State v. Boyle

9 La. Ann. 371
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 15, 1854
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 9 La. Ann. 371 (State v. Boyle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Boyle, 9 La. Ann. 371 (La. 1854).

Opinion

Ogden, J.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of murder, and having been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death, appeals to this court for relief. The record contains a bill of exceptions to the opinion of the Judge of the court below, overruling a motion which was made for a continuance. This bill of exceptions states, “the defendant also insisted that he i ad not had suf-ib ient legal notice of the trial of this cause, and makes the Sheriff’s return a part of this bill of exceptions.” The return of the Sheriff incorporated in the bill of exceptions, is his return of service on the prisoner, of a copy of the indictment and list of the jury, which by the 35th section of the Statute of 1805, it is required, should be delivered to the prisoner at least two entire days before he shall he tried. This return shows the service to have been made on the 23d of April, and the trial of the prisoner took place on the 26th of April. One of the days intervening was Sunday; and we are called on to decide, whether the two entire days allowed to the prisoner under the statute, between [372]*372the service of the indictment and jury list, and his trial, are judicial days or exclusive of Sunday. That ground is not specially stated in the bill of exceptions, but we consider it substantially embraced in the objection made, that he had not sufficient notice of the trial, as shown by the Sheriff’s return of the service of copy of the indictment and jury list. There could be no other object in the law requiring this service to be made on the prisoner, except to enable him to prepare for his defence and to ascertain the character of the jury summoned to try him. Sunday, is declared by a statute of the State to be a day of rest, and this is a recognition by law of the divine commandment to abstain from secular employment on that day. ' Considering the object and intention of the statute according to the prisoner two entire days from the service on him of the indictment and jury list, must have been solely to enable him to exercise within that delay, proper diligence in securing the attendance of witnesses, communicating with his counsel, and otherwise preparing for his defence, we cannot consider Sunday, which is set apart by law as a day of rest, as included within the delay thus accorded to him. In civil proceedings, our law has, in some cases, expressly declared Sunday to be included, and in others to be excluded in the delays fixed for doing certain acts. However the rule may be in civil cases, we think, unless expressly included by the statute, Sundays must be excluded, when a certain number of days is allowed to a defendant in criminal cases.

On this ground, we feel bound to reverse the judgment of the court below, and order a new trial.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Campbell, J.,

(with whom concurred Buchanan, J.)

In this case, a copy of the indictment and a list of the jury were served on the defendant in prison on Friday, the 23d of April, 1853. He was tried on Monday, the 26th of April.

By the 35th section of the Act of 1805, it is provided that, in capital cases, a copy of the indictment and a list of the jury who are to pass on his trial, shall be delivered to him at least two entire days, before he shall be tried. The defendant objected to go to trial on the ground, that he had not received sufficient legal notice of the trial of the cause.

On these facts, two questions arise:

1st. Had the accused due notice of trial ?

2d. Was he served with a copy of the indictment and a list of the jury at least two entire days before the trial ?

I. Although there is no statute in this State, expressly requiring a notice of trial in criminal cases, it is evident that the accused cannot exercise the rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution and laws of Louisiana, without such a notice. How can he practically exercise the right given to him by the 35th section of the Act of 1805, to produce lawful witnesses in Ms defence, and to “ home process to compel Ms witnesses to appear on Ms trial," unless he first receive notice of the time and place of trial ? How can he, without such notice, enjoy the right, secured to him by the 103d Article of the Constitution, “of Toeing heard Toy himself or counsel;" of “ meeting the witnesses face to face;" and of having “ compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in Ms favor ?" Similar questions might be asked concerning other legal and constitutional provisions. These are sufficient, however, to show that the accused is entitled to have notice, that is to say, to be informed of the time and place, when and [373]*373where he is to be tried. No statute prescribes any precise form of giving this notice or information. But the Constitution and laws necessarily imply that notice of trial must be given in criminal cases.

Nemo inauditus punitur. It is indeed a principle pervading our free institutions, that no one is to be condemned unheard. “ Whenever justice is fully and impartially administered, it must be a fundamental rule, that the party impleaded shall have due notice of when and where, and against what, he is to defend himself.” This is the language of an American jurist. “ Justice requires, if there be no notice, or if it be insufficient,- — -there having been in truth no trial — that the verdict be set aside, unless the defendant have waived it. Want of due notice therefore has been held to be a proper ground for a motion for a new trial.” Graham on New Trials. And this is the law of criminal as well as of civil cases. In Rex v. Bear, 2 Salk. 646, the court says : In cases of acquittal, on indictments for libel, new trials were never allowed, unless the acquittals were procured by fraud or mal-practiee. “ In indictments for perjury, we never do it because the verdict is against evidence; but if you prove a trick, as no notice, it is otherwise.” So in an information in the exchequer, against Stevens & Frail, the court held, that each defendant, though they were partners in trade, and the charge against them was for smuggling, was entitled to a separate notice of trial, and Frail not having been served, the verdict was set aside, and a new trial was granted as to both defendants. 8 Price, 72.

Upon a motion for a now trial, on account of the insufficiency of the notice, the court shall inquire whether the defendant was misled or prevented from preparing his defence, or injured and deprived of any legal or constitutional right thereby; and should grant or refuse the motion in the exercise of a sound legal discretion.

I see no reason to believe that the defendant in this case, had not due notice of trial, or was deprived of any right, unless he was not served with a copy of the indictment, and a list of the jury in due time. And this leads to examine, whether the ttoo entire days, mentioned in the Statute of 1805, are to be interpreted as judicial days, exclusive of Sundays.

II. If this were res integra, I would unhesitatingly pronounce the two days mentioned in the statute, to mean judicial days. In general, when a certain number of days is allowed for pleading, &c., Sundays are reckoned the same as other days, in England and in the United States. But it would be an error to suppose that Sunday is dies non juridicus, only for matters to be transacted in court. The maxim is, dies dominicus non est juridicus. The Lord’s day is not the law’s day.

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Related

State v. Waldron
54 So. 1009 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1911)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 La. Ann. 371, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-boyle-la-1854.