Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals from his conviction in Lancaster County District Court for driving while under a lifetime license suspension, a Class IV felony. He was sentenced to not less than 20 months’ nor more than 5 years’ imprisonment and fined $10,000.
Defendant’s driver’s license was permanently revoked on February 15, 1985, following his plea of guilty to a charge of driving while intoxicated, third offense. On January 30, 1987, defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under permanent revocation, a Class IV felony. On February 11 defendant was arraigned on that charge and entered a plea of not guilty.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the felony information in the district court on May 12, 1987. The motion alleged, in essence, that the previous sentence of permanent revocation (a necessary element for a conviction of the Class IV felony charge of driving while under permanent revocation) was void due to improper execution of sentence in the district court following an affirmance of the third-offense DWI conviction by this court on December 18, 1985. It was argued that the district court, as an intermediate appellate court, could not execute sentence on our mandate. Instead, defendant alleges, it was required that the county court must execute sentence following affirmance, since it was the original sentencing court on the third-offense DWI conviction.
On May 28,1987, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion. The district court overruled the motion to dismiss based on a finding that the attack on the third-offense DWI conviction and sentence was an improper collateral attack.
On June 11a bench trial was held on the Class IV felony [413]*413charge. Defendant made several motions at trial, continuing to attack the validity of the third-offense DWI conviction and sentence of permanent revocation. All motions were overruled, and defendant, following trial, was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under permanent license revocation.
We should note at this point that defendant also filed a motion to set aside conviction on June 10 in the district court for Lancaster County before Judge William D. Blue, the judge who presided over the district court appeal on the third-offense DWI conviction. That postconviction attack was premised upon the argument set forth above. The motion to set aside conviction was denied. Blankenfeld appealed that district court order to this court in case No. 87-661. Our recent decision in that case, found in State v. Blankenfeld, 228 Neb. 611, 423 N.W.2d 479 (1988), is partially dispositive of some issues raised on this appeal and will be referred to later in this opinion.
Defendant’s brief in this case assigns several errors, which can be summarized as follows: The district court erred in (1) ruling that defendant’s motions to dismiss constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a prior conviction, and (2) ruling that the prior conviction for third-offense DWI was a final judgment at the time the mandate was issued from this court. Finally, defendant alleges that the district court erred in finding that Blankenfeld was not a fit and proper candidate for probation.
In addition to the assigned errors, this court noted at oral arguments that the record in the case revealed an additional issue that required attention. We noted a variance between the information in this case and the proof offered at trial. On April 27, 1988, this court entered an order setting the case for reargument on the following issues: “Is the variance between the information and proof fatal to the convictions? Alternatively, is the language which describes the specific violations which resulted in the permanent suspension mere surplusage?” Briefs were submitted by both parties, and reargument was heard on Monday, June 6,1988.
We will first address the issues presented on reargument. The record reveals that the defendant was charged by information with “driving while under a lifetime suspension: 39-669.08 F [414]*414IV.” Specifically, the information alleged that
Jim D. Blankenfeld on or about the 25th day of December 1986 . . . did[,] being a person whose Nebraska driver’s license has been permanently revoked pursuant to subdivision (c) of subsection 4 of Neb. Rev. Stat, Section Number 39-669.08, operate a motor vehicle on the street or highways of this state.
This court discovered a disparity between the allegation that Blankenfeld was a person whose license was permanently revoked pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.08(4)(c) (Reissue 1984) and the proof. The record submitted in this case, as well as this court’s records relating to Blankenfeld’s previous third-offense DWI appeal (case No. 85-520), establishes that the defendant’s driver’s license was permanently revoked pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(3) (Reissue 1984), in other words, for a third-offense DWI conviction.
Sections 39-669.07 and 39-669.08 contain similar and often identical language. Although § 39-669.07 relates to driving under the influence of alcohol and § 39-669.08 relates to refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test or a chemical test of one’s blood, breath, or urine, both statutes provide identical provisions for conviction of a Class IV felony if a person is found to be operating a motor vehicle while under permanent revocation. (For the sake of clarity, we note at this point that both statutes, as of April 19, 1986, allow for a 15-year license revocation instead of the previous lifetime revocation.)
Section 39-669.07(3) provides in part: “Any person operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his or her operator’s license has been permanently revoked pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 39-669.08(4)(c) provides in part: “Any person operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his or her operator’s license has been permanently revokedpursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The relevant portions of the statutes referred to in the emphasized language above allow for a penalty of, inter alia, permanent revocation upon conviction of third-offense DWI or third-offense refusal to submit to a chemical test, [415]*415respectively.
We believe that the language in the information which describes the specific violation which resulted in Blankenfeld’s permanent license revocation was mere surplusage. We have held that where the elements of a crime defined by statute are set out in an information or complaint, it is sufficient; and if words appear in such information or complaint which might be stricken, leaving a crime sufficiently charged, and such words do not tend to negative any of the essential averments, they may be treated as surplusage and be entirely rejected. State v. Parks, 212 Neb. 635, 324 N.W.2d 673 (1982).
If the words “pursuant to subdivision (c) of subsection 4 of Neb. Rev. Stat.
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Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals from his conviction in Lancaster County District Court for driving while under a lifetime license suspension, a Class IV felony. He was sentenced to not less than 20 months’ nor more than 5 years’ imprisonment and fined $10,000.
Defendant’s driver’s license was permanently revoked on February 15, 1985, following his plea of guilty to a charge of driving while intoxicated, third offense. On January 30, 1987, defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under permanent revocation, a Class IV felony. On February 11 defendant was arraigned on that charge and entered a plea of not guilty.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the felony information in the district court on May 12, 1987. The motion alleged, in essence, that the previous sentence of permanent revocation (a necessary element for a conviction of the Class IV felony charge of driving while under permanent revocation) was void due to improper execution of sentence in the district court following an affirmance of the third-offense DWI conviction by this court on December 18, 1985. It was argued that the district court, as an intermediate appellate court, could not execute sentence on our mandate. Instead, defendant alleges, it was required that the county court must execute sentence following affirmance, since it was the original sentencing court on the third-offense DWI conviction.
On May 28,1987, a hearing was held on defendant’s motion. The district court overruled the motion to dismiss based on a finding that the attack on the third-offense DWI conviction and sentence was an improper collateral attack.
On June 11a bench trial was held on the Class IV felony [413]*413charge. Defendant made several motions at trial, continuing to attack the validity of the third-offense DWI conviction and sentence of permanent revocation. All motions were overruled, and defendant, following trial, was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under permanent license revocation.
We should note at this point that defendant also filed a motion to set aside conviction on June 10 in the district court for Lancaster County before Judge William D. Blue, the judge who presided over the district court appeal on the third-offense DWI conviction. That postconviction attack was premised upon the argument set forth above. The motion to set aside conviction was denied. Blankenfeld appealed that district court order to this court in case No. 87-661. Our recent decision in that case, found in State v. Blankenfeld, 228 Neb. 611, 423 N.W.2d 479 (1988), is partially dispositive of some issues raised on this appeal and will be referred to later in this opinion.
Defendant’s brief in this case assigns several errors, which can be summarized as follows: The district court erred in (1) ruling that defendant’s motions to dismiss constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a prior conviction, and (2) ruling that the prior conviction for third-offense DWI was a final judgment at the time the mandate was issued from this court. Finally, defendant alleges that the district court erred in finding that Blankenfeld was not a fit and proper candidate for probation.
In addition to the assigned errors, this court noted at oral arguments that the record in the case revealed an additional issue that required attention. We noted a variance between the information in this case and the proof offered at trial. On April 27, 1988, this court entered an order setting the case for reargument on the following issues: “Is the variance between the information and proof fatal to the convictions? Alternatively, is the language which describes the specific violations which resulted in the permanent suspension mere surplusage?” Briefs were submitted by both parties, and reargument was heard on Monday, June 6,1988.
We will first address the issues presented on reargument. The record reveals that the defendant was charged by information with “driving while under a lifetime suspension: 39-669.08 F [414]*414IV.” Specifically, the information alleged that
Jim D. Blankenfeld on or about the 25th day of December 1986 . . . did[,] being a person whose Nebraska driver’s license has been permanently revoked pursuant to subdivision (c) of subsection 4 of Neb. Rev. Stat, Section Number 39-669.08, operate a motor vehicle on the street or highways of this state.
This court discovered a disparity between the allegation that Blankenfeld was a person whose license was permanently revoked pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.08(4)(c) (Reissue 1984) and the proof. The record submitted in this case, as well as this court’s records relating to Blankenfeld’s previous third-offense DWI appeal (case No. 85-520), establishes that the defendant’s driver’s license was permanently revoked pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07(3) (Reissue 1984), in other words, for a third-offense DWI conviction.
Sections 39-669.07 and 39-669.08 contain similar and often identical language. Although § 39-669.07 relates to driving under the influence of alcohol and § 39-669.08 relates to refusal to submit to a preliminary breath test or a chemical test of one’s blood, breath, or urine, both statutes provide identical provisions for conviction of a Class IV felony if a person is found to be operating a motor vehicle while under permanent revocation. (For the sake of clarity, we note at this point that both statutes, as of April 19, 1986, allow for a 15-year license revocation instead of the previous lifetime revocation.)
Section 39-669.07(3) provides in part: “Any person operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his or her operator’s license has been permanently revoked pursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 39-669.08(4)(c) provides in part: “Any person operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his or her operator’s license has been permanently revokedpursuant to this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The relevant portions of the statutes referred to in the emphasized language above allow for a penalty of, inter alia, permanent revocation upon conviction of third-offense DWI or third-offense refusal to submit to a chemical test, [415]*415respectively.
We believe that the language in the information which describes the specific violation which resulted in Blankenfeld’s permanent license revocation was mere surplusage. We have held that where the elements of a crime defined by statute are set out in an information or complaint, it is sufficient; and if words appear in such information or complaint which might be stricken, leaving a crime sufficiently charged, and such words do not tend to negative any of the essential averments, they may be treated as surplusage and be entirely rejected. State v. Parks, 212 Neb. 635, 324 N.W.2d 673 (1982).
If the words “pursuant to subdivision (c) of subsection 4 of Neb. Rev. Stat. Section Number 39-669.08” are stricken from the information, Blankenfeld was still sufficiently charged with the crime of “operating] a motor vehicle on the street or highways of this state” while “being a person whose Nebraska driver’s license has been permanently revoked.” The stricken words are irrelevant to the essential elements of the crime charged which are (1) operating a motor vehicle (2) while one’s driver’s license is permanently revoked.
We note that the Supreme Court of Minnesota has reached a similar result in a case closely analogous to the case at bar. In State v. Owens, 268 Minn. 321, 129 N.W.2d 284 (1964), the court held, and cited several authorities in accord, that “where the specific acts constituting the offense with which the defendant is charged are set forth in the indictment with a sufficient degree of certainty to inform the defendant of the crime with which he is charged, the designation of the wrong statute is immaterial.” Id. at 326, 129 N.W.2d at 287.
Thus, the court in Owens held that the incorrect citation of a statute in an information will be treated as mere surplusage, when raised for the first time on appeal, in the absence of prejudice to any substantial rights of the defendant.
Admittedly, the defendant in Owens pled guilty to the charge in the information, while in this case Blankenfeld was found guilty following a bench trial. However, it is clear from the record in this case that Blankenfeld and his counsel were well aware that his license had been revoked pursuant to a third-offense DWI conviction. The numerous motions to [416]*416dismiss and the attempted postconviction action were all intended to challenge that underlying conviction. The specific acts constituting the offense were set forth with sufficient certainty in the information to inform Blankenfeld of the charges he faced. The incorrect citation to the statute in this case is not fatal to the defendant’s conviction.
In addressing the errors assigned by the defendant on appeal, we note that our prior decision in State v. Blankenfeld, 228 Neb. 611, 423 N.W.2d 479 (1988), disposes of the issue of the district court’s ruling on the finality of the third-offense DWI judgment. In Blankenfeld’s earlier case we held that the third-offense DWI judgment and sentence became final on January 8, 1986, the day we forwarded our mandate to the district court ordering execution of the sentence. The district court in this case was correct in ruling that Blankenfeld’s prior third-offense DWI conviction became final upon issuance of the mandate by this court.
Defendant further alleges that the district court erred in ruling that the motions to dismiss the felony information based on an allegedly void third-offense DWI conviction were improper collateral attacks.
To use a prior conviction as a basis for enhancement, the State need only show that the convicted defendant had, or waived, counsel at the time of such prior conviction. Other objections to the validity of such prior conviction constitute collateral attacks on that prior conviction and must be raised either by direct appeal from the prior conviction or in separate proceedings commenced expressly for the purpose of setting aside such prior conviction as an invalid judgment.
State v. Davis, 224 Neb. 518, 519-20, 398 N.W.2d 729, 730 (1987). See, also, State v. Baxter, 218 Neb. 414, 355 N.W.2d 514 (1984).
Defendant’s attempts to challenge the validity of his prior third-offense DWI conviction and sentence were improper in the proceedings before the district court on the charge of driving on a permanently revoked license.
Finally, defendant argues that the district court erred in finding that the defendant was not a fit and proper candidate [417]*417for probation. The granting of probation as opposed to imposing a jail sentence is a matter which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Donnelson, 225 Neb. 41, 402 N.W.2d 302 (1987).
Defendant has a substantial history of alcohol-related arrests and convictions involving automobiles. He has ignored prior suspensions of his license and was viewed by the sentencing judge as an obvious threat to society due to his inability to control his behavior when he drinks. Given our review of defendant’s past criminal history, we find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed.
Affirmed.