State v. Bicker

2025 Ohio 4934

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 25-COA-002
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Bicker, 2025-Ohio-4934.]

COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO Case No. 25-COA-002

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 24-CRI-069 JORDAN BICKER Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry: October 28, 2025

BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges

APPEARANCES: CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL, JAMES B. REESE III for Plaintiff-Appellee; APRIL F. CAMPBELL, for Defendant-Appellant.

King, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Jordan Bicker appeals the January 7, 2025

judgment of conviction and sentence of the Ashland County Court of Common

Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In February, 2022, Ashland County Sheriff's Office Lieutenant Jason

Martin received tips from the Cleveland Ohio Internet Crimes Against Children

Task Force regarding downloads of child pornography involving a Verizon Wireless

account and phone number associated with Timothy Bonnell. Martin found the

information he received confusing and therefore recruited the assistance of Special Agent John Saraya of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Saraya

specializes in child exploitation cases. Saraya advised Martin to obtain account

information from Verizon and then assisted Martin in obtaining a search warrant

for the residence and electronic devices of Timothy Bonnell. The focus was on one

phone number which came back to Bonnell.

{¶ 3} When the search of Bonnell's devices and residence yielded none of

the suspected contraband, Bonnell told officers that the phone number they were

interested in belonged to his son, Jordon Bicker. He further advised Bicker was on

Bonnell's Verizon family phone plan. Bonnell advised Bicker had moved to an

address on Evergreen Street, which he provided to the officers.

{¶ 4} Using the same affidavit template he had used for the Bonnell

residence, Martin sought a second warrant, this time for Bicker's residence and

electronic devices. On the affidavit, Martin failed to change the person of interest

and the address from Bonnell to Bicker in several places, but a judge issued a

warrant. Upon executing the warrant, officers located the phone tied to the tips.

The phone contained child pornography.

{¶ 5} As a result of these events, on February 9, 2024, the Ashland County

Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Bicker with eleven counts of illegal

use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance, and

four counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor or an impaired

person. Bicker entered pleas of not guilty and filed two motions to suppress the

evidence obtained in the search of his home and phone. Seizing upon the careless

drafting of the second affidavit, in his March 18, 2024 motion to suppress, Bicker argued a nexus between himself and a fair probability that evidence of a crime

would be found on his person or property was absent. Bicker's second motion to

suppress, filed March 21, 2024, argued he was entitled to a hearing pursuant to

Franks v. Delaware, 328 U.S. 154 (1978) because Martin allegedly withheld

information about where Bicker was living and when and how many files Internet

Crimes Against Children had reviewed. He additionally argued the good faith

exception should not apply to the warrant.

{¶ 6} A hearing took place on Bicker's motions on May 20, 2024. The state

presented the testimony of Saraya and elicited the above outlined facts. Bicker

called Lieutenant Martin who testified he had drafted the second affidavit and made

some clerical errors in doing so by failing to change the name and address in some

places.

{¶ 7} By judgment entry filed June 21, 2024, the trial court denied Bicker's

motions. Bicker subsequently entered pleas of no contest to each count of the

indictment. The trial court accepted Bicker's pleas and convicted him. Following

the preparation of a presentence report, the trial court sentenced Bicker to an

aggregate prison term of six years.

{¶ 8} Bicker filed an appeal, and the matter is now before this court for

review. He raises two assignments of error as follows:

I

{¶ 9} "THE EVIDENCE AGAINST BICKER SHOULD HAVE BEEN

SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING THE SEARCH OF HIM AND HIS HOME WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE: THERE

WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY THERE."

II

{¶ 10} "THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CURE

THE WARRANT'S LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH BICKER AND/OR

HIS HOME."

I, II

{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Bicker argues the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress because the warrant to search his home and

devices issued without probable cause. Specifically, he argues the drafting errors

in the affidavit created a lack of a factual link between criminal activity and the

place to be searched. In his second assignment of error, Bicker argues the good

faith exception is inapplicable in this case. We disagree.

{¶ 12} There certainly are serious questions about sufficiency of the second

warrant affidavit standing alone. Based on the entire sequence of events, however,

we conclude that there were indeed sufficient facts to establish probable cause to

issue the second warrant.

{¶ 13} The facts here tell us that child pornography was downloaded to a

device connected to a certain cell number that was connected to Bonnell’s

account. The phone officers sought to seize was on the cell phone plan of Bicker's

father Bonnell and thus was technically Bonnell's property. Bonnell, however, told

officers that the phone utilizing the phone number the officers were targeting was

in Bicker's possession. We know the officers had probable cause for connecting the downloading of child pornography, the phone in Bicker's possession, and

Bicker's residence. As the trial court noted, Bicker could have downloaded the

pornography from anywhere, his home or Bonnell's due to the nature of cell

phones, making the particular address less significant here regarding the seizure

and search of the cell phone assigned to the phone number that was the target of

the investigation.

{¶ 14} Yet, within the four corners of the affidavit much of that information

is omitted. But for purposes of the good faith exception, we do not find this is so

lacking the indicia of probable cause as to render the belief in probable cause

unreasonable. So, we will proceed to consider the second assignment of error, as

it is dispositive.

The Affidavit

{¶ 15} During the suppression hearing, the affidavit for the search warrant

for Bicker's home and devices was marked as joint exhibit 3. On page one, the

second and third paragraphs indicated the affiant was seeking a warrant for "the

person of Jordan S. Bicker," on the premises of "515 Evergreen Street" which was

Bicker's address.

{¶ 16} The fourth paragraph on page one indicates the search will include

"any electronic devices . . . brought or transported by Timothy Bonnell."

{¶ 17} The fifth paragraph begins "Affiant has reason to believe that kept in

the custody and/or on the person of Timothy D. Bonnell . . . there is now being

unlawfully kept, concealed and possessed in said residence the following property

. . .." {¶ 18} Page three of the affidavit, item 1b states the affiant reasonably

believes electronic devices "in the custody of Jordan S. Bicker, and under his

control in his residence at 515 Evergreen . . ." contained the electronic media the

officers sought. Item 3, beginning on the same page provides "law enforcement

personnel are authorized to press the fingers/thumbs of Timothy D. Bonnell to the

Touch ID and/or place the device in front of his face, of any locked cellular

device(s) of which he is a known or suspected user or owner . . ." in order to unlock

the same.

{¶ 19} Page five of the affidavit sets forth the facts of the investigation. The

fifth paragraph indicates "The illegal material returns to the phone and online

accounts coming back to the address of . . .Township Road 555 [Bonnell's

address]. Later learned from Tim [Bonnell] that his son Jordan S. Bicker now lives

at [Evergreen] St . . . and is on his cell phone plan."

{¶ 20} Page eight of the affidavit, item l states in relevant part ". . . Affiant

believes that there is probable cause to believe that an individual residing in the

residence has a sexual interest in children and that computers and/or electronic

devices located at . . .Township Road 555 . . . are likely storage locations for copies

of nude images and or videos of adults and/or children in various stages of undress

. . .."

{¶ 21} It is apparent that the names and addresses are correct on some

portions of the affidavit and incorrect in others. During the suppression hearing,

both Special Agent Saraya and Lieutenant Martin conceded there were drafting

errors in the affidavit. Transcript of suppression hearing (T.) 32, 40. Lieutenant Martin admitted that he used the affidavit for Bonnell's address on Township Road

555, utilized copy/paste to create the affidavit for Bicker's address on Evergreen

Street, and made some errors in doing so. T. 40.

Analysis

{¶ 22} This is a case of sloppy drafting. But the application of the

exclusionary rule is meant to deter law enforcement conduct that "flagrantly,

deliberately, or recklessly violates the Fourth Amendment." State v. Hoffman,

2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 46. The record before us contains no evidence of any such

conduct.

{¶ 23} As we discussed above, had the entire course of the investigation

been included in the affidavit, it would have certainly established probable cause.

And we know from the testimony that the officers were involved in the execution of

the prior warrant and thus aware of those facts. Moreover, the officers admitted

that the inaccuracies in the affidavit were their errors. The trial court appeared to

find this testimony credible in denying the motion to suppress. So, the situation

before us is one where the officers made mistakes in preparing the affidavit and

then relied on the subsequent warrant in good faith.

{¶ 24} Evidence recovered should be suppressed " 'only if it can be said

that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with

knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.' "

U.S. v Leon, 468 U.S. 897 at 919 (1984), quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.

531, 542 (1975). To be sure, errors were committed here in the effort to obtain the

warrant. Although one might characterize the officers’ preparation of the affidavit as reckless, that is not enough. It must be a reckless disregard for the truth. United

States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 773 (6th Cir. 2003), citing U.S. v. Leon, at 922.

There is no argument before us that the affidavit was false, nor is that plain to our

eyes.

{¶ 25} Under Leon, we are to consider whether the affidavit is "so lacking in

indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable." Leon at 293. More specifically, our review of the affidavit is to

consider whether the affidavit was so conclusory and devoid of sufficient facts that

any reasonable person would conclude probable cause was not established. See

United States v. O'Neill, 94 F.4th 531, 541 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 301

(2024). As discussed above, the affidavit did not completely lack the indicia of

probable cause as to bar the application of the good faith rule. Further, in State v.

Newman, 2017-Ohio-4047 (5th Dist.), we noted "it is well-established that

inadvertent clerical errors, unless they cause prejudice to the defendant, will not

invalidate an otherwise valid search warrant." Id. at ¶ 22. This warrant affidavit

contained technical violations which did not rise to the level of constitutional error.

{¶ 26} And whether we disagree with the magistrate’s decision is beside the

point. To that end we note that "any error in deciding whether probable cause

exists for the search warrant belongs primarily to the magistrate issuing

the warrant, not the officer seeking it." United States v. Baker, 976 F.3d 636, 647

(6th Cir. 2020), citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239, (2011) (emphasis

original). The trial court may well have been justified in denying the application for

the warrant on this affidavit. That issue is not our focus; rather, our focus here is whether the officers were justified in relying on the warrant that was issued. We

conclude that they were. There is no argument before us that the warrant itself was

facially deficient.

{¶ 27} Accordingly, irrespective of the deficiencies of the second affidavit,

we find the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies here, and the trial

court properly concluded the evidence seized from the warrant should not be

suppressed.

{¶ 28} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment

of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

{¶ 29} Costs to Appellant.

By: King, P.J.

Montgomery, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.