State v. Billy Harris

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: March 12, 1999
• Docket: 02C01-9808-CC-00240
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

DECEMBER 1998 SESSION FILED March 12, 1999 BILLY JOE HARRIS, * C.C.A. # 02C01-9808-CC-00240 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk Appellant, * LAKE COUNTY

VS. * Hon. R. Lee Moore, Jr., Judge

FRED RANEY, WARDEN, * (Habeas Corpus)

Appellee. *

For Appellant: For Appellee:

Billy Harris, Pro Se John Knox Walkup NWCX Site Two Attorney General and Reporter Route 1, Box 660 Tiptonville, TN 38079 Clinton J. Morgan Counsel for the State 425 Fifth Avenue North Second Floor, Cordell Hull Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493

C. Phillip Bivens District Attorney General P.O. Drawer E Dyersburg, TN 38024

OPINION FILED:__________________________

AFFIRMED

GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE OPINION

The petitioner, Billy Joe Harris, filed a habeas corpus petition alleging

that his 1989 conviction for aggravated sexual battery was void for lack of

jurisdiction due to a faulty indictment. He also contended that certain of the

evidence offered by the state at his trial should have been excluded. The trial court

concluded the petition as "not [a] proper subject for habeas corpus relief." In this

appeal of right, the single issue is whether the judgment was void because of the

defective indictment.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner1 was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in 1989.

This court affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Billy Harris, No. 4 (Tenn. Crim. App.,

at Jackson, Aug. 22, 1990). After the grant of an application for permission to

appeal, our supreme court affirmed. State v. Harris, 844 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1992).

In his action for habeas corpus relief, the petitioner asserts that the

indictment is fatally defective because it charged only that he "did unlawfully and

feloniously have unlawful sexual contact with a child under 13 years of age." He

claims that no culpable mental state was alleged by the state and that habeas

corpus relief was warranted by virtue of the holding by a panel of this court in State

v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June

20, 1996).

1 In 1997, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his conviction for aggravated sexual battery was void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea. The trial court de nied relief an d this cou rt affirme d pursu ant to Ru le 20. Billy Joe Har ris v. State , No. 02C01- 9610-CC-00333 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 24, 1997). The supreme court denied application for permission to appeal, concurring in results only, on October 12, 1998. The petitioner presents the same claim here and it has been previously determined. A petitioner may not "relitigat[e] questions previously determined adversely to him in ... separate habeas corpus cases by courts of com petent juris diction." Myers v. S tate, 462 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -3811, -3 812); Young v. State, 539 S.W .2d 850 ( Tenn . Crim. A pp. 1976 ).

2 In State v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725 (Tenn. 1997), however, the supreme

court reversed the holding in this court, ruling that "an indictment which fails to

allege [a] mental state will be sufficient to support ... [a] conviction so long as,

[among other things], the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct

alleged." Id. at 726-27. In Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Tenn. 1998), our

supreme court applied the Hill analysis to determine whether a post 1989 Act

indictment for aggravated sexual battery was sufficient. The court held that "the

intentional nature of aggravated sexual battery may be inferred from the conduct

alleged in the indictment--unlawful sexual contact." Id. at 97. This Hill analysis is

applicable to pre-1989 Act indictments. Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn.

1998). The language of the indictment challenged here is the same as that in Ruff.

(More recently, our supreme court ruled that mere reference to the statute allegedly

violated will serve satisfactory notice. State v. Carter, ____ S.W.2d ____ (Tenn.

1999). Here there was no statutory reference.) These holdings by our high court in

Hill, Ruff, and Dykes control the disposition in this case. In our view, the indictment

satisfies the standard established by the supreme court.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

________________________________ Gary R. Wade, Presiding Judge

CONCUR:

_____________________________ Thomas T. W oodall, Judge

_____________________________ John Everett Williams, Judge