Glass, J.
The defendant, Terrence Boyd, was charged in a substitute information with the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54e,1 burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2), larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-124 (a) (1) and larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-122 (a) (3). All of the charges stemmed from the murder of Ann Viner during the burglary of her home in New Canaan, [134] on December 10,1986. After a trial to a jury of twelve, the defendant was found guilty on all of the charges except larceny in the first degree. On January 21,1988, the defendant was sentenced to an effective prison term of forty-five years.
The defendant’s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding probable cause to prosecute him for felony murder. Specifically, at a joint probable cause hearing, the state offered evidence against the defendant and his codefendant, Tyrone Wilson.2 Neither the defendant nor Wilson took the stand and, in effect, the only evidence offered by the state implicating the defendant in Ann Viner’s murder was a written statement made by Wilson.3 In particular, Wilson claimed in his statement that, while both he and the defendant participated in the burglary of the Viner residence, it was the defendant who killed Ann Viner.
The defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted Wilson’s statement for the following reasons: (1) the statement was hearsay and did not come under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule; and (2) admission of the statement violated his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Thus, the defendant asserts, and [135] the state concedes, that without Wilson’s statement, there was insufficient evidence offered by the state to find probable cause to prosecute the defendant for felony murder.
In assessing the defendant’s claim, we must undertake several levels of inquiry. First, because the defendant received a fair trial,4 we must resolve the question of whether appellate review of the trial court’s probable cause determination is warranted in this case. If so, we must then determine whether the trial court erred in admitting Wilson’s statement at the probable cause hearing.
I
Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, provides in part that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.” In State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 331, 512 A.2d 140 (1986), we held that “appellate review of the determination of probable cause is essential to fulfilling the purpose of [article first, § 8].” Furthermore, we stated that “an invalid finding of probable cause at such a hearing undermines the court’s power to hear the case at trial.” Id., 332.
Moreover, in Mitchell, we held that the standard for determining whether probable cause exists is “ ‘whether the government’s evidence would warrant a person of [136] reasonable caution to believe that the accused [had] committed the crime.’ ” Id., 336. We further noted that, when a defendant claims the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to meet this standard, “we must examine the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to determine whether it was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of probable cause.” Id., 335. In our recent decision of State v. McPhail, 213 Conn. 161, 170, 567 A.2d 812 (1989), we reaffirmed this principle, stating: “[I]mplicit in our decision [in Mitchell] was an understanding that, at the very least, insufficiency of the evidence presented at the probable cause hearing will deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, thus rendering moot any subsequent prosecution and conviction.”
Therefore, even though the defendant received a fair trial, appellate review of his claim that the state presented insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to prosecute him for felony murder is mandated.
II
The defendant’s first ground for claiming that the trial court erred in admitting Wilson’s statement is that the statement is hearsay and does not fall under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.5 General Stat[137] utes § 54-46a (b),6 the implementing legislation for article first, § 8, states that at a probable cause hearing “[t]he court shall be confined to the rules of evidence.”7 The state concedes that Wilson’s statement is hearsay, but argues that it is admissible as a third party statement against penal interest or, alternatively, is admissible under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.
[138] “In State v. DeFreitas, [179 Conn. 431, 450, 426 A.2d 799 (1980)], we adopted a rule, consistent with Chambers v. Mississippi, [410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed 2d 297 (1973)], and in accord with rule 804 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,8 which provides that trustworthy third party statements against penal interest which are exculpatory to the defendant are admissible if the declarant is unavailable.” State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 692, 523 A.2d 451 (1987); see State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 630, 431 A.2d 501, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980). In the present case, however, Wilson’s statement does not exculpate the defendant but, rather, clearly inculpates the defendant.
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Glass, J.
The defendant, Terrence Boyd, was charged in a substitute information with the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54e,1 burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2), larceny in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-124 (a) (1) and larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-119 and 53a-122 (a) (3). All of the charges stemmed from the murder of Ann Viner during the burglary of her home in New Canaan, [134] on December 10,1986. After a trial to a jury of twelve, the defendant was found guilty on all of the charges except larceny in the first degree. On January 21,1988, the defendant was sentenced to an effective prison term of forty-five years.
The defendant’s principal argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding probable cause to prosecute him for felony murder. Specifically, at a joint probable cause hearing, the state offered evidence against the defendant and his codefendant, Tyrone Wilson.2 Neither the defendant nor Wilson took the stand and, in effect, the only evidence offered by the state implicating the defendant in Ann Viner’s murder was a written statement made by Wilson.3 In particular, Wilson claimed in his statement that, while both he and the defendant participated in the burglary of the Viner residence, it was the defendant who killed Ann Viner.
The defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted Wilson’s statement for the following reasons: (1) the statement was hearsay and did not come under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule; and (2) admission of the statement violated his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. Thus, the defendant asserts, and [135] the state concedes, that without Wilson’s statement, there was insufficient evidence offered by the state to find probable cause to prosecute the defendant for felony murder.
In assessing the defendant’s claim, we must undertake several levels of inquiry. First, because the defendant received a fair trial,4 we must resolve the question of whether appellate review of the trial court’s probable cause determination is warranted in this case. If so, we must then determine whether the trial court erred in admitting Wilson’s statement at the probable cause hearing.
I
Article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended, provides in part that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for any crime, punishable by death or life imprisonment, unless upon probable cause shown at a hearing in accordance with procedures prescribed by law.” In State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 331, 512 A.2d 140 (1986), we held that “appellate review of the determination of probable cause is essential to fulfilling the purpose of [article first, § 8].” Furthermore, we stated that “an invalid finding of probable cause at such a hearing undermines the court’s power to hear the case at trial.” Id., 332.
Moreover, in Mitchell, we held that the standard for determining whether probable cause exists is “ ‘whether the government’s evidence would warrant a person of [136] reasonable caution to believe that the accused [had] committed the crime.’ ” Id., 336. We further noted that, when a defendant claims the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to meet this standard, “we must examine the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing to determine whether it was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of probable cause.” Id., 335. In our recent decision of State v. McPhail, 213 Conn. 161, 170, 567 A.2d 812 (1989), we reaffirmed this principle, stating: “[I]mplicit in our decision [in Mitchell] was an understanding that, at the very least, insufficiency of the evidence presented at the probable cause hearing will deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, thus rendering moot any subsequent prosecution and conviction.”
Therefore, even though the defendant received a fair trial, appellate review of his claim that the state presented insufficient evidence to establish probable cause to prosecute him for felony murder is mandated.
II
The defendant’s first ground for claiming that the trial court erred in admitting Wilson’s statement is that the statement is hearsay and does not fall under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.5 General Stat[137] utes § 54-46a (b),6 the implementing legislation for article first, § 8, states that at a probable cause hearing “[t]he court shall be confined to the rules of evidence.”7 The state concedes that Wilson’s statement is hearsay, but argues that it is admissible as a third party statement against penal interest or, alternatively, is admissible under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule.
[138] “In State v. DeFreitas, [179 Conn. 431, 450, 426 A.2d 799 (1980)], we adopted a rule, consistent with Chambers v. Mississippi, [410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed 2d 297 (1973)], and in accord with rule 804 (b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,8 which provides that trustworthy third party statements against penal interest which are exculpatory to the defendant are admissible if the declarant is unavailable.” State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 692, 523 A.2d 451 (1987); see State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 630, 431 A.2d 501, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1980). In the present case, however, Wilson’s statement does not exculpate the defendant but, rather, clearly inculpates the defendant.
This court has never extended the principles of DeFreitas to include inculpatory as well as exculpatory trustworthy third party statements against penal interest. The state argues that we should now so extend DeFreitas. We decline, however, to do so. The state accurately cites to several federal jurisdictions that have held that trustworthy third party statements, that are inculpatory to the defendant, are admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Candoli, 870 F.2d 496, 509 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S. Ct. 704, 79 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1984); United States v. [139] Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1111, 103 S. Ct. 742, 74 L. Ed. 2d 962 (1983); United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834, 103 S. Ct. 77, 74 L. Ed. 2d 75 (1982). These jurisdictions only admit third party inculpatory statements, however, if such statements are corroborated by circumstances that indicate trustworthiness. See, e.g., United States v. Candoli, supra; United States v. Katsougrakis, supra; United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, supra, 1098; United States v. Alverez, 584 F.2d 694, 699, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
Significantly, courts have failed to find sufficient indicia of trustworthiness surrounding inculpatory statements, made against a codefendant by a third party in police custody, to warrant their admission. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 127-28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819, 102 S. Ct. 100, 70 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1981); United States v. SarmientoPerez, supra, 1102; United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alverez, supra, 701-702; United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 345-46 (3d Cir. 1978). As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted in United States v. Palumbo, supra, 127: “The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence has warned, in particular, that the courts should exercise special caution when the statement was made by a defendant in police custody and against a co-defendant. ‘Whether a statement is in fact against interest,’ the committee observed, ‘must be determined from the circumstances of each case. Thus a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest.’ Advisory Committee Note to Rule 804 reprinted in 4 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, at 804-24.” See State v. Gold, supra, 635. In United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, supra, the [140] Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that in such situations there exists “obvious motives for falsification— the very natural desire to curry favor from the arresting officers, the desire to alleviate culpability by implicating others, the enmity often generated in a conspiracy gone awry, the desire for revenge, all might lead an arrestee-declarant to misrepresent or to exaggerate the role of others in the criminal enterprise.”9
In the present case, Wilson’s statement implicated his codefendant, and was made to the police while Wilson was in custody. Furthermore, at the probable cause hearing no evidence was offered that corroborated Wilson’s statement to the extent that it implicated the defendant in Ann Viner’s murder. Therefore, even if we were to extend the principles of DeFreitas to encompass inculpatory third party statements, Wilson’s statement lacks sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be admissible.
In addition, Wilson’s statement was not admissible under the catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. Under the catch-all exception a court may admit a statement that is technically hearsay and does not fall within the traditional hearsay exceptions, provided: “(1) there is a ‘reasonable necessity’ for the admission of such statement, and (2) the statement is supported by ‘an adequate basis of assurance that the evidence has those qualities of reliability and trustworthiness attributed to other evidence admissible under long-established exceptions to the hearsay rule. . . .’ ” C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed.) § 11.25, [141] p. 414; see State v. Stepney, 191 Conn. 233, 249-50, 464 A.2d 758 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S. Ct. 1455, 79 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984); State v. Reardon, 172 Conn. 593, 597-98, 376 A.2d 65 (1977). Thus, it is clear from our above examination of Wilson’s statement, that it lacks the requisite “reliability and trustworthiness” to be admissible under the catch-all exception.
In conclusion, we hold that Wilson’s statement was inadmissible on evidentiary grounds.10 Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the statement at the defendant’s probable cause hearing. Thus, since Wilson’s statement was the only evidence offered by the state at the probable cause hearing that effectively implicated the defendant in Ann Viner’s murder, and since our decision in State v. McPhail, supra, 170, states that “insufficiency of the evidence presented at the probable cause hearing will deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,” the defendant’s subsequent prosecution and conviction is rendered moot. 11
[142] There is error, the judgment of conviction of felony murder is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
In this opinion Healey and Hull, Js., concurred.