State v. Bell

Supreme Court of Louisiana

State v. Bell

122 So. 3d 1007, 2013 WL 5397309

CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana

DecidedSeptember 27, 2013

DocketNo. 2013-K-0117

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 122 So. 3d 1007 (State v. Bell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Bell, 122 So. 3d 1007, 2013 WL 5397309 (La. 2013).

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Opinions

PER CURIAM.

h Granted. Under the facts of the matter presented, we find the court of appeal erred in upholding the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to quash. Relying on the four factors courts consider in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, we find no violation of the defendant’s constitutional right. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). While a 30-month delay is certainly not insignificant, we find it is not necessarily as presumptively prejudicial a length of time as the lower courts, even in dissent, concluded. However, even assuming the delay was presumptively prejudicial, our examination of the reasons for the delay shows the defendant and the trial court were active parties to the delay, as well as the state. In addition, the record shows the defendant failed to object to any of the state’s continuances, and made no formal speedy trial claim until filing his motion to quash. Finally, the only prejudice the defendant enumerates is his inability to have chosen counsel. In the absence of allegations appointed counsel has been providing, or would in future provide, ineffective assistance, defendant fails to raise sufficient and specific prejudice, as opposed to only claims of general prejudice. The lower courts’ rulings on the motion to quash are in error and are reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.

HUGHES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents.

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PER CURIAM.

h Granted. Under the facts of the matter presented, we find the court of appeal erred in upholding the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to quash. Relying on the four factors courts consider in determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, we find no violation of the defendant’s constitutional right. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). While a 30-month delay is certainly not insignificant, we find it is not necessarily as presumptively prejudicial a length of time as the lower courts, even in dissent, concluded. However, even assuming the delay was presumptively prejudicial, our examination of the reasons for the delay shows the defendant and the trial court were active parties to the delay, as well as the state. In addition, the record shows the defendant failed to object to any of the state’s continuances, and made no formal speedy trial claim until filing his motion to quash. Finally, the only prejudice the defendant enumerates is his inability to have chosen counsel. In the absence of allegations appointed counsel has been providing, or would in future provide, ineffective assistance, defendant fails to raise sufficient and specific prejudice, as opposed to only claims of general prejudice. The lower courts’ rulings on the motion to quash are in error and are reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.

HUGHES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for the reasons assigned by WEIMER, J.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents.

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122 So. 3d 1007, 2013 WL 5397309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bell-la-2013.

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