State v. Bettle

11 A. 17, 50 N.J.L. 132, 1887 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 2
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 15, 1887
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 11 A. 17 (State v. Bettle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Bettle, 11 A. 17, 50 N.J.L. 132, 1887 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 2 (N.J. 1887).

Opinion

[133]*133The opinion of the court was delivered by

Parker, J.

This writ of certiorari brings before the court the action of the state board of assessors in assessing the property of the West Shore and Ontario Terminal Company for the year 1885. Among the reasons urged for setting aside the assessment is that said company is not a railroad corporation, and therefore not liable to be taxed under the “Act for taxation of railroad and canal property,” approved April 10th, 1884.

The Open Cut and General Storehouse Company, the corporate name of which was subsequently changed to the West Shore and Ontario Terminal Company, was created by the consolidation of the National Stock Yard Company, the Midland Terminal and Ferry Company and the Open Cut and General Storehouse Company.

This consolidation was effected under an act entitled “An act relating, to the consolidation of corporations authorized to establish storehouses, piers or docks, or to maintain yards and buildings for the keeping and accommodation of live stock,” approved March 23d, 1883. The first section of that act provides that it shall be lawful for such corporations to consolidate and merge their corporate rights, franchises, powers and privileges into any one of said corporations, so that by virtue of said act such corporations should be consolidated and merged, and, also, so that all the property, rights, franchises and privileges by law vested in such corporations should be transferred to and vested in the corporation into which such consolidation and merger should be made. The succeeding sections of said act provide for the mode of effecting such consolidation and merger. The fourth section enacts that upon filing a certificate and copy of the agreement provided for in the preceding sections, in the office of the secretary of state, the merger should be deemed to have taken place and the said corporations be one corporation, possessing all the rights, privileges and franchises theretofore vested in either of them. It follows that if either of the said corporations which by consolidation and merger went to constitute the Open [134]*134Cut and General Storehouse Company, possessed at the time of such consolidation and merger the rights, privileges and franchises of a railroad corporation, such rights, privileges and franchises, by the consolidation and merger, after such agreement filed, were transferred to the new corporation.

Upon reference to the act whereby the name of the Weehawken Transportation Company is changed to the Midland Terminal and Ferry Company, it is found that the last-named corporation was authorized to improve all or any part of its lands, by constructing therefrom and thereon, and over the lands of others, a railroad or railroads, to intersect with the railroad or railroads then built belonging to the Montclair Railway Company, the New Jersey Midland Railway Company, and the Ridgfield Railroad Company, within the limits of the county of Hudson, north of the railroads of the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company, east of the Hackensack river and west of Bergen Hill, so as to connect with any or all the railroads above mentioned, and with any other railroad or railroads then built, or which might thereafter be built. The said The Midland Terminal and Ferry Company was also by said last-named act given power to survey, lay out and construct a railroad or railroads. In short, said company was invested with all the rights, privileges and franchises of a railroad corporation, including the power of eminent domain.

By the consolidation and merger, all the aforesaid powers were transferred to and vested in the Open Cut and General Storehouse Company, and subsequently, when the name of that corporation was legally changed, passed to the West Shore and Ontario Terminal Company.”

It also appears by the proof that the property of the West Shore and Ontario Terminal Company valued for taxation by the state board of assessors, had been, and was at the time of the valuation and assessment, used for railroad purposes.

It is clear, therefore, that the West Shore and Ontario Terminal Company was, at the time of the assessment, a railroad corporation, and that its property assessed by the state [135]*135board of assessors for the year 1885 was liable to taxation under the railroad tax law of 1884.

Another reason alleged why the assessment should be set aside is that neither the secured nor unsecured, debts were deducted from the valuation of the property by the board of state assessors.

The railroad tax law of 1884 provides that no deduction, either for mortgage or other indebtedness, shall be allowed, unless such deduction be applied for in the statement required to be made by the companies in the twenty-first section of said law. It appears that no claim for deduction was made under that section, nor in any other way.

It is also alleged that the valuation of the property on which the assessment was predicated was excessive. The proofs taken under this head relate to the valuation of the franchise, and of certain structures which will hereafter be mentioned. As to all the other property, there not being any testimony on the subject, the valuation made by the state board of assessors will stand.

The important question raised under the head of excessive valuation relates to the franchise. It is said that in making the valuation of the franchise, the board did not take into account the value of certain property of the company in the State of New York.

The testimony in reference to that property and its value relates to the date of January, 1887, which is two years after the time when "the state board of assessors made the valuation on which the assessment in this case is based. There is no evidence showing what property, if any, the said company held in the State of New York, or the value thereof, in January, 1885, being the taxing date. The court cannot, in the absence of proof, interfere with the valuation of the franchise by the state board of assessors. There is no proof by which the court can determine that the valuation of the franchise by the state board, in January, 1885, was excessive, and therefore the valuation will not be changed.

Certain property is claimed to be exempt because, as alleged, [136]*136it was within the main stem of the railroad, the main stem having also been assessed as such. No proof was given to show that such property was within the one hundred feet taxed as main stem, nor was there any evidence showing that the valuation was excessive, and therefore the court will not disturb the assessment on the value of such property.

Objection is made to the valuation of a bridge. It was part of the property, the construction of which was necessary to the use of the railroad. In the case of Central Railroad Company v. State, 20 Vroom 1, bridges were considered in the valuation.

As to the other property claimed to be exempt because not used, as alleged, for railroad purposes, it is sufficient to remark that such property was returned to the state board as used for railroad purposes, thus escaping local taxation, and after such return it was too late to claim exemption. Nor does the proof show that the valuation of such property was excessive.

The evidence sustains the valuation placed oh four of the ferryboats, but the valuation of the other boat should be reduced from $25,000 to $15,000.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
11 A. 17, 50 N.J.L. 132, 1887 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 2, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bettle-nj-1887.