State v. Berry

328 P.2d 891, 52 Wash. 2d 748, 1958 Wash. LEXIS 434
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 21, 1958
Docket34548
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 328 P.2d 891 (State v. Berry) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Berry, 328 P.2d 891, 52 Wash. 2d 748, 1958 Wash. LEXIS 434 (Wash. 1958).

Opinion

Donworth, J.

Respondent was tried after a plea of not guilty to an information charging him with the crime of murder in the second degree, committed as follows:

“That he, the said Marshall Berry, in the County of Sno-homish, State of Washington, on or about the 14th day of April, 1957, while then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engaged in committing, attempting to commit or in withdrawing from the scene of the commission of a felony, to-wit: assault in the second degree, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did shoot into the body of one llene Berry, a human being, with a pistol then and there loaded with powder and ball, and then and there had and held by him, the said Marshall Berry, thereby mortally wounding the said llene Berry, from which said wounds the said llene Berry then and there languished and died on the 14th day of April, 1957.”

In its instructions to the jury, the trial court included instruction No. 6, reading as follows:

“You are instructed that manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being, done without excuse or justification, by a person while engaged in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in doing a lawful act in a negligent manner; that in order to constitute manslaughter it is not necessary that it be either premeditated or an intent to kill.”

• Respondent duly excepted to the giving of this instruction on the ground that there was no evidence in this case to warrant the court’s ruling that manslaughter was an included offense under a charge of second-degree murder alleged to have been committed while perpetrating a felony. He contends that he was either guilty of murder in the second degree or not guilty of any crime.

After the jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter, respondent moved for a new trial on several grounds, including the giving of instruction No. 6.

The trial court granted respondent’s motion for a. new trial on the ground that it had erred in instructing the jury relative to the crime of manslaughter.

*750 The state has appealed from the order granting the new trial,;.and its.-.four assignments of error raise the single question of law whether, under the evidence in this case, manslaughter :was an included offense within the charge contained in; the information.

Respondent'is, and for many years has been, a sergeant in the United States Air Force.' In May, 1952, he and llene Berry were married^ Each of them had children by prior marriages. In December, 1954, he was transferred to Paine Air Base near Everett. His wife, during a portion of the time between then and her death, on April 14,1957, worked as a waitress at Northgate. Shortly after coming to Paine Air Base, they purchased a house situated near Lynnwood, to which they brought Mrs. Berry’s three children.

In the late fall of 1955, respondent was temporarily transferred to an air force base in Georgia for a.few weeks. On his return, he learned that another sergeant, George Futch, had been very attentive to Mrs. Berry. On several occasions thereafter, respondent told Sergeant Futch to keep away from his house and leave his wife alone.

It is not necessary to state in detail all of the unpleasant events which took place during the last eighteen months of Mrs. Berry’s life as a result of the existence of this triangle. Suffice it to say that after respondent completed a tour of duty in Greenland, he returned home on March 10, 1957, to find that Futch had been living in his house during his absence. He- had, in 1956, commenced suit for divorce, and at the time of the fatal shooting was expecting to obtain a decree on the following day. In fact, he had, two days previously, delivered to his wife a quitclaim deed to their home. At that time, she was undecided whether to marry Futch or to remarry respondent after the divorce decree became effective.

With the foregoing brief background in mind, we now come to the events which immediately preceded the fatal shooting of Mrs. Berry.

On Saturday, April 13, 1957, respondent drove his wife to work. She informed him that she had a date with “the girls” after work and that it would not be necessary for him to *751 pick her up. Apparently she did not go out with the girls, because respondent walked into the Corner Tavern at Lynn-wood about 10:30 that evening and found Sergeant Futch and Mrs. Berry there together. :-■<

Respondent was then returning from a party in Seattle, and no words were exchanged between- him and his wife except for a possible casual greeting. Respondent then went to the NCO club at the Paine Air Base, where he discussed his domestic difficulties with other servicemen friends. This discussion took place at the bar, where respondent had three or four drinks. He left the club about 1:45’a. m. on April 14th.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Futch and Mrs. Berry left the Corner Tavern and went to her home. After putting the children to bed, at about eleven o’clock, they drove to a roadhouse, and, after eating, returned, to the Berry home.

Both respondent and Sergeant Futch testified at the trial concerning the homicide, which occurred about 2:00 a. m. on April 14th. While respondent denied certain portions of Sergeant Futch’s testimony, particularly that he ever threatened to kill him with his pistol, their versions as to the manner in which Mrs. Berry was fatally wounded are not materially different.

Sergeant Futch’s version was substantially as follows:

While Mrs. Berry and Sergeant Futch were in the kitchen of the Berry home, respondent drove into the yard, parking his car behind the car Mrs. Berry and Sergeant Futch had used. Whether he left the lights of the car on and whether the motor was left running, a deputy sheriff, who arrived after the shooting, was not positive.

Mrs. Berry said to Futch, “George, it’s Berry.” Respondent entered the back door with a gun in his hand, which he admitted belonged to him. It was a .32 caliber pistol which he always carried in his glove compartment.

Respondent was in a state of jealous rage and was highly excited. He pushed his wife aside and confronted Futch with the gun, saying, “I’m going to kill you, you............................... Where do you want it?” He then shoved Futch toward the *752 back door. of. the house. Mrs. Berry attempted to seize'her husband, but he pushed hér back into the kitchen. •'

Futch and respondent went through.'the back door, and the latter pushed the former down the steps. While he was standing on the top step, respondent fired the first shot. The muzzle blast was to the left of Futch’s shoulder.

Respondent reached the ground and fired another ..shot, which, did not hit anyone. Respondent Continued to threaten to kill Futch and gradually forcéd him from the house out to the gate of a picket fence which separates the yard from the concrete driveway. Between the back steps and the fence, respondent fired a third shot in Futch’s direction. Mrs. Berry accompanied the two men, pleading with her husband to let Futch leave the premises and to allow her to move her husband’s car so that Futch could drive off.

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Related

State v. Gamble
114 P.3d 646 (Washington Supreme Court, 2005)
State v. Tamalini
953 P.2d 450 (Washington Supreme Court, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
328 P.2d 891, 52 Wash. 2d 748, 1958 Wash. LEXIS 434, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-berry-wash-1958.