State v. Beck

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 15, 2023
• Docket: 264A21
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 264A21

Filed 15 December 2023

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. ISAIAH SCOTT BECK

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of

the Court of Appeals, 278 N.C. App. 255 (2021), vacating in part and finding no error

in part in a judgment entered on 31 October 2019 by Judge Susan E. Bray, in Superior

Court, Watauga County. On 14 December 2021, the Supreme Court allowed

defendant’s petition for discretionary review of an additional issue. Heard in the

Supreme Court on 13 September 2023.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Robert C. Ennis, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant/appellee.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Sterling Rozear, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant/appellee.

BARRINGER, Justice.

Here, we consider whether the Court of Appeals erred by vacating defendant’s

conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Upon careful

review, we hold that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we reverse the Court of

Appeals and direct the Court of Appeals to reinstate defendant’s conviction for

conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. STATE V. BECK

Opinion of the Court

I. Factual Background

In April of 2017, Daniel Silva, Javier Holloway, and defendant Isaiah Scott

Beck lived in Lexington, North Carolina. The three also knew Cameron Baker who,

at that time, lived in Boone, North Carolina. Baker knew Mackenzie Beshears, a drug

dealer selling marijuana and Xanax in Boone.

At defendant’s trial, the evidence tended to show as follows. Defendant, Silva,

and Holloway made plans to rob a drug dealer in Boone. Initially, the three did not

have a plan as to whom, specifically, they would rob. On 18 April 2017, Silva texted

Holloway, “Send me a pic with me and the gun [ ] so I can show my [a]migo.” Later

that day, Holloway texted Silva, “[hit me up as soon as possible] got a lick,” referring

to a robbery. On 24 April 2017, Holloway texted Silva saying, “Aye bro I need that AR

asap.” On 26 April 2017, Holloway texted Silva asking whether he was “try[ing to get

in] on this lick in the [a.m.].” When Silva texted back asking, “Where?”, Holloway

replied, “Boone, certified we gone come up bro we just need a ride.” Silva responded

to Holloway, “I got you” and “Be ready at 9.” Silva clarified by asking, “me you and

[defendant]?”, to which Holloway replied, “Yeah.”

While defendant, Silva, and Holloway were en route to Boone on 27 April 2017,

defendant contacted Baker and asked him if he knew where defendant “could buy

some drugs and stuff.” Baker then coordinated a meeting between Beshears and

defendant, Holloway, and Silva, to take place that day. Defendant then informed

Baker he was going to “take all the money [Beshears] got too . . . .”

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At trial, Beshears testified that Baker had contacted her on 27 April 2017,

asking if she had any marijuana or Xanax for sale. Baker told Beshears that he and

a friend would be coming over to purchase the drugs. Baker later told Beshears that

only his friend Silva would meet her instead. On the afternoon of 27 April 2017,

Beshears and her boyfriend, Devon Trivette, saw Silva pull into the empty parking

lot at her apartment. Beshears spoke with Silva on the phone, identifying which

apartment was hers. Then Silva drove away unexpectedly. Beshears texted Silva,

who replied that he had become “sketched . . . out [when he saw] somebody peaking

[sic] round the corner . . . .” Silva explained that he understood from Baker that

Beshears was going to come to the parking lot to transact the sale. Beshears replied

“I’ll come down if ya want!” Roughly twenty-four minutes later, Silva returned to

Beshears’ apartment complex, parked his vehicle, and went inside Beshears’

apartment.

Upon entering Beshears’ apartment, Silva sat down on her couch. Then

defendant and Holloway, wearing all black clothing and face coverings, broke in the

door of the apartment. Defendant pointed the barrel of an AR-15 at Beshears’ head

while instructing Holloway to “grab everything.” A struggle ensued. Beshears and

Trivette were able to push defendant and Holloway out of the apartment, while their

roommate called police. Silva helped hold the door closed as Beshears and Trivette

pushed defendant and Holloway outside. Beshears testified that during the struggle,

Silva stated that he did not know the break-in was going to happen.

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II. Procedural Background

Defendant was indicted on four charges: conspiracy to commit robbery with a

dangerous weapon, robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit felonious

breaking or entering, and felonious breaking or entering. At the close of the State’s

evidence, defendant moved to dismiss all charges. Pertinent to this appeal, defendant

contended that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of multiple conspiracies.

The trial court denied defendant’s motions to dismiss. A jury found defendant guilty

of all four charges.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by denying

defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the two conspiracy charges, and vacated

defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.

State v. Beck, 278 N.C. App. 255, 261–62 (2021).1 The Court of Appeals reasoned that

the State’s evidence established one single conspiracy that continued from on or

around 18 April 2017 through the date of the breaking or entering and armed robbery

on 27 April 2017. Id. Judge Tyson issued an opinion, dissenting in part, in which he

opined that the State presented sufficient evidence to deny defendant’s motion to

dismiss the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Id. at

1 We also note that the Court of Appeals erred in determining the charge of conspiracy

to commit breaking or entering would be the conspiracy charge to remain if there had been sufficient evidence of only one conspiracy. During oral argument, defendant conceded that the conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon would be the conspiracy charge to remain, if only one conspiracy charge would stand. See Oral Argument at 53:34, State v. Beck (No. 264A21) (Sept. 13, 2023).

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264–65. The State appealed that issue to this Court, in accordance with N.C.G.S.

§ 7A-30(2). Defendant also filed a petition for discretionary review of an additional

issue pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31, which this Court allowed.2

III. Standard of Review

Whether the State presented substantial evidence of conspiracy to commit

robbery with a dangerous weapon is a question of law. Therefore, we review the denial

of defendant’s motion to dismiss de novo. E.g., State v. Golder, 374 N.C. 238, 250

(2020). Substantial evidence is the “amount . . . necessary to persuade a rational juror

to accept a conclusion.” Id. at 249 (quoting State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574 (2015)).

Substantial evidence means “more than a scintilla of evidence.” State v. Powell, 299

N.C. 95, 99 (1980). In our review of the sufficiency of evidence, we consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State. E.g., Golder, 374 N.C. at 250. The

State is entitled to “every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to

be drawn” from the evidence presented. Id. (cleaned up). If the record reveals that

substantial evidence of the charged offenses has been presented, “the case is for the

jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.” Id. (cleaned up).

IV. Analysis

The crime of conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to

perform an unlawful act. State v. Cox, 375 N.C. 165, 169 (2020). A single conspiracy

2 The issue presented in the petition for discretionary review was whether the Court

of Appeals erred when it failed to remand for resentencing after vacating one of two convictions that had been consolidated for judgment.

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can encompass multiple crimes. See State v. McLamb, 313 N.C. 572, 578 (1985).

However, in the course of completing the target crime of an original conspiracy,

a defendant may enter into an additional and separate conspiracy to commit a

different crime not conspired to originally. State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 48–49 (1993)

(defendant first conspired to commit murder with two co-conspirators, then formed a

second conspiracy when, in the course of committing the murders, he and one of the

original co-conspirators formed a separate agreement to commit burglary in order to

accomplish the murders), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246 (1994). “[W]hether multiple

agreements constitute a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is a question of

fact for the jury.” State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 577 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 909

(2005) (identifying a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be considered by the

Tirado jury). Evidence of an express agreement is not required. State v. Winkler, 368

N.C. 572, 575 (2015). Rather, “evidence tending to show a mutual, implied

understanding will suffice.” Id. (quoting State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 658 (1991)).

The issue before us is whether the State presented substantial evidence of

multiple conspiracies, or just one conspiracy. As related to the conspiracies, the State

had the burden of presenting substantial evidence tending to show that defendant

and at least one other person formed the original conspiracy by agreeing to commit

robbery with a dangerous weapon. The State also had the burden of presenting

substantial evidence tending to show that defendant and at least one other person

formed an additional and separate conspiracy by agreeing to commit the crime of

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felonious breaking or entering. See Cox, 375 N.C. at 169. The elements of robbery

with a dangerous weapon are: (1) the unlawful taking or attempt to take personal

property from another; (2) having in possession or with the use or threatened use of

any firearms or other dangerous weapon; (3) whereby the life of a person is

endangered or threatened. Id.; N.C.G.S. § 14-87(a) (2021). The elements of felony

breaking or entering are: (1) the breaking or entering; (2) of any building; (3) with the

intent to commit any felony or larceny therein. Cox, 375 N.C. at 172; N.C.G.S. § 14-

54 (2021).

Here, the State presented evidence that on 18 April 2017, Silva texted

Holloway asking for “a pic with [Silva] and the gun [ ] so [he] can show [his] [a]migo.”

Holloway then texted Silva later that same day, “[hit me up as soon as possible] got

a lick,” referring to a robbery. On 24 April 2017, Holloway texted Silva, saying, “Aye

bro I need that AR asap.” On 26 April 2017, Holloway texted Silva asking whether he

was “try[ing to get in] on this lick in the [a.m.]?” When Silva texted back asking,

“Where?”, Holloway replied, “Boone, certified we gone come up bro we just need a

ride.” Silva texted Holloway, “I got you” and “Be ready at 9.” Silva clarified by asking

“me you and [defendant]?” to which Holloway replied “Yeah.” While en route to Boone,

defendant contacted Baker and asked where he “could buy some drugs and stuff.”

Baker then coordinated a meeting between Beshears and Silva to take place on

27 April 2017.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the State presented more

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than a scintilla of evidence from which a rational juror could conclude that defendant

conspired with Silva and Holloway to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon

against Beshears. Further, that juror could reasonably conclude that the original

crime of conspiracy—to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon—was complete no

later than the morning of 27 April 2017.

Importantly, no evidence was produced that the original plan included

breaking or entering the apartment. Instead, the evidence presented indicates that

defendant, Silva, and Holloway originally wanted to rob Beshears somewhere other

than inside her apartment. Baker testified that “they weren’t trying to necessarily go

to [Beshears’] house to get the [drugs] . . . . They wanted to meet somewhere else.”

Silva went to Beshears’ apartment complex, thinking they would meet in the parking

lot.

Upon arrival at the apartment complex, Silva became “sketched . . . out” and

drove away. Silva then texted Beshears, communicating that he understood that

Beshears was going to leave her apartment and come to the parking lot. Beshears

replied, offering to come to the parking lot. Roughly twenty-four minutes later, Silva

texted Beshears that he was returning to the apartment complex. No evidence was

presented regarding what communication may or may not have transpired amongst

defendant, Silva, and Holloway in those twenty-four minutes. Silva then went inside

Beshears’ apartment and sat down. Shortly thereafter, defendant and Holloway,

wearing all black clothing and face coverings, broke in the door of Beshears’

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apartment. Beshears testified that during the ensuing struggle, Silva stated that he

did not know the break-in was going to happen. Silva helped hold the front door closed

as Beshears and Trivette pushed defendant and Holloway outside. This testimony

creates a question of fact for jury consideration.

When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could

conclude that the original plan was to rob Beshears in the parking lot. When viewed

in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could also conclude that, in

those twenty-four minutes between Silva’s first and second appearances at the

apartment complex, defendant and at least one other person formed an additional

and separate conspiracy—a new plan. Gibbs, 335 N.C. at 48 (“[T]he defendant

committed the offense of conspiracy to commit murder when he, Doris, and Yvette

agreed to kill Ann’s family. . . . [O]n the night of the murder, a separate agreement

was made between the defendant and Yvette . . . to commit first-degree burglary.”);

Tirado, 358 N.C. at 578 (“a rational juror, considering [facts specific to Tirado, could

find] the evidence established multiple separate conspiracies, rather than one single

conspiracy”) In the new plan, Silva would enter Beshears’ apartment for the meeting,

and defendant and Holloway would feloniously break into the apartment.

V. Conclusion

A rational juror could find, based on the State’s evidence presented at trial,

that defendant entered into multiple conspiracies—namely, conspiracy to commit

robbery with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit felonious breaking or

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entering. Accordingly, we conclude that, when the evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to the State, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s decision to deny

defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him, including the charge of

conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Thus, we hold that the trial

court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss that charge. Therefore, we

reverse the Court of Appeals and direct the Court of Appeals to reinstate the

defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.

Because we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the issue on direct

appeal and have thus ordered reinstatement of the trial court’s judgment upon

defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon,

we do not reach the sentencing issue on which defendant seeks discretionary review.

Therefore, we conclude that the petition for discretionary review as to an additional

issue was improvidently allowed.

REVERSED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED.

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Riggs, J., dissenting

Justice RIGGS dissenting.

The majority reverses the Court of Appeals because, in its view, the State

submitted sufficient evidence to permit a rational juror to find the existence of two

separate conspiracies. Its rationale rests largely on the fact that the evidence did not

show the conspiracy to rob Ms. Beshears originally included an agreement to break

and enter into her apartment. But our precedents are clear that a multifactor

analysis applies to the factual question of whether multiple conspiracies existed: “The

nature of the agreement or agreements, the objectives of the conspiracies, the time

interval between them, the number of participants, and the number of meetings are

all factors that may be considered.” State v. Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 577 (2004). So,

too, is the time at which the purported separate conspiracies were complete. Id. at

577–78. Because I believe a full consideration of these several factors shows that the

agreement to break and enter was part and parcel of the conspiracy to rob Ms.

Beshears, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ vacatur of the conspiracy to commit

felonious breaking or entering. And, because I believe that improper conviction may

have led the trial court to impose a harsher consolidated sentence than if only one

conspiracy conviction was returned, I would also remand for resentencing based on a

single conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon.

I. Single or Multiple Conspiracies as a Constitutional Concern

I do not disagree with the majority’s recitation of the applicable scope of review

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on appeal and the evidentiary burden placed on the State in attempting to send

multiple conspiracy counts to the jury. I do, however, think it appropriate to reiterate

the evidentiary standard’s constitutional underpinnings. That this evidentiary

standard—and any test adopted by this Court to distinguish between single and

multiple conspiracies—seeks to protect the constitutional right against double

jeopardy cannot be overlooked.

The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause establishes that “[n]o person

shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.

Const. amend. V. Similarly, “[t]he Law of the Land Clause incorporates similar

protections under the North Carolina Constitution,” State v. Oliver, 343 N.C. 202, 205

(1996) (citing N.C. Const. art. I, § 19), and “[d]ouble jeopardy has long been a

fundamental prohibition of our common law and is deeply imbedded in our

jurisprudence,” State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 207, 214 (1975) (citations omitted). This

constitutional protection bears directly on the ability of the State to bring multiple

conspiracy charges in connection with related activities,1 as “[t]he double jeopardy

clause clearly prohibits the division of a single criminal conspiracy into multiple

violations of a conspiracy statute.” United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1144

(4th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (citing Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49,

52–53 (1942)).

1 As the majority recognizes, the law is clear that plans to commit multiple different

crimes may nonetheless constitute a single conspiracy. E.g., State v. McLamb, 313 N.C. 572, 578–79 (1985).

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Courts have struggled with how to cleanly and clearly distinguish between

single and multiple conspiracies in vindication of this constitutional right. See, e.g.,

State v. Rozier, 69 N.C. App. 38, 52 (1984) (“Defining the scope of a conspiracy or

conspiracies remains a thorny problem for the courts.”). Most have recognized that a

consideration of the full factual circumstances surrounding the criminal enterprise is

the appropriate course. See, e.g., United States v. Leavis, 853 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir.

1988) (“Whether there is a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies depends upon

the overlap of key actors, methods, and goals.” (citations omitted)). Our Court of

Appeals—which, by simple dint of volume, has had more occasion than this Court to

consider the issue—has recognized the same. See, e.g., Rozier, 69 N.C. App. at 52

(“There is no simple test for determining whether single or multiple conspiracies are

involved: . . . factors such as time intervals, participants, objectives, and number of

meetings all must be considered.”). Central to the evaluation of these factors is “the

nature of the agreement.” Id. (citing Braverman, 317 U.S. 49).

II. The Tirado Factors Applied

Recognizing the wisdom of our Court of Appeals’ decisions in cases involving

multiple conspiracies, this Court explicitly adopted a multifactor analysis in Tirado.

358 N.C. at 577. Our holding in that case tasks us with considering, inter alia, “[t]he

nature of the agreement or agreements, the objectives of the conspiracies, the time

interval between them, the number of participants, and the number of meetings.” Id.

(citing State v. Dalton, 122 N.C. App. 666, 672–73 (1996)). Also relevant is the timing

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of when each purportedly separate conspiracy ended. Id. at 577–78.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, I believe the

nature and objectives of the agreements in this case weigh against multiple

conspiracies. There is no evidence suggesting, for example, that breaking and

entering into Ms. Besehears’ apartment was considered an end in and of itself; in

other words, the breaking and entering was not agreed to and accomplished for its

own sake. Nor does the breaking and entering appear to have been undertaken for

any purpose other than to rob Ms. Beshears. To the contrary, all the evidence

demonstrates that Mr. Silva, Mr. Holloway, and Mr. Beck agreed to break and enter

for the single and sole purpose of stealing from Ms. Beshears; no other motivation is

suggested by the evidence. The nature and object of the agreements are thus

functionally indistinguishable and militate against submitting separate conspiracy

counts to the jury.

The time interval, number of participants, and number of meetings likewise

weigh against multiple conspiracies, even considered in the light most favorable to

the State. As the majority notes, the State’s evidence shows the agreement to rob

Ms. Beshears was complete amongst Mr. Silva, Mr. Holloway, and Mr. Beck on the

morning of 27 April 2017.2 That afternoon, and a mere twenty-four minutes after the

2 Assuming the text messages between Mr. Silva and Mr. Holloway suggest some prior

agreement by Mr. Beck to participate in a robbery of Ms. Beshears, the first mention of his involvement occurred on the night of 26 April 2017. I do not find this difference of less than twenty-four hours to be significant.

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original plan was frustrated by Ms. Beshears’ absence, Mr. Silva, Mr. Holloway, and

Mr. Beck agreed to break and enter into her apartment to accomplish the previously

planned robbery. A few hours difference in plans amongst the same three

participants, spread between a few text messages and a single physical meeting, does

not suggest the existence of multiple conspiracies.

That both conspiracies terminated at the same time also suggests the existence

of a single conspiracy. While it is true that the offense of conspiracy is complete “[a]s

soon as the union of wills for the unlawful purpose is perfected,” State v. Knotts, 168

N.C. 173, 188 (1914), the crime itself “ends with the attainment of its criminal

objectives,” Tirado, 358 N.C. at 577 (cleaned up). I therefore believe the majority’s

narrow focus and emphasis on which crimes were contemplated when the offense of

conspiracy to commit armed robbery was completed misses the mark, as the evidence

shows the conspiracy was still continuing when the plan to break and enter was

formed. Indeed, to hold otherwise renders that consideration dispositive—a result

plainly not contemplated, let alone suggested, by the multifactor test enunciated in

Tirado. 3

In sum, the evidence in the light most favorable to the State shows three men

conspired to rob Ms. Beshears. Less than twenty-four hours later, and before the

3 The majority suggests that a full consideration of all relevant factors is not required

by Tirado. I do not believe that is consistent with the analysis actually conducted in that case, which reached its ultimate decision only after “considering the series of meetings, the variety of locations and participants, their different objectives, and the statements of conspirators.” Id. at 578.

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robbery was accomplished, those same three men agreed to breaking and entering in

order to accomplish the planned robbery.4 Consideration of these facts consistent

with the multifactor test in Tirado leads me to conclude that the evidence establishes

the existence of a single overarching conspiracy, consisting of multiple planned

crimes, to rob Ms. Beshears. Because our caselaw recognizes only a single chargeable

offense arises in these circumstances, McLamb, 313 N.C. at 578—79, and with

concern for constitutional double jeopardy protections, I respectfully disagree with

the majority’s holding that the trial court properly submitted two separate conspiracy

III. Resentencing

My resolution of the above issues necessarily leads me to dissent from the

majority’s decision to dismiss Mr. Beck’s petition for discretionary review as

improvidently allowed. Turning to the arguments raised in that petition on the

merits, I would hold that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to remand this

matter for resentencing after vacating one of the conspiracies consolidated at Mr.

Beck’s initial sentencing.

In State v. Wortham, this Court identified the influence of multiple convictions

in consolidated discretionary sentencing, and concluded that remand for resentencing

is appropriate when at least one of the consolidated convictions was in error:

Since it is probable that a defendant’s conviction for

4 Mr. Baker, for his part, set up both the initial robbery and Mr. Silva’s return to the

apartment complex after the initial buy fell through.

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two or more offenses influences adversely to him the trial court’s judgment on the length of the sentence to be imposed when these offenses are consolidated for judgment, we think the better procedure is to remand for resentencing when one or more but not all of the convictions consolidated for judgment has been vacated.

318 N.C. 669, 674 (1987). While Wortham was decided in the context of the discretion

afforded to judges under the repealed Fair Sentencing Act rather than under the now-

controlling Structured Sentencing Act, trial court judges nonetheless retain

discretion under current law to sentence a defendant “within the range specified for

the class of offense and prior record level.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.13(b) (2023). See

also State v. Parker, 143 N.C. App. 680, 685–86 (2001) (“The Structured Sentencing

Act clearly provides for judicial discretion in allowing the trial court to choose a

minimum sentence within a specified range.”). I would thus continue to apply the

practice adopted in Wortham and remand for resentencing.5 See, e.g., State v. Dew,

379 N.C. 64, 74–75 (2021) (remanding for resentencing when one of the convictions

incorporated in the consolidated sentence was in error).

IV. Conclusion

The majority’s analysis omits substantive engagement with Tirado’s recitation

of a multifactor test for determining whether the State has introduced sufficient

evidence of multiple conspiracies. The majority’s elision of that precedent flattens

the relevant analysis to a single question—namely, whether commission of the later

5 Notably, Mr. Beck received the maximum sentence allowed within the presumptive

range for each offense.

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agreed-upon crime was originally envisioned when the conspiracy was first formed.

My reading of Tirado—and my concern for the double jeopardy protection

undergirding the rule against improper prosecution for multiple conspiracies—would

lead me to affirm the vacatur of Mr. Beck’s conviction for conspiracy to commit

breaking and entering. I also would remand for resentencing on the remaining

conspiracy conviction. I respectfully dissent.

Justice EARLS joins in this dissenting opinion.

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