State v. Benoit

570 So. 2d 490, 1990 La. App. LEXIS 2645, 1990 WL 180760
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 14, 1990
DocketNo. 90-KA-346
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 570 So. 2d 490 (State v. Benoit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Benoit, 570 So. 2d 490, 1990 La. App. LEXIS 2645, 1990 WL 180760 (La. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinions

KLIEBERT, Judge.

Defendant, Dean Benoit, was charged with vehicular homicide, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:32.1,1 following an automobile accident on Interstate 55 which resulted in two deaths. Defendant moved to suppress the results of a blood test administered following the accident and of statements made to State Trooper Van Penouilh. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant applied to this Court for supervisory writs.2 We granted a writ of review and ordered the entire record lodged with this Court and upon lodging directed our [491]*491clerk to set the case for briefing and argument on our regular appellate docket. For the following reasons we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

Here, defendant alleges the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress statements made to Trooper Penouilh because defendant was in a state of shock following the accident and therefore could not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights against self incrimination.

Before a confession or inculpatory statement can be introduced into evidence, the state has the burden of affirmatively proving that it was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. LSA-R.S. 15:451. State v. Ordonez, 395 So.2d 778 (La.1981). It must also be established that an accused who makes a confession during a custodial interrogation was first advised of his constitutional rights as per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights. State v. Castillo, 389 So.2d 1307 (La. 1980), cert. denied, Castillo v. Louisiana, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 3159, 69 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1981); State v. Toups, 499 So.2d 1149 (La.App. 5th Cir.1986), writ denied, 501 So.2d 772 (La. 1987).

Whether a showing of voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case by case basis with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The trial judge must consider the “totality of the circumstances” in deciding whether the confession/statement is admissible. State v. Shepherd, 449 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 5th Cir.1984). The admissibility of a confession is in the first instance a question for the trial judge. His conclusions on the credibility and weight of testimony relating to the voluntariness of a confession are entitled to great weight and will not be overturned on appeal unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Benoit, 440 So.2d 129 (La.1983); State v. Toups, supra; State v. Beck, 445 So.2d 470 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1984), writ denied, 446 So.2d 315 (La.1984).

Defendant claims his state of mind following the accident prevented a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. The testimony at trial reveals otherwise.

Although Trooper Penouilh found defendant to be in “sort of shock stage” while in the ambulance shortly after the accident, an interrogation did not occur and defendant offered only an exculpatory statement. About one hour later at River Parishes Medical Center, defendant was advised of his rights before being questioned. Trooper Penouilh and Dr. William Schoo-ley 3 both testified defendant was lucid and appeared to understand his rights as per Miranda and alcohol testing after being explained same by the officer. We find no evidence of record to suggest otherwise.

Therefore, we find any statements obtained at this time were made after defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress statements.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS BLOOD ANALYSIS RESULTS

Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the blood test results because:

1) The driver of the other vehicle was not asked to take an alcohol test;
2) There was no clearly established chain of evidence with regard to the delivery and handling of the blood kit used and,
3) The State’s failure to establish and/or adhere to reasonable, promulgated procedures with regard to blood analysis and/or the repair, maintenance or inspection of gas chromatographs used by the state under the ruling of State v. Rowell, 517 So.2d 799 (La.1988).

In State v. Rowell, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit Court of Appeal’s reversal of the trial [492]*492court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress results of a blood test which established a presumption the defendant was driving while intoxicated. In doing so, the Supreme Court, at page 800, stated:

“In order for the state to avail itself of the statutory presumption of a defendant’s intoxication arising from a chemical analysis of his blood under La.R.S. 32:662, it must show that the state has promulgated detailed procedures which will insure the integrity'and reliability of the chemical test, including provisions for repair, maintenance, inspection, cleaning, certification, and chemical accuracy. It must also show that the state has strictly complied with the promulgated procedures.”

In response to Rowell, supra, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) changed its 1985 regulations (in effect at the time of Rowell) and promulgated new rules and regulations concerning blood alcohol analysis which are contained in the June 1988 Louisiana Register.4

In State v. Allison, 554 So.2d 262 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1989), the Third Circuit was called upon to interpret the June 1988 regulations promulgated by DPS in response to Rowell, supra. In upholding the admissibility of a blood test, the court found the new regulations5 sufficient, stating:

“In June 1988, new regulations were promulgated in an attempt to correct the problems pointed out in the Rowell case. See 14 La.Reg. 360. These regulations now provide in detail for certification testing for applicants to perform blood analyses. 55 L.A.C. 1.599. These sections also provide for specific types of proficiency testing with periodic refresher courses. Provision has been made for repair, maintenance and inspection of the gas chromatograph. 55 L.A.C. 1.557. The new regulations specify-the quality of chemicals to be used for the analyses of a control blood sample in such a way as to insure the accuracy of the chemicals used to calibrate the gas chromato-graph. 55 L.A.C. 1.555, and 561. Finally, the regulations make specific provision for the preservation of the blood sample prior to testing. 55 L.A.C. 1.555(G)(1). Accordingly, we find the regulations, as amended, to be sufficient to insure the integrity and reliability of blood analyses.” Id. at p. 264

Although we agree the June 1988 regulations are better than the March 1985 regulations, we disagree with the Third Circuit. We believe and therefore hold the regulations do not go far enough to assure preservation of the blood sample prior to testing or sufficient provisions for the repair and maintenance of the machine and accuracy of the samples used in calibrating the machines.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Ruiz
630 So. 2d 897 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1993)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
570 So. 2d 490, 1990 La. App. LEXIS 2645, 1990 WL 180760, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-benoit-lactapp-1990.