State v. Booker

2025 Ohio 2595

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: July 24, 2025
• Docket: 114521
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Booker, 2025-Ohio-2595.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 114521 v. :

SHERITA Q. BOOKER, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 24, 2025

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-688564-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mikayla Ortiz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Sherita Q. Booker (“Booker”) appeals her

convictions for having a weapon while under disability (“HWWUD”) and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. She raises the following assignments of error

for review:

Assignment of Error I: There was insufficient evidence produced at trial to support a finding of guilt on all counts.

Assignment of Error II: The trial court sitting as fact-finder lost its way by finding the defendant guilty against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Booker’s convictions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The matter before us is a reindicted case in which Booker was charged

with HWWUD and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle resulting from

a traffic stop in Middleburg Heights on May 28, 2022.1 The following evidence was

presented at a bench trial.

Middleburg Heights police officer Nicholas Spronz (“Officer Spronz”)

testified that on May 28, 2022, around 9:00 p.m., he conducted a traffic stop on the

entrance ramp to Interstate-71 from Bagley Road. He observed Booker, who was

driving an Audi SUV, run a red light on Bagley Road. Officer Spronz was wearing

his body camera at the time, and video of the traffic stop was played for the court.

In the video, Officer Spronz can be observed approaching the Audi SUV and asking

Booker for her driver’s license and proof of insurance. Booker handed Officer

Spronz her license, showed him her proof of insurance, and told Officer Spronz that

the car was a private rental. Officer Spronz testified that Booker’s license check

1 Both Counts 1 and 2 included a forfeiture-of-a-weapon specification. came back as suspended. As a result, Officer Spronz could not allow Booker to drive

the vehicle home and asked her to exit it so it could be towed. According to Officer

Spronz, officers typically do an inventory of the vehicle prior to the tow.

In the video, Officer Spronz can then be observed asking Booker, who

was standing at the side of the road at this point, if there was anything on her person

or in the car he should know about before allowing Booker to get her cell phone.

Booker replied, “[M]y husband’s gun is in there and I meant to take it out.” (State’s

exhibit No. 3.) Booker then said that the gun “is in the glove compartment” and “it

actually [belongs] to my stepfather, it’s his gun.” (State’s exhibit No. 3.) Booker said

that the glove compartment was “locked” and she also had some marijuana in the

car. (State’s exhibit No. 3.) However, Booker can then be observed opening the

glove compartment without using a key showing Officer Spronz where the firearm

was located. Officer Spronz can be observed removing the cartridge, which

appeared to be loaded and removing a bullet from the chamber. Officer Spronz

testified that Booker would have been able to reach the firearm from the driver’s

seat. The firearm was determined to be loaded and was later tested and found to be

operable.2

Booker and her stepfather Curtis Watkins (“Watkins”) testified for

the defense. Watkins testified that he borrowed Booker’s car the night of the

incident. According to Watkins, the gun that was found in the SUV was his. On the

2 The parties stipulated that Booker had prior conviction for drug possession that

disabled her from having a firearm. day in question, Watkins testified that around 7:30 p.m. he drove Booker’s vehicle

to the store and placed the gun in the glove compartment. Afterwards, he came back

home and returned the vehicle back to Booker, forgetting that his firearm was still

in the glove compartment. Approximately 30 minutes later, he realized that he did

not have his gun. Watkins called Booker and told her that he left his firearm in the

glove compartment. Booker told him that she was going to bring it back to him.

Booker testified that on the day in question she gave Watkins her keys

so he could go to the store. When Watkins returned home, he returned the keys to

her. Booker left at that point to return to the hotel room she was renting. She

stopped at the gas station on her way to the hotel room. Booker acknowledged that

she knew the gun was in the glove compartment once Watkins contacted her around

8:15-8:30 p.m., and that she was not allowed to have a gun. Watkins told her “the

gun is in the car, I forgot to take it out of the glove compartment; when you get a

chance, bring it back.” (Tr. 60.) Booker told him that she would call him back but

she “never made it to the hotel room for [her to even] call [Watkins] and say come

and get [your] gun.” (Tr. 60.) Approximately an hour later, Booker was pulled over

for running the red light. According to Booker, she did not know her driver’s license

was suspended because she was “renting a car and in order for you to rent these cars

your license [has] to be valid.” (Tr. 53.)

Following the conclusion of trial, the court found Booker guilty of

both counts, ordered her to forfeit the gun, and sentenced her to a total of two years

of community-control sanctions. It is from this order that Booker appeals, raising two assignments of

error for review.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

prosecution met its burden of production at trial. State v. Bowden, 2009-Ohio-

3598, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). An appellate court’s function when reviewing sufficiency is to

determine “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77,

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

With a sufficiency inquiry, an appellate court does not review whether

the State’s evidence is to be believed but whether, if believed, the evidence admitted

at trial supported the conviction. State v. Starks, 2009-Ohio-3375, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). A sufficiency-of-the-

evidence argument is not a factual determination, but a question of law. Thompkins

at 386.

In State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-3311, the Ohio Supreme Court

cautioned:

But it is worth remembering what is not part of the court’s role when conducting a sufficiency review. It falls to the trier of fact to ‘“resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” [State v. McFarland, 162 Ohio St.3d 36, 2020-Ohio-3343, 164 N.E.3d 316, ¶ 24], quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Thus, an appellate court’s role is limited. It does not ask whether the evidence should be believed or assess the evidence’s “credibility or effect in inducing belief.” State v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13, citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541. Instead, it asks whether the evidence against a defendant, if believed, supports the conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring).

Id. at ¶ 16.

In the first assignment of error, Booker argues there was insufficient

evidence to support her convictions for HWWUD and improperly handling a firearm

in a motor vehicle. She contends that the State’s own witnesses failed to establish

the fundamental elements of the crimes charged.

In order to convict Booker of HWWUD, the State was required to

present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Booker “knowingly acquire[d],

ha[d], carr[ied], or use[d] any firearm or dangerous ordnance, if . . . [Booker] . . . has

been convicted of any felony offense involving the illegal possession, use, sale,

administration, distribution, or trafficking in any drug of abuse[.]” R.C.

2923.13(A)(3). To convict Booker of improperly handling a firearm in a motor

vehicle, the State was required to present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that

Booker “knowingly transport[ed] or ha[d] a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in

such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without

leaving the vehicle.” R.C. 2923.16(B).

Booker argues the evidence was insufficient because of the absence of

the following: (1) “knowledge” — essentially she claims that she did not have “actual knowledge” of the gun, but rather assumed it was in the glove compartment of the

vehicle because she never physically opened the glove compartment to check for it

after Watkins told her that he left it in the car; (2) “dominion and control” — Booker

claims that she never had possession of the gun because she never physically

handled it; and (3) “ready at hand” — Booker asserts that the gun was not “ready at

hand” or conveniently accessible. The State counters that (1) the Ohio Revised Code

does not require “actual knowledge” and that knowledge of a fact can be based on

the circumstances surrounding the situation; (2) Booker had constructive

possession over the gun, and as the driver of the vehicle, the gun was within arm’s

reach and in her control; and finally (3) “ready at hand” is not a requirement under

statute. We find the State’s arguments more persuasive.

1. Knowledge

A person acts knowingly

when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.

R.C. 2901.22(B).

Booker argues she did not genuinely know that there was a gun in the

car because she never confirmed if the gun was actually in the glove compartment

by opening it to verify what Watkins told her. Instead, she claims she took Watkins’s words at face value, assumed there was a gun, and relayed that information to the

police.

Contrary to Booker’s assertions, “actual knowledge” is not required.

R.C. 2901.22(B) states that knowledge of a fact can be based on circumstances and

knowledge can be established “if a person subjectively believes that there is a high

probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose

to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B). This is precisely what the evidence

demonstrates in the matter before us.

Watkins called Booker around 8 p.m. and told her that he accidentally

left his gun in the glove compartment of her vehicle. The moment Watkins told

Booker is the moment she had knowledge of the gun in the glove compartment. She

did not need to verify if the firearm was actually in her vehicle. Booker’s own

testimony confirms that she believed that the firearm was in the glove compartment

when Watkins called her. Booker testified:

[STATE]: So you knew the gun was in the glove compartment –

[BOOKER]: When he contacted me, yes.

(Tr. 59.) Booker further testified:

[STATE]: So you’re at the gas station and you chose to get back in the car knowing the gun was in the glove compartment?

[BOOKER]: Yes, because I had to get home.

(Tr. 61.)

Additionally, the body-camera video demonstrates Booker’s

knowledge of the gun. When asked by Officer Spronz if there was anything on her person or in the car he should know about before allowing Booker to get her cell

phone, Booker replied, “[M]y husband’s gun is in there and I meant to take it out.”

(State’s exhibit No. 3.) Booker then said that the gun “is in the glove compartment”

and “it actually [belongs] to my stepfather, it’s his gun.” (State’s exhibit No. 3.) In

the video, Booker said that the glove compartment was “locked” and can then be

observed opening the glove compartment by only pressing a button and showing the

officer where the firearm was located.

It is clear from Booker’s own words and actions that she had

knowledge of the gun in her vehicle.

2. Dominion and Control

Booker next argues the State failed to introduce any evidence that she

actually exercised any dominion or control over the gun itself. In support of her

argument, she cites to two cases — State v. Duganitz, 76 Ohio App.3d 363 (8th Dist.

1991), and State v. Hardy, 60 Ohio App.2d 325 (8th Dist. 1978) — for the

proposition that the evidence in the instant case was insufficient to demonstrate that

she exercised dominion and control over the gun.

In Duganitz, the appellant, who was the driver of a vehicle, was

convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. After a traffic stop, the police found a gun

in the car, under a blanket between the driver’s and passenger’s seat. On appeal,

this court reversed the conviction, finding that

the record does not contain any direct evidence of Duganitz’s ownership, possession, or control of the weapon. The extent of the circumstantial evidence, in this case, is first that the appellant exited the car quickly. The appellant was the driver of the car. He allegedly made a statement that he was in the area to buy some crack cocaine. The time was approximately five o’clock a.m. The appellant also denied ownership of the weapon. The weapon was found in a place in the car accessible to both the appellant and passenger.

Id. at 369-370.

In reaching its decision, the Duganitz Court relied on Hardy. In

Hardy, the appellant was convicted of HWWUD. The appellant was an employee at

a beverage store, who was approached by another employee. This employee claimed

that he needed money for rent. The appellant informed the employee that he would

give him an advance at the end of the day. Thereafter, an altercation between the

two of them ensued that resulted in the appellant picking up a rifle located in the

corner and wounding the employee. On appeal, the Hardy Court found that

appellant did not “have” the weapon prior to the point when he grabbed it. This

court reasoned that

[i]n order to “have” a firearm, one must either actually or constructively possess it. Actual possession requires ownership and, or, physical control. Constructive possession may be achieved by means of an agent.

The facts in the case at bar demonstrate only that appellant, along with other employees, had knowledge of and physical access to a loaded rifle. The record fails to disclose any evidence demonstrating that appellant ever exercised dominion or the sort of control over the weapon that comes with ownership or actual possession. Nor was there a showing that the unidentified owner had ever given appellant permission to use the weapon.

(Emphasis in original.) Id. at 327.

In footnote 3, the Hardy Court expounded on its rationale, stating: The record does not contain any direct evidence of ownership, possession or control of the weapon by the appellant. The extent of the circumstantial evidence is contained in a statement made by appellant to the police in which he admitted knowledge that the rifle was “always ready to fire.” This evidence, however, is insufficient on which to base a finding that the weapon was actually or constructively possessed by the appellant. There are other reasonable explanations for knowledge concerning the readiness of the rifle for firing; e.g., he could have been informed of this fact by the store owner, or he may have seen the owner or other employees use the weapon.

It may well be that if further evidence had been adduced, the prosecutor could have developed a case establishing that appellant “had” the weapon. However, with the record in this posture, such a conclusion is not the only reasonable inference which could be drawn.

Id.

We find these cases distinguishable. Unlike in Duganitz and Hardy,

there is sufficient evidence in this case to find that Booker had constructive

possession of the gun. Constructive possession may be established by

demonstrating that

the defendant was able to exercise dominion or control over the items, even though the items may not be within the defendant’s immediate physical possession. State v. Wolery (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 348 N.E.2d 351; see, also, State v. Brown, 8th Dist. No. 87932, 2007 Ohio 527, ¶ 7, citing State v. Hankerson (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 434 N.E.2d 1362, syllabus; State v. Messer (1995), 107 Ohio App.3d 51, 56, 667 N.E.2d 1022. Constructive possession may also be inferred when a person has dominion or control over the premises upon which the object in question is found and knows that the object is on those premises. State v. Scalf (1998), 126 Ohio App. 3d 614, 710 N.E.2d 1206. Further, a person may knowingly possess or control property belonging to another; the state need not establish ownership to prove constructive possession. See State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. No. 90751, 2008-Ohio- 5580.

Moreover, circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. State v. Mason (July 5, 2001), 8th Dist. No. 78606, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3019, citing Jenks, supra. State v. Bray, 2009-Ohio-6461, ¶ 23-24 (8th Dist.); see State v. Long, 2005-Ohio-

5344, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.)(“Ohio courts have routinely held that constructive possession

can be established by the fact that a defendant had access to a weapon and had the

ability to control its use.”), citing State v. Thomas, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 4545 (11th

Dist. Oct. 11, 1996); State v. Williams, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4467 (10th Dist. Sept.

30, 1997); State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316 (1976) (holding that physical

possession or ownership of the weapon is not necessary, and mere access to a

weapon can establish guilt). Moreover, whether a person “knowingly acquired, had,

carried, or used any firearm or dangerous ordnance ‘is to be determined from all the

attendant facts and circumstances available.’” Bray at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Teamer,

82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492 (1998).

After applying these standards, the facts establish that Booker had

constructive possession of the gun found in the car she was driving. Contrary to

Booker’s assertions, her own testimony establishes that she knew that the gun was

in the glove compartment of the car. In addition, Officer Spronz’s testimony

established that the gun was easily accessible from the driver’s seat. Although

Booker stated that the glove compartment was locked, according to Officer Spronz,

the glove compartment opened with the touch of a button on the dashboard and

Booker would have been able to reach the gun “[f]rom the driver’s seat[.]” (Tr. 28.)

Taking all of these circumstances into account: (1) Booker knew the

gun was in the vehicle after Watkins called her; (2) that the glove compartment was

within arm’s reach; and (3) the gun was easily accessible through the touch of a button, Booker exercised dominion and control over the gun and had constructive

possession of it.

3. Ready at Hand

Lastly, Booker argues that the gun was not “ready at hand” because

the gun was in the glove compartment, which required pressing a button on the

dashboard. In support of her argument, Booker relies on State v. Miller, 2003-

Ohio-6239 (2d Dist.) “Ready at hand,” however, is not a requirement under either

statute, and the Miller case Booker cites involves elements for a completely different

offense — carrying a concealed weapon. Therefore, we find Booker’s arguments

regarding “ready at hand” misplaced.

When viewing the foregoing evidence in a light most favorable to the

State, any rational trier of fact could have found that Booker knew of the gun and

had constructive possession of the gun, which was found in her glove compartment.

The evidence admitted at trial, if believed, supported her convictions for HWWUD

and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle.

Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.

B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In the second assignment of error, Booker argues the trial court lost

its way because she made the decision to refrain from even touching the gun in the

glove compartment, much less exercising any dominion over it.

In contrast to a challenge based on sufficiency of the evidence, a

manifest-weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence presented and questions whether the State met its burden of persuasion at trial. State v. Whitsett,

2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380; Bowden,

2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).

In our manifest-weight review of a bench trial verdict, we recognize

that the trial court is serving as the factfinder, and not a jury:

Accordingly, to warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest weight of the evidence claim, this court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in evidence, the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106842, 2019-Ohio- 340, ¶ 41 citing State v. Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602, 2009-Ohio- 3906, 918 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Kessler, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93340, 2010-Ohio-2094, ¶ 13.

State v. Crenshaw, 2020-Ohio-4922, ¶ 22-24 (8th Dist.).

Neverthelss, a conviction should be reversed as against the manifest

weight of the evidence only in the most “exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387.

This is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily

against the conviction. The trial court, as the factfinder, heard Booker’s own

testimony that she knew the gun was in the glove compartment, heard Officer

Spronz’s testimony that the gun was easily accessible, observed the traffic stop from

Officer Spronz’s body-camera footage, and found Booker guilty of both counts. We

cannot say that the trial court lost its way.

Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled. Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_____________________________ MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR