State v. Bennett

297 S.E.2d 138, 59 N.C. App. 418, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 3146
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedNovember 16, 1982
Docket8227SC369
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 297 S.E.2d 138 (State v. Bennett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Bennett, 297 S.E.2d 138, 59 N.C. App. 418, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 3146 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

WELLS, Judge.

By his sole assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in including in its charge to the jury, without request from defendant, the following instruction:

Now, ladies and gentlemen, the defendant in this case has not gone on the witness stand and testified during this trial, and under the law, when a person is placed upon trial, such defendant may or may not go on the witness stand and testify in his own behalf as he may elect or as his counsel may advise. The Court, therefore, charges you that his failure to go upon the witness stand is not to be considered as evidence of any kind in this case, for the burden of proof is upon the State, as the Court will instruct you, to satisfy you from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.

Defendant contends first that it was error for the trial court to give any instruction on defendant’s failure to testify because defendant did not request such an instruction; and second, that the instruction given was erroneous because it failed to clearly inform the jury that defendant’s failure to testify should not create any inferences adverse to defendant.

Defendant did not object to the disputed charge and therefore, the threshold question we must address in this appeal is whether defendant has properly preserved his assignment of error.

Article IV, Sec. 13(2) of the North Carolina Constitution provides the framework for our discussion:

(2) Rules of procedure. — The Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division. The General Assembly may *420 make rules of procedure and practice for the Superior Court and District Court Divisions, and the General Assembly may delegate this authority to the Supreme Court. No rule of procedure or practice shall abridge substantive rights or abrogate or limit the right of trial by jury. If the General Assembly should delegate to the Supreme Court the rule-making power, the General Assembly may, nevertheless, alter, amend, or repeal any rule of procedure or practice adopted by the Supreme Court for the Superior Court or District Court Divisions.

Pursuant to that article, the General Assembly has enacted the following pertinent statutes:

— G.S. 7A-33. Supreme Court to prescribe appellate division rules of practice and procedure.— The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of practice and procedure designed to procure the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of all litigation in the appellate division.
—G.S. 7A-34. Rules of practice and procedure in trial courts. — The Supreme Court is hereby authorized to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the superior and district courts supplementary to, and not inconsistent with, acts of the General Assembly.

Under its constitutional mandate, our Supreme Court has adopted the following pertinent rule of appellate procedure:

—Rule 10(b)(2). Jury Instructions; Findings and Conclusions of Judge. — No party may assign as error any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly that to which he objects and the grounds of his objection; provided, that opportunity was given to the party to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the jury.

Pursuant to the authority delegated to it under G.S. 7A-34, our Supreme Court has adopted the following pertinent rule of practice for the Superior and District Courts:

—Rule 21. Jury Instruction Conference. — At the close of the evidence (or at such earlier time as the judge may reasonably *421 direct) in every jury trial, civil and criminal, in the superior and district courts, the trial judge shall conduct a conference on instructions with the attorneys of record (or party, if not represented by counsel). Such conference shall be out of the presence of the jury, and shall be held for the purpose of discussing the proposed instructions to be given to the jury. An opportunity must be given to the attorneys (or party, if not represented by counsel) to request any additional instructions or to object to any of those instructions proposed by the judge. . . .
At the conclusion of the charge and before the jury begins its deliberations, and out of the hearing, or upon request, out of the presence of the jury, counsel shall be given the opportunity to object on the record to any portion of the charge, or omission therefrom, stating distinctly that to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.

We next discuss the apparently conflicting provisions of Rule 10(b)(2) and the provisions of sub-sections (b) and (d)(13) of G.S. 15A-1446, which are:

— G.S. 15A-1446. Requisites for preserving the right to appellate review.—
(b) Failure to make an appropriate and timely motion or objection constitutes a waiver of the right to assert the alleged error upon appeal, but the appellate court may review such errors in the interest of justice if it determines it appropriate to do so.
(d) Errors based upon any of the following grounds, which are asserted to have occurred, may be the subject of appellate review even though no objection, exception or motion has been made in the trial division.
(13) Error of law in the charge to the jury.

*422 A similar question was before our Supreme Court in State v. Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 273 S.E. 2d 661 (1981), involving the conflicting provisions of G.S. 15A-1446(d)(6), 1 and Appellate Rule 14(b)(2) 2 , where the constitutional issue was not raised at trial. The Court’s response to this issue in Elam was as follows:

Subsection (6) of G.S. 15A-1446(d) is in direct conflict with Rules 10 and 14(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and our case law on the point. The Constitution of North Carolina provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to make rules of practice and procedure for the Appellate Division.” N.C. Const. Art. IV § 13(2). The General Assembly was without authority to enact G.S. 15A-1446(d)(6). It violates our Constitution. Our Rule 14(b)(2) and our case law are authoritative on this point. . . . This Court will refrain from deciding constitutional questions which are not raised or passed upon in the trial court. . . .

Recognizing that the Court in Elam relied in part on a long case law history in this State requiring trial court activity as a requisite for appellate review of constitutional issues, the Court’s language nevertheless compels us to the conclusion that by enacting Rule 10(b)(2), the Court has by preemption abrogated G.S. 15A-1446(d)(13).

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Related

State v. Morris
300 S.E.2d 46 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
297 S.E.2d 138, 59 N.C. App. 418, 1982 N.C. App. LEXIS 3146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bennett-ncctapp-1982.