State v. Beechler
This text of 2015 Ohio 4106 (State v. Beechler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as State v. Beechler, 2015-Ohio-4106.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CLARK COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellate Case No. 2014-CA-139 Plaintiff-Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 09-CR-72 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from DANA BEECHLER : Common Pleas Court) : Defendant-Appellant : : ........... OPINION Rendered on the 2nd day of October, 2015. ...........
RYAN A SAUNDERS, Atty. Reg. No. 0091678, Clark County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, 4th Floor, Springfield, Ohio 45502 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
DANA BEECHLER, #606639, London Correctional Institution, Post Office Box 69, London, Ohio 43140 Defendant-Appellant, pro se
.............
HALL, J.
{¶ 1} Dana Beechler appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial of his post-
conviction September 25, 2014 “Motion to Vacate Sentence for the Specification and or -2-
a New Trial.”
{¶ 2} Beechler advances the following three assignments of error:
I. The appellant’s motion to vacate sentence for the specification and
or a new trial was rejected due to the conflict of interest that exist when the
trial judge ruled on the motion that explains how the trial judge violated the
appellant’s due process rights, abusing its discretion.
II. The appellant’s rights to due process of a trial by jury was violated
by the trial court when it stipulated to the specification without the
appellant’s consent or knowledge thereof.
III. The trial court committed plain error when it failed to inquire with
the appellant during trial about the OVI specification charge being stipulated
to pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B) & violated Civ.R. 8(C) & (D).
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Beechler was convicted in 2009 on two felony counts
of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OVI”), each with a specification that he had been
convicted of or pled guilty to five or more OVI violations or equivalent offenses within the
prior 20 years. The convictions merged at sentencing, and the trial court imposed a five-
year prison term for the second count and a consecutive five-year prison term for the
specification. This court affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark
No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900. Acting pro se, Beechler then sought various forms of
post-conviction relief, including a motion for relief from judgment and a petition for a writ
of mandamus. We affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief from judgment in State v.
Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-11, 2014-Ohio-3350. The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed the dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus in State ex rel. Beechler v. -3-
Rastatter, 140 Ohio St.3d 343, 2014-Ohio-4061, 18 N.E.3d 433.
{¶ 4} Beechler’s present appeal concerns his September 25, 2014 “Motion to
Vacate Sentence for the Specification and or a New Trial.” (Doc. #52). Therein, he
asserted that his trial counsel improperly had stipulated to the prior-offense specification
without his knowledge or consent. He argued: “The trial record will show that at no time
during trial the Defendant was addressed by the court pertaining to the stipulation of the
specification * * *.” (Id. at 2). As a result, he maintained that he was entitled either to
dismissal of the specification and vacation of the sentence thereon or to a new trial. (Id.
at 3). The trial court summarily overruled Beechler’s motion. (Doc. #53). This appeal
followed.
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, Beechler argues that a conflict of interest
should have precluded the trial court judge from ruling on his motion. Beechler asserts
that the same judge improperly had permitted the prosecutor and defense counsel to
stipulate at trial to the prior-offense specification without his knowledge. That being so,
he reasons that the judge should not have been allowed to rule on his motion, which
essentially accused that judge of having violated his due process rights by permitting the
stipulation.
{¶ 6} Beechler addressed the recusal issue in his September 25, 2014 motion as
follows:
The Defendant would respectfully request the Honorable Judge
Douglas M. Rastatter recuse himself from this motion to avoid any further
mishap of justice that may arise from the conflict of interest that exist,
because Judge Rastatter was the trial Judge that failed to inquire with the -4-
Defendant about the Stipulation that caused the Defendant’s case to be
prejudiced.
(Doc. #52 at 3).
{¶ 7} The trial court overruled Beechler’s motion without addressing the request
for recusal. (Doc. #53). On appeal, the State argues that Beechler’s first assignment of
error is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the issue it raises could have been
raised on direct appeal. (Appellee’s brief at 4-5). We find that argument unpersuasive.
Beechler plainly could not have raised on direct appeal the trial court’s failure to recuse
itself from a motion he did not file until years later. We nevertheless find Beechler’s first
assignment of error unpersuasive. As the State also notes, the only proper procedure
when a defendant believes recusal is appropriate is to file an affidavit with the Ohio
Supreme Court, which has exclusive authority to determine whether recusal is warranted.
In re A.K., 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2013-CA-63, 2015-Ohio-29, ¶19-21. Accordingly, the
first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 8} In his second assignment of error, Beechler claims the trial court erred in
accepting counsel’s stipulation at trial to his guilt on the prior-offense specification when
the stipulation was made without his knowledge or consent. In this regard, Beechler
asserts that the trial court was required by law to address him on the record in open court
to assure that he understood the stipulation and wanted to admit the specification.
Although we disagree with Beechler’s argument, even if what he says is true, he could
have raised this issue in his direct appeal. Indeed, if the trial court was required to, but
did not, address Beechler on the record in open court to ascertain his understanding of
and his agreement to the stipulation, the trial record would reflect that he was not -5-
informed. Beechler essentially admitted this in his motion, asserting: “Nowhere on the
record does it show that the Defendant was informed of the stipulation that was going to
take place between both parties, and in fact the only people that [were] aware of the
stipulation taking place [were] Judge Rastatter and both attorneys and the Court Reporter
Lisa Rae Wirkner.” (Doc. #52 at 2, citing Trial Tr. pgs. 71-72). Because the record would
have shown the error Beechler alleges, he could have raised the trial court’s failure to
address the stipulation with him as an issue on his prior appeal. The doctrine of res
judicata precludes him from raising that issue now. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226
N.E.2d 104 (1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus (“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a
final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel
from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any
defense or claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the
defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from
that judgment.”).
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