[Cite as State v. Blake-Taylor, 2014-Ohio-3495.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 100419
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
JAMES BLAKE-TAYLOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-12-565521
BEFORE: Stewart, J., E.A. Gallagher, P.J., and McCormack, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 14, 2014 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Robert L. Tobik Cuyahoga County Public Defender
BY: John T. Martin Assistant County Public Defender 310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200 Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Daniel A. Cleary Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center 1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor Cleveland, OH 44113 MELODY J. STEWART, J.:
{¶1} In 2006, while 15 years of age, defendant-appellant James Blake-Taylor
committed acts of sexual battery and kidnapping against a six-year-old victim. The
counts were not charged by indictment until 2012, and Blake-Taylor pleaded guilty to
them in 2013. During the period of time between the commission of the acts and his
conviction, Blake-Taylor was adjudicated delinquent for committing acts against an
11-year-old boy that would constitute the crime of rape if committed by an adult. The
court classified Blake-Taylor as a sexual predator and imposed a lifetime duty to register
as a sexually oriented offender under Megan’s Law. Blake-Taylor appeals, arguing (1)
that the court failed to conduct an adequate sexual predator classification hearing; (2) that
even if the hearing was adequate, the state failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he was likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented
offenses; and (3) that his classification as a sexual predator for acts committed while a
juvenile violates due process and equal protection.
I
{¶2} Blake-Taylor’s first assignment of error complains that the court failed to
conduct an adequate classification hearing in violation of his due process rights.
Specifically, he argues that the court erred by failing to make a finding that he was likely
to commit future sexually oriented offenses and that the court failed to make an adequate
record for its determination and for subsequent appellate review. A
{¶3} Ohio’s former sexual offender registration law, commonly known as
“Megan’s Law,” established three classes of sexually oriented offenders. The law
assigned to each class a duty to register as a sexual offender for a period of time
commensurate with the seriousness of the classification. The most serious classification
— sexual predator — required registration every 90 days for a period of life. See former
R.C. 2950.07(B)(1) and 2950.06(B)(1).
{¶4} Former R.C. 2950.01(E)(1) defined a sexual predator as a person who has
been convicted of or pleaded guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense and “is
likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.” The court
could classify an offender as a sexual predator only after first affording the offender a
hearing, under the representation of counsel, at which “the offender and the prosecutor
shall have an opportunity to testify, present evidence, call and examine witnesses and
expert witnesses, and cross-examine witnesses and expert witnesses regarding the
determination as to whether the offender is a sexual predator.” Former R.C.
2950.09(B)(1). After reviewing all of the testimony and considering the nonexclusive
list of factors set forth in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3), “the judge shall determine by clear
and convincing evidence whether the offender is a sexual predator.” Former R.C.
2950.09(B)(4). If the judge does determine that the offender is a sexual predator, “the
judge shall specify in the offender’s sentence and the judgment of conviction that contains the sentence that the judge has determined that the offender is a sexual predator
and shall specify that the determination was pursuant to [R.C. 2950.09(B)].” Id.
{¶5} Although the court is required to state in the judgment of conviction that the
offender is a sexual predator, former R.C. 2950.09(B)(4) does not require that the court
specifically state that the offender is likely to commit sexually oriented offenses in the
future. In fact, doing so would be redundant — as defined in former R.C. 2950.01(E)
the term “sexual predator” necessarily means that the offender is likely to commit a
sexually oriented offense in the future.
{¶6} In its journal entry classifying Blake-Taylor as a sexual predator, the court
stated:
The court considers the evidence and testimony presented, including: (1) sex offender evaluation by Dr. John Fabian dated June 25, 2013; and (2) court psychiatric clinic HB 180 evaluation by Michael H. Arnoff [sic] dated June 19, 2013. After considering all the evidence, the court finds the defendant to be a sexual predator.
Because the court specified that Blake-Taylor was a sexual predator, it necessarily found
that he was likely to reoffend in the future, thus fulfilling its duties under former R.C.
2950.03(B)(4).
B
{¶7} Blake-Taylor next argues that the court did not make an “adequate” record of
the reasons for his classification because it failed to make any findings at all relative to
the evidence and factors on which it relied to determine that he posed a risk of
reoffending. {¶8} Former R.C. 2950.09(B)(4) does not require the court to give its reasons for
classifying an offender as a sexual predator. In fact, the court is required to give reasons
only in the event it does not find that the offender is a sexual predator. See former R.C.
2950.09(B)(4); State v. Mack, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050968, 2006-Ohio-6284, ¶ 17.
{¶9} Blake-Taylor cites State v. Eppinger, 91 Ohio St.3d 158, 162, 743 N.E.2d 881
(2001), for the proposition that the trial court should “discuss on the record the particular
evidence and factors upon which it relies in making its determination regarding the
likelihood of recidivism.” Id. at 166. It is important to understand that the quoted
passage from Eppinger was in contemplation of a “model” sexual predator hearing. Id.
While the “model” hearing might be ideal, it is not mandatory — Eppinger made it clear
that it was only “suggesting” standards for sexual predator classification hearings. Id. at
167; State v. Lent, 4th Dist. Washington No. 014CA38, 2005-Ohio-4757, ¶ 32.
{¶10} We see no basis for Blake-Taylor’s assertion that the court’s lack of findings
makes it “impossible to discern what the trial court relied upon in reaching its conclusion
that [Blake-Taylor] was a sexual predator.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. The record contains
a transcript of the hearing, the evidence offered at that hearing, and most significantly, the
briefing of the parties in which they discussed at great length the facts both for and
against a sexual predator classification. The record is more than adequate to review the
sexual predator classification.
II {¶11} Blake-Taylor next argues that the state failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually
oriented offenses. To support this argument, he maintains that psychological testing
showed him to be a “mild” risk to reoffend, that he was deemed to have normal sexual
interests and is not a pedophile, and that his conduct occurred while a juvenile at a time
when he displayed a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.
A
{¶12} The sexual offender registration law is civil in nature, so a sexual predator
classification is reviewed under “a civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and
may not be disturbed when the judge’s findings are supported by some competent,
credible evidence.” State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d
1264, syllabus. The trial judge has “discretion to determine what weight, if any, he or
she will assign to each guideline” set forth in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3). State v.
Thompson, 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001), paragraph two of the syllabus.
Given that discretion, an appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial
judge when reviewing a sexual predator classification. See State v. Ellison, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 78256, 2002-Ohio-4024, ¶ 3.
{¶13} Blake-Taylor twice perpetrated acts of sexual abuse against children under
13 years of age. The acts of abuse charged in this case occurred between August 2005
and September 2005 when Blake-Taylor was 15 years old. The six-year-old victim was the grandchild of a woman who was providing foster care to Blake-Taylor. The victim
told the police that Blake-Taylor forced him to both give and receive oral sex and that
Blake-Taylor performed anal sex on him.
{¶14} The acts of sexual abuse charged in the juvenile court proceedings occurred
when Blake-Taylor was 17 years old and his victim was 11 years old. Blake-Taylor was
performing oral sex on the child when the child’s father walked in the room. The father
called the police, and Blake-Taylor gave the police a statement in which he admitted
performing oral sex on the child.
{¶15} Blake-Taylor’s personal history is harrowing: his mother was addicted to
crack cocaine and sold the four-year-old Blake-Taylor into child prostitution to fund her
drug habit. He also alleged that his mother’s brother likewise sexually molested him, but
that his mother told him that her brother was “retarded and could not help himself.”
Blake-Taylor claimed to have informed four social workers from the department of
children and family services about the abuse, but said that nothing came of his
allegations. He said that his mother moved constantly and recalled men coming to their
apartment and holding guns to their heads because the mother had not paid a drug debt.
{¶16} Blake-Taylor claimed to have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, and depression. He reported auditory hallucinations along with nightmares and
flashbacks. He has an IQ of 80, placing him in the ninth percentile borderline range and
has a working memory index in the second percentile. C
{¶17} A psychologist retained by Blake-Taylor administered a Static-99 test and
said that Blake-Taylor’s score indicated a 6.6 percent risk of reoffending in the next five
years. The expert noted that although Blake-Taylor admitted to the sexual molestation of
the 11-year-old victim, he denied committing the acts against the six-year-old victim,
despite pleading guilty to the charges. The expert found that Blake-Taylor does not have
“a long duration history of deviant sexual interest,” that Blake-Taylor did not have
multiple victims, did not have unusually frequent sexual thoughts or use of pornography,
and “does not currently endorse attitudes supportive of sex offending.” Based on the
results of the Static-99, the expert prepared a report in which he offered an opinion to a
reasonable degree of psychological and neuropsychological certainty that Blake-Taylor’s
“risk of sexual reoffending is low[.]” The expert believed that Blake-Taylor requires
“intervention while in the community” and that “[h]e should participate in outpatient sex
offender treatment programming if available.”
D
{¶18} Blake-Taylor’s heavy reliance on the Static-99 is misplaced. We have been
critical of the Static-99 because it makes an actuarial risk assessment that does not
“purport to make a prediction of a particular offender’s future conduct.” (Emphasis
sic.) Ellison, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78256, 2002-Ohio-4024, at ¶ 9. In addition, to the
extent that the Static-99 assesses the risk of reoffending, it is beyond debate from this
case that Blake-Taylor has reoffended. It is difficult to explain the expert’s reliance on the Static-99 to claim a low risk of reoffending when the offender has a history of sexual
molestation. And if Blake-Taylor was such a low risk to reoffend, it was unclear why the
expert suggested that he obtain sex offender treatment.
{¶19} The expert also said that he was hesitant to diagnose a juvenile offender like
Blake-Taylor as a pedophile because juveniles’ brains are changing. Yet the expert failed
to offer an explanation of why Blake-Taylor, who was just days shy of his 16th birthday
and presumably physically mature, chose prepubescent victims. While it might be said
that Blake-Taylor was mentally still a child despite reaching puberty, the expert failed to
differentiate the mentally mature/physically mature offender from the mentally
immature/physically mature offender in a way that would support his conclusion that
Blake-Taylor was not a pedophile.
{¶20} What the court could have found as most damaging to the expert’s opinion,
however, was the revelation that Blake-Taylor did not give the expert important
information during psychological testing. The expert administered the Juvenile Sex
Offender Protocol-II, known as the “J-Soap.” The expert report described the J-Soap as
“a structured professional judgment type instrument [that] has an empirical foundation
with risk factors correlated with juvenile sex offending.” The J-Soap-II is an
experimental checklist whose “purpose is to aid in the systematic review of risk factors
that have been identified in the professional literature as being associated with sexual and
criminal offending.” Prentky and Righthand, Juvenile Sex Offender Assessment
Protocol-II (J-SOAP-II) Manual, at iii (2003). {¶21} The expert found it positive for J-Soap-II purposes that Blake-Taylor “did
not have prior legally charged sex offenses and this would negate prior behavior
predicting future behavior.” The expert also found it positive that Blake-Taylor “likely
only had one victim,” his sexual offense history was “very short and likely occurred on
one occasion,” and “[t]here did not appear to be much planning in the sex offense, rather
it was an impulsive offense.”
{¶22} The expert’s conclusions in the J-Soap-II were challenged in the expert’s
cross-examination at the sexual predator classification hearing when the state referenced a
2008 report prepared by the Mokita Center. The Mokita report, which the expert had not
seen prior to preparing his expert report, noted that Blake-Taylor reported “some sexual
acting out behaviors” when he was five to eight years of age with “a couple of other
children.” In addition, Blake-Taylor self-reported having oral sex at the age of eight
with a child “much younger than himself.” Among the victims of Blake-Taylor’s sexual
acts were both males and females, including strangers. The expert conceded that he read
in the Mokita report that Blake-Taylor self-reported that he fantasized and planned his
sexual behavior beforehand. Finally, the Mokita report detailed how Blake-Taylor was
preoccupied with pornography and sexual behavior, something he denied in his interview
with the expert.
{¶23} The expert tried to downplay the importance of the J-Soap-II by saying “we
don’t use the J-SOAP as saying, okay, he has 20 of the 40 factors; therefore, he’s more
likely or not to reoffend. Structured professional judgment instruments are not utilized that much. We look at just kind of the analysis of the risk factors.” Tr. 88. Disclaiming
reliance on “structured professional judgment instruments” was not a credible strategy for
the expert. Among the tests the expert administered to Blake-Taylor was the Estimate of
Risk of Adolescent Sexual Offense Recidivism, an assessment that the expert said was
similar to the J-Soap-II and was likewise “a structured professional judgment type
instruction utilizing empirically related risk factors to sexual offending recidivism in
juveniles.” If these “professional judgment instruments are not utilized that much,” it
was unclear why the expert’s report used them, much less relied on them when forming
his opinion on the likelihood of Blake-Taylor’s reoffending.
{¶24} The expert conceded that the information contained in the Mokita report
“would aggravate [Blake-Taylor’s] risk assessment.” Tr. 88. For that reason, the expert
chose to “hang [his] hat” on the Static-99. But doing so ignored important history that
the expert admittedly did not have when preparing the Static-99 assessment. For the
expert to rely on an actuarial assessment to predict Blake-Taylor’s future conduct to the
exclusion of what appeared to be a much more significant history of sexual molestation
led to an opinion that the court could find to be fundamentally flawed.
{¶25} The expert also suggested that the results of the Abel Assessment for Sexual
Interest showed Blake-Taylor to have “a significant sexual interest in adolescent and adult
females,” thus negating any claim that Blake-Taylor was a pedophile. The Abel
Assessment, like the Static-99, is not a predictor of an individual’s likelihood to sexually
reoffend — it merely purports to determine the level of an individual’s sexual interest. And like the Static-99, the Abel Assessment has been criticized: its creator’s refusal to
make public certain proprietary information has prevented independent verification,
leading one court to call the assessment “merely an untested and unproven theory.”
United States v. Birdsbill, 243 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1133-1134 (D.Mont. 2003).
{¶26} Even if we were to accept the validity of the Abel Assessment in showing
Blake-Taylor’s current preference in the age of his sexual partners, the assessment that he
did not have a predilection for pre-adolescent children said nothing about whether his
“significant interest” in adolescent and adult females made him a risk to sexually
reoffend. Blake-Taylor has a history of sexual abuse and the court could rationally
conclude that this history made it likely that he could sexually reoffend in the future,
albeit with post-pubescent partners.
{¶27} We also find that Blake-Taylor’s citation to case precedent is not authority
for the proposition that he should not be classified as a sexual predator. The three cases
he cites, State v. Elie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83169, 2004-Ohio-3127, State v. Youlten,
151 Ohio App. 3d 518, 2003-Ohio-430, 784 N.E.2d 768 (8th Dist.), and State v. Milam,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86268, 2006-Ohio-4742, are not on point because in all three
cases this court vacated sexual predator classifications made on the basis of a single,
sexually-oriented offense. We long ago noted that a sexual predator classification
required more than a single sexually-oriented offense.
{¶28} We have no basis for finding Blake-Taylor’s classification as a sexual
predator to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. The factors set forth in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) that support the classification are: Blake-Taylor’s prior
criminal and juvenile record; the young age of his victims; that he engaged in acts with
multiple victims; and the nature of the sexual abuse and that it could be viewed as part of
a pattern. The factors set forth in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(3) that weigh against the
classification are: Blake-Taylor’s age at the time of the offenses; his limited cognitive
skills; and that he has not had any subsequent offenses. The court could also consider
the sexual abuse that Blake-Taylor himself suffered as a child as a factor weighing against
classification.
{¶29} On balance, the court could rationally find that the factors supporting the
sexual-predator classification outweighed the factors against classification. Blake-Taylor
is no doubt a victim of his childhood, and his duty to register for life as a sexual predator
is an onerous one, coming as it does so early in life for him. But his victimization does
not minimize the fact that he has created his own victims. In State v. Williams, 88 Ohio
St.3d 513, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000), the Supreme Court noted that when enacting the
sexual registration law:
The General Assembly found that if the public is provided notice and information about sexual predators, habitual sex offenders, and other individuals convicted of sexually oriented offenses as defined in R.C. 2950.01, the citizens can inform and prepare themselves and their children for the release from confinement of a sex offender. R.C. 2950.02(A)(1). Dissemination of information is deemed to be justified because sexual predators and habitual sex offenders pose a high risk of recidivism, and protection of the public from these types of sex offenders is of “paramount governmental interest.”
Id. at 518, quoting R.C. 2950.02(A)(2). {¶30} Blake-Taylor’s history of sexual molestation and the need to protect the
public thus justified the court’s decision to classify him as a sexual predator and impose a
lifetime reporting requirement. We therefore overrule his second assigned error.
III
{¶31} Blake-Taylor’s third assignment of error is a constitutional claim that the
application of a sexual offender registration law to acts he committed while a juvenile
violates due process and equal protection of the law.
{¶32} Blake-Taylor first argues that his classification as a sexual predator violates
due process because a classification system based on adult offenders “fails to take into
account the physiological immaturity of the adolescent brain, which is still developing
with respect to key characteristics involving impulse control and the exercise of
judgment.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
{¶33} The sole authority cited by Blake-Taylor for his proposition that it is wrong
to apply an adult sexual registration law to a juvenile is Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), in which the United States Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile
offenders under the age of 18. Wisely, Blake-Taylor does not equate his requirement to
register as a sexual offender with a penalty of death imposed on a juvenile murderer. He
does, however, reference a quote of the United States Supreme Court for the proposition
that “the reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of
irretrievably depraved character.” Id. at 570. He argues that children’s brains are
evolving with respect to impulse control and the exercise of judgment such that it would
be unfair to classify him under a system that assumes he acted as an adult.
{¶34} The flaw with Blake-Taylor’s argument is that he equates the duty to
register with a punishment. Roper deals with the constitutional implications of imposing
the death penalty on juveniles, yet the Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that sexual
offender notification, reporting, and verification requirements under Chapter 2950 are
remedial and do not constitute punishment. See State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 417,
700 N.E.2d 570 (1998). Blake-Taylor’s duty to report is structured as a remedial tool to
address his risk of reoffending. That is not regarded as punishment in Ohio. The duty
to report is premised on the likelihood that he will commit further sexually oriented acts
in the future. That Blake-Taylor’s prior conduct occurred when he was a juvenile does
not lessen the severity of his actions nor does it mean that he no longer poses a threat of
reoffending.
{¶35} Blake-Taylor was diagnosed with having several mental and behavioral
issues that postdate his conduct as a juvenile. The psychological assessment conducted
in June 2013 found that he suffered from mood disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder,
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. His own
expert believed that sexual offender counseling would be required while Blake-Taylor served his prison sentence as an adult. Given these facts, we find no due process
violation.
{¶36} Blake-Taylor’s equal protection argument is even less-developed than his
due process argument. Without citation to any authority, he argues that had he been
prosecuted for his offenses when they were committed, he would have been a juvenile
offender for whom Megan’s Law did not apply. He maintains that it is unfair to subject
him to Megan’s Law for crimes committed as a juvenile but not charged until he became
an adult, or reached adulthood.
{¶37} The court rejected Blake-Taylor’s equal protection claim by relying on State
v. Warren, 118 Ohio St.3d 200, 2008-Ohio-2011, 887 N.E.2d 1145. Warren held that an
offender was not denied due process of the law when charged and punished as an adult
for acts committed while the offender was a juvenile. The court believed that if it was
permissible to order a life sentence upon a defendant who committed his crimes while a
juvenile, it would be no less fair to impose a nonpenal registration requirement on an
offender who committed sexually-oriented offenses giving rise to the duty to register as
a juvenile.
{¶38} We agree with the court that the rationale used in Warren is equally
applicable in this case. Admittedly, the Supreme Court decided Warren on due process
grounds and not a violation of equal protection as argued by Blake-Taylor. However,
despite labeling his argument as one of equal protection, it is abundantly clear that Blake-Taylor has simply restyled his due process argument as one involving equal
protection. If it is permissible to impose a life sentence on an offender for acts
committed while the offender was a juvenile but not charged until the offender is an
adult, it is equally permissible to require an offender to register as a sexual predator based
on acts committed while the offender was a juvenile but not charged until the offender
reaches adulthood.
{¶39} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. A certified
copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
________________________________________ MELODY J. STEWART, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR