State v. Boykin

Ohio Court of Appeals

State v. Boykin

2012 Ohio 1090

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedMarch 16, 2012

Docket24479

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 2012 Ohio 1090 (State v. Boykin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Boykin, 2012 Ohio 1090 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Boykin, 2012-Ohio-1090.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 24479 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2010-CR-1559 v. :

: KEITH BOYKIN : (Criminal Appeal from : (Common Pleas Court) Defendant-Appellant : : ...........

OPINION

Rendered on the 16th day of March, 2012.

...........

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Atty. Reg. #0069384, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, P.O. Box 972, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

JEFFREY T. GRAMZA, Atty. Reg. #0053392, Talbott Tower, Suite 1210, 131 North Ludlow Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

.............

FAIN, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Keith Boykin appeals from his conviction and sentence 2

for Felonious Assault. Boykin contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to

represent himself at trial. He further contends that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to

Vacate Verdict and Order a New Trial, which was based upon an allegation of juror misconduct.

{¶ 2} We conclude that Boykin did not explicitly and unequivocally seek to represent

himself at trial and that his motion, made on the day of trial, was untimely. We further

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Boykin’s motion for a new

trial, because Boykin merely raised a “possibility” that a juror may have known him, his family

or the victim. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.

I

{¶ 3} Boykin was indicted on one count of Felonious Assault with a deadly weapon

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and one count of Felonious Assault (Serious Harm) in

violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). Counsel was appointed and the matter was set for jury trial to

begin October 25, 2010. However, at the final pre-trial conference held on October 19, counsel

requested to be removed from the case. The motion was granted, and new counsel was

appointed. The trial date was continued to January 19, 2011 with a final pre-trial date of

January 11.

{¶ 4} Moments prior to the start of trial, Boykin appeared in chambers with counsel,

stated that he no longer wished to be represented by current counsel, and informed the trial court

that he would hire new counsel. When his request was denied, Boykin made a statement that

he would represent himself. The trial court denied the motion for new counsel and informed

Boykin that current counsel would continue to represent him. The matter then proceeded to

trial.

{¶ 5} Following trial, Boykin was convicted as charged. Thereafter, Boykin filed a 3

Motion to Vacate Verdict and Order a New Trial. In that motion Boykin alleged that after the

verdict he was “informed by his brother that it is likely that Juror Number 12 has had previous

interactions with [Boykin] and more specifically has had direct contact with Mr. Boykin’s

family and it is likely to assume [sic] had prior contact with the victim in this matter because of

the relationship between [Boykin’s] family and the victim’s family.” The motion admitted that

Boykin’s brother had been present in the courtroom on the first day of trial. Boykin alleged

that his brother did not share this information with him until after the verdict. Boykin

submitted his own affidavit in support of the motion in which he averred as follows:

1. I was notified by my brother, Eric Boykin and cousin, Reggie

McCollough, that they knew Juror Number 12 and that he knew them.

2. They informed me that Juror Number 12 probably knew who I was

because they reported that he had been over my [sic] relative’s home when I was

present in the past.

3. I believe that there is a strong possibility that Juror Number 12 knew

me or my family and that he may also have known the victim in this matter, since

our families were so close.

4. I believe that Juror Number 12 was not honest in jury selection.

{¶ 6} The trial court overruled the motion. At sentencing the trial court merged the

two convictions and sentenced Boykin to a prison term of six years. From his conviction and

sentence, Boykin appeals.

II

{¶ 7} Boykin’s First Assignment of Error is as follows: 4

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

DENYING DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF AT

{¶ 8} Boykin contends that the trial court should have granted his request to represent

himself at trial. In support, he argues that he “was able to articulate his reasons for his election

to self-representation, i.e. that he believed his counsel was going to cause him to be found guilty

and sent to prison, that his counsel was not acting in [his] best interest, that he and his counsel

did not see eye to eye on things, that his counsel ‘scared’ him with discussion of what sentence

he would receive if he went to trial, [which] shows that his request was not made for purposes of

delay or manipulation of the trial process.” Thus, Boykin claims that the trial court’s decision

is “reversible error per se” and not subject to a harmless error analysis.

{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘a defendant in a state criminal

trial has an independent constitutional right of self-representation and * * * may proceed to

defend himself without counsel when he voluntarily, and knowingly and intelligently elects to

do so.’ ” State v. Cassano, 96 Ohio St.3d 94, 2002-Ohio-3751, 772 N.E.2d 81, ¶ 32, quoting

State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366, 345 N.E.2d 399 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus.

“ ‘The constitutional right of self-representation is waived if it is not timely and unequivocally

asserted.’ ” Cassano at ¶ 38, quoting Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888

(9th Cir. 1990). “If a trial court denies the right to self-representation, when properly invoked,

the denial is per se reversible error.” Citations omitted. Id. at ¶ 32. “To establish an

effective waiver of the right to counsel, ‘the trial court must make sufficient inquiry to

determine whether [the] defendant fully understands and intelligently relinquishes that right.’ ”

Id., quoting Gidion, 45 Ohio St.2d 366. Paragraph two of the syllabus. Citations omitted. 5

{¶ 10} We have reviewed the record and note that at the start of trial proceedings,

Boykin indicated that he no longer wanted his appointed counsel to represent him. The trial

court addressed the matter in chambers, at which point Boykin indicated that he and counsel

“don’t see eye to eye on anything.” Boykin specifically mentioned that he wanted to take a “lie

detector test” and that he wanted to argue self-defense. Boykin also mentioned that his

attorney “scared” him when he started talking about the possible sentence differences between a

plea bargain and a jury conviction. Boykin admitted to the trial court that he had known about

these disagreements for “a couple of weeks.” He also stated that he wanted “a real lawyer.”

At that point, the following colloquy took place:

THE COURT: From what I have heard you tell me with the jury out there

waiting, that is an insufficient reason for you to say - -

THE DEFENDANT: He’s going to send me to jail, Judge Hall. I’m –

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI