State v. Blanton

• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court
• Decided: June 15, 1998
• Docket: 01S01-9605-CC-00093
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED June 15, 1998 STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) FOR PUBLICATION ) Cecil W. Crowson Appellee, ) FILED: Appellate Court Clerk ) v. ) CHEATHAM COUNTY ) JAMES BLANTON ) HON. ALLEN W. WALLACE, JUDGE ) Appellant. ) NO. 01-S-01-9605-CC-00093

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

I join the majority in affirming the conviction of the

defendant on two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, three

counts of grand larceny, and three counts of first-degree burglary.

However, because I conclude that the punishment of death is

disproportionate under the record in this case, I respectfully

dissent.

The defendant argues that the “heinous, atrocious, and

cruel” aggravating circumstance cannot apply to him because there

is no evidence that he shot or stabbed Mrs. Vester. The majority

disposes of his argument by concluding that the evidence was

clearly sufficient to support the convictions. However, the

“sufficiency of the evidence” analysis, utilized to determine

whether to uphold a conviction, should not also be utilized to

uphold imposition of the death penalty. Clearly, its standard of

review is too deferential for use in this context. See State v.

Sutton, 761 S.W.2d 763, 764-65 (Tenn. 1988), cert. denied, 497 U.S.

1031, 110 S. Ct. 3287, 111 L. Ed.2d 796 (1990) (when determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review is whether,

after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). The death

penalty involves the most serious of all constitutional issues.

Consequently, evidence should be scrutinized closely when a court

is reviewing its imposition.

As stated, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that

the evidence is clearly sufficient to support the convictions, even

though there is no direct evidence that the defendant shot or

stabbed either victim. With respect to the sentence, however, I am

unwilling to acquiesce in the imposition of the death penalty

without a closer link between the defendant and the perpetration of

the crime. As Justice Reid noted in his dissent, the evidence does

not even necessarily place the defendant at the scene of the

killings as they were occurring. For this reason, I conclude that

“the defendant’s involvement or role in the murder[s],” a factor of

proportionality, is dispositive here. Because there is no direct

evidence that the defendant was present at the time of the

killings, I conclude that the penalty of death is disproportionate,

and indeed unconstitutional. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,

107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed.2d 127 (1987); State v. Branam, 855

S.W.2d 563, 570-71 (Tenn. 1993). Accordingly, I respectfully

___________________________________ ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., Justice