State v. Bleau

2025 Ohio 1951

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 30, 2025
• Docket: L-24-1128
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bleau, 2025-Ohio-1951.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio/ City of Toledo Court of Appeals No. L-24-1128

Appellee Trial Court No. CRB-24-01653

v.

Mariah Bleau DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: May 30, 2025

*****

Laurel A. Kendall, Esq., for appellant.

Rebecca Facey Prosecuting Attorney and Jimmie L. Jones, Esq., Assistant Prosecutor for appellee.

ZMUDA, J. I. Introduction

{¶ 1} Appellant, Mariah Bleau, appeals from the Toledo Municipal Court’s May

14, 2024 judgment convicting her of one count of trespassing and one count of resisting

arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. A. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On February 24, 2024, appellant was charged with one count of trespassing

in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) and one count of resisting arrest in violation of R.C.

2921.33(A). The incidents underlying the offenses occurred earlier that day at Toledo

Hospital in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio. Appellant appeared before the trial court on

February 26, 2024, and entered a not guilty plea to both charged offenses. She was then

determined to be indigent and was appointed defense counsel.

{¶ 3} Following discovery, the matter proceeded to a bench trial on May 14, 2024.

The arresting officer, Austin Jacobs, and appellant were the only witnesses called to

testify. A summary of their testimony follows:

Testimony of Officer Austin Jacobs

{¶ 4} At the time of trial, Officer Austin Jacobs had been employed as a police

officer at Promedica Toledo Hospital for two years. He was on duty on the morning of

February 24, 2024, when he was notified by dispatch that appellant was lying on a couch

in a hallway between the hospital’s “A” and “C” entrances. He and two other officers

were asked to go check on appellant to see if she needed help or was waiting on a ride.

Appellant informed Jacobs that she was waiting on a ride from the hospital. Jacobs and

the other officers directed appellant to entrance “C” as it was open 24 hours while

entrances “A” and “B’ would not permit entrance to the facility at that time. 1 A video of

1 Neither party elicited testimony regarding the time each of Jacobs’s multiple interactions with appellant occurred and the security videos played at trial are not time-

2. Jacobs’s initial interaction with appellant, without audio, was recorded by a security

camera in that hallway and was admitted into evidence, without objection, as part of the

state’s composite Exhibit A.

{¶ 5} Approximately an hour later, Jacobs again encountered appellant inside the

hospital. He asked her to verify that she had a ride coming to pick her up. Appellant

could not do so and Jacobs asked her to leave the property.

{¶ 6} Jacobs testified that he next encountered appellant, for a third and final time,

in the entrance to a stairwell leading to an underground parking garage. The entrance is

still located on hospital property and is on the “back part of the hospital” near entrances

“A” and “B.” Jacobs testified that appellant walked to this location after their second

interaction. Upon reaching the stairwell, he joined two other officers already speaking

with appellant. Jacobs informed appellant that she was under arrest for trespassing.

Appellant then “attempted to run away” from the officers. She was placed in handcuffs

and the officers called a female officer to search appellant for weapons. While she was

being searched, appellant continued to “pull away” from Jacobs and the female officer.

Jacobs noted that he had previously informed appellant prior to this third encounter that if

she did not leave the premises that she could be arrested for trespassing. A video of this

third incident was also recorded by a security camera and was admitted into evidence,

stamped. Appellant describes the initial interaction as occurring at approximately 3:00 a.m. with the second interaction occurring at approximately 4:00 a.m.

3. without objection, as part of the state’s composite Exhibit A. Jacobs’s did not offer any

specific testimony regarding the contents of either video.

{¶ 7} On cross-examination, Jacobs confirmed that he initially agreed to allow

appellant to remain on hospital property while she waited on her ride, as described in

their first interaction. He noted that after informing appellant to leave the property during

their second interaction, she vacated the hospital but did not leave the grounds. Instead,

she proceeded to the stairwell outside of the hospital but still remained on hospital

property. Jacobs also conceded that it was “quite cold” at the time appellant entered the

stairwell. He confirmed that appellant had been informed that she was under arrest before

trying to evade officers and pulling away from him while in handcuffs.

Testimony of Appellant Mariah Bleau

{¶ 8} Appellant began her testimony with a summary of the events that occurred

on February 24, 2024. On that date, appellant went to Toledo Hospital to receive

treatment for a knee injury. After completing her treatment, she found a hallway couch

to sleep on because she was homeless, had been kicked out of a homeless shelter, and did

not want to go outside due to inclement weather. At around 3:00 a.m., as she began to

fall asleep, Officer Jacobs approached her and asked what she was doing there. She

informed him that she did not have anywhere to stay and that she was waiting to have a

friend pick her up or that she would “catch the first bus.” She said Jacobs agreed that she

could stay in the hospital but he asked her to wait in a different part of the hospital.

4. {¶ 9} Once she arrived there, she found another bench. She did not cause any

“disturbance” but was again approached by Jacobs. He asked her to move “farther down

the hospital” but she believed they were still under the agreement that she could remain

in the building while waiting for her ride. She believed that the first bus would be

available “probably 6:00 a.m.-ish.” If the bus did not arrive by 7:00, she planned to leave

since it would be “light out” at that time. Appellant testified that there was a third

encounter with Jacobs inside the hospital2 but she did not offer any specific details about

that encounter.

{¶ 10} Appellant next described her final encounter with Jacobs. She testified that

she was “trying to leave the hospital” when she found the covered stairwell entrance. She

went inside the stairwell to obtain shelter from the weather. She believed that this should

not have been an issue of concern because she was not causing a disturbance and “[i]t’s a

public hospital.” She stated that when she entered the stairwell, she contacted a ride

share service. At this point, she claimed that the officers “rushed” her and arrested her.

{¶ 11} On cross-examination, appellant stated that she was not at the hospital

seeking treatment despite her prior testimony. She then alleged that her arrest was an

“abuse of litigation.”

2 Jacobs described only two encounters with appellant inside the hospital with a third encounter in the stairwell to the parking garage.

5. Closing Arguments, Verdict, and Sentencing

{¶ 12} At the conclusion of appellant’s testimony, the trial court heard closing

arguments. The state argued that Jacobs’s testimony showed that appellant was asked to

leave the property and declined to do so, satisfying the elements of trespass. The state

also argued that Jacobs’s testimony that when appellant was placed under arrest that she

was “pulling away, tugging, [and] trying to leave” satisfied the elements of resisting

arrest. Appellant argued that each of her encounters with Jacobs took place under their

initial agreement that she could wait at the hospital for her ride. She argued that her

arrest occurred when she was “leaving the property” in compliance with Jacobs’s

instructions and, therefore, she was not committing a trespass. She also argued that

Jacobs’s description of their encounter in the stairwell did not satisfy the elements of

resisting arrest.

{¶ 13} The trial court found appellant guilty on both counts. The trial court

concluded that appellant was aware, through her own testimony, that she had been asked

to leave the property but did not do so. The trial court also determined that appellant’s

attempt to walk or run away from Jacobs and her pulling away after being placed in

handcuffs showed that she had resisted her arrest. The trial court then sentenced

appellant to thirty days in jail, with all time suspended, and six months of unsupervised

probation.

B. Assignments of Error

{¶ 14} Appellant timely appealed and asserts the following errors for our review:

6. 1. [Appellant’s] conviction for criminal trespass was not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

2. In the alternative, the trial court committed plain error when it did not apply the common law defense of “necessity” to the offense of criminal trespass, when appellant was at the hospital, arguably rightfully, but homeless, in February, without transportation, and potentially exposed to injury when ejected from hospital property, into cold weather.

3. [Appellant’s] conviction for resisting arrest was not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

We review appellant’s second assignment of error first as it informs our analysis of

appellant’s remaining assignments of error. Additionally, because they are analyzed

under the same standard of review, we address appellant’s first and third assignment of

error jointly.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Appellant forfeited her affirmative defense of necessity to her trespass offense.

{¶ 15} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court

committed plain error when it failed to consider the affirmative defense of necessity to

the criminal trespass offense. Specifically, she argues that the trial court should have

considered that Toledo Hospital’s revocation of her privilege to remain on their property

would have exposed her to dangerous elements due to the cold temperatures. Appellant

concedes, however, that she did not raise this defense at trial.

{¶ 16} In support of her argument that the trial court committed plain error by not

considering the unalleged affirmative defense of necessity, appellant cites State v.

7. Marzette, 1999 WL 218159 (2d. Dist. April 16, 1999). There is no holding in Marzette,

or even a suggestion, that a trial court commits plain error when it fails to consider an

affirmative defense that the defendant did not raise at trial. Moreover, this court did not

find any authority in support of appellant’s argument. We do, however, find Marzette

instructive on this issue in that it held “the defense of necessity was not argued in the trial

court and accordingly cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Id. at 1. See also

State v. Talley, 2021-Ohio-2558 (6th Dist.) (holding that arguments raised for the first

time on appeal are barred by the doctrine of waiver); State v. Pimental, 2005-Ohio-384

(8th Dist.) (holding that affirmative defenses must be raised at trial or they are forfeited,

pursuant to R.C. 2901.05(C)(2)).

{¶ 17} Appellant’s failure to raise necessity as an affirmative defense to the

trespassing offense at trial precludes her from raising it for the first time in this appeal.

Further, there is no basis on which we can find error in the trial court’s failure to consider

this unalleged affirmative defense. As a result, we find appellant’s second assignment of

error not well-taken.

{¶ 18} We note that in her first and third assignments of error, appellant argues, in

part, that the inclement weather supports her argument that her convictions were against

the manifest weight of the evidence. Because the inclement weather relates to her

forfeited necessity defense, we do not consider it in our analysis of those assigned errors.

B. Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

8. {¶ 19} In her first and third assignments of error, appellant argues that her

convictions for criminal trespass and resisting arrest were against the manifest weight of

the evidence. “In a bench trial, the court assumes the fact-finding function of the jury.

Accordingly, to warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest weight of the

evidence claim, it must be determined that the court clearly lost its way and created such

a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.” State v. Hayes, 2004-Ohio-6460, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). “Due deference must be accorded the findings of the trial court

because the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,

gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of

the proffered testimony.” Id., citing State v. Archie, 2004-Ohio-4844 (6th Dist.).

Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v.

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). We find that appellant’s convictions

for trespassing and resisting arrest were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

i. Appellant’s trespassing conviction.

{¶ 20} A trespass occurs when a person, without privilege to do so, knowingly

enters or remains on the land or premises of another. R.C. 2911.21(A)(1); State v. Mills,

2023-Ohio-1094 (6th Dist.). “If a defendant’s presence at the property is initially lawful,

a trespass may nevertheless occur if the defendant’s privilege is revoked or terminated.

Id. at ¶ 22, citing State v. Petefish, 2011-Ohio-6367 (7th Dist.). Here, Jacobs’s testimony

9. shows that appellant’s presence in the hospital was initially lawful as he allowed her to

wait on a ride at entrance “C” following their initial encounter. Jacobs later advised

appellant that she could no longer wait for a ride and to vacate the premises. He also

advised her that if she did not leave, she would be subject to arrest. Appellant did not

leave the premises but instead walked to the covered stairwell leading to the hospital’s

parking garage. Jacobs then arrested her for trespassing.

{¶ 21} Appellant argues that her privilege had not been revoked at the time she

was arrested because she was still waiting for her ride when she entered the stairwell.

Alternatively, she argues that if her privilege had been revoked, she substantially

complied with Jacobs’s order to leave the property by moving to the stairwell. Appellant

cites no authority that allows for “substantial compliance” with an order to leave as a

defense to a trespassing offense. Further, Jacobs’s testimony shows that her privilege to

remain on the premises was explicitly revoked, while her own testimony acknowledges

that she was “asked to leave.” In light of this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court

lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding appellant guilty of

trespassing in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A). As a result, her conviction for trespassing

was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

ii. Appellant’s resisting arrest conviction.

{¶ 22} R.C. 2921.33(A) states “[n]o person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or

interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” A “lawful arrest” is an element of

the offense of resisting arrest. State v. Barker, 128 Ohio App.3d 233 (6th Dist. 1998).

10. Appellant argues that her conviction for resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33 was

against the manifest weight because the arrest was “arguably unlawful” because she “was

not causing a disturbance and was arguably simply trying to avoid exposure to the

elements while she waited for a bus[.]” She also argues that the evidence does not show

that she interfered with her own arrest even if it were deemed lawful.

{¶ 23} Having already concluded that appellant’s conviction for trespassing was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we find that her arrest for that offense

was lawful. Importantly, appellant’s argument that her arrest was unlawful because she

was not creating a disturbance attempts to add an element not found in the offense of

trespassing and is irrelevant to our analysis. Whether appellant remained on the property

peacefully or not has no bearing on whether her arrest for violating R.C. 2911.21(A) was

lawful.

{¶ 24} As to whether the evidence showed appellant resisted her lawful arrest,

Jacobs’s testimony showed that appellant either ran or walked away after being informed

that she was under arrest. Further, Jacobs testified that appellant continued to “pull

away” from him even after she was placed in handcuffs. Appellant offered no testimony

disputing Jacobs’s assertions. As a result, the trial court did not lose its way in finding

appellant guilty of resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A) and its judgment is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

11. {¶ 25} In sum, we find that appellant’s convictions for trespassing and resisting

arrest were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we find

appellant’s first and third assignments of error not well-taken.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 26} For these reasons, we find appellant’s first, second, and third assignments

of error not well-taken and we affirm the Toledo Municipal Court’s May 14, 2024

judgment.

{¶ 27} Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE

Myron C. Duhart, J. CONCURS. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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