IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ID. No. 2406003020 ) ) RANDALL B. BOYLES, JR. ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: October 18, 2025 Decided: January 30, 2026
COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE DENIED
Matthew A. Casale, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Defendant Randall B. Boyles, Jr., Howard R. Young Correctional Institute, Wilmington, Delaware, pro se.
SALOMONE, Commissioner This 30th day of January, 2026, upon consideration of the Motion for
Postconviction Relief filed by Defendant Randall B. Boyles, Jr. (“Defendant” or
“Boyles”);1 the Affidavit in Response to Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction
Relief filed by defense counsel;2 the State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for
Postconviction Relief;3 and the record in this matter, the following is my Report and
Recommendation.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 7, 2024, at 12:34 am, New Castle City police officers patrolling the
area of Wilmington Road observed a silver 2011 Mercedes CLS failing to maintain
a lane and breaking erratically.4 After initiating a traffic stop, the police discovered
two occupants, identifying the driver as Boyles.5 While requesting Defendant’s
driver’s license, registration and insurance, officers observed Boyles’ eyes to be
blood-shot and glassy.6 Further, Defendant’s speech was slurred, and his breath
1 Docket Item 22. For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, all docket item references relate to Superior Court Criminal Docket, State v. Boyles, Case No. 2406003020 (hereinafter, “D.I. ____”). 2 D.I. 29. 3 D.I. 33. 4 Adult Complaint and Warrant In the Justice of the Peace Court in and for The State of Delaware, State of Delaware v. Randall B. Boyles, Jr., Case Number 24-06-003020, Exhibit B. 5 Id. 6 Id.
2 produced a strong odor of alcohol.7 While speaking to Defendant, the police officers
noticed a handgun-shaped object concealed in his pocket.8
Upon a search of Defendant’s person, officers located a Glock 23 handgun,
which was loaded with ten rounds of ammunition.9 Defendant was then transported
to the New Castle City Police Department to undergo further field sobriety testing.10
Standardized testing revealed Defendant to be under the influence. 11 A search
warrant for his blood was obtained within four hours, and his blood alcohol content
was determined to be 0.21.12 Pursuant to inquiries made with respect to the traffic
stop, the police discovered that Defendant had an active Protection From Abuse
Order against him and prior felony convictions, all of which prohibited him from
possessing a firearm.13 In addition, officers learned that Defendant had four previous
DUI convictions, with the most recent in 2022 resulting in a sixty month revocation
of his license.14
On July 1, 2024, a grand jury indicted Boyles for (i) Driving a Vehicle While
Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”), (ii) Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon
(“CCDW”), (iii) Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, (iv) Possession of
7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 D.I. 33. 13 Id. 14 Id.
3 Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, (v) Possession of a Firearm While Under the
Influence, (vi) Driving a Vehicle While Suspended or Revoked, and (vii) Failure to
Maintain Lane.15 On August 1, 2024, the State provided Boyles’ defense counsel
with discovery, which outlined the four previous DUI convictions Boyles’ incurred
from 2006, 2014, 2017, and 2022.16 Thereafter, the State discovered a fifth DUI
conviction from the Court of Common Pleas in 2015, which was provided to defense
counsel in a subsequent letter dated August 5, 2024.17
Defendant’s first case review was held on August 19, 2024, at which time
Boyles expressed confusion regarding the number of previous DUI convictions
being asserted by the State.18 In a letter, dated August 20, 2024, defense counsel
clarified for Boyles that his current DUI charge was, in fact, Defendant’s sixth.19
Additionally, the correspondence conveyed that defense counsel would schedule a
meeting to review body worn camera footage, explained the possible sentence
Defendant faced if convicted, and confirmed counsel would file a motion for
reconsideration of bail on Boyles’ behalf.20
15 D.I. 7, Indictment. 16 D.I. 11; See also D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 17 D.I. 14, See also D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 18 D.I. 15, See also D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 19 D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 20 Id.
4 At his final case review on October 14, 2024, Defendant pleaded guilty to
DUI 6th and CCDW.21 The remaining charges were nolle prossed.22 On the same
day, the Court sentenced Boyles to the agreed upon joint recommendation of eight
years of Level V incarceration, suspended after a minimum mandatory sentence of
two years for eighteen months at Level II probation for the DUI 6th conviction, as
well as eight years of Level V incarceration, suspended after a minimum mandatory
sentence of sixth months for eighteen months at Level II probation for the CCDW
conviction.23 Level V time was ordered to run consecutively and probation to run
concurrently.24 Boyles did not appeal his conviction.
On March 4, 2025, Boyles filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief.25
On April 28, 2025, this Court ordered defense counsel to submit an affidavit in
response to the factual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel raised by
Defendant.26 The same day, the Court ordered the Department of Justice to file a
legal memorandum in response to Defendant’s asserted claims.27 On June 25, 2025,
defense counsel submitted his affidavit in response to Defendant’s claims.28 On
21 D.I. 20, Plea Agreement. 22 Id. 23 D.I. 21, D.I. 33, Final Case Review Transcript, dated October 14, 2024, at 21 (hereinafter referred to as “Final Case Review at__”). 24 D.I. 21, D.I. 33, Final Case Review at 21. 25 D.I. 22. 26 D.I. 26, See also Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (g)(2). 27 Id. 28 D.I. 28.
5 September 17, 2025, Defendant submitted a letter to the Court in which he explained
that he had not received a copy of defense counsel’s affidavit, nor the State’s
response, and reasserted his claims as set forth in his postconviction motion.29 On
September 18, 2025, the State filed its response to Defendant’s Motion for
Postconviction Relief.30 Defendant had until October 18, 2025 to file a Reply, but
chose not to do so. The matter is now ripe for decision.
DEFENDANT’S CLAIMS FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
In his pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, Boyles raises eight claims for
relief.31 He asserts seven claims of ineffective assistance of counsel alleging that
defense counsel was ineffective for (i) failing to consult Defendant regarding the
strengths and weaknesses of his defenses, (ii) coercing Defendant to forgo trial and
threatening to withdraw if Defendant did not accept the State’s offer, (iii) failing to
respond to Defendant’s questions regarding (a) the arresting officer’s status on the
Department of Justice Brady violations list, (b) availability and reliability of the
dashcam footage, and (c) requirements for utilizing dashcam under Delaware law,
(iv) refusing Defendant’s request to file a motion to suppress regarding the traffic
stop, (v) acting only as a liaison for the State to have Defendant improperly plead
guilty to a 6th DUI offense (claiming there was a mistake in his conviction records),
29 D.I. 31. 30 D.I. 33. 31 D.I. 22.
6 (vi) denying Defendant’s request to pursue concurrent sentences for the two charges
to which he plead, and (vii) not properly explaining the terms of the plea agreement,
which Defendant asserts was misleading and ambiguous.32
In addition to the claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, Boyles argues
that he was prejudiced by “the DAG improperly amending the charging documents
to enhance sentencing without proper procedure. Thus, creating a 6th Amendment
violation, changing from Class E to D.”33 For the reasons discussed below, Boyles’
claim regarding improper amendment of his charging documents is procedurally
barred and his ineffective assistance of counsel claims were waived upon entry of
his guilty plea.
APPLICABLE LAW GOVERNING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
Rule 61 and Procedural Bars to Relief
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) governs the procedures by
which an incarcerated individual may seek to have his conviction set aside on the
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or any other ground that is a sufficient
factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon the conviction.34 That is, it is a
means by which the court may correct Constitutional infirmities in a conviction or
32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
7 sentence.35 “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors in the trial process, not allow
defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their convictions.”36
Given that intent, before considering the merits of any claims for
postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether there are any
procedural bars to Defendant’s postconviction motion.37 Rule 61(i) establishes four
procedural bars to postconviction relief.38 Rule 61(i)(1) prohibits the Court from
considering a motion for postconviction relief unless it is filed within one year after
the judgment of conviction is final. 39 Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for
postconviction relief unless certain conditions are met.40
Rule 61(i)(3) provides that “any ground for relief not asserted in the
proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” is barred, unless the movant
shows (a) cause for relief from the procedural default, and (b) prejudice from the
violation of movant’s rights.41 Rule 61(i)(4) provides that “any ground for relief that
was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of
conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred.”42 However, ineffective assistance of
35 Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500 (Del. 1970). 36 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 37 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 38 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4). 39 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 40 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 41 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 42 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
8 counsel claims cannot be raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings and are
properly presented by way of a motion for postconviction relief. 43 Lastly, the
aforementioned bars to relief do not apply either to a claim that the Court lacked
jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i)-
(ii).44
Boyles pleaded guilty on October 14, 2024 and filed his pro se Motion for
Postconviction Relief on March 4, 2025.45 Having not appealed, his judgment of
conviction became final on November 13, 2024, thirty days after his sentence was
imposed. As such, his postconviction motion was timely filed within one year after
his judgment of conviction was final and is not procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1).
Nor is his postconviction motion barred for being repetitive pursuant to Rule 61(i)(2)
as this is his first postconviction motion. Although timely filed, one of Boyles’
postconviction claims is procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3).
Of Boyles eight claims for postconviction relief, one alleges a violation of
procedural due process by the State. Specifically, Boyles contends the State
“improperly amend[ed] the charging document to enhance sentencing without
43 Sabb v. State, 2021 WL 2229631, at *1 (Del. Super. May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 187-88 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evan-Mayes, 2016 WL 4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016). 44 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5). Defendant does not assert that this Court lacks jurisdiction or a claim that would satisfy Rule 21(d)(2)(i) or (ii). 45 D.I. 20, 22.
9 proper procedure.”46 Such a claim should have been raised on appeal. Having failed
to do so, Boyles must demonstrate cause for relief from the procedural default and a
prejudicial effect for the Court to consider this claim.47 He has done neither. Rather,
he simply asserts that he was prejudiced by the State’s actions with nothing more.
Even if Defendant had shown cause for relief from the Rule 61(i)(3) procedural bar,
his argument is without merit.
Boyles suggests his due process rights were violated when the State amended
the charging documents because the State failed to file a motion to pursue sentencing
pursuant to 21 Del. C. §4177(d)(11).48 This argument, however, evidences a
fundamental misunderstanding of the statute. 21 Del. C. §4177(d)(11) provides as
follows:
A person who has been convicted of prior or previous offenses of this section, as defined in § 4177B(e) of this title, need not be charged as a subsequent offender in the complaint, information or indictment against the person in order to render the person liable for the punishment imposed by this section on a person with prior or previous offenses under this section. However, if at any time after conviction and before sentence, it shall appear to the Attorney General or to the sentencing court that by reason of such conviction and prior or previous convictions, a person should be subjected to paragraph (d)(3), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(6) or (d)(7) of this section, the Attorney General 46 D.I. 22, See also D.I. 33 (In Defendant’s response to defense counsel and the State’s response, Boyles expands on his arguments regarding the charging documents and specifically outlines his legal argument for violation of due process.) 47 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)(A)-(B); See State v. Gordon, 2011 WL 5592585 at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. November 15, 2011). 48 21 Del. C. 4177(d)(11).
10 shall file a motion to have the defendant sentenced pursuant to those provisions. If it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing on the motion that the defendant falls within paragraph (d)(3), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(6) or (d)(7) of this section, the court shall enter an order declaring the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced to be a felony and shall impose a sentence accordingly.49
Accordingly, 21 Del. C. §4177(d)(11) authorizes the State to pursue enhanced
DUI sentencing “at any time after conviction and before sentence ” if, “by reason of
such conviction and prior or previous convictions, a person should be subjected” to
such sentencing.50 In this case, Defendant pled guilty to his 6th DUI after the State
revealed in discovery that he had five previous DUI convictions51 and defense
counsel confirmed and explained the five previous DUI convictions to Boyles in
correspondence dated August 20, 2024.52 The hearing which Defendant argues he
was entitled to was not applicable as there was no period of time “after conviction
and before sentencing.” He was convicted by virtue of his plea and sentenced the
same day.53 Therefore, even if Defendant had shown cause for relief from the
procedural default, the argument is simply without merit.54
49 Id. 50 Id. 51 D.I. 15, See also D.I. 33. 52 D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 53 D.I. 20. 54 The Court notes that at times through his filings Boyles seems to suggest that the failure to raise his due process claim was due to the ineffectiveness of his counsel. See D.I. 22, 33. To the extent Boyles proffers his due process claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, he waived it for the reasons discussed herein.
11 All of Boyles’ Claims Have Been Waived
Notwithstanding the procedural bar and lack of merit regarding Defendant’s
due process claim, Boyles waived the foregoing claim as well as any claims he had
for ineffective assistance of counsel upon rendering his guilty plea.
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.55 This test requires
that a defendant demonstrate that (a) his counsel’s performance was deficient and
(b) that said deficiency prejudiced him.56
To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that his attorney’s performance “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” under the prevailing professional norms.57
That is, he was not reasonably competent.58 Judicial scrutiny under the first prong
is highly deferential. Courts must ignore the distorting effects of hindsight and
proceed with a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable. 59 To
establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there exists a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different.60
55 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 56 Id. at 687-88, 694. 57 Id. at 688. 58 Id. at 687-88, 694. 59 Id. at 689. 60 Id. at 694.
12 When evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable
professional assistance and constituted sound strategy.61 Mere allegations of
ineffectiveness will not suffice; instead, a defendant must make and substantiate
concrete allegations of actual prejudice.62 In evaluating counsel’s performance, the
Court must “reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct,” and
“evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”63
In the context of a guilty plea, to establish prejudice under Strickland, the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.64
A defendant’s statements during a plea colloquy are presumed to be truthful,65 and
a defendant “is bound by all the representations…made during [the] plea colloquy”
absent clear and convincing evidence that the statements were not made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.66 Moreover, “a voluntary guilty plea waives a
61 Id. at 698; Gattis v. State, 697 A.2d 1174, 1184 (Del. 1997). 62 Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003); Gattis, 697 A.2d at 1178-79. 63 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 64 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 65 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 66 Hammons v. State, 2005 WL 2414271, at *1 (Del. Sep. 28, 2005); see also State v. Richardson, 2025 WL 617829, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 20, 2025); State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1998); State v. Stuart, 2008 WL 4868658, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2008).
13 defendant’s right to challenge any errors or defects before the plea, even those of
constitutional dimension.”67
In the subject action, the Plea Agreement, plea colloquy, and Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form indicate that Boyles knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently entered a guilty plea.68 During the guilty plea colloquy, Boyles
provided sworn testimony that (1) he reviewed and understood the Plea Agreement,
Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, and the Immediate Sentencing Form,69 (2)
defense counsel addressed any issues, questions, or concerns that he had, 70 and (3)
he had not been threatened or forced to plead guilty.71 Boyles further represented
that he was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation,72 understood the
Constitutional rights he was giving up by entering the plea, and admitted his guilt to
both charges comprising the Plea Agreement.73 The Court thereafter found Boyles’
plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.74
67 Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2024); see also Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997) (“[A] guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a trial on the charges and a waiver of the constitutional rights to which he or she would have been entitled to exercise at a trial.”); Rodriguez v. State, 2003 WL 1857547, at *1 (Del. Apr. 7, 2003) (stating that a defendant’s guilty plea “eliminates his claim relating to events that occurred before the entry of the plea[.]”). 68 D.I. 20, Final Case Review 7-14. 69 Final Case Review at 8-12. 70 Id. at 8. 71 Id. at 9. 72 Id. at 11-12. 73 Id. at 10. 74 Id. at 14.
14 Boyles does not contend that his plea was involuntarily entered. Nor has he
presented any clear, contrary evidence to call into question his testimony at the plea
colloquy or answers in the Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. Accordingly,
Boyles’ valid guilty plea waived his right to challenge any alleged errors,
deficiencies or defects occurring prior to the entry of his plea, even those of
constitutional proportions.75
Although the query could conclude at this point, the Court will, nonetheless,
address Boyles’ individual claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on a
substantive basis, each of which has no merit.
First, Boyles alleges defense counsel was ineffective for failing to consult
Defendant regarding the strengths and weaknesses of his defense.76 The record does
not support this assertion. Defense counsel’s response to Defendant’s
postconviction motion attaches a letter, dated August 20, 2024, pursuant to which
counsel (i) explains the reason Boyles is being charged with a DUI 6th (as opposed
to a DUI 5th), (ii) provides Boyles with discovery, (iii) reviews the evidence against
Boyles, noting that counsel saw no viable suppression issue for the vehicle stop or
75 Evans v. State, 2025 WL 1565409 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2025) (affirming judgment of Superior Court and finding defendant entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and therefore waived his claim that counsel failed to investigate and then file a motion to suppress); Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004); Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997); Modjica v. State, 2009 WL 2426675 (Del. Supr. Aug. 10, 2009); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003). 76 D.I. 22.
15 search, and (iv) discusses the potential sentence he was facing.”77 Given the facts of
this case, defense counsel could offer little by way of “strengths” and in stating he
saw no viable suppression issues he was, in fact, explaining the “weakness” of
Defendant’s case. Moreover, Boyles fails to articulate how defense counsel’s
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or how he suffered
prejudice as a result. Rather, Boyles first claim is simply an allegation of
ineffectiveness with nothing more -- which is insufficient under Strickland.
Second, Defendant claims defense counsel “did infer fear and compulsion…to
forgo any formidable defense at trial” and threatened to withdraw if Defendant did
not plead guilty.78 As previously noted, this claim directly contradicts Defendant’s
statements at Final Case Review, in which Boyles acknowledged that he was not
threatened or forced to plead guilty.79 Boyles cannot now argue to the contrary
without evidence to support the notion that his plea was not made voluntarily.
Third, Boyles alleges defense counsel was ineffective for failing to answer his
questions including whether (i) the arresting officer was on the “DOJ Brady
violations list,” (ii) the New Castle Police Department was equipped with “dashcam”
and had MVR footage, and (iii) if there was a policy which required “dashcam.”80
77 D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 78 D.I. 22. 79 Final Case Review at 9. 80 D.I. 22.
16 Pursuant to discovery provided to defense counsel on June 25, 2024, the State noted
it was unaware of any information that must be disclosed under Brady.81 The State
provided both MVR and body worn camera footage in supplemental discovery on
August 1, 2024.82 In defense counsel’s letter to Defendant, dated August 20, 2024,
counsel provided police reports, and explained he would set up a meeting to review
any body worn camera and MVR video that was available.83 Based on the foregoing,
the record suggests Defendant’s questions were in fact addressed by counsel.
Furthermore, it does not appear that counsel’s responses to Defendant’s questions
were objectively unreasonable.84
Fourth, Boyles asserts defense counsel was ineffective for refusing
Defendant’s request to file a motion to suppress.85 Again, in defense counsel’s letter
to Defendant, dated August 20, 2024, counsel explained that he did not “see a viable
suppression issue for the vehicle stop or search.”86 Based on the record, the Court
agrees.
Evidence is permissible in any prosecution if it is “legitimately obtained.”87
Had defense counsel filed a motion to suppress, the question before the Court would
81 D.I. 13; see also D.I. 33. 82 D.I. 11; see also D.I. 33. 83 D.I. 29. 84 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. 85 D.I. 22. 86 D.I. 29, Exhibit B. 87 Juliano v. State, 260 A.3d 619, 626 (Del. 2021).
17 have been whether the police had a valid reason for the initial stop of Defendant’s
vehicle. “Police may stop and detain a motorist whom they reasonably suspect of
criminal activity, which includes violation of our traffic laws.”88 “A determination
of reasonable suspicion must be evaluated in the context of the totality of the
circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in
the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with such an officers
subjective interpretation of those facts.”89 “In determining if there was reasonable
suspicion to justify a detention, the court defers to the experience and training of law
enforcement officers.”90 Here, officers observed Defendant braking erratically and
failing to maintain a lane,91 in violation of 21 Del. C. §4122.92 Therefore, a
legitimate reason to stop the vehicle was established, and no basis exists to suppress
body worn camera footage which recorded the interaction. Further, Defendant’s
suggestion that he was not of danger to others because there were no other vehicles
on the road is without merit, as he had a passenger in his vehicle at the time of the
stop.93
Defendant has provided the Court with no argument or basis upon which a
motion to suppress should have been filed. Considering the facts in this case, filing
88 Houston v. State, 251 A.3d 102, 108-09 (Del. 2021) (internal citations omitted). 89 Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 861 (Del. 1999) (internal citations omitted). 90 Flowers v. State, 195 A.3d 18, 27 (Del. 2018) (internal citations omitted). 91 D.I. 33. 92 21 Del. C. §4122. 93 D.I. 22, 33.
18 a motion to suppress would have been frivolous with virtually no likelihood of
succeeding. An attorney does not have an obligation to file frivolous motions;
rather, he has an obligation not to file frivolous motions.94 Defense counsel's failure
to file a frivolous motion was objectively reasonable and cannot be found to
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. For these reasons, this claim has no
merit.
Fifth, Defendant alleges defense counsel was ineffective by acting “as a
liaison for the State” to coerce Defendant into pleading guilty to a sixth DUI offense.
As noted above, the State provided defense counsel and Defendant with notice of
the State’s discovery of Boyle’s fifth DUI offense in its supplemental discovery on
August 5, 2024.95 In defense counsel’s letter to Defendant, dated August 20, 2024,
he explains that Defendant’s fourth DUI conviction should have been his fifth DUI
conviction and that Defendant “received the benefit of never having to serve the
sentence for a 5th DUI (3-5 years with a 18 months minimum mandatory) when [he]
took the plea to the 4th DUI which should have really been [Defendant’s] 5th DUI.”96
Nothing in the record or provided by Boyles demonstrates that defense counsel was
94 State v. Pandiscio, 1995 WL 339028, *5 (Del. Super. May 17, 1995), aff'd, 670 A.2d 1340, 1995 WL 715627 (Del. Oct. 25, 1995) (Table); see also Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” 95 See D.I. 33, D.I. 14. 96 D.I. 29, Exhibit B.
19 acting as an instrument or liaison of the State. Moreover, Defendant agreed to the
State’s description of his prior criminal record on the Immediate Sentencing Form
and that he was subject to sentencing for a DUI 6 th at the time he entered his
voluntary plea.97 As such, this claim is also without merit.
Sixth, Defendant alleges that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
pursue concurrent sentences for the DUI 6th and CCDW convictions.98 As the plea
agreement indicates, the sentencing recommendation was a joint recommendation
by the parties.99 Boyles as well as defense counsel signed the plea agreement, which
manifests his agreement to the terms set forth therein. Were defense counsel to argue
for a sentence other than that which was agreed upon would have been a breach of
the plea agreement.100 Additionally, such a pursuit by defense counsel would be a
violation of both his ethical duties owed to the Court, as well as professional
standards of abiding by the terms of a plea agreement.101 Moreover, a court’s
imposition of consecutive sentences, when it has the discretion to do so, does not in
97 D.I. 20. 98 D.I. 22. 99 D.I. 20, Final Case Review at 21, D.I. 29, D.I. 33. 100 See State v. Colburn, 2016 WL 3248222, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 1, 2016); citing United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 516, 521–24 (3d Cir. 2007) (review of a defendant's alleged breach of a plea agreement by failure to abide by agreed-upon sentencing recommendation requires application of basic principles of contract law); Chavous v. State, 953 A.2d 282, 286–87 (Del. 2008) (adopting Williams standard of review of alleged breach of a plea agreement and noting that standard applies whether it is a defendant or the State that is alleged to have breached it). 101 State v. Colburn, 2016 WL 3248222, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 1, 2016); citing United States v. Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1995) (“When a defendant stipulates to a point in a plea agreement, he ‘is not in a position to make ... arguments [to the contrary].’ ”).
20 and of itself evidence ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.102 Because
the parties agreed to the joint recommendation (which was adopted by the Court),
and pursuit of alternative sentencing by defense counsel would have been a violation
of his ethical obligations, as well as cause for the State’s entire withdrawal of the
agreement,103 this claim, too, has no merit.
Finally, Defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective by failing to
explain the terms of the plea agreement, which were “misleading” and
“ambiguous.”104 The fact that the sentencing judge is not bound by the sentencing
recommendation set forth in the plea agreement does not render the agreement itself
ambiguous as Defendant suggests. Boyles’ signatures on the Plea Agreement,
Truth-In-Sentencing Form, and Immediate Sentencing Form are proof that he
understood the terms he was agreeing to, as well as the possible sentencing.105
Moreover, Defendant testified at the Final Case Review that he understood the terms
of each,106 and the Court accepted his plea only after finding it to be made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.107 Accordingly, this claim has no merit.
102 See State v. Guilford, 2025 WL 2181471, at *11 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 2025). 103 See State v. Colburn, 2016 WL 3248222, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 1, 2016); citing United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 972–73 (7th Cir. 2014) (defendant's material breach of a plea agreement excuses the government's obligation to recommend the guideline, or government may “elect to terminate the entire agreement or seek to enforce the remainder of the contract”). 104 D.I. 22. 105 D.I. 20, Plea Agreement, Truth-In-Sentencing Form, Immediate Sentencing Form. 106 Final Case Review at 8-14. 107 Id. at 14.
21 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Boyles’ Motion for Postconviction Relief should
be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
_____________________________ The Honorable Janine M. Salomone
oc: Prothonotary cc: Matthew A. Casale, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General Timothy J. Weiler, Esquire, Office of Defense Services Randall B. Boyles, Jr. (SBI #00198783)