State v. Beal

2025 Ohio 1666

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 8, 2025
• Docket: 2024CA00085 & 2024CA00086
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Beal, 2025-Ohio-1666.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Andrew J. King, P. J. : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2024CA00085 OCTAVIUS BEAL : 2024CA00086 : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court, Case Nos. 2024 CRB 423 & 2024TRD00518

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 8, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JASON P. REESE DONOVAN R. HILL Canton Law Director 122 Market Avenue North, Ste. 101 BY: BEAU WENGER Canton, OH 44702 Assistant Prosecutor 218 Cleveland Avenue SW Canton OH 44702 Popham, J.,

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Octavius Beal (“Beal”) appeals his conviction and

sentence after a jury trial in the Canton Municipal Court.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On January 25, 2024, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Canton Police Officer

Christian Paris observed a man, later identified as Beal, walking in the middle of Market

Avenue. (T. at 58.)1 Officer Paris, operating a marked cruiser, stopped and approached

the man, requesting his identification. (T. at 59 - 65.) The man refused, citing concerns

about heavy fog and personal safety. (Id.) The encounter was captured on the officer’s

body camera and a nearby traffic camera. (T. at 62; State’s Exhibit 1; State’s Exhibit 2.)

{¶3} Officer Paris advised him that he was walking unlawfully in the roadway and

was required to provide identifying information. (T. at 65.) The man continued to refuse

despite repeated requests and the arrival of a second officer, who warned him that

noncompliance could result in his arrest. (T. at 66; 94.) The man continued to refuse to

identify himself, providing only his first name. He did not identify himself as Octavius Beal

until after his arrest.

{¶4} Officer Paris charged Beal with obstructing official business (R.C. 2921.31),

failure to disclose personal information (R.C. 2921.29(A)(1)), and pedestrian walking in

the roadway (R.C. 4511.50(A) / (E)). The trial court denied Beal’s motion to suppress on

April 16, 2024.

1 For clarity, the transcript of Beal’s jury trial held April 25, 2024, will be referred to as “T.__”. {¶5} Following a jury trial, Beal was acquitted of obstructing official business but

convicted of failure to disclose personal information. The trial judge separately found Beal

guilty of pedestrians walking along highways, a minor misdemeanor. (T. at 130.)

{¶6} On the conviction for failure to disclose personal information, Beal was

sentenced to 30 days in jail, with 29 days suspended and credit for one day served. He

was also ordered to complete the Canton Anger Management Program (CAMP) and pay

the court costs. On the conviction for pedestrians walking in the roadway, the judge

ordered Beal to pay court costs.

Assignments of Error

{¶7} Beal raises two Assignments of Error:

{¶8} “I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF FAILURE TO DISCLOSE

PERSONAL INFORMATION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT

EVIDENCE.

{¶9} “II. APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF FAILURE TO DISCLOSE

PERSONAL INFORMATION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE

EVIDENCE.”

The Mootness Doctrine

{¶10} Before addressing the merits of Beal’s arguments, we must consider

whether his appeal has been rendered moot.

{¶11} Mootness is a jurisdictional question because courts are tasked with

deciding adversarial legal cases and issuing judgments that can be carried into effect.

Cyran v. Cyran, 2018-Ohio-24, ¶ 9, citing Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 (1970).

See also United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Because mootness is jurisdictional, a court must address

it even if the parties do not raise the issue. Rice, 404 U.S. at 246.

{¶12} A court may take judicial notice of mootness. As the Supreme Court of Ohio

has noted, “an event that causes a case to be moot may be proved by extrinsic evidence

outside the record.” State ex rel. Nelson v. Russo, 89 Ohio St.3d 227, 228 (2000), quoting

Pewitt v. Lorain Correctional Inst., 64 Ohio St.3d 470, 472 (1992). Accord, Miner v. Witt,

82 Ohio St. 237, 239 (1910). See also State v. Lawless, 2018-Ohio-1471, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.);

State v. Williams, 2020-Ohio-77, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).

{¶13} Here, Beal’s appeal is not moot because he received a suspended sentence

conditioned on good behavior for two years. He remains subject to the balance of the jail

term if he fails to comply with the conditions of his sentence. A case is not moot where

the suspended sentence is still in effect. See State v. Baumgardt, 2002-Ohio-4662, ¶ 7

(5th Dist.); In re A.B., 2020-Ohio-3904, ¶10 (1st Dist.); In the Matter of J.N., 2018-Ohio-

2557, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.); State v. Singleton, 2019-Ohio-4518, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.).

I.

{¶14} In his First Assignment of Error, Beal contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his conviction for failure to disclose personal information.

Standard of Appellate Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶15} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury....” This right, in

conjunction with the Due Process Clause, requires that each of the material elements of

a crime be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gaudin, 515

U.S. 506, 509-510 (1995); Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016). {¶16} The test for the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law for

resolution by the appellate court. State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30; State v. Jordan,

2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 13. “This naturally entails a review of the elements of the charged

offense and a review of the state's evidence.” State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶

13.

{¶17} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court does not

assess whether the evidence should be believed. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by State constitutional amendment on

other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4 (1997); Walker at

¶ 30. Thus, on review for evidentiary sufficiency we do not second-guess the jury's

credibility determinations; rather, we ask whether the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, would convince a rational trier of fact of the defendant's guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy, 91 Ohio St.3d 516, 543 (2001), citing Jenks

at paragraph two of the syllabus. See also, Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295 at ¶ 31; State v.

Poutney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19.

{¶18} We will not “disturb a verdict on appeal on sufficiency grounds unless

‘reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.’” State v.

Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283 ¶ 94, quoting State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997).

Accord State v. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-5487, ¶ 74.

Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, would convince a rational trier of fact that Beal was guilty

of failure to disclose personal information {¶19} Beal was convicted under R.C. 2921.29(A)(1), which requires a person,

upon lawful detention supported by reasonable suspicion, to disclose their name,

address, or date of birth. To lawfully detain a person under this statute, an officer must

have reasonable suspicion that the individual is committing, has committed, or is about

to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.

491, 497- 98 (1983).

{¶20} Here, Officer Paris stopped Beal for violating R.C. 4511.50(A) by walking in

the roadway despite the availability of a sidewalk. (T. at 58 - 60.) Reasonable suspicion

supported the detention. State v. Lenzy, 2018-Ohio-3485, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.); State v. Shorts,

2011-Ohio-6202, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.). Therefore, he was permitted to lawfully stop Beal to

investigate the behavior and potentially issue a citation.

{¶21} Beal’s repeated refusals to identify himself justified his arrest under R.C.

2935.26(A)(2), which permits arrest for a minor misdemeanor when the offender fails to

provide satisfactory proof of identity. See State v. Habel, 2010-Ohio-3907, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.).

Moreover, requiring identification during a lawful Terry stop is constitutionally permissible.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 187-188 (2004).

{¶22} Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we

conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Beal failed to disclose his personal information in violation of R.C. 2921.29(A). We

therefore find that the State met its burden of production regarding each element of the

offense and, accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to submit the charge to the jury

and to support Beal’s conviction.

{¶23} Beal’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. II.

{¶24} In his Second Assignment of Error, Beal contends that his conviction is

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Standard of Appellate Review –Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶25} The term “‘manifest weight of the evidence’. . . relates to persuasion.”

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. It “concerns ‘the inclination of the greater

amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than

the other.’” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387(1997),

superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith,

80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4 (1997); State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.

{¶26} When evaluating the manifest weight of the evidence, the question is

whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts in the evidence, thereby creating

a manifest miscarriage of justice- even where the evidence of guilt is legally sufficient.

Thompkins, at 386-387; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001).

{¶27} Manifest weight review focuses on the effect of the evidence in inducing

belief. Thompkins, at 386-387; State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4396, ¶ 83. In this context,

an appellate court acts as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree with the fact finder’s

resolution of the conflicting testimony. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, Thompkins at

387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982) (quotation marks omitted); State v.

Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶ 25, citing Thompkins.

{¶28} Traditionally appellate courts have recognized a presumption in favor of the

finder of fact when reviewing a manifest weight of the evidence challenge. Eastley v.

Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21. This deference stems from the trier of facts unique position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections- elements

critical in assessing credibility. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77,

80 (1984).

{¶29} However, the Eighth District Court of Appeals has recently observed in

State v. Reillo, 2024-Ohio-3307, ¶ 20, appeal allowed 2025-Ohio-705 (Table), that

Eastley arguably implied that the presumption from the civil manifest weight review

persists in criminal cases. Id. at ¶ 27. The court emphasized that if an appellate court

simply defers to the trier of facts credibility determinations “there would be no difference

between that and the sufficiency analysis, in effect merging the separate concepts of

sufficiency and weight, as was once the standard for civil cases.” Reillo at ¶ 23 (citations

omitted). The court further noted: “If appellate panels defer to the trier of fact’s credibility

determinations, which resulted in the finding of guilt or there would not be an appeal, there

would be no reason to advance a manifest-weight challenge.” Id. See also State v. Butler,

2024-Ohio-5879, ¶ 27 (5th Dist.). Accordingly, an appellate court reviews de novo the

trier of fact’s credibility determinations.

{¶30} A manifest-weight challenge should be sustained only in “‘the exceptional

case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

{¶31} Additionally, to reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight

of the evidence, a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals

panel reviewing the case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio

Constitution. Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶ 2 - 4, citing Thompkins

at paragraph four of the syllabus. Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost its way and created a

manifest miscarriage of justice requiring a reversal

{¶32} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable

inferences and assessing credibility as a thirteenth juror, we conclude that the jury did not

lose its way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice.

{¶33} Officer Paris’ testimony was corroborated by the traffic camera and body

camera videos. The record contains no compelling evidence that weighs heavily against

Beal’s conviction. We find that the greater weight of the credible evidence supports the

jury’s finding that Beal failed to disclose personal information when lawfully detained. We

further find no indication that the jury lost its way or ignored substantial evidence.

Accordingly, Beal’s conviction for failing to disclose personal information is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶34} Beal’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. {¶35} The judgment of the Canton Municipal Court, Stark County, Ohio is

affirmed.

By Popham, J.,

King, P.J., and

Gormley, J., concur