Lab did not change its procedures in 2010 in accordance with
the updated NDIS manual.
In 2014, the Lab initiated a self-audit of DNA samples. According to
Sammel, in 2016, she reached out to Dr. Douglas Hares from the FBI who
informed her that, although exclusionary data was permitted to be entered into
CODIS before 2010, the NDIS manual had been updated in 2010 to include a
written policy clarifying that exclusionary data could be entered into CODIS .
The Lab in 2016 then updated its procedures to expressly allow entry of such
exclusionary data, which in turn would expand the reported information to
include additional loci with peaks under 100 RFUs.
6 The record contains the 2015 NDIS manual, and the parties agree that the 2010 manual was updated to clarify that exclusionary data could be entered into CODIS. The 2010 manual is not part of the record. 11 In March 2016, a “quality search” during the audit alerted a Lab analyst
that exclusionary data for Specimen 12A had not been entered into CODIS and
that there was therefore an insufficient number of loci to produce a match or a
hit for that sample. The Lab then reentered the data for Specimen 12A,
including peaks under 100 RFUs, into CODIS, which finally returned a match
for that sample. The match indicated that Specimen 12A, the sample taken
from victim C.S., matched the DNA sample collected from defendant during
the unrelated juvenile matter in 2004.
On May 18, 2016, the Lab informed the New Jersey State Police of a
“possible investigative lead” in reference to Specimen 12A and defendant’s
buccal swab. The Lab also informed the police that it could not reach a
conclusion until it obtained a confirmatory buccal swab from defendant, as
required by standard procedure.
On July 13, 2016, defendant submitted a buccal swab, which the Lab
received for analysis on July 21, 2016. 7 On August 17, 2016, the Lab
confirmed there was a hit between the buccal swab taken from defendant on
July 13, 2016 and Specimen 12A.
7 The police officer who obtained the buccal swab dated the consent form July 13, 2016, but defendant dated it as October 13, 2016. Because the Lab received the sample for analysis on July 21, 2016, we accept July 13, 2016 as the date of the buccal swab. The earlier date does not prejudice defendant. 12 II.
In May 2017, a Camden County Grand Jury indicted defendant on the
following nine counts: three counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault
(counts one through three); three counts of first-degree sexual assault (counts
four through six); two counts of third-degree aggravated sexual contact (counts
seven and eight); and one count of second-degree burglary (count nine).
In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to dismiss counts one to three and
counts seven to nine on statute-of-limitations grounds. He argued that,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), the statute of limitations on those charges
began to run in 2004 when the State had in its possession the two items
necessary to generate a match -- the physical evidence from the crime and
defendant’s DNA sample. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. In
its decision, the court reasoned that to calculate the start-time for a limitations
period under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), the proper inquiry “is what was necessary for
the State to establish the identification of this defendant to the specimen that
they had in their possession.” The court noted that the comments to the statute
reveal the Legislature’s intent that for “DNA and fingerprint evidence . . . the
time period does not begin to run until the prosecution gets that evidence, not
only the samples, but the evidence of a match.”
13 Additionally, the court found that the State did not complete the testing
until 2016 because the Lab had followed the then-current policies, and the
“science evolv[ed] here.” The court concluded that, for purposes of N.J.S.A.
2C:1-6(c), the Lab obtained the necessary evidence during the 2016 audit when
it changed its policy to include exclusionary data and Specimen 12A produced
a hit to defendant’s 2004 sample.
On January 12, 2018, after defendant filed a motion for leave to appeal
to the Appellate Division, the trial court issued supplemental findings. It
distinguished State v. Twiggs, 445 N.J. Super. 23, 31 (App. Div. 2016), from
the present case and noted that it was guided by the Code’s commentary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), which interprets the statute of limitations to start running
when the State has evidence of a match. The court, however, acknowledged
that the commentary is not itself law.
The Appellate Division denied defendant’s interlocutory appeal of the
trial court’s dismissal of the motion.
Defendant proceeded to trial. Midtrial, the trial court found insufficient
evidence of severe personal injury; thus, the court granted defendant’s motion
for judgment of acquittal on counts four to six and on count eight. 8 On May 3,
8 Although the record indicates that the trial court renumbered the counts on the verdict sheet, the court entered a judgment of acquittal on count eight of the indictment, as identified above. 14 2018, the jury acquitted defendant of all remaining counts, but convicted
defendant of lesser-included offenses under counts seven and nine -- fourth-
degree criminal sexual contact and fourth-degree criminal trespass,
respectively.
On May 31, 2018, the court sentenced defendant to an eighteen-month
prison term on the fourth-degree criminal sexual contact conviction, with nine
months of parole ineligibility, and a consecutive fifteen-month prison term on
the criminal trespass conviction, with no parole ineligibility.
Defendant appealed, arguing that counts seven and nine should have
been dismissed because the State possessed the DNA needed to generate a
match in 2004, twelve years before the indictment. Defendant further argued
that the trial court relied on an unofficial code commentary to make its
decision, that dicta in State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513 (2018), supports his
statutory interpretation of “in possession,” and that prosecuting after the
statute of limitations expired prejudiced him. Defendant also contended the
sentence imposed by the trial court was manifestly excessive.
The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence in
an unpublished decision. The Appellate Division reviewed the statutory
construction issue de novo and found that the statute of limitations started to
15 run on August 17, 2016, when the State possessed the conclusive hit between
defendant’s confirmatory DNA sample and Specimen 12A.
First, the Appellate Division held that under the statute’s plain meaning,
the statute of limitations began to run at the moment the confirmatory sample
evidence was matched by the State, rather than the moment the evidence
required to make a match was in the State’s possession. The court reasoned
that the match itself constitutes evidence sufficient to establish the suspect’s
identity by comparing the DNA evidence and physical evidence.
Second, the appellate court agreed that Twiggs did not apply because the
facts of the Twiggs companion cases were insufficiently related to the
circumstances in this case. The court did not directly address defendant’s
argument regarding the trial court’s reliance on unofficial code commentary.
Third, the Appellate Division held that defendant was not prejudiced by
the statute of limitations because, although the Legislature and the Court have
recognized that defendants have a right to timely prosecution, DNA evidence
is uniquely reliable and can be used long after commission of a crime. The
Appellate Division agreed with the trial court that the Lab did not have the
scientific capability to make a match until 2016 when the Lab updated its
procedure. It concluded that “the passage of time did not force defendant to
16 defend himself against stale evidence because the prosecution’s case was
based almost entirely on DNA evidence.”
We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 245 N.J. 457 (2021).
We also granted amicus curiae status to the Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL).
III.
Defendant argues that the Appellate Division erred in affirming his
conviction and sentence. Defendant argues that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c)’s plain
language provides that the State’s possession of both the physical evidence and
the DNA or fingerprints is the triggering event -- not when the State confirms a
match. Defendant contends that the counts in question were time-barred
because he was not indicted within five years of the possession of both the
sample found on the victim and defendant’s DNA in 2004; the entry of
defendant’s DNA into CODIS in 2006; or the update of the FBI’s NDIS
manual in 2010. The match, defendant contends, did not happen until the State
entered additional information from Specimen 12A into CODIS in 2016
-- information the State had in its possession since 2002.
Defendant further argues that the trial court and the Appellate Division
misinterpreted the statute’s plain language reading of “in possession” to equate
17 to the discovery of a match. Additionally, defendant contends that both earlier
courts failed to narrowly construe the statutory exception as required by
Twiggs.
The ACDL supports defendant’s position and adds that Twiggs demands
the Court to narrowly construe the plain language of the DNA-tolling
provision. The ACDL stresses two errors: the trial court conflated possession
and discovery, and the Appellate Division “misconstrued the language in
‘evidence necessary to establish the identification’ with an actual match.”
The State argues that the Appellate Division properly affirmed
defendant’s conviction because the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c)
requires the statute of limitations to begin when the State possesses a DNA
match of evidence with a chain of custody that establishes identification of the
actor by comparison to physical evidence. The State interprets the exception
to allow the statute of limitations to begin to toll once the State possesses a
match of the physical evidence and the DNA evidence. Applying that
definition, the State argues that the statute of limitations started to run either
on “July 13, 2016, when the State received defendant’s confirmatory sample”
or on “August 17, 2016, when the State had a conclusive match between
defendant’s DNA profile and the DNA profile from Specimen 12A.” The
18 State also maintains that “the meaning of the DNA-tolling provision is clear
and unambiguous on its face,” and the only logical reading is that the statute of
limitations begins when the DNA is matched.
The State concedes that it possessed defendant’s DNA in 2004, but
maintains that the Lab’s policies regarding entry of exclusionary loci made it
impossible at that time to produce an initial match and thereafter establish the
perpetrator’s identity through a confirmatory sample. Either way, the State
maintains, defendant’s May 2017 indictment occurred within the five-year
statute of limitations.
IV.
We ordinarily review the dismissal of an indictment under an abuse of
discretion standard. Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532. “When the decision to dismiss
relies on a purely legal question, however, we review that determination de
novo.” Ibid. Particularly in the interpretation of statutes, “we owe no
deference to the interpretive conclusions of either the trial court or the
Appellate Division.” State v. Ferguson, 238 N.J. 78, 93 (2019).
To interpret the Legislature’s meaning in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), we look to
established principles of statutory construction.
19 The principal objective “of statutory interpretation is to determine and
give meaning to the Legislature’s intent.” State v. Carter, 247 N.J. 488, 513
(2021). To do so, as always, we must first look at the plain language of a
statute. Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532. That is because the plain language is
typically “‘the best indicator’ of legislative intent.” Ibid. (quoting DiProspero
v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). “If the text of the law is clear, the ‘court’s
task is complete.’” Carter, 247 N.J. at 513 (quoting State v. Lopez-Carrera,
245 N.J. 596, 613 (2021)).
To that end, we give words “their generally accepted meaning.” Ibid.
(quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1). And we “read them in context with related
provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” DiProspero, 183
N.J. at 492. “Where a specific definition is absent, ‘[w]e must presume that
the Legislature intended the words it chose and the plain and ordinary meaning
ascribed to those words.’” Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532 (alteration in original)
(quoting Paff v. Galloway Township, 229 N.J. 340, 353 (2017)).
Only when a statute contains ambiguous “language that leads to more
than one plausible interpretation” should courts “turn to extrinsic evidence,
‘including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous
construction.’” DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor
Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)).
20 “In keeping with standard canons of statutory construction, it is not the
general rule, but rather the exceptions that are to be construed narrowly.” In re
Expungement Application of P.A.F., 176 N.J. 218, 223 (2003).
The statute of limitations in a criminal statute is a complete defense to
the prosecution of the crime. State v. Cagno, 211 N.J. 488, 506 (2012). “[A]
statute of limitations is not intended to assist the State in its investigations; it is
intended to protect a defendant’s ability to sustain [a] defense.” Twiggs, 233
N.J. at 539. In criminal cases, a statute of limitations “protect[s] individuals
from charges when the basic facts have become obscured by time.” State v.
Diorio, 216 N.J. 598, 612 (2014); State v. Zarinsky, 75 N.J. 101, 106 (1977).
“A statute of limitations balances the right of the public to have persons who
commit criminal offenses charged, tried, and sanctioned with the right of the
defendant to a prompt prosecution.” Ibid. “It is designed to protect a
defendant ‘from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses
have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost.’” State v. Jones, 445
N.J. Super. 555, 566 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945)), aff’d, 233 N.J. 513 (2018).
21 D.
We now turn to the statute at issue in this case. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 sets
forth time limitations for the prosecution of various offenses. Section (b)(1) of
the statute provides that “[a] prosecution for a crime must be commenced
within five years after it is committed.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1). Section (c)
notes that the statute of limitations for most crimes begins “to run on the day
after the offense is committed.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c).
The statute, however, carves out an exception for circumstances in
which the prosecution includes DNA or fingerprint evidence. Ibid. In those
cases, the statute provides that
[t]ime starts to run on the day after the offense is committed, except that when the prosecution is supported by physical evidence that identifies the actor by means of DNA testing or fingerprint analysis, time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical evidence.
[Ibid. (emphasis added).]
The Court has previously considered the meaning of the phrase
“identifies the actor” within N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c). In Twiggs, the Court
addressed in a consolidated opinion two cases in which DNA evidence of a
third party was used to identify the defendant. 233 N.J. at 523-28. The
Twiggs Court had to determine whether N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c)’s tolling 22 “provision applies when a DNA identification does not directly identify the
defendant but rather begins an investigative chain that leads to the defend ant.”
Id. at 520. “Based on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) and the policy
rationale underlying the criminal statute of limitations, [the Court concluded]
that the DNA-tolling exception applies only when the State obtains DNA
evidence that directly matches the defendant to physical evidence of a crime.”
Id. at 521. Although that determination is not relevant to the circumstances of
this case, the Court’s reliance on the statute’s policy rationale and its narrow
construction of the statute’s plain language are informative. And, in
interpreting the plain language, the Court determined the meanings of the
words “actor” and “identifies” -- neither of which were defined in in N.J.S.A.
2C:1-6(c) -- according to the dictionary meanings of the words. Id. at 535.
In this case, the key terms are “possession,” “necessary,” “establish,”
and “comparison,” and the Legislature did not include those terms in the
definition section of the Code. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(a) to (r). Therefore, we
are required to ascribe the “generally accepted meaning” of the words, Carter,
247 N.J. at 513 (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1), and must “read them in context with
related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole,”
DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492.
23 The word “possession” commonly connotes “the act of or fact of
possessing” with “possess” meaning “to gain or seize.” Merriam-Webster’s II
New College Dictionary 882 (3d ed. 2005). The word “necessary” in this
context means “absolutely required,” or “needed for some purpose or reason;
essential.” Id. at 748; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1241 (11th ed. 2019).
“Establish” in this context means “to prove the truth of.” Merriam-
Webster’s II New College Dictionary 392 (3d ed. 2005). Finally,
“comparison” refers in relevant part to “the act of comparing” in order to
“examine so as to note similarities or differences.” Id. at 234.
Applying the customary principles of statutory construction, we hold
that a plain reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) requires the statute of limitations in
cases involving DNA evidence to begin when the State possesses the physical
evidence from the crime as well as the DNA sample from the defendant, not
when a match is confirmed.
As noted, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) is an exception to the general rule found in
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(b)(1) that a prosecution “must be commenced within five
years after [the crime] is committed.” The exception in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c)
provides that “time does not start to run until the State is in possession of both
the physical evidence and the DNA or fingerprint evidence necessary to
24 establish the identification of the actor by means of comparison to the physical
evidence.”
A plain reading of the statute reveals that the statute of limitations, in
cases involving DNA evidence, begins to run when “the State is in possession
of” two things: (1) the physical evidence from the crime and (2) the DNA of
the suspect. Those are the two items “necessary to establish the identification
of the actor by means of comparison of the physical evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2C:1 -
6(c). Stated differently, once the State is in possession of the two pieces of
information, those two DNA samples can be compared to determine whether
the suspect’s DNA matches the DNA evidence recovered from the crime
scene.
The plain language of the statute unequivocally states that the time does
not begin “until the State is in possession of --- both” those items. This is a
logical point at which to begin the statute of limitations clock because the
expectation is that once law enforcement possesses the DNA from the crime
and a suspect’s DNA, those samples will be compared to determine whether
there is a match. It is unlikely that the Legislature contemplated a situation in
which the State would possess both items necessary to generate a match but
that the DNA match would not occur given the systems in place to coordinate,
maintain, and compare DNA samples both locally and nationally.
25 Indeed, the DNA Database and Databank Act of 1994, N.J.S.A. 53:1-
20.17 to -20.38, contemplates the procedures by which DNA evidence is
collected and maintained by the State Lab and forwarded to the FBI for
inclusion into the CODIS database. The Lab sends DNA profiles to CODIS
for the storage, exchange, and comparison of DNA records contributed by
federal, state, and local labs from around the country with the expectation that
DNA matches and hits will occur upon inputting DNA profiles into those
systems. See id. at 53:1-20.19 to -21, -24. Any other reading would permit
the State to be in possession of physical evidence from a crime scene and DNA
evidence from a suspect and yet allow that evidence to go untested for an
inordinate amount of time, thereby tolling the statute of limitations. That was
certainly not the Legislature’s expectation when it created the carve out to the
five-year statute of limitations for cases involving DNA evidence.
The State argues that a logical reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) directs that
the statute of limitations begins to run when the State is in possession of a
match of the crime scene evidence and the suspect’s DNA. The State further
contends that the phrase “necessary to establish the identification” indicates
26 that the match is required in order to trigger the statute of limitations. 9 The
State’s interpretation of the statute’s plain language, however, is irreconcilable
with the entirety of the provision. As previously discussed, this portion of the
statute essentially states that the clock begins to run when the State is in
possession of the two items needed to generate a match, i.e., identification of
an actor by means of comparison. Were we to adopt the State’s reading of the
statute and substitute the word “match” for the terms “physical evidence and
DNA,” then the statute would prescribe that the statute of limitations begins
when the State is in possession of a match necessary to generate a match. That
reading leads to an illogical interpretation of the statute and renders the second
half of that clause superfluous. If the Legislature did in fact contemplate that a
match would trigger the start of the statute of limitations, it undoubtedly could
have easily said so.
Furthermore, the State’s suggestion -- that the matching of the DNA
starts the statute of limitations -- completely ignores the language that states
9 The State additionally argues, and the Appellate Division held, that the statute of limitations in this case began to run either when the State received defendant’s confirmatory sample or when the State had a conclusive match, or hit, utilizing that confirmatory sample. To hold that the statute of limitations begins to run on either of the dates involving the “confirmatory sample,” which is not mentioned anywhere in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), would add language to the statute that does not comport with the apparent Legislative intent found in the statute’s plain language. 27 the time does not begin “until the State is in possession of both the physical
evidence and the DNA.” In using the term “both,” the Legislature signaled
that the two items that follow the term are the items the State must be in
possession of in order to start the clock.
In sum, a plain reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that the
statute of limitations begins to run exactly as the statute directs -- when the
State possesses both the physical evidence from the crime and a suspect’s
DNA sample -- not when a match occurs. That reading appropriately construes
narrowly the exception to the five-year limitations period. See P.A.F., 176 at
223. And a contrary reading would essentially endorse inaction by a
prosecution equipped with all the necessary components to identify a suspect,
a reading that cannot be reconciled with the protective purpose of a statute of
limitations. See Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 539; Diorio, 216 N.J. at 612.
VI.
Having determined that the statute of limitations pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:1-6(c) begins to run when the State is in possession of the two items
necessary to generate a match, we must now determine when the clock started
in this case.
To be sure, this is an unusual case. Here, the physical evidence from the
crime, Specimen 12A, was collected on July 22, 2001, a day after the crime. It
28 was sent to the Lab on July 26, 2001, and entered into CODIS sometime in
2002. Due to an unwritten policy at the Lab based on its understanding that
exclusionary data should not be reported, not all facets of Specimen 12A’s
DNA profile were entered into CODIS. As a result, the DNA profile for
Specimen 12A that was entered into CODIS could never have generated a
match because the profile did not include sufficient information to properly
compare it to another DNA profile. So after defendant’s DNA was collected in
January 2004 and his DNA profile was entered into CODIS in April 2006, that
entry did not result in a match with the profile entered in 2002.
At some point in 2010, the FBI updated the NDIS manual to reflect that
the exclusionary data -- loci with peaks under 100 RFUs, the same data that
the Lab did not enter for Specimen 12A -- could be entered into the system.
The Lab, however, did not change its procedures to reflect the 2010 update in
the NDIS manual until 2016. In 2016, upon entering the exclusionary data for
Specimen 12A, the Lab was alerted that a match occurred between defendant’s
DNA and another sample.
In this case, the State Lab possessed both the physical evidence from the
crime and defendant’s DNA sample as of January 29, 2004. At the time,
however, the Lab’s understanding of the NDIS policies and procedures that
state laboratories must follow in order to continue participation in the database
29 resulted in a policy by which the Lab did not include all data present in a DNA
sample, i.e., loci with peak heights below 100 RFUs. From the Lab’s
perspective, such exclusionary data that fell below the Lab’s analytical
threshold was not to be used for data interpretation or analysis and was
therefore left off DNA profiles. The Lab believed this was in line with the
NDIS procedures.
Although we hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c) requires the statute of
limitations to begin when the State is in possession of the physical evidence
and the DNA sample, there may be situations in which the science or the
generally accepted scientific guidance at the moment those items come into the
State’s possession has not advanced so far as to allow for that evidence to
actually generate a match. Indeed, if the State possessed a sample but the
technology had yet to evolve to allow a usable DNA profile to be created from
that evidence, it would not be the case that the State was then in possession of
the evidence “necessary to establish the identification of the actor by means of
comparison of the physical evidence.” If the science has yet to be developed
or if the method of analysis that would lead to a match has not been officially
adopted within the scientific community, then regardless of whether the State
possesses the evidence, the statute of limitations does not start to run.
30 Here, there was a lack of clarity at the Lab, and perhaps the scientific
community at large regarding the utility of including exclusionary data below
a certain threshold within DNA profiles. At the time the Lab entered
Specimen 12A, the Lab did not include that data because it was under the
impression that it could not do so pursuant to NDIS guidelines and that the
data was inconclusive.
In 2010, however, the FBI updated the NDIS manual to specifically note
that peaks below 100 RFUs could be added to the DNA profile. So as of 2010,
the State Lab was in possession of Specimen 12A, defendant’s DNA, and
updated guidance from NDIS officially adopting a policy that allowed for the
subject exclusionary data to be entered for Specimen 12A. Thus, even if the
scientific guidance was unclear in 2004, there was no uncertainty regarding the
use of exclusionary data with the update to the NDIS manual by 2010. Once
NDIS manual gave the go-ahead for including the exact information in a DNA
profile that the Lab previously excluded, the Lab was on notice and effectively
had all the evidence it needed as well as the scientific capability and guidance
to generate a match. Consequently, we hold that the statute of limitations in
this case began to run in 2010, when the FBI updated the NDIS manual.
31 Given that the statute of limitations began to run in 2010, defendant’s
2017 indictment was well beyond the five-year limitations period. 10
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division and remand the matter for defendant’s convictions to be vacated. The
charges arising from the 2001 assault on C.S. are time-barred.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES ALBIN, PATTERSON, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE PIERRE-LOUIS’s opinion. JUDGE FUENTES (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
10 In his petition for certification, defendant also challenged the Appellate Division’s affirmance of his sentence. Because defendant’s convictions must be vacated on statute of limitations grounds, we do not reach the sentencing issues raised in his petition. 32