[Cite as State v. Bayman, 2024-Ohio-5405.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DARKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-31 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 22-CR-00074 : JEREMIAH BAYMAN : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
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OPINION
Rendered on November 15, 2024
ADAM JAMES STOUT, Attorney for Appellant
R. KELLY ORMSBY, III, Attorney for Appellee
.............
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Jeremiah Bayman appeals from his conviction in the Darke County Court of
Common Pleas on one count of aggravated possession of drugs (methamphetamine), a
felony of the second degree. He claims that the trial court erred in overruling his motion -2-
to suppress, in overruling his motion to dismiss due to destruction of evidence by the
State, and in finding him competent without holding a hearing. For the following reasons,
the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In the early morning hours of June 8, 2021, a deputy with the Darke County
Sheriff’s Office stopped the vehicle in which Bayman was the rear seat passenger.
Neither the driver nor Bayman had a valid driver’s license, and the front seat passenger
appeared to be impaired. While the three were seated inside the vehicle, the deputy
walked his canine partner around the car; the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. After
Bayman was removed from the vehicle and prior to being patted down, Bayman indicated
that he had a syringe in his pocket. His removal of the syringe exposed a part of plastic
bag containing what appeared to be an illegal drug. The bag was later determined to
contain approximately 38.33 grams of methamphetamine.
{¶ 3} Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Bayman was not taken to jail. Because he
was not placed under arrest, the cruiser video of the stop was not preserved, and the
deputy did not take steps to ensure that it would be.
{¶ 4} On March 24, 2022, Bayman was indicted on one count of aggravated
possession of drugs (methamphetamine) in an amount equal to or exceeding five times
the bulk amount of 3 grams. Approximately two months later, Bayman filed a pro se
motion, asking the court to dismiss the case due to the State’s destruction of the cruiser
video. He also expressed concerns about his attorney. The next day, the trial court
summarily denied the motion to dismiss. -3-
{¶ 5} Over the next several months, Bayman repeatedly filed pro se motions. The
motions sought reconsideration of the denial of his motion to dismiss due to the
destruction of evidence, the appointment of chemical and forensic experts, a continuance
of the trial date, dismissal due to a speedy trial violation, and a bond reduction. Bayman
also wrote about the circumstances of his case, claiming that the deputy acted illegally
and that he was “set up.”
{¶ 6} On July 27, 2022, defense counsel filed a joint motion to suppress and motion
to dismiss due to destruction of exculpatory evidence. The trial court set a hearing on
counsel’s motion for August 18, 2022. In September 2022, the trial court denied the
motion to suppress, the motion to dismiss due to destruction of evidence, and the motion
to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
{¶ 7} At some point, defense counsel orally notified the trial court that a motion
related to Bayman’s competency was forthcoming. In response to that representation,
on October 18, 2022, the trial court ordered the sheriff’s office to provide all records from
corrections staff regarding Bayman’s behavior since April 15, 2022, and all Bayman’s
medical, mental, dental, prescription, and other records related to his care during his
incarceration. No written motion appears to have been filed.
{¶ 8} Nevertheless, on December 7, 2022, in an entry deciding several pending
motions, the trial court summarily denied a request for a forensic examination to analyze
Bayman’s competency. The court stated that it had “considered the records from the
Darke County Jail regarding his behavior and treatment. There are not facts that indicate
any competency problems. While his behavior at times has been non-compliant or -4-
unruly, such actions appear to be conscious behavior instead of an indication of
competency issues.”
{¶ 9} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on December 13, 2022. The jury found
Bayman guilty of possession of drugs and determined that the amount involved was 38.33
grams of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced Bayman to a minimum of two
years to a maximum of three years in prison and ordered him to pay certain fees and
costs.
{¶ 10} Bayman did not immediately appeal his conviction. However, in January
2024, we granted his motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. Bayman now raises three
assignments of error.
II. Motion to Suppress
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Bayman claims that the trial court erred in
failing to suppress evidence from the June 8, 2021 traffic stop.
{¶ 12} An appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of fact and law. State v. Ojezua, 2016-Ohio-2659, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). When considering a
motion to suppress, the trial court takes on the role of trier of fact and is in the best position
to resolve factual questions and assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Turner,
2015-Ohio-4612, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). As a result, we must accept the trial court’s findings of
fact if they are supported by competent and credible evidence. Id. “Accepting these
facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference
to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”
Id., quoting State v. Koon, 2015-Ohio-1326, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). The trial court’s application -5-
of law to the findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. State v.
Shepherd, 2021-Ohio-4230, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.).
A. Evidence and Trial Court’s Decision
{¶ 13} Deputy Colton Magel of the Darke County Sheriff’s Office was the sole
witness at the suppression hearing. His testimony established the following facts.
{¶ 14} On June 8, 2021, Deputy Magel was working road patrol with his canine
partner, Bear. Shortly before 2:00 a.m., he was parked near the intersection of State
Route 49 and Delisle Fourman Road when he saw a vehicle containing two women
heading northbound on State Route 49. On a hunch, Deputy Magel decided to follow
the vehicle. When he ran the license plate, he learned that the registered owner had an
active warrant.
{¶ 15} Magel initiated an investigatory stop, and another deputy, Deputy Mullins,
arrived soon after as backup. When Deputy Magel approached the vehicle, he saw that
it contained three individuals: the two women in the front seats and Bayman in the rear
driver’s-side seat. Bayman appeared to be asleep, but he passed along his identification
when Magel requested it. Magel testified that Bayman then “closed his eyes again and
just ignored my presence.” In contrast, the driver appeared to be “pretty nervous,” and
Magel initially thought she might be lying about her identity. The front seat passenger
“was possibly under the influence of something” and had very small pupils. They told
Magel that they had gone to look at a car in Phillipsburg.
{¶ 16} Upon running the individuals’ identifications, Deputy Magel learned that the
driver and Bayman’s driver’s licenses were suspended. The dispatcher also told Magel -6-
that they had “a prior narcotics history.” Although the front seat passenger had a valid
license, Magel did not believe she was capable of driving.
{¶ 17} Approximately 15 minutes after initiating the stop, Deputy Magel walked
Bear around the vehicle with the passengers still inside it. Bear alerted to the odor of
illegal narcotics at the driver’s front door. Magel put Bear back in his cruiser and then
had Bayman exit the vehicle and stand in front of his cruiser. The deputy testified that,
based on Bear’s alert, he intended to do a “clothed patted search” for contraband by
patting down Bayman outside his clothing.
{¶ 18} Deputy Magel asked Bayman if he (Bayman) had anything that would poke,
stick, or hurt him (the deputy). Bayman admitted that he had a syringe in his pants and
was unsure whether it had a cap. At the deputy’s request, Bayman removed the syringe
from his pocket and placed it on the hood of the cruiser. When he did so, approximately
one inch to an inch and a half of a clear plastic baggie was also exposed. Based on his
training and experience, the deputy recognized the contents as illegal drugs. Magel
thought he even said, “There’s your drugs.” He placed Bayman in handcuffs and
removed the bag from Bayman’s pants. Deputy Mullins read Bayman his Miranda rights.
Bayman said that the drugs were not his and that he was holding them for someone else.
Upon questioning, the women did not seem to know anything about the drugs.
{¶ 19} Due to COVID-19 protocols, Bayman was not taken to jail. The handcuffs
were removed, and Deputy Magel helped the three individuals push the car across the
street. Because none was able to drive, the three walked to a nearby gas station and
waited for someone to pick them up. -7-
{¶ 20} The trial court found that the evidence and Bayman’s statements during the
encounter were admissible. First, it concluded that the outstanding warrant for the
vehicle’s owner constituted probable cause for the traffic stop of the vehicle in which
Bayman had been a passenger. Second, it concluded that the stop had not been
unreasonably prolonged. The court reasoned:
After determining that the owner of the vehicle was not the driver and after
further determining no one in the vehicle was subject to an arrest warrant,
Dep. Magel was stuck with the unenviable problem of what to do with a
motor vehicle that could not be driven from that point. As such, an
extended delay would be expected and necessary. This delay therefore
permitted time for a free-air search by K-9 Bear; there was no unreasonable
delay of the traffic stop, since no driver was capable of driving the vehicle
from the scene.
{¶ 21} Third, the trial court found that the alert by Bear justified the continued
detention of the vehicle’s occupants, and removing the passengers from the vehicle was
both reasonable and necessary to conduct the search of the vehicle. The court
continued: “This lawful removal of the Defendant from the vehicle led to the appropriate
Terry pat down for discovery of weapons and officer safety purposes. Seizure of the
syringe and observation of the bag – a typical drug paraphernalia item especially when
accompanied by a hidden syringe – were not constitutionally deficient.” The court thus
determined the suppression of the evidence was not warranted.
{¶ 22} Finally, the trial court found that Deputy Magel’s inquiry prior to the pat down -8-
fit squarely within the public safety exception. Thus, Bayman’s statements preceding
the pat down were not made in violation of Miranda.
B. Review of Suppression Ruling
{¶ 23} The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391 (2001).
“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 250 (1991). Whether a stop and search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment depends upon the particular facts and circumstances, viewed objectively by
examining the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, ¶ 14.
{¶ 24} A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and like all seizures,
it must be justified at its inception. E.g., Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 386 (2020).
Police officers may briefly stop and temporarily detain individuals to investigate possible
criminal activity if the officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. Terry; State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-4539,
¶ 7-8; State v. Laster, 2018-Ohio-3601, ¶ 49 (2d Dist.). When a lawfully stopped vehicle
contains passengers, the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement officers to detain
those passengers for the duration of the lawful detention of the driver. State v. Brown,
2004-Ohio-4058, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 25} Here, Deputy Magel stopped the vehicle in which Bayman was a passenger
based on a report that the registered owner of the vehicle was subject to an active
warrant. “Such a stop is reasonable as long as ‘the officer lacks information negating an -9-
inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle.’ ” State v. Dunlap, 2024-Ohio-4821,
¶ 17 (a stop based on report that the owner had a suspended license was reasonable),
quoting Glover at 378. Magel initially saw two women in the vehicle; no description of
the registered owner was provided. Consequently, there is no evidence that Deputy
Magel possessed information negating an inference that the owner was the driver. With
the information before us, the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that the registered
owner was driving to justify stopping the vehicle. Bayman agrees that the stop was
lawful.
{¶ 26} “Law enforcement officers may detain the driver and passengers only for
the time necessary to complete the reason for the stop.” Kettering v. Maston, 2018-Ohio-
1948, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.); see Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015); State v.
Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 521 (1992). The reasonableness of the detention “depends
on what the police in fact do,” and the officer’s diligence is measured “by noting what the
officer actually did and how he did it.” State v. Hall, 2017-Ohio-2682, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.),
quoting Rodriguez at 357.
{¶ 27} “[I]t is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself
in the course of a Terry stop.” Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt
Cty., 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004). During a brief investigatory stop, “an officer can ask for
identification or sufficient information to write a citation or to run a background check for
outstanding warrants, often called a ‘field investigation.’ ” State v. Millerton, 2015-Ohio-
34, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.). An officer is entitled to ask questions to confirm or dispel his or her
suspicions that criminal activity occurred. Id. at ¶ 23. “[A]n officer who has properly -10-
executed a traffic stop may make ordinary inquiries necessary to complete the mission of
the traffic stop – including confirming that the driver has a valid driver’s license.” Dunlap
at ¶ 2, citing Rodriguez at 355; see Maston at ¶ 17. When a lawfully stopped vehicle
contains passengers, the police also may request and obtain identification from a
passenger. State v. Haynes, 2018-Ohio-607, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 28} A drug dog sniff does not constitute a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Cantu, 2024-Ohio-3211, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.). A police officer need not
have a reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains contraband prior to summoning a
canine drug unit or conducting a canine free air sniff. State v. Thomas, 2009-Ohio-3520,
¶ 15 (2d Dist.). However, “an officer may not prolong a traffic stop to perform a drug sniff
even if the ‘overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration of
other stops involving similar circumstances.’ ” Hall at ¶ 13, quoting Rodriguez at 357.
{¶ 29} In this case, Bayman does not claim that Deputy Magel acted unlawfully
when he asked the vehicle’s occupants for their identification, nor does he argue that the
deputy acted improperly when he spoke with the occupants before the check of their
identifications was completed. Rather, Bayman claims that the deputy’s reasonable
suspicion ended after the officer determined the status of the driver’s and the two
passengers’ driver’s licenses. He argues that once the deputy learned that no one was
subject to an outstanding warrant, the deputy could not extend the seizure.
{¶ 30} Although Deputy Magel did not point to the driver’s lack of a valid license,
the record establishes that, upon learning that the driver’s license was suspended, the
deputy had reasonable suspicion to detain the driver for the offense of driving under -11-
suspension. See generally R.C. 4510.11 to 4511.12. Deputy Magel testified that none
of the occupants could lawfully drive away in the vehicle, either due to the lack of a valid
license (the driver and Bayman) or apparent intoxication (the front seat passenger).
Although there was no testimony that the deputy intended to cite the driver, the deputy
nevertheless needed to decide what to do with the vehicle.
{¶ 31} Moreover, the discovery that the driver had a suspended license allowed
Deputy Magel to detain the vehicle’s occupants to investigate additional suspicions of
criminal activity. See State v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-4866, ¶ 24. When asked what
information created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the occupants’
continued detention, Deputy Magel cited the occupants’ prior drug history, the explanation
of what they had been doing, and their behavior – the driver’s nervousness, the
passenger’s appearing to be under the influence, and Bayman’s acting like he was
asleep. Deputy Magel asserted that the totality of the circumstances created a
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.
{¶ 32} At this juncture, Deputy Magel walked his canine around the vehicle.
Magel’s actions did not delay the departure of the vehicle, as none of the occupants could
drive away with it. Although Bayman and the others were required to remain in the car
while Deputy Magel walked his dog around the vehicle, this brief delay did not
unreasonably prolong the stop of the driver and passengers. Thus, the detention did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
{¶ 33} To be sure, “[i]f a trained canine alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully
stopped and detained vehicle, an officer has probable cause to search the vehicle for -12-
contraband.” State v. Boyce, 2020-Ohio-3573, ¶ 73 (2d Dist.). The facts here raise an
interesting question about whether the alert also created probable cause to search the
occupants of the vehicle, but that issue is not before us. Bayman’s argument is directed
to the length of his detention before the dog sniff, not what occurred afterward. We
decline to address issues that have not been raised.
{¶ 34} Bayman’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Destruction of Evidence
{¶ 35} Bayman’s second assignment of error claims that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to dismiss when the State had failed to preserve evidence.
{¶ 36} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution protects a criminal defendant from being convicted when the State either fails
to preserve materially exculpatory evidence or destroys, in bad faith, potentially useful
evidence. State v. Glowney, 2019-Ohio-3390, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). Evidence is “materially
exculpatory” if it (1) possesses “an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed” and (2) is “of such a nature that the defendant would be unable
to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); State v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 74.
{¶ 37} “In contrast, evidence is not materially exculpatory if it is merely potentially
useful. Potentially useful evidence indicates that the evidence may or may not have
incriminated the defendant. The failure to preserve evidence that by its nature or subject
is merely potentially useful violates a defendant’s due process rights only if the police or
prosecution acted in bad faith.” State v. Cox, 2013-Ohio-4941, ¶ 88 (2d Dist.). “The -13-
term ‘bad faith’ generally implies something more than bad judgment or negligence. ‘It
imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known
duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.’ ” (Citations
omitted.) Powell at ¶ 81; State v. Carr, 2020-Ohio-1523, ¶ 47 (2d Dist.). Under current
case law, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence in question was
materially exculpatory, not merely potentially useful. Id. at ¶ 74; Carr at ¶ 35.
{¶ 38} In this case, the missing evidence is the cruiser video of the investigatory
stop. Deputy Magel testified that a recording was made, but it was no longer available.
He explained that, typically, when an arrest was made, a sergeant or supervisor would
burn a DVD of the recording and save it for court. Magel did not know how to download
the video himself and had never received training on how to do it.
{¶ 39} Due to COVID protocols, Bayman was not arrested and taken to jail, so the
regular procedure was not employed. Deputy Magel testified that there was a button in
“Watch Guard” to prevent the recording being purged, but he was unaware of it at the
time. As a result, the recording had been purged according to a set schedule. He stated
that he had not destroyed the video; rather, it had not been preserved.
{¶ 40} No evidence was presented at the hearing to demonstrate that the missing
cruiser video was materially exculpatory, as opposed to potentially useful. Nor was there
evidence that Deputy Magel acted in bad faith when he failed to ensure that the cruiser
video would be preserved. As we stated in Carr, “[t]he most that could be said is the
police may have been negligent. That simply is not sufficient to find a violation of due
process warranting dismissal.” Carr, 2020-Ohio-1523, at ¶ 53. -14-
{¶ 41} Bayman’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Competency Evaluation and Hearing
{¶ 42} In his third assignment of error, Bayman claims that the trial court erred in
making a competency determination without referring him to an expert or holding a
competency hearing.
{¶ 43} Under fundamental principles of due process, a criminal defendant who is
legally incompetent may not be tried. E.g., State v. Thomas, 2002-Ohio-6624, ¶ 36. “It
has long been recognized that ‘a person [who] lacks the capacity to understand the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.’ ” State v. Smith, 89 Ohio St.3d
323, 329 (2000), quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
{¶ 44} R.C. 2945.37(A) defines incompetency consistent with the constitutional
standards. The supreme court has made clear that “[i]ncompetency must not be equated
with mere mental or emotional instability or even with outright insanity. A defendant may
be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be capable of understanding the
charges against him and of assisting his counsel.” State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108,
110 (1986).
{¶ 45} “A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial.” R.C. 2945.37(G).
However, the trial court, prosecutor, or defense counsel “may raise the issue of the
defendant’s competence to stand trial.” R.C. 2945.37(B). If the issue is raised, the trial
court may order one or more evaluations of the defendant’s present mental condition.
R.C. 2945.371(A). In addition, both the prosecutor and defense counsel may submit -15-
evidence on the issue of the defendant’s competence to stand trial. R.C. 2945.37(E). If
the issue is raised before trial has commenced, the trial court is required to hold a hearing
on the issue. Id.; State v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 66.
{¶ 46} A motion by defense counsel requesting a competency evaluation is
sufficient to raise the issue of the defendant’s competency, even if the motion provides
no bases for counsel’s request. State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-965, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).
Because Bayman’s competency was raised prior to trial, the trial court was required to
hold a competency hearing, and it had the discretion to order Bayman to undergo an
evaluation prior to the hearing. See id.
{¶ 47} However, a trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing is not
necessarily reversible error. State v. Mills, 2023-Ohio-4716, ¶ 14, citing Bock, 28 Ohio
St.3d at 110. Rather, “the failure to hold a mandatory competency hearing is harmless
error where the record fails to reveal sufficient indicia of incompetency.” Bock at 110.
When determining whether the failure to hold a competency hearing is harmless, courts
must consider “the totality of the evidence,” including “both evidence of incompetency and
evidence of competency.” Mills at ¶ 21.
{¶ 48} In this case, upon being informed that a competency motion was
forthcoming, the trial court ordered the Darke County Sheriff’s Office to provide it (1)
Bayman’s medical, mental, dental, prescription and other records, involving all aspects of
his care, since his incarceration at the jail on or about April 15, 2022, and (2) all records
from jail corrections staff regarding Bayman’s conduct since April 15, 2022. Entry
Ordering Medical Information and Records (Oct. 18, 2022.) The court indicated that it -16-
would share the records with defense counsel and would later determine whether copies
should be provided to the State.
{¶ 49} On December 7, 2022, a week before the scheduled trial date, the trial court
overruled the request for a forensic examination of Bayman’s competency. The court
stated that it had reviewed the jail records and found “no facts that indicate any
competency problems.” It noted that while Bayman’s behavior had been, at times, “non-
compliant or unruly,” his actions appeared to be conscious behavior and not an indication
of incompetency. The trial court did not hold a hearing on Bayman’s competency, and
the matter proceeded to trial as scheduled.
{¶ 50} It was within the trial court’s discretion not to order a competency evaluation,
but it erred in failing to hold a hearing on Bayman’s competency. Nevertheless, on this
record, we conclude that the error was harmless as nothing in the record suggests that
Bayman was incompetent.
{¶ 51} Bayman appeared by video for his arraignment on April 19, 2022. During
that proceeding, Bayman indicated that he had received the indictment and believed it
charged “a felony 2.” After the court explained that the charge involved possession of
approximately 38 grams of methamphetamine on June 8, 2021, and the penalty for the
offense, Bayman expressed that he understood and had no questions. When asked
what he wanted to do about an attorney, Bayman told the court, “I think I will need the
State to appoint me a lawyer at this time.” When asked about his lack of recent
employment, Bayman said that he had come from a rehab facility. He continued: “I just
came from a (inaudible) meeting, and they said there is a recovery house here in town. -17-
And I don’t know, that would probably be the best option for me as far as bond, if you give
me a bond.” Bayman discussed his indigence, his history of substance abuse and
recovery efforts, and a pending case in another county. Nothing in Bayman’s dialog with
the court suggested that he was incompetent to stand trial.
{¶ 52} Bayman also appeared by video for a pretrial conference on May 19, 2022.
At the end of the conference, Bayman asked the court about receiving a conditional own
recognizance bond. Following that pretrial conference, Bayman filed several pro se
motions. He sought, among other things, dismissal of the charge due to the destruction
of the cruiser video, production of the deputy’s CAD report or a full dispatch log related to
his incident, the appointment of chemical and forensic experts, a continuance because
he was not ready for trial, dismissal of the charge on speedy trial grounds, and a bond
modification. While some of Bayman’s motions were repetitive, the motions were
concisely and cogently written, and they demonstrated an understanding of the legal
issues and processes related to his case.
{¶ 53} The record does not reveal what prompted defense counsel to notify the
trial court that he intended to file a competency motion. The jail records provided by the
Darke County Sheriff’s Office indicated that Bayman had ongoing physical and mental
health challenges, and that he had a couple behavioral issues while incarcerated. In
November 2022 (after defense counsel raised the issue of Bayman’s competency),
Bayman complained of psychotic symptoms and was briefly on suicide watch. The jail
records further reflected, however, that Bayman had a history of dishonesty and
manipulative behavior. Nothing in the jail records indicated that Bayman was -18-
incompetent to stand trial.
{¶ 54} We further note that Bayman testified on his own behalf at trial, asserting
that he was unaware of the drugs until they were pulled from his pants and that one of
the other occupants of the car had placed the drugs there while he was asleep. In
addition, at the conclusion of the trial, Bayman also acknowledged that he had conferred
with his attorney and had participated in and understood the trial process.
{¶ 55} With the record before us, any error by the trial court in failing to hold a
competency hearing before trial was harmless. Bayman’s third assignment of error is
overruled.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 56} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.