[Cite as State v. Bonifas, 2025-Ohio-5177.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT VAN WERT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 15-25-02 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ANTHONY J. BONIFAS, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Van Wert County Municipal Court Trial Court No. CRB 2400461
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 17, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Austin C. Buchholz for Appellant
John Hatcher for Appellee Case No. 15-25-02
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony J. Bonifas (“Bonifas”), appeals the
January 13, 2025 judgment of conviction and sentence of the Van Wert Municipal
Court.
{¶2} This case arises from an August 4, 2024 confrontation between Bonifas
and Alyiah Smith (“Smith”) culminating in Bonifas yelling “That’s it. I’m blowing
up your house.” On September 16, 2024, a complaint was filed in the Van Wert
Municipal Court charging Bonifas with a single count of aggravated menacing in
violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. At his initial appearance
on October 8, 2024, Bonifas entered a not-guilty plea.
{¶3} A trial to the court was held on January 10, 20251, at the conclusion of
which the trial court found Bonifas guilty as charged. The court proceeded
immediately to sentencing and Bonifas was sentenced to 90 days of local
incarceration, fined $100, and ordered to have no-contact with the victim for five
years. The trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction and sentence on January
13, 2025.
{¶4} On February 7, 2025, Bonifas filed his notice of appeal. He raises two
assignments of error, which we elect to address together.
1 We note that although the trial transcript references February 11, 2025, it appears that the trial was held on January 10, 2025.
-2- Case No. 15-25-02
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence presented at trial.
Second Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Bonifas argues that his conviction for
aggravated menacing was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. In his
second assignment of error, Bonifas argues that his conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Standards of Review
{¶6} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89
(1997). Accordingly, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶7} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997).
Consequently, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
-3- Case No. 15-25-02
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In
deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor
assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of
fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).
{¶8} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘[w]eigh[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524,
¶ 119.
-4- Case No. 15-25-02
Bonifas’s Conviction
{¶9} The trial court found Bonifas guilty of aggravated menacing in violation
of R.C. 2903.21(A). That statute provides, in relevant part:
No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person . . . or a member of the other person’s immediate family.
{¶10} As the statute indicates, the State was required to prove that
Bonifas acted knowingly, and pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), “[a] person acts
‘knowingly,’ regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the
person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature.” “Aggravated menacing does not require proof that the
defendant is able to carry out his or her threat or that the defendant intends
to carry out the threat or believes himself or herself capable of carrying it
out.” State v. Gardner, 2017-Ohio-7241, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). “Nor does it
require an ‘imminent fear of serious physical harm.’” Id., quoting State v.
Wetherby, 2013-Ohio-3442, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.). “It is sufficient if the defendant
knowingly causes the victim to believe the defendant will carry his or her
threat into execution.” Id.
Evidence at Trial
{¶11} At trial, Smith testified that she was 21 years old and lived at
903 Erie Street in Delphos, Van Wert County, Ohio. (Jan. 10, 2025 Tr. at 5,
7). Bonifas lived in the house two houses behind her for approximately ten
-5- Case No. 15-25-02
years. (Id. at 5-6). Smith recalled that she had a number of negative
interactions with Bonifas throughout that time, including Bonifas yelling at
her and the other neighborhood kids. (Id. at 7-8). Smith also recounted a
time when Bonifas threw eggs at her. (Id. at 8). Further, although Bonifas
had never previously physically assaulted Smith, she was aware of a situation
where Bonifas physically assaulted Smith’s cousin. (Id. at 8-9). Julie
Wagner, Smith’s mother, testified that in the ten years they have been
neighbors with Bonifas, there have been multiple “incidents” and that the
family has learned to keep their distance from him. (Id. at 40-41, 53-54).
{¶12} According to Smith, on August 4, 2024, she was standing
outside of her home when a white SUV drove past. (Id. at 9). Smith recalled
that the person in the passenger seat waved at her and, not immediately
recognizing the person as Bonifas, she did not wave back. (Id. at 9-10).
Smith testified that Bonifas then called her a “bitch,” which shocked Smith.
(Id. at 10).
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[Cite as State v. Bonifas, 2025-Ohio-5177.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT VAN WERT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 15-25-02 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ANTHONY J. BONIFAS, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Van Wert County Municipal Court Trial Court No. CRB 2400461
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: November 17, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Austin C. Buchholz for Appellant
John Hatcher for Appellee Case No. 15-25-02
MILLER, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Anthony J. Bonifas (“Bonifas”), appeals the
January 13, 2025 judgment of conviction and sentence of the Van Wert Municipal
Court.
{¶2} This case arises from an August 4, 2024 confrontation between Bonifas
and Alyiah Smith (“Smith”) culminating in Bonifas yelling “That’s it. I’m blowing
up your house.” On September 16, 2024, a complaint was filed in the Van Wert
Municipal Court charging Bonifas with a single count of aggravated menacing in
violation of R.C. 2903.21(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. At his initial appearance
on October 8, 2024, Bonifas entered a not-guilty plea.
{¶3} A trial to the court was held on January 10, 20251, at the conclusion of
which the trial court found Bonifas guilty as charged. The court proceeded
immediately to sentencing and Bonifas was sentenced to 90 days of local
incarceration, fined $100, and ordered to have no-contact with the victim for five
years. The trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction and sentence on January
13, 2025.
{¶4} On February 7, 2025, Bonifas filed his notice of appeal. He raises two
assignments of error, which we elect to address together.
1 We note that although the trial transcript references February 11, 2025, it appears that the trial was held on January 10, 2025.
-2- Case No. 15-25-02
First Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence presented at trial.
Second Assignment of Error
Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at trial.
{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Bonifas argues that his conviction for
aggravated menacing was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. In his
second assignment of error, Bonifas argues that his conviction was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
Standards of Review
{¶6} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89
(1997). Accordingly, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶7} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997).
Consequently, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a
-3- Case No. 15-25-02
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In
deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor
assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of
fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).
{¶8} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘[w]eigh[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524,
¶ 119.
-4- Case No. 15-25-02
Bonifas’s Conviction
{¶9} The trial court found Bonifas guilty of aggravated menacing in violation
of R.C. 2903.21(A). That statute provides, in relevant part:
No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person . . . or a member of the other person’s immediate family.
{¶10} As the statute indicates, the State was required to prove that
Bonifas acted knowingly, and pursuant to R.C. 2901.22(B), “[a] person acts
‘knowingly,’ regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the
person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a
certain nature.” “Aggravated menacing does not require proof that the
defendant is able to carry out his or her threat or that the defendant intends
to carry out the threat or believes himself or herself capable of carrying it
out.” State v. Gardner, 2017-Ohio-7241, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). “Nor does it
require an ‘imminent fear of serious physical harm.’” Id., quoting State v.
Wetherby, 2013-Ohio-3442, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.). “It is sufficient if the defendant
knowingly causes the victim to believe the defendant will carry his or her
threat into execution.” Id.
Evidence at Trial
{¶11} At trial, Smith testified that she was 21 years old and lived at
903 Erie Street in Delphos, Van Wert County, Ohio. (Jan. 10, 2025 Tr. at 5,
7). Bonifas lived in the house two houses behind her for approximately ten
-5- Case No. 15-25-02
years. (Id. at 5-6). Smith recalled that she had a number of negative
interactions with Bonifas throughout that time, including Bonifas yelling at
her and the other neighborhood kids. (Id. at 7-8). Smith also recounted a
time when Bonifas threw eggs at her. (Id. at 8). Further, although Bonifas
had never previously physically assaulted Smith, she was aware of a situation
where Bonifas physically assaulted Smith’s cousin. (Id. at 8-9). Julie
Wagner, Smith’s mother, testified that in the ten years they have been
neighbors with Bonifas, there have been multiple “incidents” and that the
family has learned to keep their distance from him. (Id. at 40-41, 53-54).
{¶12} According to Smith, on August 4, 2024, she was standing
outside of her home when a white SUV drove past. (Id. at 9). Smith recalled
that the person in the passenger seat waved at her and, not immediately
recognizing the person as Bonifas, she did not wave back. (Id. at 9-10).
Smith testified that Bonifas then called her a “bitch,” which shocked Smith.
(Id. at 10).
{¶13} Approximately 15 minutes later, Bonifas rode his bicycle by
Smith’s house while she was sitting outside. (Jan. 10, 2025 Tr. at 10-11).
Bonifas said something to Smith which, because she was listening to music
through headphones, she could not hear. (Id. at 11). Smith removed her
headphones and asked, “What did you say?” Bonifas replied, “You fucking
-6- Case No. 15-25-02
heard me.” (Id.). After Smith denied that she heard him, Bonifas stated,
“That’s it. I’m blowing your house up.” (Id.).
{¶14} Smith recounted that after making that statement, Bonifas
continued to his house. (Id. at 11-12). Smith testified that Bonifas’s actions
caused her to be “frightened for [her] life” because she was “scared that he
was going to do it.” (Id. at 12-13). Smith testified that Bonifas’s previous
actions and his anger toward her and other members of the neighborhood
factored into her belief that Bonifas would follow through with his threat.
(Id. at 20). Smith stated that the house she lives in is owned by her parents,
but she has resided with them there for over a decade. (Id. at 14).
{¶15} Patrolman Sarah Couch (“Patrolman Couch”) testified that on
August 4, 2024, she responded to Smith’s residence to investigate an incident
involving Bonifas and Smith. (Jan. 10, 2025 Tr. at 23-24). Patrolman Couch
stated that, prior to that time, she was familiar with Bonifas due to his
involvement in previous incidents. (Id.). According to Patrolman Couch,
when she arrived at the house, Smith was “beside herself” “terrified,” and
crying. (Id. at 24). After interviewing Smith and her family, Patrolman
Couch proceeded to interview Bonifas, who initially denied leaving the
house that day. (Id. at 26-27).
{¶16} After presenting these witnesses, the State rested its case. (Id.
at 55).
-7- Case No. 15-25-02
{¶17} The defense called one witness, Bonifas’s mother, Susan
Bonifas, who denied that Bonifas had issues with Smith or her family in the
past. (Jan. 10, 2025 Tr. at 58-60).
Analysis: Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶18} On appeal, Bonifas does not challenge the State’s evidence with
respect to the statements threatening to “blow up” Smith’s house or Smith’s belief
that Bonifas would carry through on his threat. Rather, Bonifas argues that because
Smith’s parents owned the house, rather than Smith, that the State did not establish
that Bonifas made a threat to Smith, a member of Smith’s immediate family, or
Smith’s property.
{¶19} However, “[a] [trier of fact] can make reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” State v. Knight, 2016-Ohio-8134, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). “‘It is permissible
for a jury to draw inferences from the facts presented to them.’” Id., quoting State
v. Sanders, 1998 WL 78787, *3 (6th Dist. Feb. 13, 1998), citing State v. Palmer, 80
Ohio St.3d 543, 561 (1997). Accordingly, even though Smith did not own the house
where she lived for the past decade, the trial court could have made an inference
that Bonifas, who had been her neighbor for many years, would have been aware
that Smith lived in that house with her parents and that her personal belongings were
inside. Further, Bonifas’s statement, “That’s it. I’m blowing up your house,” can
reasonably be understood to be a threat to the lives of Smith and her immediate
family who lived in the house, as well as their property.
-8- Case No. 15-25-02
{¶20} Accordingly, we reject Bonifas’s argument that his conviction for
aggravated menacing was not supported by sufficient evidence. Bonifas’s first
assignment is overruled.
Analysis: Manifest Weight
{¶21} In his second assignment of error, Bonifas argues that his conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of his motion, he relies
on the same arguments he made with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence. We
reject those arguments on the same grounds as we did in the discussion of the
sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶22} To the extent that Bonifas is attempting to argue that the trial court
erred by believing the State’s witnesses, we note that “[a] verdict is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence because the finder of fact chose to believe the
State’s [evidence] rather than the defendant’s version of the events.” State v.
Martinez, 2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). “‘Although we review credibility when
considering the manifest weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses is
primarily a determination for the trier of fact.’” State v. Cox, 2022-Ohio-571, ¶ 20
(3d Dist.), quoting State v. Banks, 2011-Ohio-5671, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d at paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘The trier of fact is best able to
“view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures[,] and voice inflections,
and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.”’”
State v. Brentley, 2023-Ohio-2530, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.), quoting Banks at ¶ 13, quoting
-9- Case No. 15-25-02
State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 24, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland,
10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80-81 (1984).
{¶23} We find that the record fully supports the trial court’s credibility
assessments, and we find no basis to alter its analysis. Having examined the record,
we do not conclude that the court lost its way when it returned a guilty verdict with
respect to the aggravated menacing charge. Accordingly, Bonifas’s second
assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Van Wert Municipal
ZIMMERMAN and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
-10- Case No. 15-25-02
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby
rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the
judgment for costs.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s
judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.
27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the
proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.
Mark C. Miller, Judge
William R. Zimmerman, Judge
John R. Willamowski, Judge
DATED: /jlm
-11-