NO. 82-457
I i V THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O f4O"LaTrlTJA F
STATE O F MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
SCOTT BOLT,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal f r o n : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Lake, The H o n o r a b l e J a c k L. G r e e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Ap2ellant:
C h r i s t i a n , IlcCurdy G Tdold; Donald I<. P e t e r s o n , P o l s o n , Nontana
For Resgondent :
!dike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Jlontana John F r e d e r i c k , County A t t o r n e y , P o l s o n , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 1.983
Decided: June 2 , 1983
-I_
Clerk Hr. J u s t i c e Frea J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
D e f e n d a n t B o l t a p p e a l s from t i l e order of the Fourth
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Lake C o u n t y , i m p o s i n g a s e n t e n c e o f
one y e a r i n j a i l f o r c r i m i n a l p o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s ,
a inisdemeanor. We affirm.
The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s of t h i s case, t h e d e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d t o a d e -
ferred imposition of sentence under section 45-9-102(5),
MCA. That s e c t i o n provides :
" A p e r s o n of t h e age of 21 y e a r s o r under c o n v i c t e d of a f i r s t v i o l a t i o n u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be presumed t o be e n t i t l e d t o a d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . "
A p p e i i a n t was t w e n t y y e a r s o f a g e a t t h e t i m e h e c o m m i t t e d
the drug-related misdemeanor o f f e n s e . L e s s t h a n o n e gram o f
h a s h i s h was f o u n d i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n d u r i n g a r o u t i n e s e a r c h
following visiting hours at the Swan River Youth Forest
Camp, where he was serving concurrent five-year sentences
f o r two f e l o n i e s c o m m i t t e d e a r l i e r i n 1982.
On J u l y 1 3 , 1 9 8 2 , a p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n
with t h e c r i m e of p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous drugs, a misde-
meanor, a s s p e c i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 45-9-102(1), MCA. Defense
counsel was appointed, and appellant entered a plea of
g u i l t y on J u l y 2 1 , 1 9 8 2 . A presentence r e p o r t d a t e d August
2, 1 9 8 2 , c o n c l u d e d t h a t " u n d e r 45-9-102 subsection ( 5 ) , t h i s
d e f e n d a n t i s presumed t o be e n t i t l e d t o a d e f e r r e d imposi-
t i o n of s e n t e n c e r e g a r d l e s s of t h e two p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c -
tions. I'
The District Court Judge initially followed the
report's recommendation and d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of sentence
t o r a p e r i o d of t h r e e y e a r s , commencing when s u p e r v i s i o n o f appellant in prison or on parole ceased. After hearing
argument on the county attorney's motion for reconsidera- tion, the court vacated the deferred imposition of sentence on August 4, 1982, and ordered appellant to serve one year imprisonment in the Lake County jail upon his release from
the state prison. The court concluded that the presumption of section 45-9-102(5), MCA, was overcome by defendant's prior felony convictions for burglary and criminal mischief. Presumption is defined in Rule 301(b), Mont.R.Evid.:
"A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or groups of facts . . ." Presumptions are classified in Rule 301(b), Mont.R.Evid., in
pertinent part: "(1) Conclusive presumptions are presump- tions that are specifically declared conclusive by statute ... "(2) All presumptions, other than conclu- sive presumptions, are disputable pre- sumptions and may be controverted. A disputable presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption. Unless the presumption is overcome, the trier of fact must find the assumed fact in accordance with the presumption. " Under the statute and the foregoing definition, defendant
was entitled to a presumption of deferred imposition of sentence because he was twenty years old at the commission ot his first offense involving dangerous drugs. However, that presumption in favor of deferred sen- tencing is not conclusive. It is a disputable presumption w h l c h may be overcome by other evidence. State v. Simtob (1969), 154 Mont. 286, 291, 462 P.2d 873, 876. The parties disagree as to the nature of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Appellant contends t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 45-9-102(5), MCA, "a
f i r s t v i o l a t i o n under t h i s s e c t i o n f n r e s t r i c t s t h e evidence
that can be considered in rebutting the presumption to
evidence surrounding t h e crime a t i s s u e o r evidence of o t h e r
offenses involving dangerous drugs. Respondent a s s e r t s t h a t
t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t o be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t a l l o t h e r e v i d e n c e
relevant to sentencing, and that the presumption remains
s u b j e c t t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e d u r e s and c r i t e r i a s e t f o r t h
i n T i t l e 4 6 , C h a p t e r 1 8 , P a r t s 1 and 2 , MCA.
The presumption in favor of deferred imposition of
s e n t e n c e f o r young v i o l a t o r s "may b e c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r
evidence, but unless so contradicted the presumption
controls." Campus v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 321, 326, 483
P.2d 275, 278, q u o t i n g S i m t o b , 1 5 4 Mont. a t 291, 462 P.2d at
876. If the t r i a l c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e presumption has n o t
been overcome, then the c o u r t ' s discretion i n sentencing a
young offender is limited by the Dangerous Drug Act to
d e f e r r i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of sentence. S t a t e v. D r e w ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,
158 Mont. 2 1 4 , 216-17, 490 P.2d 2 3 0 , 232.
The question here is whether the sentencing judge
abused his discretion in concluding that the statutory
p r e s u m p t i o n was o v e r c o m e by e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e young v i o l a t o r
had a felony record and was incarcerated at the time he
engaged i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t d r u g - r e l a t e d c r irninal a c t i v i t y .
By e n a c t i n g s e c t i o n 4 5 - 9 - 1 0 2 ( 5 ) , MCA [ f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n
54-133(5), R.C.M. 19471 the Legislature "intended t o give
b e n e f i t t o young v i o l a t o r s s o t h a t t h e i r f u t u r e s would n o t
b e d e s t r o y e d by a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n . " S i m t o b , 1 5 4 Mont. at
2 9 4 , 462 P.2d a t 877 ( H a r r i s o n , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . T h i s bene-
fit cannot be realized where the violator already has a felony conviction record t h a t w i l l o v e r s h a d o w any p r o s p e c -
tive damage that might result from a first drug-related
conviction.
I n Campus v . State ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 321, 327, 483
P.2d 275, 279, this Court enumerated four standards that
m u s t b e met i n o r d e r t o overcome t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n
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NO. 82-457
I i V THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O f4O"LaTrlTJA F
STATE O F MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
SCOTT BOLT,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal f r o n : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Lake, The H o n o r a b l e J a c k L. G r e e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Ap2ellant:
C h r i s t i a n , IlcCurdy G Tdold; Donald I<. P e t e r s o n , P o l s o n , Nontana
For Resgondent :
!dike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Jlontana John F r e d e r i c k , County A t t o r n e y , P o l s o n , Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : F e b r u a r y 1 0 , 1.983
Decided: June 2 , 1983
-I_
Clerk Hr. J u s t i c e Frea J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
D e f e n d a n t B o l t a p p e a l s from t i l e order of the Fourth
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Lake C o u n t y , i m p o s i n g a s e n t e n c e o f
one y e a r i n j a i l f o r c r i m i n a l p o s s e s s i o n of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s ,
a inisdemeanor. We affirm.
The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m -
s t a n c e s of t h i s case, t h e d e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d t o a d e -
ferred imposition of sentence under section 45-9-102(5),
MCA. That s e c t i o n provides :
" A p e r s o n of t h e age of 21 y e a r s o r under c o n v i c t e d of a f i r s t v i o l a t i o n u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l be presumed t o be e n t i t l e d t o a d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . "
A p p e i i a n t was t w e n t y y e a r s o f a g e a t t h e t i m e h e c o m m i t t e d
the drug-related misdemeanor o f f e n s e . L e s s t h a n o n e gram o f
h a s h i s h was f o u n d i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n d u r i n g a r o u t i n e s e a r c h
following visiting hours at the Swan River Youth Forest
Camp, where he was serving concurrent five-year sentences
f o r two f e l o n i e s c o m m i t t e d e a r l i e r i n 1982.
On J u l y 1 3 , 1 9 8 2 , a p p e l l a n t was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n
with t h e c r i m e of p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous drugs, a misde-
meanor, a s s p e c i f i e d i n s e c t i o n 45-9-102(1), MCA. Defense
counsel was appointed, and appellant entered a plea of
g u i l t y on J u l y 2 1 , 1 9 8 2 . A presentence r e p o r t d a t e d August
2, 1 9 8 2 , c o n c l u d e d t h a t " u n d e r 45-9-102 subsection ( 5 ) , t h i s
d e f e n d a n t i s presumed t o be e n t i t l e d t o a d e f e r r e d imposi-
t i o n of s e n t e n c e r e g a r d l e s s of t h e two p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c -
tions. I'
The District Court Judge initially followed the
report's recommendation and d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of sentence
t o r a p e r i o d of t h r e e y e a r s , commencing when s u p e r v i s i o n o f appellant in prison or on parole ceased. After hearing
argument on the county attorney's motion for reconsidera- tion, the court vacated the deferred imposition of sentence on August 4, 1982, and ordered appellant to serve one year imprisonment in the Lake County jail upon his release from
the state prison. The court concluded that the presumption of section 45-9-102(5), MCA, was overcome by defendant's prior felony convictions for burglary and criminal mischief. Presumption is defined in Rule 301(b), Mont.R.Evid.:
"A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or groups of facts . . ." Presumptions are classified in Rule 301(b), Mont.R.Evid., in
pertinent part: "(1) Conclusive presumptions are presump- tions that are specifically declared conclusive by statute ... "(2) All presumptions, other than conclu- sive presumptions, are disputable pre- sumptions and may be controverted. A disputable presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of evidence contrary to the presumption. Unless the presumption is overcome, the trier of fact must find the assumed fact in accordance with the presumption. " Under the statute and the foregoing definition, defendant
was entitled to a presumption of deferred imposition of sentence because he was twenty years old at the commission ot his first offense involving dangerous drugs. However, that presumption in favor of deferred sen- tencing is not conclusive. It is a disputable presumption w h l c h may be overcome by other evidence. State v. Simtob (1969), 154 Mont. 286, 291, 462 P.2d 873, 876. The parties disagree as to the nature of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Appellant contends t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y l a n g u a g e of s e c t i o n 45-9-102(5), MCA, "a
f i r s t v i o l a t i o n under t h i s s e c t i o n f n r e s t r i c t s t h e evidence
that can be considered in rebutting the presumption to
evidence surrounding t h e crime a t i s s u e o r evidence of o t h e r
offenses involving dangerous drugs. Respondent a s s e r t s t h a t
t h e p r e s u m p t i o n i s t o be w e i g h e d a g a i n s t a l l o t h e r e v i d e n c e
relevant to sentencing, and that the presumption remains
s u b j e c t t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e d u r e s and c r i t e r i a s e t f o r t h
i n T i t l e 4 6 , C h a p t e r 1 8 , P a r t s 1 and 2 , MCA.
The presumption in favor of deferred imposition of
s e n t e n c e f o r young v i o l a t o r s "may b e c o n t r o v e r t e d by o t h e r
evidence, but unless so contradicted the presumption
controls." Campus v. S t a t e ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 321, 326, 483
P.2d 275, 278, q u o t i n g S i m t o b , 1 5 4 Mont. a t 291, 462 P.2d at
876. If the t r i a l c o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e presumption has n o t
been overcome, then the c o u r t ' s discretion i n sentencing a
young offender is limited by the Dangerous Drug Act to
d e f e r r i n g t h e i m p o s i t i o n of sentence. S t a t e v. D r e w ( 1 9 7 1 ) ,
158 Mont. 2 1 4 , 216-17, 490 P.2d 2 3 0 , 232.
The question here is whether the sentencing judge
abused his discretion in concluding that the statutory
p r e s u m p t i o n was o v e r c o m e by e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e young v i o l a t o r
had a felony record and was incarcerated at the time he
engaged i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t d r u g - r e l a t e d c r irninal a c t i v i t y .
By e n a c t i n g s e c t i o n 4 5 - 9 - 1 0 2 ( 5 ) , MCA [ f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n
54-133(5), R.C.M. 19471 the Legislature "intended t o give
b e n e f i t t o young v i o l a t o r s s o t h a t t h e i r f u t u r e s would n o t
b e d e s t r o y e d by a f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n . " S i m t o b , 1 5 4 Mont. at
2 9 4 , 462 P.2d a t 877 ( H a r r i s o n , J . , d i s s e n t i n g ) . T h i s bene-
fit cannot be realized where the violator already has a felony conviction record t h a t w i l l o v e r s h a d o w any p r o s p e c -
tive damage that might result from a first drug-related
conviction.
I n Campus v . State ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 7 Mont. 321, 327, 483
P.2d 275, 279, this Court enumerated four standards that
m u s t b e met i n o r d e r t o overcome t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n
i n f a v o r of d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e :
" F i r s t , w e i n t e r p r e t i t t o mean t h a t t h e record i t s e l f must d i s c l o s e t h e e v i d e n c e , a s w e h e l d i n Simtob. Second, t h e e v i - d e n c e may be c o n t a i n e d e i t h e r w i t h i n o r w i t h o u t t h e p r o o f of t h e c r i m e i t s e l f . Third, the aggravating circumstances s h o u l d be some s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e o v e r and a b o v e t h e s i m p l e f a c t s o f a p r i m a f a c i e case. F i n a l l y , it is c l e a r t h a t t h i s C o u r t w i l l r e q u i r e h e a r i n g s and a record t o d i s c l o s e t h e aggravating evi- d e n c e , i f t h e r e be no e x p r e s s v o l u n t a r y waiver a s i n t h i s case."
First, we i n q u i r e "whether the record here d i s c l o s e s
a n y f a c t s t o overcome t h e s t a t u t o r y p r e s u m p t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n
the Dangerous Drug Act that defendant is entitled to a
d e f e r r e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . " S i m t o b , 1 5 4 Mont. a t 2 9 1 ,
4 6 2 P.2d a t 876. The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t a p p e l l a n t was a n
i n m a t e a t t h e Swan R i v e r Youth F o r e s t Camp a t t h e t i m e he
engaged in the illicit drug activity and that his prior
felony convictions related to two separate incidents of
f o r c e d e n t r y and v a n d a l i s m . N e i t h e r o f t h e s e f a c t s was con-
troverted. T h i s e v i d e n c e i s d i s c l o s e d f r o m t h e r e c o r d and
is c o n t a i n e d w i t h o u t p r o o f of t h e crime i t s e l f . Thus, the f i r s t two s t a n d a r d s f r o m Campus a r e s a t i s f i e d .
The n e x t i n q u i r y is w h e t h e r t h e s e a g g r a v a t i n g circum-
stances c o n s t i t u t e s u b s t a n t i a l evidence over and a b o v e t h e
s i m p l e f a c t s of t h e p r i m a f a c i e c a s e . A judge's belief that
a defendant lacked candor in responding t o q u e s t i o n s from the trial court is insufficient to classify it as one of
those aggravating circumstances necessary to overcome the
presumption f o r g i v i n g a d e f e r r e d s e n t e n c e . S t a t e v. B u r r i s
(1975), 1 6 8 Mont. 195, 198, 542 P.2d 1223, 1225. Nor are
a f f i d a v i t s accusing the defendant of p r i o r d e a l i n g s i n drugs
adequate aggravating evidence. S t a t e v. Harney ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 160
Mont. 5 5 , 6 2 , 499 P.2d 8 0 2 , 805-06. Here, u n l i k e i n B u r r i s
and B a r n e y , the a g g r a v a t i n g e v i d e n c e of defendant's incar-
ceration at the time of the o f f e n s e and h i s p r i o r felony
convictions constitute substantial evidence over and a b o v e
the simple facts of a prima facie case of possession of
dangerous drugs.
Last, the appellant had opportunity to rebut the
aggravating evidence contained i n the parole o f f i c e r ' s pre-
s e n t e n c e r e p o r t a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g and a t t h e h e a r i n g
on r e s p o n d e n t ' s m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . He f a i l e d t o d o
SO.
All four Campus c r i t e r i a have been m e t . We do n o t
hold that the rebutting evidence should be restricted to
evidence r e l a t i n g t o drug a c t i v i t i e s . Neither the s t a t u t o r y
l a n g u a g e n o r t h e c a s e law c o n t a i n s s u c h a r e s t r i c t i o n . This
is a case of a convicted felon engaging in subsequent
c r i m i n a l conduct d u r i n g confinement. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d
nor abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n determining t h a t t h e s e circum-
s t a n c e s w a r r a n t e d i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e .
For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , t h e s e n t e n c e is a f f i r m e d . We c o n c u r :
/I I2 '[\J,A-- . Justice