State v. Bleam

2025 Ohio 4629

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: 16-25-02
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bleam, 2025-Ohio-4629.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT WYANDOT COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 16-25-02 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

BRENT M. BLEAM JR., OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Upper Sandusky Municipal Court Wyandot County Trial Court No. CRB2500034

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: October 6, 2025

APPEARANCE:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant Case No. 16-25-02

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Brent Bleam, Jr. (“Bleam”), appeals from the

February 19, 2025 journal entry issued by the Upper Sandusky Municipal Court,

sentencing him following his guilty plea to a first-degree misdemeanor offense.

Bleam argues the trial court did not properly explain to him the consequence and

effect of his guilty plea and erred in accepting his plea because it was not knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with

Bleam and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} Bleam was charged with committing domestic violence, in violation of

R.C. 2919.25(A), a first-degree misdemeanor. On February 14, 2025, the trial court

held an arraignment hearing. On the onset of the hearing, Bleam acknowledged he

had received and read a printed explanation of rights and plea options. He told the

trial court he had no questions about his rights or the available plea options. After

confirming that Bleam had received a copy of the Complaint, the trial court

explained the charge and potential fine and jail term that could be imposed. Bleam

said he understood—and had no questions about—the nature of the charge and the

possible penalties if he was convicted.

{¶3} Bleam told the trial court he wanted to plead guilty to the charge.

Critically for purposes of this appeal, the trial court then asked Bleam, “You

understand by entering a plea of guilty, it is a complete admission of your guilt as

-2- Case No. 16-25-02

to this charge?” (Feb. 14, 2025 Tr. at 6). Bleam responded, “Yes, sir.” (Id.). Bleam

then received and read a Waiver of Constitutional Rights form, and he informed the

trial court he did not have any questions about the document and understood it. He

then signed the document. Bleam confirmed he was not under the influence of any

medications, drugs, or alcohol at the time. The trial court found that Bleam

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered a plea of guilty, and it accepted

that plea.

{¶4} On February 19, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The

court sentenced Bleam to a $250 fine and 180 days in jail, with 130 days suspended

on the condition he complete a one-year period of community control. This appeal

followed.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶5} Bleam raises a single assignment of error for our review:

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred by accepting a plea which was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and did not properly explain the consequences and effect of the plea, and the rights being waived by entering the plea to the defendant, requiring that the plea be vacated and remanded to trial court for further proceedings.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law

{¶6} “Ohio’s Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to

follow when accepting pleas.” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11. The rule

-3- Case No. 16-25-02

“sets forth distinct procedures, depending upon the classification of the offense

involved.” State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, ¶ 11. In deciding if a defendant is

entitled to have his or her plea vacated, “the questions to be answered are simply:

(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the

court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that

excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a

showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶

16-17.

{¶7} “A trial court’s obligations in accepting a plea depend upon the level of

offense to which the defendant is pleading.” Jones at ¶ 6. In misdemeanor cases

involving petty offenses, Crim.R. 11 provides that the court shall not accept a guilty

plea without first informing the defendant of the effect of the plea. Crim.R. 11(E);

Jones at paragraph one of the syllabus (clarifying that, “[i]n accepting a plea to a

misdemeanor involving a petty offense, a trial court is required to inform the

defendant only of the effect of the specific plea being entered”). The trial court may

provide that information either orally or in writing. Jones at ¶ 51. Crim.R. 11(B)

sets forth the appropriate language for the trial court to use in satisfying “the

requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea.” Id. at paragraph two

of the syllabus. For example, the appropriate explanation for a guilty plea is: “The

plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(B)(1).

-4- Case No. 16-25-02

{¶8} Notably, with respect to cases involving only misdemeanor petty

offenses, a trial court is not required to fulfill the notice requirements set forth in

Crim.R. 11(C) (which apply to felony cases) or Crim.R. 11(D) (which apply to

misdemeanor cases involving serious offenses). State v. Vinka, 2019-Ohio-2007, ¶

6-7 (7th Dist.); State v. Halderman, 2025-Ohio-2253, ¶ 7, 9-10 (2d Dist.); see also

Jones at ¶ 23 (the effect of the plea is not defined by the requirements of Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c)). In other words, the trial court must fulfill additional requirements in

those cases that involve guilty pleas to crimes more serious than misdemeanor petty

offenses. State v. Watkins, 2003-Ohio-2419, ¶ 25-28.

B. Analysis

{¶9} Bleam makes two arguments in support of his assignment of error and

assertion that his guilty plea must be vacated. First, he contends the trial court failed

to ensure his plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered into because

he was not advised of the rights he was waiving by entering a plea and the effect of

the plea. Second, he attempts to bolster this argument by asserting that he may have

been suffering from mental health issues at the time of his plea. We address each

argument separately.

1. The trial court fulfilled its obligations in accepting Bleam’s guilty plea

-5- Case No. 16-25-02

{¶10} First, Bleam argues that, although he signed a written waiver of

constitutional rights, the trial court erred by failing to orally advise him of those

rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Bleam is mistaken.

{¶11} Bleam pleaded guilty to a single charge of domestic violence as a first-

degree misdemeanor. See R.C. 2919.25(D)(2). The maximum penalty was a fine

and a definite jail term of not more than one hundred eighty days. See R.C.

2929.24(A)(1). Pursuant to Crim.R. 2(C) and (D), Bleam’s offense was a “petty

offense.” Therefore, before accepting Bleam’s guilty plea, “the court was required

to inform [Bleam] that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.” Jones,

2007-Ohio-6093, at ¶ 25; see also Crim.R. 11(B)(1), (E). The trial court did so—

and much more—during the February 14, 2025 hearing before it accepted Bleam’s

guilty plea. The record demonstrates the trial court conducted a thorough plea

colloquy, which was reinforced by Bleam initially reading a printed explanation of

rights and plea options and, later, a written waiver form reviewed with Bleam and

signed on the record. Importantly, the trial court did review with Bleam that his

guilty plea was a complete admission of his guilt.

{¶12} Consequently, the trial court complied with the relevant provision of

Crim.R. 11 at issue in this appeal. Although it is perhaps the better practice, the

trial court was not required to advise him—orally or otherwise—of the rights set

forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2). That portion of the rule only applies to felony cases, and

-6- Case No. 16-25-02

Bleam relies on caselaw that is outdated to support his argument.1 See State v.

Smith, 2004-Ohio-1953, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.).

2. The record does not indicate Bleam’s mental health affected his decision to plead guilty

{¶13} Second, Bleam argues that the record indicates “his mental health”

may have presented a challenge to him at the time of the plea. (Appellant’s Brief at

7). Although it was not specifically required by the Criminal Rules to engage in an

extensive plea colloquy, the trial court did engage Bleam in a dialogue discussing

his rights and the circumstances of the domestic violence charge. Only after

accepting his plea, and discussing the issue of whether Bleam should be released on

bond while the case was awaiting sentencing, did Bleam mention that he suffered

from anxiety issues and PTSD for which he was previously prescribed medication.

{¶14} Based on our review of the record, there is no indication that Bleam’s

“mental health” requires the guilty plea to be vacated. Bleam said nothing in his

conversation with the trial court to arouse concerns about his mental health or lack

of understanding of the proceedings. Bleam was very familiar with the criminal

justice system, as evidenced by him referencing his previous “violent felonies.”

1 Specifically, Bleam cites to State v. James, 2001-Ohio-2200, 2001 WL 424285 (3d Dist. Apr. 26, 2001) and State v. Morrow, 2002-Ohio-2982 (3d Dist.). (See Appellant’s Brief at 4-5). In James, we found that “a defendant in a misdemeanor, petty offense must be advised of his constitutional rights as set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2).” James at *2. However, both of those cases were decided before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones and are no longer reliable precedent. See also Watkins, 2003-Ohio-2419, at ¶ 25-28 (“[f]or felony defendants, and only felony defendants, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) adds something extra and separate—the judge must also inform the defendant of all the rights attendant to the trial that he is foregoing” (emphasis in original)).

-7- Case No. 16-25-02

Additionally, Bleam actively participated in the plea process, admitted to grabbing

and pushing the victim, acknowledged that what he had done was wrong, and

apologized. Bleam mentioned he had previously taken anxiety and PTSD

medications, and he thought either counseling or being put on medication would

help him more than sitting in a jail cell. The record does not indicate Bleam did not

know and understand what he was doing by pleading guilty, or the consequences in

doing so, due to any mental health issue. In fact, he made a lengthy, reasoned

explanation of the circumstances surrounding the crime, his remorse, and his

feelings on the best way to be rehabilitated. Because the trial court conducted a

thorough plea colloquy, the court was able to both assess Bleam’s ability to

comprehend what was transpiring and could consider the information Bleam shared

in return. We find no error in the trial court’s acceptance of Bleam’s guilty plea.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignment of error is

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Upper Sandusky Municipal

Court.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

-8- Case No. 16-25-02

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /jlm

-9-