An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-269
Filed 21 January 2026
McDowell County, Nos. 21CR051229-580, 21CR051230-580, 21CR051231-580, 22CR000301-580
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JUSTIN TYLER BOLLINGER, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 January 2024 by Judge Reggie
E. McKnight in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20
November 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Erin Hukka, for the State.
Attorney John E. Ryan III for Defendant–Appellant.
MURRY, Judge.
Justin T. Bollinger (Defendant) appeals from his convictions for possession
with intent to sell or deliver a Scheduled II controlled substance, maintaining a
vehicle or dwelling place for controlled substances, and possession of a firearm by a
felon. On appeal, Defendant argues that he “was deprived [of] effective assistance of
counsel by counsel’s failure to move to suppress [his] inculpatory statements” to law STATE V. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court
enforcement officers. For the following reasons, we disagree and deny Defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim.
I. Background
Early in 2021, Defendant and his girlfriend, Ashliegh McCraw, leased a
property at 992 Fairview Road that included a large metal garage (Fairview
Property). McCraw moved a gun safe containing firearms and valuables into the
metal garage. Defendant and McCraw also purchased a camper and parked it on the
Fairview Property.
On 3 September 2021, officers with the McDowell County Sheriff’s Office
arrived at the Fairview Property to execute a search warrant for narcotics and stolen
firearms. The warrant instructed officers to locate Defendant. When the officers
arrived, they observed Defendant exiting the camper. The officers immediately
detained Defendant, handcuffed him, and advised him of his rights. Defendant
requested an attorney at this point.
After securing the scene, the officers searched the camper and found a small
bag containing methamphetamine. Upon finding a gun safe in the metal building, the
officers explained to Defendant that they were looking for narcotics and firearms, to
which Defendant denied having drugs in his safe. When the officers asked Defendant
if he would open the safe for them, he agreed to do so and opened it by typing in a
code on a keypad. Within the safe, the officers found seven firearms, one of which
formed the basis of the indictment; ammunition; $6,696 in cash; a container with
-2- STATE V. BOLLINGER
crystal residue; and multiple documents bearing Defendant’s name, including
Defendant’s car title and mail addressed to him. When speaking to law enforcement
about the safe, Defendant stated, “I don’t have no dope in my safe,” which the officers
understood as Defendant “claiming the safe to be his.” Additionally, the officers
recovered a money counter, packaging materials, unused bags, a digital scale, a
smoking pipe, and a lighter from the area around the safe. They also found a bill of
sale listing Defendant as the purchaser of the camper.
On 24 October 2024, a grand jury indicted Defendant for trafficking
methamphetamine,1 possession with intent to sell or deliver a Scheduled II controlled
substance, maintaining a vehicle or dwelling place for a controlled substance,
possession of a firearm by a felon, and obtaining habitual-felon status. On 16 January
2024, this case came on for trial. The State proceeded under the theory of constructive
possession for Defendant’s possession of firearm by felon. McCraw testified that
Defendant had access to the safe and knew the code. She also stated that Defendant
had a key to the metal building, could come and go as he wished, and spent a lot of
time at the Fairview Property.
Detective Alkire, one of the officers at the scene, testified to Defendant’s “exact
words” to law-enforcement as, “I don’t have dope in my safe.” Detective Alkire “noted”
Defendant’s statement “because[,] at that moment,” he believed Defendant had
1 The State dismissed this charge pre-trial.
-3- STATE V. BOLLINGER
“claim[ed] the safe to be his.” Detective Alkire confirmed this understanding by
further “not[ing] that [Defendant] did end up having a digital code, which he entered.”
Defense counsel did not move to suppress any of Defendant’s post-arrest statements
to the officers or object to their admission at trial.
On 18 January 2024, the jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to
sell or deliver a Scheduled II controlled substance, maintaining a vehicle or dwelling
place for a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant
then pleaded guilty to attaining habitual-felon status. The trial court sentenced him
to consecutive terms of 23–40 months and 83–112 months imprisonment. Defendant
timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
Generally, IAC claims “should be considered through motions for appropriate
relief and not on direct appeal.” State v. Stroud, 147 N.C. App. 549, 553 (2001).
Because “the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required,” this Court
has jurisdiction to determine Defendant’s IAC claim on direct review. State v. Fair,
354 N.C. 131, 166 (2001).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that his trial counsel “deprived [him of] effective assistance
of counsel by . . . fail[ing] to move to suppress [his] inculpatory statements” to law
enforcement officers. He asserts that the officers interrogated him when they asked
him to open the safe and thus compelled him to testify against himself. “[W]ithout
-4- STATE V. BOLLINGER
[his] overt and implied admissions” to his “ownership, dominion, and control of the
safe containing the guns,” including his possession of the safe and his knowledge of
its combination and contents, the State “likely . . . could not have prove[n] the
possession element in possession of firearm by felon.” For the following reasons, we
disagree and hold that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; accord
N.C. Const. art I, § 23, cl. 3 (Counsel Clause). To successfully claim IAC, Defendant
must establish both that (1) trial counsel’s deficient performance “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced
Defendant’s defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316 (2006).
To show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense,
Defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Allen,
360 N.C. at 316; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is that
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-269
Filed 21 January 2026
McDowell County, Nos. 21CR051229-580, 21CR051230-580, 21CR051231-580, 22CR000301-580
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JUSTIN TYLER BOLLINGER, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 January 2024 by Judge Reggie
E. McKnight in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20
November 2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Erin Hukka, for the State.
Attorney John E. Ryan III for Defendant–Appellant.
MURRY, Judge.
Justin T. Bollinger (Defendant) appeals from his convictions for possession
with intent to sell or deliver a Scheduled II controlled substance, maintaining a
vehicle or dwelling place for controlled substances, and possession of a firearm by a
felon. On appeal, Defendant argues that he “was deprived [of] effective assistance of
counsel by counsel’s failure to move to suppress [his] inculpatory statements” to law STATE V. BOLLINGER
Opinion of the Court
enforcement officers. For the following reasons, we disagree and deny Defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim.
I. Background
Early in 2021, Defendant and his girlfriend, Ashliegh McCraw, leased a
property at 992 Fairview Road that included a large metal garage (Fairview
Property). McCraw moved a gun safe containing firearms and valuables into the
metal garage. Defendant and McCraw also purchased a camper and parked it on the
Fairview Property.
On 3 September 2021, officers with the McDowell County Sheriff’s Office
arrived at the Fairview Property to execute a search warrant for narcotics and stolen
firearms. The warrant instructed officers to locate Defendant. When the officers
arrived, they observed Defendant exiting the camper. The officers immediately
detained Defendant, handcuffed him, and advised him of his rights. Defendant
requested an attorney at this point.
After securing the scene, the officers searched the camper and found a small
bag containing methamphetamine. Upon finding a gun safe in the metal building, the
officers explained to Defendant that they were looking for narcotics and firearms, to
which Defendant denied having drugs in his safe. When the officers asked Defendant
if he would open the safe for them, he agreed to do so and opened it by typing in a
code on a keypad. Within the safe, the officers found seven firearms, one of which
formed the basis of the indictment; ammunition; $6,696 in cash; a container with
-2- STATE V. BOLLINGER
crystal residue; and multiple documents bearing Defendant’s name, including
Defendant’s car title and mail addressed to him. When speaking to law enforcement
about the safe, Defendant stated, “I don’t have no dope in my safe,” which the officers
understood as Defendant “claiming the safe to be his.” Additionally, the officers
recovered a money counter, packaging materials, unused bags, a digital scale, a
smoking pipe, and a lighter from the area around the safe. They also found a bill of
sale listing Defendant as the purchaser of the camper.
On 24 October 2024, a grand jury indicted Defendant for trafficking
methamphetamine,1 possession with intent to sell or deliver a Scheduled II controlled
substance, maintaining a vehicle or dwelling place for a controlled substance,
possession of a firearm by a felon, and obtaining habitual-felon status. On 16 January
2024, this case came on for trial. The State proceeded under the theory of constructive
possession for Defendant’s possession of firearm by felon. McCraw testified that
Defendant had access to the safe and knew the code. She also stated that Defendant
had a key to the metal building, could come and go as he wished, and spent a lot of
time at the Fairview Property.
Detective Alkire, one of the officers at the scene, testified to Defendant’s “exact
words” to law-enforcement as, “I don’t have dope in my safe.” Detective Alkire “noted”
Defendant’s statement “because[,] at that moment,” he believed Defendant had
1 The State dismissed this charge pre-trial.
-3- STATE V. BOLLINGER
“claim[ed] the safe to be his.” Detective Alkire confirmed this understanding by
further “not[ing] that [Defendant] did end up having a digital code, which he entered.”
Defense counsel did not move to suppress any of Defendant’s post-arrest statements
to the officers or object to their admission at trial.
On 18 January 2024, the jury convicted Defendant of possession with intent to
sell or deliver a Scheduled II controlled substance, maintaining a vehicle or dwelling
place for a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant
then pleaded guilty to attaining habitual-felon status. The trial court sentenced him
to consecutive terms of 23–40 months and 83–112 months imprisonment. Defendant
timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
Generally, IAC claims “should be considered through motions for appropriate
relief and not on direct appeal.” State v. Stroud, 147 N.C. App. 549, 553 (2001).
Because “the cold record reveals that no further investigation is required,” this Court
has jurisdiction to determine Defendant’s IAC claim on direct review. State v. Fair,
354 N.C. 131, 166 (2001).
III. Analysis
Defendant argues that his trial counsel “deprived [him of] effective assistance
of counsel by . . . fail[ing] to move to suppress [his] inculpatory statements” to law
enforcement officers. He asserts that the officers interrogated him when they asked
him to open the safe and thus compelled him to testify against himself. “[W]ithout
-4- STATE V. BOLLINGER
[his] overt and implied admissions” to his “ownership, dominion, and control of the
safe containing the guns,” including his possession of the safe and his knowledge of
its combination and contents, the State “likely . . . could not have prove[n] the
possession element in possession of firearm by felon.” For the following reasons, we
disagree and hold that Defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; accord
N.C. Const. art I, § 23, cl. 3 (Counsel Clause). To successfully claim IAC, Defendant
must establish both that (1) trial counsel’s deficient performance “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) such deficient performance prejudiced
Defendant’s defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v.
Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 316 (2006).
To show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense,
Defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Allen,
360 N.C. at 316; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is that
which is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694, for which “a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” State v.
Lane, 271 N.C. App. 307, 313–14 (2020) (quotation omitted). “[T]hat counsel made an
error, even an unreasonable error, does not warrant reversal of a conviction unless
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been
-5- STATE V. BOLLINGER
a different result in the proceedings.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Thus, “[e]ven assuming trial counsel’s error fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, [the] defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Hope, 223 N.C. App. 468, 479
(2012) (quotation omitted).
This Court has held that an attorney’s “failure to file a motion to suppress is
not ineffective assistance of counsel where the search or stop that led to the discovery
of the evidence was lawful.” State v. Canty, 224 N.C. App. 514, 517 (2012). Assuming
error arguendo, Defendant fails to show that, “but for” this error, the jury would have
reached a different result. Braswell, 312 N.C. at 563 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). Put more simply, Defendant would fail to satisfy Strickland’s second prong
regardless of his ability to satisfy its first. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Under N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, a felon may not “possess, or have in his custody,
care, or control any firearm.” N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1(a) (2025). To obtain a conviction for
possession of a firearm by a felon, the State must establish that the defendant (1) has
been convicted of or has pled guilty to a felony and (2) possessed a firearm, subsequent
to the conviction or guilty plea. See State v. Taylor, 203 N.C. App. 448, 458–59 (2010).
A defendant has “constructive possession of the firearm when the weapon is not in
the defendant’s physical custody, but the defendant is aware of its presence and has
both the power and intent to control its disposition or use.” Id. at 459. Accordingly,
-6- STATE V. BOLLINGER
the State must “show other incriminating circumstances . . . to establish constructive
possession” “depend[ing] on the totality of the circumstances in each case” when a
defendant lacks exclusive possession of the firearm. Id.
Because the State advanced a theory of constructive possession, it had to prove
that Defendant had the “power and intent to control” the disposition or use of the
firearm. Id. at 458–59. Here, law enforcement officers could have opened the safe
upon Defendant’s consent or pursuant to the search warrant that included the safe.
Either way, the State could have offered evidence tending to show other incriminating
circumstances supporting constructive possession, such as Defendant’s mail and
personal effects found inside the safe. The State also offered McCraw’s testimony that
Defendant had access to the safe and knew the code. Even without Defendant’s
statements to law enforcement, the State offered sufficient evidence of constructive
possession. Therefore, any failure by defense counsel to move to suppress Defendant’s
comments would not have “undermine[d] confidence” in the jury’s verdict, Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694, or created “a reasonable probability” of a different result, Allen, 360
N.C. at 316. Thus, Defendant has failed to show prejudice.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons above, this Court holds that Defendant received effective
assistance of counsel.
DISMISSED.
Judges GRIFFIN and FREEMAN concur.
-7- STATE V. BOLLINGER
Report per Rule 30(e).
-8-