State v. Bickle

45 S.E. 917, 53 W. Va. 597, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 65
West Virginia Supreme Court·Decided November 14, 1903·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

MoWiiorter, PresideNt:

Chris Bielde was convicted of murder in the first degree on the 15th of September, 19 02, in the circuit court of Braxton County upon an indictment therein found by die grand jury for the murder of his wife, Salina Bielde, in April, 1902, to which judgment the prisoner obtained a writ of error. The second assignment of error was to the action of the court in overruling the demurrer to the indictment and tire motion to quash the same. The indictment was framed after the form prescribed in the statute for indictment for murder and conformed very closely thereto: This question has been so1 well settled and so often passed upon that I deem it unnecessary to give it further notice here, indeed it does not seem tó be at all relied upon by the defendant’s counsel.

The first assignment of error is that the court erred in giving to the jury, at the instance of the State, the five several instructions set out in bill of exceptions No. 1, which instructions áre as follows:

NO. 1.

“The court instructs the jury that if they have a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt they must acquit him, but a doubt to authorize an acquittal must be a substantial doubt [599] arising from the insufficiency of evidence and not a mere possibility of innocence, and a reasonable doubt is that state of the case which after the entire comparison'and consideration of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainey of the truth of the charge.

NO. 2.

The coui't instructs the jury as a matter of law that in considering the case tlxe jury are not bound to go beyond the evidence to hunt up doubts nor must they entertain such doubts as are merely chimerical or conjectural. A doubt to justify an acquittal must be reasonable and must arise from a candid and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the ease, and unless it is such that were the same kind of doubt interposed in a graver transaction of life it would cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause it is insufficient to authorize a verdict of not guilty. If after considering all the evidence the jury can say they have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

NO. 3.

The. court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt is not a vague or uncertain doubt and that what the jury believe from the evidence as men they should believe as jurors.

NO. 4.

The court instructs the jury that a doubt produced by undue sensibility in the mind of a juror in view of the consequences of his verdict is not a reasonable doubt and the juror is not allowed to create sources of material for doubt by resorting to trivial or fanciful suppositions and remote conjectures as to a possible state of facts differing from that established by the evidence. The oath of a juror imposes on him no obligation to doubt where no doubt would exist if no oath had been administered. When a circumstance is, of a doubtful character the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. If, however, all the facts established necessarily lead the mind to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty though there be a bare possi[600] bility merely, not supported by some good reason therefor that he is innocent, the jury should find him guilty. A juror’s duty to the State, to. society and to himself is equally sacred to hold for conviction, if he has an abiding satisfaction of defendant’s guilt and if after deliberation no juror is possessed of any good reason to doubt the defendant’s guilt it is the duty of the jury to find him guilty.

NO. 5.

The court instructs the jury that they are the sole judges of the evidence and that they may believe or refuse to believe any witness and that when passing upon the credibility of any witness they may take into consideration his interest in the matter in controversy, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his statement, his bias or prejudice in the matter, if any appear and his demeanor upon the witness stand.”

The first four of these instructions are upon the question of reasonable doubt. This question of "reasonable doubt” has been discussed so many times and has been so much "defined” that it would seem that the juror of average intelligence would be able to know what is meat by it, even though he might not be able to* give anything like a technical definition. It can hardly be necessary to present in so many phases the meaning of “reasonable doubt.” Jurors when impannelled are sworn to well and truly try and true deliverance make between the State ánd the prisoner at the bar, and the State is bound to prove all the material allegations contained in the indictment and failure on any one point necessary to be proved, to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution fails. In section 12, Underhill on Criminal Evidence, and note 5, page 17 and cases there cited, especially in State v. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, 557; (17 S. W. 990,) and in Cross v. State, 132 Ind. 65, (31 N. E. 473), the question is very thoroughly discussed, and the instructions 1, 2, 3 and 4 come within the purview of the rulings and definitions therein. While No. 3 is in the exact words of instruction No. 5 approved in State v. Dickey, 48 W. Va., 326, and the State’s instruction No. 5 in case at bar is substantially the same as No. 4 in said Diclcey Case. The court did not err in giving the instructions for the State set out in bill of exceptions No. 1. ,

[601] Tbe third assignment is that the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict of the jury as contrary to the law and the evidence and because of the admission of improper evidence and the rejection of proper evidence, as set out in further bills of exceptions.

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State v. Bickle, 45 S.E. 917, 53 W. Va. 597, 1903 W. Va. LEXIS 65 (W. Va. 1903).

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