[Cite as State v. Beall, 2025-Ohio-5585.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025CA00024
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion and Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Massillon Municipal Court, Case No. 2024-CRB-01934 SAMUEL BEALL Judgment: Affirmed Defendant – Appellee Date of Judgment Entry: December 15, 2025 (KILINA AND DARLENE JELLEL, Appellants)
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Kevin W. Popham, David M. Gormley, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: Justin Richard, City of Massillon Director of Law, Bailey Ricci, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Earle E. Wise, Jr., Chief Counsel, Massillon Law Department, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Kilina and Darlene Jellel, Pro se Appellants OPINION
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Appellants Darlene Jellel and Kilina Jellel appeal the February 19, 2025
Journal Entry and Order entered by the Massillon Municipal Court, which found
defendant-appellee Samuel Beall guilty of criminal damaging or endangering and
ordering him to pay restitution to Darlene Jellel in the amount of $99.00, following a bench
trial.1 Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} On August 28, 2024, a complaint was filed in the Massillon Municipal Court,
charging Beall with criminal damaging or endangering, in violation of R.C. 2909.06(A)(1),
a misdemeanor of the second degree. The complaint alleged Beall sprayed with a hose
the security camera mounted on the home of his neighbor, Darlene M. Jellel. Darlene
Jellel claimed the security camera had a value of $500. Beall entered a plea of not guilty
to the charge at his arraignment on September 6, 2024.
{¶3} The trial court’s attempt to resolve the matter by having Beall pay for the
camera proved unsuccessful and the case proceeded to bench trial on February 19, 2025.
Darlene Jellel and her daughter, Kilina Jellel (collectively, “Appellants”) were present at
the trial and both women testified. Officer Jacob Dexter testified he responded to a call
involving a dispute between two neighbors on August 26, 2024. Officer Dexter spoke
with Darlene Jellel and Beall. Beall admitted to Officer Dexter he sprayed the camera.
Officer Bernard testified the security camera was not damaged. Darlene Jellel confirmed
1 Appellee Samuel Beall did not file a brief in this appeal. the security camera was not damaged. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found
Beall guilty of criminal damaging or endangering and ordered him to pay restitution in the
amount of $99.00. The trial court memorialized its findings and orders via Journal Entry
and Order filed February 19, 2025. Beall paid the full amount of restitution on the same
day. Kilina Jellel, on behalf of herself and Darlene Jellel, filed a Notice of Appeal from the
February 19, 2025 Journal Entry and Order.
{¶4} Kilina Jellel, on behalf of herself and Darlene Jellel, filed a motion for
issuance of final appealable order on March 17, 2025. Thereafter, on March 25, 2025,
Kilina Jellel filed a number of documents as well as three flash drives. Via Entry and
Order filed March 25, 2025, the trial court noted a copy of the February 19, 2025 Journal
Entry and Order convicting and sentencing Beall was provided to Darlene Jellel. The trial
court also indicated the documents submitted by Kilina Jellel would be filed, but not
docketed as Kilina Jellel was not the victim; therefore, Kilina did not have standing to file
an appeal or continue to file documents with the trial court. The trial court further found
Kilina Jellel was practicing law without a license and referred the matter to the City of
Massillon Law Director for review.
{¶5} Kilina Jellel filed additional documents with the trial court on March 26,
2025. Via Entry and Order filed March 26, 2025, the trial court struck the documents,
finding such were “frivolous, burdensome to the court system and not relevant to the
case.” March 26, 2025 Entry and Order. The trial court indicated the documents would
not be docketed or made part of the record. The trial court again found Kilina Jellel lacked
standing and was practicing law without a license. {¶6} On March 27, 2025, Kilina Jellel, on behalf of herself and Darlene Jellel,
filed a motion to vacate the March 25, 2025 Entry and Order. The trial court did not rule
on the motion.
{¶7} It is from the February 19, 2025 Journal Entry and Order Appellants appeal,
raising the following assignments of error:
I. THE TRIAL CT., UNDER JUDGE EDWARD J. ELUM, ERRED BY
IMPROPERLY ADVISING THE DEFENDANT, SAMUEL E. BEALL, OF
EXPUNGEMENT ELIGIBILITY DURING THE FEB. 19, 2025 TRIAL W/O
NOTIFYING OR CONSULTING DARLENE JELLEL, A RECOGNIZED
VICTIM, IN VIOLATION OF OHIO CONST., ART. I, §10a(A)(2), R.C.
§2953.32, AND THE 14TH AMEND. DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
II. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY ALLOWING BEALL TO CLAIM
INDIGENCE DESPITE EVIDENCE OF HIS FINANCIAL RESOURCES,
INCL. SOCIAL MEDIA AND FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE OF HIS
HOUSEHOLD INCOME, VIOLATING R.C. §120.05, OHIO ADMIN. CODE
120-1-03, AND THE 14TH AMEND.
III. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY ALLOWING IMPROPER
FAMILIARITY AND BIAS DURING TRIAL, INCLUDING REPEATED USE
OF FIRST NAMES FOR THE PROSECUTOR (“BAILEY”) AND THE
DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY (“KARA”), WHO WAS ALSO THE
DEFENDANT’S NIECE BY MARRIAGE - A RELATIONSHIP THE
PROSECUTOR ADMITTED AND APPELLANTS LATER CONFIRMED THROUGH A PUBLIC OBITUARY – WHILE TREATING APPELLANTS
WITH COLDNESS AND INDIFFERENCE, UNDERMINING FAIRNESS
AND IMPARTIALITY IN VIOLATION OF OHIO RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7, THE 6TH AND 14TH
AMENDMENTS, AND OHIO CONST., ART. I, §16.
IV. THE TRIAL CT. AND PROS. ERRED BY RESTRICTING
APPELLANTS’ TESTIMONY, REFUSING RELEVANT FACTS ABOUT
HARASSMENT, AND REDIRECTING TESTIMONY, VIOLATING R.C.
§2930.09, THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDS., AND OHIO CONST., ART. I, §16.
V. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY EXCLUDING D. JELLEL FROM THE
COURTROOM DURING CRITICAL PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL,
PREVENTING HER FROM OBSERVING EVIDENCE OR DETERMINING
WHETHER THE DEFENDANT TESTIFIED, VIOLATING R.C. §2930.09,
THE 14TH AMEND., AND OHIO CONST., ART. I, §10a(A)(2).
VI. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE
PROS.’S MISCONDUCT, INCLUDING TAKING OVER A FEB. 18, 2025
PHONE CALL FROM THE VIC. ADV. WITHIN ONE MINUTE,
INSTRUCTING D. JELLEL EXACTLY WHAT TO SAY AT TRIAL WHILE
ACKNOWLEDGING BEALL’S CONSTANT HARASSMENT, AND
FALSELY CLAIMING TO THE TRIAL CT. THAT SHE MAINTAINED
CLOSE CONTACT WITH APPELLANTS DESPITE ISSING NO
SUBPOENAS. THIS CONDUCT VIOLATED R.C. §2930.06, MARSY’S
LAW, AND THE 14TH AMEND., AS DOCUMENTED IN USB EXHIBIT 2. VII. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY ENGAGING IN INAPPROPRIATE
JUDICIAL CONDUCT THROUGH STATEMENTS SUCH AS “SIT DOWN
AND BE QUIET” AND REFERRING TO THE MATTER AS A “PISSING
MATCH,” INTIMIDATING APPELLANTS, VIOLATING OHIO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT RULE 2.8(B) AND THE 14TH AMEND.
VIII. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY ISSUING A MAR. 26, 2025
JUDGMENT ENTRY REFERRING K. JELLEL FOR UPL TO INTIMIDATE
OR RETALIATE AGAINST HER FOR ASSERTING HER RIGHTS,
VIOLATING THE FIRST AND 14TH AMENDS. AND OHIO CONST., ART. I,
§16.
IX. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
REMOVING EVIDENCE FROM TRIAL TO “AVOID A MISTRIAL,”
VIOLATING BRADY V. MARYLAND, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), R.C. §2921.12,
AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
X. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY FAILING
TO ACT ON BEALL’S ONGOING HARASSMENT – DESPITE
ACKNOWLEDGING IT IN THE FEBRUARY 18, 2025 RECORDED CALL,
THE SEPTEMBER 6, 2024 VICTIM ADVOCATE EMAIL, AND PRIOR
COURT PROCEEDINGS – VIOLATING R.C. §2930.02 AND THE 14TH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
XI. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT BY
IMPROPERLY APPROACHING K. JELLEL ON MARCH 26, 2025 WHILE
SHE WAS ATTEMPTING TO FILE MOTIONS RELATED TO HER APPEAL, AND CONTINUING THE INTERACTION AFTER
ACKNOWLEDGING THE APPEAL WAS AGAINST HER, DESPITE AN
ONGOING DELAY CAUSED BY THE CLERK’S OFFICE. THIS VIOLATED
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT STANDARDS AND THE 14TH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
XII. THE PROSECUTOR ACTED IMPROPERLY BY
ACKNOWLEDGING THAT SAMUEL E. BEALL’S ATTORNEY WAS HIS
NIECE, AND DISMISSING APPELLANTS’ CONCERN AFTER THEY
INFORMED HER THE ATTORNEY HAD PREVIOUSLY LIED IN COURT
DURING A PROTECTION ORDER HEARING – CONSTITUTING A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT VIOLATED APPELLANTS’ RIGHTS TO
A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE OHIO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, RULE 1.7, AND THE 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS.
XIII. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY PERMITTING A 251-DAY DELAY
BETWEEN THE REPORTED CRIME AND TRIAL, AN UNREASONABLE
DELAY, VIOLATING R.C. §2945.71 AND THE 14TH AMEND.
XIV. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
EXCLUDING THE POISONING AND DESTRUCTION OF APPELLANTS’
GARDEN FROM TRIAL – DESPITE ITS INCLUSION IN THE VICTIM
IMPACT STATEMENT AND RELEVANCE TO HARASSMENT –
CONSTITUTING SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN
VIOLATION OF OHIO CONST., ART. I, §10a(A)(1), THE 14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, AND BRADY V. MARYLAND,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
XV. THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY FAILING
TO PRESENT, ACKNOWLEDGE, OR EXCHANGE KEY EVIDENCE
FROM APPELLANTS – DESPITE A COURT JOURNAL ENTRY
REQUIRING IT – CONSTITUTING SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL
EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF OHIO CRIM. R. 16, THE 14 TH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, BRADY V. MARYLAND, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), AND STATE V. KEENAN, 1993-Ohio-409 (Ohio Sup. Ct.),
AS DOCUMENTED IN USB EXHIBIT 7.
XVI. OFFICER DEXTER VIOLATED APPELLANTS’ RIGHTS BY
FALSELY STATING TO K. JELLEL THAT THE AUGUST 26, 2024
OFFENSE WAS NON-ARRESTABLE, EVEN AFTER BEING SHOWN
CLEAR SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE OF BEALL INTENTIONALLY
SPRAYING THE CAMERA AND LAUGHING ABOUT IT TO HIMSELF.
DEXTER VIEWED THIS VIDEO, VISITED BEALL, AND RETURNED
STATING HE DIDN’T BELIEVE BEALL’S EXCUSE. HOWEVER,
PROSECUTOR RICCI LATER ADMITTED THAT DEXTER’S BODY CAM
CAPTURED BEALL CONFESSING – PROVING THE OFFENSE WAS
ARRESTABLE AND SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN ARREST.
DESPITE THIS, NO ARREST OCCURRED, AND DEXTER WAS FALSELY
LISTED AS THE ARRESTING OFFICER. HIS ACTIONS CONSTITUTE
FALSIFICATION OF RECORDS, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, DERELICTION OF DUTY, VICTIM RETALIATION, AND DEPRIVATION
OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION, IN VIOLATION OF R.C.
§2921.13, §2921.45, §2921.32, §2921.44, §2921.03, THE 14TH
AMENDMENT, AND OHIO CONST., ART. I, §§10a(A)(1), 10a(A)(6), AND
1.
XVII. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE
CLERK OF COURT’S ACTIONS ON MAR. 26, 2025, INCL. DELAYING K.
JELLEL, BACKDATING ENTRIES, AND MISHANDLING MOTIONS,
OBSTRUCTING ACCESS TO THE COURTS UNDER OHIO CONST.,
ART. I, §16.
XVIII. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY FAILING TO ADDRESS CLERK
OF COURT SHANE JACKSON’S ISSUANCE OF A JUDGMENT ENTRY
REFERRING K. JELLEL FOR UPL WITHOUT CLARIFICATION,
INCLUDING HIS REFUSAL TO CONFIRM WHETHER IT WAS THE FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER, AND HIS STATEMENT “YOU CAN FILE
ANYTHING AT ANY TIME” AFTER IMPLYING IMPROPER CONDUCT,
OBSTRUCTING ACCESS TO THE COURTS IN VIOLATION OF OHIO
CONST., ART. I, §16, AND THE 14TH AMEND.
XIX. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED ITS OWN NOVEMBER 7, 2024
JOURNAL ENTRY REQUIRING THAT “ALL ADDITIONAL VIDEO SHALL
BE EXCHANGED” BY FAILING TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE, IGNORING
APPELLANTS’ ATTEMPTS TO SUBMIT VIDEO EVIDENCE, AND
ULTIMATELY SILENCING THEM AT TRIAL. DESPITE CLEAR EFFORTS TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE – INCLUDING A MARCH 2025 AUDIO
RECORDING WITH THE LAW DIRECTOR CONFIRMING SUBMISSION –
APPELLANTS WERE DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
THIS CONSTITUTED SUPPRESSION OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN
VIOLATION OF OHIO CRIM. R. 16, THE 14TH AMENDMENT DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE, BRADY V. MARYLAND, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), AND
STATE V. KEENAN, 1993-Ohio-409 (OHIO SUP. CT.).
XX. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY PERMITTING THE STRIPPING OF
THE JELLELS’ VICTIM STATUS DESPITE PRIOR RECOGNITION,
VIOLATING OHIO CONST., ART. I, §10a(A)(1), AND R.C. §2930.01.
XXI. THE TRIAL CT. ERRED BY FAILING TO PROVIDE FULL AND
PROPER RESTITUTION, IGNORING EVIDENCE OF THE BROADER
DAMAGES OUTLINED IN THE SEPTEMBER 2024 VICTIM IMPACT
STATEMENT, INCLUDING THE DESTRUCTION OF A 25-YEAR
MEDICINAL GARDEN, A DISCOUNTED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
VALUED AT $423.99, A $100 LADDER REQUIRED TO REINSTALL IT,
AND RELATED LOSSES, IN VIOLATION OF R.C. §2929.18 AND
MARSY’S LAW.
{¶8} We begin by noting Appellants' Brief fails to comply with App. R. 16, which
provides, in relevant part: (A) Brief of the Appellant. The appellant shall include in its brief,
under the headings and in the order indicated, all of the following:
***
(3) A statement of the assignments of error presented for review, with
reference to the place in the record where each error is reflected.
(5) A statement of the case briefly describing the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and the disposition in the court below.
(6) A statement of facts relevant to the assignments of error
presented for review, with appropriate references to the record in
accordance with division (D) of this rule.
{¶9} Although Appellants’ Brief includes a statement of the assignments of error
for review, such does not include a reference to the place in the record where each error
is reflected, in violation of App.R. 16(A)(3). Appellants’ brief includes a statement of the
case, however, such does not describe the nature of the case or the course of the
proceedings, in violation of App.R. 16(A)(5). Similarly, although Appellants’ brief includes
a section captioned “Statement of Facts,” such omits appropriate references to the record,
in violation of App.R. 16(A)(6).
{¶10} Because Appellants’ Brief fails to satisfy the requirements of App. 16(A)(3),
(4), (5), and (6); their brief is noncompliant. Compliance with the above-stated rule is
mandatory. Zanesville v. Robinson, 2010-Ohio-4843, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.). “It is not the function
of this court to construct a foundation for [an appellant's] claims; failure to comply with the rules governing practice in the appellate court is a tactic which is ordinarily fatal.” Musleve
v. Musleve, 2008-Ohio-3961, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.). Such deficiencies permit this Court to
dismiss Appellants' appeal. State v. Darby, 2019-Ohio-2186, ¶¶ 21-24 (5th Dist.).
Notwithstanding the omissions in Appellants’ brief, in the interests of justice and finality,
we elect to review the appeal.
{¶11} Of the 21 assignments of error Appellants assert, we find only 10 are related
to Marsy’s Law; the remaining assignments of error allege, inter alia, inappropriate judicial
conduct, including bias and retaliatory behavior, as well as prosecutorial misconduct. We
shall address the assignments of error which implicate Marsy’s Law together and first.
Marsy’s Law
{¶12} Marsy's Law, an amendment to Art. I, Sec. 10a of the Ohio Constitution,
expanded the rights afforded to crime victims. The law "arose from a national victims'-
rights movement," which "seeks to give crime victims constitutional rights that are equal
to the rights of individuals accused of committing crimes." Centerville v. Knab, 2020-Ohio-
5219, ¶ 11-12. "Consistent with this national movement, the Ohio amendment initiative
sought to give crime victims and their families meaningful and enforceable rights." Id. at
¶ 13.
{¶13} Marsy's Law enumerates ten specific rights: (1) the right to be treated with
fairness, respect, and dignity; (2) the right to reasonable and timely notice of all public
proceedings involving the criminal offense against the victim; (3) the right to be present
at such proceedings; (4) the right to be heard in any public proceeding involving release,
plea, sentencing, disposition, or parole; (5) the right to reasonable protection from the
accused; (6) the right to refuse discovery requests made by the accused; (7) the right to full and timely restitution; (8) the right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; (9)
the right to confer with the attorney for the government; and (10) the right to be informed
in writing of all rights enumerated in the section. Ohio Const., Art. I, Sec. 10a(A)(1)-(10).
{¶14} "[T]he victim . . . may assert the rights enumerated in [Marsy's Law] and any
other right afforded to the victim by law" in "any proceeding involving the criminal offense
. . . against the victim or in which the victim's rights are implicated." Ohio Const., Art. I,
Sec. 10a(B).
{¶15} To implement these rights, the legislature enacted new laws and amended
existing ones under R.C. Chapter 2930. For instance, R.C. 2930.19(A)(1) specifically
provides:
(1) A victim, victim’s representative, or victim’s attorney, if applicable,
or the prosecutor, on request of the victim, has standing as a matter of right
to assert, or to challenge an order denying, the rights of the victim provided
by law in any judicial or administrative proceeding. The trial court shall act
promptly on a request to enforce, or on a challenge of an order denying, the
rights of the victim. In any case, the trial court shall hear the matter within
ten days of the assertion of the victim’s rights. The reasons for any decision
denying relief under this section shall be clearly stated on the record or in a
judgment entry.
{¶16} Accordingly, crime victims and victims’ representatives have "standing as a
matter of right to assert, or to challenge an order denying, the rights of the victim provided by law in any judicial or administrative proceeding." State v. Wagner, 2025-Ohio-542, ¶
15, citing R.C. 2930.19(A)(1); accord Ohio Const., Art. I, Sec. 10a(B). “If the trial court
denies the victim's request for relief, the trial court must give the victim (1) notice of the
decision and a copy of the judgment entry and (2) a specific notice that informs the victim
of the victim's appeal rights or right to file an extraordinary writ.” Id., citing R.C.
2930.19(A)(2)(a). In other words, a victim or a victim’s representative has standing to file
a direct appeal only when the trial court denies the enforcement of his or her constitutional
rights. State v. Basher, 2022-Ohio-4703, ¶ 22.
I
{¶17} In their first assignment of error, Appellants contend the trial court
improperly advised Beall he could have his record expunged after one year pursuant to
R.C. 2953.32. We note, while Marsy’s Law affords victims of crime certain rights, Marsy’s
Law does not extinguish any rights afforded to criminal defendants. The trial court
properly advised Beall of his rights. The trial court did not have an application for
expungement by Beall before it, nor did it grant Beall an expungement without notice to
Appellants. As such, we find no violation of Marsy’s Law at this point. If Beall files an
application for expungement, Appellants would have certain rights under Marsy’s Law.
{¶18} Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled.
IV, V, VI, X, XIV
{¶19} We elect to address Appellants’ fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth, and fourteen
assignments of error together. In their fourth assignment of error, Appellants assert the
trial court and the prosecutor erred in restricting their testimony regarding Beall’s ongoing
harassment as such testimony was relevant. In their fifth assignment of error, Appellants maintain the trial court erred in precluding the Victim’s presence during critical portions of
the trial. In their sixth and tenth assignments of error, Appellants complain of misconduct
by the prosecutor and the victim’s advocate. In their fourteenth assignment of error,
Appellants submit the prosecutor committed misconduct by excluding evidence of Beall’s
destruction of Darlene Jellel’s garden, which was included in the victim impact statement.
{¶20} Appellants failed to file a transcript of the proceedings below. "When
portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of the assigned error(s) are omitted from
the record, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court's
proceedings, and to affirm." Knapp v. Edwards Labs., 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). To
the extent Appellants’ assignments of error relate to conduct which occurred at trial, our
review is hampered by the lack of transcripts in the record. Accordingly, we presume
regularity in the proceedings below.
{¶21} Appellants’ fourth, fifth, sixth, tenth, and fourteenth assignments of error are
overruled.
XVI
{¶22} In their sixteenth assignment of error, Appellants argue their rights were
violated by Officer Dexter’s failure to arrest Beall despite his confession. Appellants have
failed to reference which rights under Marsy’s Law were violated by Officer Dexter’s
decision not to arrest Beall. Upon review, we find no violation of Marsy’s Law.
{¶23} Appellants’ sixteenth assignment of error is overruled. XVII, XX
{¶24} In their seventeenth assignment of error, Appellants question the trial
court’s failure to address the actions of the Clerk of Court in backdating entries,
mishandling motions, and obstructing access to the court. In their twentieth assignment
of error, Appellants contend the trial court erred in permitting their status as victims to be
stripped. Appellants have failed to reference any evidence in the record to substantiate
their claims of misdeeds by the Clerk. In addition, Appellants failed to articulate which
rights under Marsy’s Law were violated.
{¶25} Appellants’ seventeenth and twentieth assignments of error are overruled.
XI
{¶26} In their twenty-first assignment of error, Appellants posit the trial court failed
to provide full and proper restitution, ignoring evidence of the broader damages and
related losses.
{¶27} Victims of crime possess a right to restitution under Marsy's Law. See State
v. Brasher, 2022-Ohio-4703, citing Ohio Const., Art. I, Sec. 10a(A)(7). Restitution is
determined “based on the victim's economic loss" and "shall not exceed the amount of
the economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the
commission of the offense.” R.C. 2929.18(A)(1); R.C. 2929.28(A)(1). "Economic loss" is
defined generally in R.C. 2929.01(L) as “any economic detriment suffered by a victim as
a direct and proximate result of the commission of an offense * * *.” “An order of restitution
imposed by the sentencing court on an offender for a felony is part of the sentence.” State
v. Danison, 105 Ohio St.3d 127, syllabus. {¶28} The complaint against Beall listed a single security camera outside Darlene
Jellel’s home as the only property involved. Appellants claimed the security camera had
a value of $500. At trial, Kilina Jellel testified she purchased the camera for $191.69. See
February 19, 2025 Entry and Order. Officer Bernard testified the camera was not
damaged. Id. The trial court awarded Appellants restitution in the amount of $99.00.
Because our review is limited to the record before us, we cannot find the trial court erred
in only awarding Appellants $99.00 in restitution.
{¶29} Appellants’ twenty first assignment of error is overruled.
Requested Relief
{¶30} Before addressing Appellants’ remaining assignments of error, we shall
review Appellants’ claimed violations of Marcy’s Law based upon their requested grounds
for relief. In their Brief to this Court, Appellants sought the following relief:
- Reversal of the judgment of the Massillon Municipal Court.
- Vacatur of the March 26, 2025 UPL (unauthorized practice of law)
referral.
- A new trial in a neutral venue, such as Canton Municipal Court.
- Imposition of supervision or probation on Beall, if convicted.
- Reassessment of the restitution to award $923.69 for documented
losses + the garden expenses and loss of land ($1,100 in receipts alone –
Not including loss of produce, [sic] Lost Garden Land forever due to cement
and chemical poisoning and loss of joy and safety.
Brief of Appellants at p. 30. {¶31} Assuming, arguendo, Appellants’ rights regarding restitution under Marsy’s
Law were violated, Marsy’s Law does not provide the relief sought by Appellants. There
is no provision under Marsy's Law which allows a victim to appeal a defendant's sentence.
State v. Russell, 2025-Ohio-4424, ¶ 21. Further, "a trial court lacks authority to reconsider
its own valid final judgment in a criminal case.” State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-648, ¶ 106 (2d
Dist.). Most importantly, the double jeopardy protections under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Sec. 10 of
the Ohio Constitution prohibit multiple prosecutions for the same offense.
II, III, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, XIII, XV, XVIII, XIX
{¶32} A victim has standing to appeal only the limited rights provided under
Marsy's Law. Because the errors alleged in Appellants’ remaining assignments of error
do not involve any rights enumerated in Marsy's Law, we find Appellants cannot raise
these claims on appeal.
{¶33} Appellants’ second, third, seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth,
thirteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth claims are overruled. {¶34} The judgment of the Massillon Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs to
Appellants.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Popham, J. and
Gormley, J. concur