State v. Beechler

2015 Ohio 4106
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 2, 2015
Docket2014-CA-139
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 2015 Ohio 4106 (State v. Beechler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Beechler, 2015 Ohio 4106 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Beechler, 2015-Ohio-4106.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 2014-CA-139 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 09-CR-72 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from DANA BEECHLER : Common Pleas Court) : Defendant-Appellant : : ........... OPINION Rendered on the 2nd day of October, 2015. ...........

RYAN A SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, 4th Floor, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee

DANA BEECHLER, #606639, London Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 69, London, Ohio 43140 Defendant-Appellant, pro se

.............

HALL, J.

{¶ 1} Dana Beechler appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial of his post-

conviction September 25, 2014 “Motion to Vacate Sentence for the Specification and or -2-

a New Trial.”

{¶ 2} Beechler advances the following three assignments of error:

I. The appellant’s motion to vacate sentence for the specification and

or a new trial was rejected due to the conflict of interest that exist when the

trial judge ruled on the motion that explains how the trial judge violated the

appellant’s due process rights, abusing its discretion.

II. The appellant’s rights to due process of a trial by jury was violated

by the trial court when it stipulated to the specification without the

appellant’s consent or knowledge thereof.

III. The trial court committed plain error when it failed to inquire with

the appellant during trial about the OVI specification charge being stipulated

to pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B) & violated Civ.R. 8(C) & (D).

{¶ 3} The record reflects that Beechler was convicted in 2009 on two felony counts

of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”), each with a specification that he had been

convicted of or pled guilty to five or more OVI violations or equivalent offenses within the

prior 20 years. The convictions merged at sentencing, and the trial court imposed a five-

year prison term for the second count and a consecutive five-year prison term for the

specification. This court affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark

No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900. Acting pro se, Beechler then sought various forms of

post-conviction relief, including a motion for relief from judgment and a petition for a writ

of mandamus. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief from judgment in State v.

Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-11, 2014-Ohio-3350. The Ohio Supreme Court

affirmed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus in State ex rel. Beechler v. -3-

Rastatter, 140 Ohio St.3d 343, 2014-Ohio-4061, 18 N.E.3d 433.

{¶ 4} Beechler’s present appeal concerns his September 25, 2014 “Motion to

Vacate Sentence for the Specification and or a New Trial.” (Doc. #52). Therein, he

asserted that his trial counsel improperly had stipulated to the prior-offense specification

without his knowledge or consent. He argued: “The trial record will show that at no time

during trial the Defendant was addressed by the court pertaining to the stipulation of the

specification * * *.” (Id. at 2). As a result, he maintained that he was entitled either to

dismissal of the specification and vacation of the sentence thereon or to a new trial. (Id.

at 3). The trial court summarily overruled Beechler’s motion. (Doc. #53). This appeal

followed.

{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Beechler argues that a conflict of interest

should have precluded the trial court judge from ruling on his motion. Beechler asserts

that the same judge improperly had permitted the prosecutor and defense counsel to

stipulate at trial to the prior-offense specification without his knowledge. That being so,

he reasons that the judge should not have been allowed to rule on his motion, which

essentially accused that judge of having violated his due process rights by permitting the

stipulation.

{¶ 6} Beechler addressed the recusal issue in his September 25, 2014 motion as

follows:

The Defendant would respectfully request the Honorable Judge

Douglas M. Rastatter recuse himself from this motion to avoid any further

mishap of justice that may arise from the conflict of interest that exist,

because Judge Rastatter was the trial Judge that failed to inquire with the -4-

Defendant about the Stipulation that caused the Defendant’s case to be

prejudiced.

(Doc. #52 at 3).

{¶ 7} The trial court overruled Beechler’s motion without addressing the request

for recusal. (Doc. #53). On appeal, the State argues that Beechler’s first assignment of

error is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the issue it raises could have been

raised on direct appeal. (Appellee’s brief at 4-5). We find that argument unpersuasive.

Beechler plainly could not have raised on direct appeal the trial court’s failure to recuse

itself from a motion he did not file until years later. We nevertheless find Beechler’s first

assignment of error unpersuasive. As the State also notes, the only proper procedure

when a defendant believes recusal is appropriate is to file an affidavit with the Ohio

Supreme Court, which has exclusive authority to determine whether recusal is warranted.

In re A.K., 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2013-CA-63, 2015-Ohio-29, ¶19-21. Accordingly, the

first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 8} In his second assignment of error, Beechler claims the trial court erred in

accepting counsel’s stipulation at trial to his guilt on the prior-offense specification when

the stipulation was made without his knowledge or consent. In this regard, Beechler

asserts that the trial court was required by law to address him on the record in open court

to assure that he understood the stipulation and wanted to admit the specification.

Although we disagree with Beechler’s argument, even if what he says is true, he could

have raised this issue in his direct appeal. Indeed, if the trial court was required to, but

did not, address Beechler on the record in open court to ascertain his understanding of

and his agreement to the stipulation, the trial record would reflect that he was not -5-

informed. Beechler essentially admitted this in his motion, asserting: “Nowhere on the

record does it show that the Defendant was informed of the stipulation that was going to

take place between both parties, and in fact the only people that [were] aware of the

stipulation taking place [were] Judge Rastatter and both attorneys and the Court Reporter

Lisa Rae Wirkner.” (Doc. #52 at 2, citing Trial Tr. pgs. 71-72). Because the record would

have shown the error Beechler alleges, he could have raised the trial court’s failure to

address the stipulation with him as an issue on his prior appeal. The doctrine of res

judicata precludes him from raising that issue now. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226

N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a

final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel

from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any

defense or claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the

defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from

that judgment.”).

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Related

State v. Beechler
2017 Ohio 1385 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2017)

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