[Cite as State v. Bennett, 2026-Ohio-698.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25CA012228
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE BRANDON BENNETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellee CASE No. 24CR111458
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 2, 2026
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} The State of Ohio appeals an order of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas
that granted Brandon Bennett’s motion to suppress. For the following reasons, this Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} During the early hours of January 31, 2022, Sergeant Frank Goscewski was
speaking to other officers in a restaurant parking lot when he saw a white four-door pickup truck
with a red plow blade drop two men off in the driveway of a self-storage facility. The men were
wearing dark clothing, and one was carrying a black duffel bag. One of the men was also carrying
a walkie talkie. After the officers approached the men and discovered that one of them had an
outstanding warrant, they arrested him. A search of the duffel bag uncovered an electric saw, saw
blades, a pipe, and a crowbar.
{¶3} About an hour and a half later, Sergeant Goscewski was on patrol when he spotted
a truck in the parking lot of an apartment complex that matched the one he had seen earlier. There 2
was a man sitting in the driver’s seat, but the truck was not running, which the sergeant thought
was unusual for the time of day and year. According to Sergeant Goscewski, he pulled his cruiser
near the truck, partially blocking it, but he did not activate the overhead lights or siren. He exited
his cruiser and approached the truck to ask the man, Mr. Bennett, about the reason he was sitting
in the truck. Mr. Bennett replied that he was helping a friend move and consented to a search of
the vehicle. The Grand Jury subsequently indicted Mr. Bennet for having weapons under
disability, breaking and entering, and possessing criminal tools.
{¶4} Mr. Bennett moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the truck,
arguing that the sergeant did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle or reasonable, articulable
suspicion to search it. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski did not
have probable cause to stop Mr. Bennett. The State has appealed, assigning as error that the trial
court applied the incorrect legal standard to the motion to suppress.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD AS THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BRANDON BENNETT WAS EITHER SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OR WAS VOLUNTARY.
{¶5} The State argues that the trial court incorrectly granted Mr. Bennett’s motion to
suppress. Specifically, it argues that the court incorrectly determined that Sergeant Goscewski
engaged in a traffic stop and that there was no probable cause for that stop. A motion to suppress
evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is
therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”
Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the 3
trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court
must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether
the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d
706, 710 (4th Dist. 1997). This Court, therefore, grants deference to the trial court’s findings of
fact but conducts a de novo review of whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard
to those facts. State v. Booth, 2003-Ohio-829, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).
{¶6} The State first argues that the trial court applied the incorrect standard because
Sergeant Goscewski’s interaction with Mr. Bennett was a consensual encounter. “There are three
distinct types of encounters between police officers and the public: (1) a consensual encounter,
(2) an investigatory stop, and (3) an arrest.” State v. Helmick, 2014-Ohio-4187, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.).
“Consensual encounters are not seizures and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 9.
“An investigatory stop is more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a
formal custodial arrest.” Id. at ¶ 10. “An officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity for an investigatory stop.” Id. “Finally, officers must have probable cause for
any seizure that ‘equivocates an arrest.’” Id., quoting State v. Llanderal-Raya, 2005-Ohio-3306,
¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “‘[T]he threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person . . . , or the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled’ can be indicative of a seizure.”
Id., quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
{¶7} This Court also explained in Helmick that “[t]he mere approach and questioning of
persons seated within parked vehicles does not constitute a seizure so as to require reasonable
suspicion supported by specific articulable facts.” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. McCray, 2000 WL 4
254909, *1 (9th Dist. Mar. 8, 2000). “But, ‘if an officer positions his vehicle so that a person
cannot exit a parking lot without asking the officer to move, the officer has exhibited a show of
authority constituting a seizure.’” Id., quoting State v. Maitland, 2011–Ohio–6244, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.).
{¶8} Sergeant Goscewski testified that, when he pulled his vehicle into the apartment
complex parking lot, he parked it in such a manner that it blocked Mr. Bennett’s truck. Although
the sergeant said that the truck was not completely blocked into its parking spot, he acknowledged
that it would have been difficult for Mr. Bennett to exit his parking space unless he asked the
sergeant to move his vehicle.
{¶9} The trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski partially blocked Mr. Bennett and
that he effectuated a stop of Mr. Bennett’s motor vehicle. Upon review of the record, we conclude
that the trial court’s finding that Mr. Bennett was stopped is supported by competent, credible
evidence. We, therefore, reject the State’s argument that the interaction between Sergeant
Goscewski and Mr. Bennett was a consensual encounter.
{¶10} Although the trial court found that Mr. Bennett’s interaction with Sergeant
Goscewski was not consensual, it immediately proceeded to examine whether the sergeant had
probable cause for the stop instead of considering whether it was an investigatory stop. As noted,
officers only require probable cause if a seizure “equivocates an arrest.” Helmick at ¶ 10, quoting
Llanderal-Raya at ¶ 20.
{¶11} The trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski partially blocked Mr. Bennett’s
vehicle and made initial contact with him but did not make any findings that would suggest the
interaction was anything more than an investigatory detention. The trial court, therefore, should
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[Cite as State v. Bennett, 2026-Ohio-698.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25CA012228
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE BRANDON BENNETT COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellee CASE No. 24CR111458
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 2, 2026
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} The State of Ohio appeals an order of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas
that granted Brandon Bennett’s motion to suppress. For the following reasons, this Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} During the early hours of January 31, 2022, Sergeant Frank Goscewski was
speaking to other officers in a restaurant parking lot when he saw a white four-door pickup truck
with a red plow blade drop two men off in the driveway of a self-storage facility. The men were
wearing dark clothing, and one was carrying a black duffel bag. One of the men was also carrying
a walkie talkie. After the officers approached the men and discovered that one of them had an
outstanding warrant, they arrested him. A search of the duffel bag uncovered an electric saw, saw
blades, a pipe, and a crowbar.
{¶3} About an hour and a half later, Sergeant Goscewski was on patrol when he spotted
a truck in the parking lot of an apartment complex that matched the one he had seen earlier. There 2
was a man sitting in the driver’s seat, but the truck was not running, which the sergeant thought
was unusual for the time of day and year. According to Sergeant Goscewski, he pulled his cruiser
near the truck, partially blocking it, but he did not activate the overhead lights or siren. He exited
his cruiser and approached the truck to ask the man, Mr. Bennett, about the reason he was sitting
in the truck. Mr. Bennett replied that he was helping a friend move and consented to a search of
the vehicle. The Grand Jury subsequently indicted Mr. Bennet for having weapons under
disability, breaking and entering, and possessing criminal tools.
{¶4} Mr. Bennett moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of the truck,
arguing that the sergeant did not have probable cause to stop his vehicle or reasonable, articulable
suspicion to search it. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski did not
have probable cause to stop Mr. Bennett. The State has appealed, assigning as error that the trial
court applied the incorrect legal standard to the motion to suppress.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD AS THE INTERACTION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND BRANDON BENNETT WAS EITHER SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OR WAS VOLUNTARY.
{¶5} The State argues that the trial court incorrectly granted Mr. Bennett’s motion to
suppress. Specifically, it argues that the court incorrectly determined that Sergeant Goscewski
engaged in a traffic stop and that there was no probable cause for that stop. A motion to suppress
evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is
therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”
Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Thus, a reviewing court “must accept the 3
trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court
must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether
the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d
706, 710 (4th Dist. 1997). This Court, therefore, grants deference to the trial court’s findings of
fact but conducts a de novo review of whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard
to those facts. State v. Booth, 2003-Ohio-829, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.).
{¶6} The State first argues that the trial court applied the incorrect standard because
Sergeant Goscewski’s interaction with Mr. Bennett was a consensual encounter. “There are three
distinct types of encounters between police officers and the public: (1) a consensual encounter,
(2) an investigatory stop, and (3) an arrest.” State v. Helmick, 2014-Ohio-4187, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.).
“Consensual encounters are not seizures and do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 9.
“An investigatory stop is more intrusive than a consensual encounter but less intrusive than a
formal custodial arrest.” Id. at ¶ 10. “An officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity for an investigatory stop.” Id. “Finally, officers must have probable cause for
any seizure that ‘equivocates an arrest.’” Id., quoting State v. Llanderal-Raya, 2005-Ohio-3306,
¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “‘[T]he threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person . . . , or the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled’ can be indicative of a seizure.”
Id., quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
{¶7} This Court also explained in Helmick that “[t]he mere approach and questioning of
persons seated within parked vehicles does not constitute a seizure so as to require reasonable
suspicion supported by specific articulable facts.” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. McCray, 2000 WL 4
254909, *1 (9th Dist. Mar. 8, 2000). “But, ‘if an officer positions his vehicle so that a person
cannot exit a parking lot without asking the officer to move, the officer has exhibited a show of
authority constituting a seizure.’” Id., quoting State v. Maitland, 2011–Ohio–6244, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.).
{¶8} Sergeant Goscewski testified that, when he pulled his vehicle into the apartment
complex parking lot, he parked it in such a manner that it blocked Mr. Bennett’s truck. Although
the sergeant said that the truck was not completely blocked into its parking spot, he acknowledged
that it would have been difficult for Mr. Bennett to exit his parking space unless he asked the
sergeant to move his vehicle.
{¶9} The trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski partially blocked Mr. Bennett and
that he effectuated a stop of Mr. Bennett’s motor vehicle. Upon review of the record, we conclude
that the trial court’s finding that Mr. Bennett was stopped is supported by competent, credible
evidence. We, therefore, reject the State’s argument that the interaction between Sergeant
Goscewski and Mr. Bennett was a consensual encounter.
{¶10} Although the trial court found that Mr. Bennett’s interaction with Sergeant
Goscewski was not consensual, it immediately proceeded to examine whether the sergeant had
probable cause for the stop instead of considering whether it was an investigatory stop. As noted,
officers only require probable cause if a seizure “equivocates an arrest.” Helmick at ¶ 10, quoting
Llanderal-Raya at ¶ 20.
{¶11} The trial court found that Sergeant Goscewski partially blocked Mr. Bennett’s
vehicle and made initial contact with him but did not make any findings that would suggest the
interaction was anything more than an investigatory detention. The trial court, therefore, should
have examined whether the sergeant had “a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity 5
for an investigatory stop” instead of whether there was probable cause that Mr. Bennett had
committed a violation of any law. Id.
{¶12} The State requests that this Court determine that Sergeant Goscewski conducted a
legitimate investigatory stop of Mr. Bennett based on the similarities between Mr. Bennett’s truck
and the one he observed earlier that was connected with criminal activity. This Court, however,
“functions as a court of review and we exceed the scope of our authority when we analyze issues
in the first instance that have not first been addressed by the trial court.” Williams v. Kisling,
Nestico, & Redick, LLC, 2022-Ohio-1044, ¶ 37. Instead, we conclude that the trial court’s order
must be reversed, and this matter remanded for the trial court to determine whether Sergeant
Goscewski had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify his investigatory
detention of Mr. Bennett. The State’s assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶13} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 6
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
ANTHONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and SPENCER J. LUCKWITZ, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
KENNETH M. LIEUX, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.