State v. Bingle

2026 Ohio 773

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: CA2025-07-075; CA2025-07-077
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bingle, 2026-Ohio-773.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

BUTLER COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NOS. CA2025-07-075 Appellee, : CA2025-07-077

vs. : OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY RYAN T. BINGLE, : 3/9/2026

Appellant. :

:

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2025-02-0159

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Stephen M. Wagner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

John H. Forg, for appellant.

____________ OPINION

M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Ryan T. Bingle appeals the judgment of the Butler County Court of Common

Pleas convicting him of both theft and attempted extortion. Because we conclude that Butler CA2025-07-075 CA2025-07-077

these two offenses are not allied offenses of similar import, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} On August 4, 2024, Bingle went to the apartment of the victim and accused

the victim of attempting to engage in sexual activity with a minor and threatened to expose

the victim's alleged conduct. According to the Bill of Particulars, Bingle threatened to kill

the victim if he did not surrender property to Bingle "on the date of the offense and each

future time Ryan T. Bingle came back to the [victim's] apartment." Bingle then took from

the victim an electric bicycle valued at approximately $900, a Bluetooth speaker valued

at approximately $140, an air pump valued at approximately $120, and $120 in cash.

Several days later, Bingle returned to the victim's residence. The victim then reported the

incidents to police. A subsequent search of Bingle's phone revealed conversations

between Bingle and the victim, audio and video recordings of their confrontation, and

photographs of the items taken from the victim's apartment.

{¶ 3} Bingle was indicted on four counts: Count One, theft, a fifth-degree felony,

in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); Count Two, extortion, a third-degree felony, in violation

of R.C. 2905.11(A)(2); Count Three, aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony; and Count

Four, petty theft, a first-degree misdemeanor.

{¶ 4} On June 5, 2025, Bingle entered into a negotiated plea agreement with the

State. In exchange for Bingle's guilty pleas to Count One as charged and Count Two as

amended to attempted extortion, a fourth-degree felony, the State agreed to dismiss

Counts Three and Four. There was no agreement as to sentence.

{¶ 5} At the plea hearing, defense counsel argued that the theft and attempted

extortion charges were allied offenses that should merge, contending that "the theft could

not have been accomplished but for the attempted extortion." The State responded that

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the offenses were not allied because "extortion is completed as soon as the threat is

made" and the victim "doesn't actually need to have his items stolen for extortion to be

completed." The trial court determined that the offenses were not allied offenses of similar

import. The court accepted Bingle's guilty pleas.

{¶ 6} The trial court sentenced Bingle on July 10, 2025. At the outset of the

hearing, the court confirmed with defense counsel that there was no further argument that

the offenses were allied, and counsel acknowledged that the argument had been made

at the plea hearing and rejected. The court sentenced Bingle to 11 months in prison on

Count One and 13 months in prison on Count Two, to be served consecutively.

{¶ 7} Bingle appealed.

II. Analysis

{¶ 8} The single assignment of error alleges:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR THEFT AND ATTEMPTED EXTORTION WERE ALLIED OFFENSES UNDER R.C. 2941.25 AND SHOULD BE MERGED, RATHER THAN TREATED AS SEPARATE OFFENSES.

{¶ 9} Whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger

under R.C. 2941.25 is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Colquitt, 2025-

Ohio-2727, ¶ 34 (12th Dist.).

A. The Statutory Framework

{¶ 10} Both the United States and Ohio Constitutions prohibit the government from

subjecting a person to multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Ruff, 2015-

Ohio-995, ¶ 10. Ohio has codified this protection in R.C. 2941.25, which provides in

relevant part:

Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the

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indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.

Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

{¶ 11} In Ruff, the Ohio Supreme Court established the analytical framework

courts must apply when determining whether offenses merge. Courts are instructed to

evaluate three separate factors: "the conduct, the animus, and the import." Ruff at

paragraph one of the syllabus. A defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses if any

of the following is true: "(1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import, (2) the

conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3) the conduct shows

that the offenses were committed with separate animus." Id. at paragraph three of the

syllabus. "An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions." Id.

at ¶ 31.

{¶ 12} The critical inquiry under R.C. 2941.25 is the conduct of the defendant. "At

its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts of a case because R.C.

2941.25 focuses on the defendant's conduct." Id. at ¶ 26. This means the "'analysis may

be sometimes difficult to perform and may result in varying results for the same set of

offenses in different cases. But different results are permissible, given that the statute

instructs courts to examine a defendant's conduct—an inherently subjective

determination.'" Id. at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Johnson, 2010-Ohio-6314, ¶ 52. The burden

lies with the defendant to establish his entitlement to the protection against multiple

punishments. State v. Glover, 2017-Ohio-7360, ¶ 20 (12th Dist.).

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B. The Nature of the Record

{¶ 13} Before proceeding, we note the deficiencies of the record before us. Neither

party disputes that the relevant facts of this case are, as the State conceded below,

"admittedly under-developed, principally as a result of Bingle's plea." There was no trial

testimony. The victim was not present at sentencing. The record consists principally of

the indictment, the Bill of Particulars filed for purposes of the plea, and the plea and

sentencing hearing transcripts.

{¶ 14} This limited record does not foreclose the allied-offense analysis. Courts

routinely conduct the Ruff analysis in guilty-plea cases based on the charging documents,

the bill of particulars, and the plea record. See State v. Hymer, 2025-Ohio-1691, ¶ 26

(12th Dist.) (finding dissimilar import "[b]ased on the limited record before us"); see also

State v. Washington, 2013-Ohio-4982, ¶ 24 (stating that "when deciding whether to merge

multiple offenses at sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, a court must review the entire

record"). Under Ruff, the allied-offense determination depends on the defendant's

conduct, and when a defendant pleads guilty and stipulates to the facts, the court properly

relies on the charging documents and the record of the plea hearing to determine what

conduct underlies each conviction. Moreover, the burden of establishing merger rests

with the defendant. Glover at ¶ 20. If Bingle wished to contest the State's characterization

of his conduct in the Bill of Particulars, the plea hearing was the time to do so. He did not.

C. There is No Merger

{¶ 15} Bingle pleaded guilty to theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and

attempted extortion in violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C. 2905.11(A)(2)1. He argues

1. Effective April 9, 2025, after Bingle was indicted, the prohibited conduct was moved to R.C. 2905.11(B)(2). -5- Butler CA2025-07-075 CA2025-07-077

that because both offenses arose from a single confrontation with the victim and were

committed for the same purpose, they are allied offenses of similar import that must

merge. We disagree. Applying the Ruff framework to the particular facts of this case, we

conclude that Bingle has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that merger is

required.

{¶ 16} Before addressing the three Ruff factors, we note a threshold matter. Bingle

was convicted of attempted extortion, not completed extortion. This does not matter for

our purposes here. The plea to attempted extortion was the product of a negotiated

charge reduction from extortion, a third-degree felony, to attempted extortion, a fourth-

degree felony. See R.C. 2923.02(E)(1). The "attempt" designation reflects this bargained-

for reduction in the degree of the offense, not a concession that the threatening conduct

did not occur or was somehow incomplete. Both the Bill of Particulars and the plea hearing

confirm that Bingle did, in fact, threaten to kill the victim if the victim did not surrender

property. The threat was made. It is the threat itself that constitutes the core conduct

underlying the attempted extortion, and it is the threat that bears on each of the Ruff

inquiries we now consider.

1. The Offenses Were Committed Separately

{¶ 17} We begin with whether the offenses were committed separately. This court

has previously held that "if one offense is completed before the other begins, the offenses

are considered separately for sentencing purposes even though the two offenses may

have been committed in close proximity in time." State v. Fields, 2015-Ohio-1345, ¶ 18

(12th Dist.).

{¶ 18} Here, the statutory elements of the two offenses reveal their separateness.

Extortion under R.C. 2905.11(A)(2) requires that a person, "with purpose to obtain any

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valuable thing or valuable benefit," "[t]hreaten to commit any offense of violence." The

offense is complete when the threat is made. It does not require the actual acquisition of

the thing or benefit sought. Theft under R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), by contrast, requires that a

person, "with purpose to deprive the owner of property," "knowingly obtain or exert control

over" that property "[w]ithout the consent of the owner." Theft requires the actual taking

or exertion of control over property. The attempted extortion was thus complete the

moment Bingle threatened to commit violence against the victim if he did not surrender

his property. The theft was not complete until Bingle actually took the victim's electric

bicycle, Bluetooth speaker, air pump, and cash. The threat preceded and induced the

taking. These were sequential acts, not a single unified act.

2. The Offenses Were Committed with Separate Animus

{¶ 19} We also conclude that the record supports a finding of separate animus.

"Animus" for purposes of R.C. 2941.25(B) means "purpose or, more properly, immediate

motive." State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 (1979). "If the defendant acted with the

same purpose, intent, or motive in both instances, the animus is identical for both

offenses." (Cleaned up.) State v. Maloney, 2023-Ohio-2711, ¶ 74 (12th Dist.).

{¶ 20} Bingle argues that both offenses were undertaken with the same animus—

to obtain the victim's property. This argument has some force. Both theft and extortion

are, at bottom, acquisitive offenses. At their broadest level of generality, both involve

taking something of value from someone else. Under Logan's framework, one could

describe the immediate motive behind both the threat and the taking as the desire to

obtain property.

{¶ 21} But Logan's inquiry into "immediate motive" requires a closer examination

than simply asking whether two offenses are of the same type. If it were enough to say

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that both offenses were "about property" to establish identical animus, then virtually any

combination of economically motivated offenses would merge. The question is not

whether the offenses share a general category of motivation, but whether the defendant's

immediate motive at the moment of each offense was the same. See Logan at 131.

{¶ 22} Here, the Bill of Particulars reveals that Bingle's immediate motive in making

the threat was not merely to obtain the specific items he took on August 4, 2024. The

threat was designed to terrorize the victim into surrendering property by "threatening to

kill [the victim] if he did not give Ryan T. Bingle various items belonging to [the victim] on

the date of the offense and each future time Ryan T. Bingle came back to the [victim's]

apartment." (Emphasis added.) What Bingle sought through the threat was not a one-

time acquisition of property, but the establishment of an ongoing regime of coerced

compliance. The immediate motive of the extortionate threat was to subjugate the victim

into a continuing relationship of submission and fear. The immediate motive of the theft

was to deprive the victim of the specific electric bicycle, Bluetooth speaker, air pump, and

cash that Bingle took that day. The former sought a power relationship, while the latter

sought particular things. These are qualitatively different motives, not merely broader and

narrower versions of the same one.

{¶ 23} This court's decision in Maloney does not compel a different result. In that

case, we held that aggravated burglary and felonious assault were allied offenses that

merged where "the facts indicate Maloney acted with a single criminal motive: to enter

the victims' home for the purpose of inflicting physical harm on the victims." Maloney,

2023-Ohio-2711, at ¶ 74. There, the State itself conceded that the offenses were not

committed with separate animus. Id. at ¶ 73. Critically, the felonious assault in Maloney

"was the very reason for" the aggravated burglary. Id. at ¶ 72. The entry into the home

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had no purpose apart from committing the assault. Here, by contrast, the attempted

extortion had a purpose that extended well beyond the theft. The threat of future violence

if the victim did not continue to surrender property on each return visit reveals a motive

that went beyond the immediate taking. Where Maloney involved a single criminal

objective pursued through sequential steps, this case involves distinct objectives: the

acquisition of specific property on the one hand, and the establishment of ongoing

coercive control on the other.

3. The Offenses Were of Dissimilar Import

{¶ 24} Finally, we consider whether the offenses caused separate and identifiable

harm. Under Ruff, "[t]wo or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning of

R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constitutes offenses involving separate

victims or if the harm that results from each offense is separate and identifiable." Ruff,

2015-Ohio-995, at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶ 25} The parties agree that both offenses involved the same victim. The question

is therefore whether the harm from each offense was separate and identifiable. Bingle

contends that both offenses caused the same harm—the loss of property. The State

counters that theft caused property loss while extortion caused psychological distress.

We find the State's argument convincing.

{¶ 26} Theft causes harm in the form of deprivation of property. The victim lost his

electric bicycle, Bluetooth speaker, air pump, and cash. This is a tangible, quantifiable

economic loss.

{¶ 27} Extortion, particularly extortion accomplished through threats to commit

violence, causes a qualitatively different harm. As the Sixth District observed in State v.

Vaughn, 2019-Ohio-5005, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.), "extortion causes harm in the form of the

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victim's psychological distress." The Vaughn court concluded that sexual battery and

extortion were offenses of dissimilar import because the sexual battery caused "physical

harm from unwanted sexual conduct" while extortion caused "mental distress from threats

to expose sensitive material." Id. We recognize that the analogy to Vaughn is imperfect.

That case involved categorically different types of physical harm (sexual battery) and

psychological harm (threatened exposure of intimate images). Here, both offenses are

directed at obtaining property, which arguably brings the harms closer together than in

Vaughn. But the Ruff inquiry asks whether the harm from each offense is "separate and

identifiable," not whether the offenses belong to entirely different categories. And the

nature of these two offenses yields distinct harms even when both are property-motivated.

{¶ 28} We acknowledge that the limited record before us does not include direct

evidence of the victim's psychological state. There was no trial testimony and no victim

impact statement. We reason instead from the nature of the offenses themselves and the

conduct described in the Bill of Particulars. Courts routinely assess the character of harm

based on the statutory elements of the offense and the facts underlying a conviction, even

in guilty-plea cases with limited records. See Hymer, 2025-Ohio-1691, at ¶ 26 (finding

dissimilar import "[b]ased on the limited record before us"). Bingle's threat to kill the victim

if he did not surrender property "each future time" Bingle returned is, by its nature, conduct

that causes fear, intimidation, and the anxiety of anticipating future violence. Regardless

of whether the extortion is labeled "attempted" or "completed," the threat of lethal violence

was in fact made. The victim experienced the full force of that threat. The "attempt"

designation goes to whether Bingle successfully obtained the valuable thing or benefit he

sought through the threat. It does not undo the threat or diminish the psychological harm

that the making of a death threat inherently occasions.

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{¶ 29} Bingle urges us to view both offenses as causing the same harm because

both ultimately relate to property. But this argument confuses the defendant's objective

with the victim's injury. The thief's objective is to take property, and the harm to the victim

is the loss of that property. The extortionist's objective may also involve property, but the

means he employs inflicts a separate harm: the terrorization of the victim through threats

of violence. When those threats extend to future occasions, the victim is left with the

ongoing burden of fear and uncertainty. These harms are separate and identifiable.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 30} We hold that the trial court did not err in declining to merge Bingle's theft

and attempted extortion convictions. The offenses were committed separately, with

separate animus, and caused separate and identifiable harm. Bingle's assignment of

error is overruled. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.2

HENDRICKSON, P.J., and SIEBERT, J., concur.

2. We note a clerical error in the judgment of conviction. It states that Bingle was found guilty of "ATTEMPTED EXTORTION as to Count Two, a violation of Revised Code Section 2923.02~2905.11(A)(5) a fourth-degree felony." The record plainly indicates that Bingle was found guilty of violating division (A)(2) of R.C. 2905.11. - 11 - Butler CA2025-07-075 CA2025-07-077

JUDGMENT ENTRY

The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.

/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Presiding Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge

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