THIRD DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., HODGES and WATKINS, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
February 27, 2025
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A24A1733. THE STATE v. ALMEIDA, et al.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
The State appeals from the grant of a motion to suppress evidence it seeks to
use to prosecute Bayley Almeida for one count of misdemeanor obstruction of an
officer.1 The State contends that the trial court erred by ruling that her arrest arose
from an unlawful entry into her residence without a warrant or exigent circumstances.
Because the record shows that the State failed to meet its burden to show exigency,
and the subsequent arrest arose from that entry and Almeida’s refusal to consent to
a re-entry into her residence, we affirm the grant of Almeida’s motion to suppress.
1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) (authorizing the State to appeal from an order suppressing evidence in a criminal prosecution). First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment. On numerous occasions the appellate courts of this state have invoked these three principles to affirm trial court rulings that upheld the validity of seizures. These same principles of law apply equally to trial court rulings that are in favor of the defendant. . . .[T]his standard of review requires us to focus on the findings of fact made by the trial court in its order and the evidence supporting those findings, rather than other evidence gleaned from the record, construing it in favor of upholding the trial court’s order.2
Further, the relevant events were captured in the arresting officer’s body cam footage,
and “to the extent that the controlling facts ‘are undisputed because they are plainly
discernable from the [police] video recording,’ . . . we review those facts de novo.”3
2 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. 442, 449 (2) (826 SE2d 18) (2019). 3 (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Depol, 336 Ga. App. 191, 191 (784 SE2d 51) (2016). See also Licata v. State, 305 Ga. 498, 500 (1), n. 2 (826 SE2d 94) (2019) (“Although we typically defer to the trial court’s factual findings in this context, 2 So viewed, the evidence from the suppression hearing shows that at
approximately 10:20 p.m. one evening in September 2020, a sheriff’s deputy
responded to a call regarding a “domestic issue” at a residence. The call was based
on a neighbor complaining that the residents “were out in the yard breaking windows
and fighting.” The deputy responded to the residence without lights and sirens so that
he could “listen for arguing, fighting, [or] shooting. . . .” After pausing along the side
of the house to listen for noise, the deputy walked to the front porch, testifying that
“[i]t sounded like two or three people arguing or fighting and some shuffling around
in the back bedroom.” As the deputy approached to knock on the front door, an
occupant emerged at the same time whom the deputy recognized as having an
outstanding warrant for a shoplifting offense. The deputy asked the occupant his
name, and as they spoke briefly, the deputy heard some yelling coming from the back
part of the house.
The occupant was calm and not evasive; he explained that he did not live there,
but he objected to the deputy entering the house. He offered to go get someone who
lived there, and explained that everything “was ok,” and “they’re fine,” but at that
when, as here, the controlling facts are not in dispute, because they are discernible from a video, our review is de novo.”). 3 point, the deputy pushed the door open and walked in, explaining, “if they’re yelling
and fighting I want to make sure everything’s ok.” The occupant countered,
“nobody’s fighting,” as the deputy walked past him into the living room.
At that point, the deputy announced, “hey there, sheriff’s office,” and he was
met by two occupants who immediately objected to the deputy’s presence, asked him
to leave, and stated that “nobody’s arguing.” The two occupants repeatedly objected
to the deputy’s presence, stating, “you need to exit the property, you have no
warrant.” The deputy responded by saying “alright, come outside with me.” The
occupants replied, “no, you’re going outside,” at which point Almeida appeared from
the back of the house and accompanied the deputy onto the front porch and closed the
door behind her.
Almeida calmly stood on the porch facing the deputy with her back to the door
and answered the deputy’s questions. She asked the deputy why he was there and
explained that it was just family in the house and that the arguing the deputy heard
was “not like that.” She further explained that someone had a pre-existing wound on
his hand that had re-opened and that they were trying to treat the wound. The deputy
asked whether it was from a reported broken window, and Almeida explained that it
4 was not. The deputy stated that he needed to “go in to make sure he’s ok,” and
Almeida replied, “no, not without a warrant.” The deputy responded, “You can
either allow me to do that, or I’m placing you under arrest.” Almeida responded, “I
guess you’re placing me under arrest.” The deputy then took Alemeida by the arm
and told her to step out of the way as he moved her away from the door; Almeida
offered no resistence and said, “that’s fine, put me under arrest.” The deputy told her
to have a seat in a chair on the porch, and she stood calmly reiterating her objection
to him entering the house, “that’s breaking the law,” and the deputy then stated,
“I’m arresting you for obstruction.” He placed her in handcuffs, and Almeida again
said, “that’s fine.” Almeida continued to cooperate fully with the arresting deputy as
he walked her to his vehicle, placed her in the back seat, and closed the door.
After arresting Almeida, the deputy, along with another deputy who had arrived
on the scene, entered the house over the verbal objection of two other occupants who
had appeared at the door. In the living room, the deputies encountered the injured
occupant, an adult male, who explained that he was cleaning the small wound on his
hand. He was not distraught or seeking aid, and he asked the deputies to go outside
as he attempted to calm the remaining occupants, who were escalating their demands
5 that the deputies leave the residence. At this point, it was plain that no occupants
needed or sought medical aid, and the only dispute was between the deputies and the
objecting occupants of the house.4
Based on these events, Almeida was charged with a single count of
misdemeanor obstruction.5 She moved to suppress “any evidence and statements
gathered as a result of the unlawful” entry into the home, including any evidence
relating to her arrest. Following an evidentiary hearing at which the arresting officer
testified and a recording of his body cam video was played, the trial court granted the
motion to suppress. Specifically, the trial court held that the situation encountered by
the arresting deputy — yelling and arguing inside the home — was not an exigency
justifying his initial entry into the home without consent or a warrant. The trial court
further held that the conversation with Almeida (in which he learned about an injury)
4 See generally State v. Driggers, 306 Ga. App. 849, 852 (2) (b) (702 SE2d 925) (2010) (“An officer’s conduct immediately after a legal entry ‘must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry[:] the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance.’”), quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.6 (a), p. 468 (4th ed. 2004). 5 OCGA § 16-10-24 (a) (“[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”). 6 occurred only after and in response to the initial unjustified entry, so the subsequent
arrest of Almeida was unauthorized. The State now appeals.
The State contends that the trial court erred by ruling that the arresting deputy
was not authorized to enter the house under the exigent circumstances exception to
the requirement for a warrant. We disagree.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. An unconsented police entry into [a] home constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. . . . [E]ven if the officers [have] probable cause for the entry, warrantless intrusion of a person’s home is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or a showing of exigent circumstances.6
It is undisputed that the deputies never received consent to enter the home, so
the State had the burden to prove that the deputies were justified in entering the home
due to exigent circumstances.7 Most relevant to this case, exigent circumstances
6 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 801 (643 SE2d 262) (2007), citing Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIII, Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263, 264-265 (1) (467 SE2d 315) (1996). See also Steagald v. United States, 451 U. S. 204, 211 (III) (101 SCt 1642, 68 LE2d 38) (1981). 7 See Ealum, 283 Ga. App. at 801-802, citing OCGA § 17-5-30 (b). 7 include emergency situations in which an officer has a reasonable belief that “the
warrantless entry [is] justified to protect or preserve life or to avert serious injury.”8
“‘Whether these circumstances exist is a question of fact to be determined by the trial
court, and the judge’s decision, if supported by any evidence, is to be accepted.’”9
Here, as summarized above, the evidence showed that the arresting deputy
approached the porch and encountered an occupant who did not seek help from the
deputy or otherwise seem alarmed by the circumstances inside the house. The
occupant calmly explained to the deputy that he did not live at the residence but
offered to retrieve someone with authority to allow the deputy to enter. Nevertheless,
8 (Punctuation omitted.) Ealum, 283 Ga. App. at 802. See also State v. Culpepper, 295 Ga. App. 525, 527 (672 SE2d 494) (2009) (exigency is demonstrated by “‘the officer’s reasonable belief that such action is a necessary response on his part to an emergency situation’”). 9 Culpepper, 295 Ga. App. at 527. Accord Hourin v. State, 301 Ga. 835, 847 (3) (c) (804 SE2d 388) (2017), quoting Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 716, 718 (1) (634 SE2d 846) (2006). The importance of this standard is highlighted by the disagreement among the panel members in this case. This Court is a court for the correction of legal error. See Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 539 (523 SE2d 1) (1999), citing 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. III; Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II. Where the record on a motion to suppress can be construed to support the trial court’s judgment, we are not authorized to substitute our own. See State v. Rosenbaum, 305 Ga. at 449 (2) (“[The appellate] standard of review requires us to focus on the findings of fact made by the trial court in its order and the evidence supporting those findings, rather than other evidence gleaned from the record, construing it in favor of upholding the trial court’s order.”). 8 the deputy said that he needed to enter the home to check on the people arguing. The
video recording of the deputy’s encounter at that point shows that the other
occupants’ voices were sporadically audible, but there was nothing on the order of
screaming or commotion consistent with a violent attack. And the deputy had no
knowledge of any injury at that time. Based on these circumstances, and based on our
review of the body cam video, the trial court was authorized to find that, at the time
of the initial entry, the deputy had heard only voices arguing inside the house, and the
circumstances did not rise to a level suggesting a safety threat justifying a warrantless
entry into the home. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that the deputy’s initial
entrance to the home was a Fourth Amendment violation.10
Despite this, the State argues that Almeida’s conversation on the porch gave
the deputy new information — that there was an injured occupant — justifying his re-
entry based on a new exigency. But this ignores two important facts. First, as the trial
court ruled, the deputy’s conversation with Almeida occurred only as a result of the
deputy’s initial unlawful entry.
10 See Ealum, 283 Ga. App. at 803. 9 [T]here was no significant lapse of time between the unlawful entry and her going out onto the porch, and no intervening circumstances came between the two. Under these circumstances, it would be unreasonable to infer that [Almeida’s] decision to step out onto the front porch and speak with the [deputy] was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.11
Under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, the conversation was subject to
suppression for the initial Fourth Amendment violation.12
Second, and more fundamental, Almeida’s arrest was based on her failure to
consent to the deputy’s re-entry to the residence. Even if, as the State argues, the
deputy was newly authorized by the exigency of tending to a wounded person, it does
not follow that Almeida was required to consent to the re-entry. It is well-settled that
“[o]fficers may request consent to search as long as they do not convey a message that
11 (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 804. 12 See id. at 803-804. See generally Jackson v. State, 369 Ga. App. 319, 321 (893 SE2d 436) (2023) (“‘An officer’s conduct immediately after a legal entry must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry: the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance.’”). Under the circumstances in this case, the deputy could have pursued the option of asking that the injured party come outside in order to assess his well-being, but he did not. 10 compliance with their request is required.”13 The ability to decline consent is inherent
in the voluntariness that must accompany consent14 — it is not an independent offense
of obstruction. It is plain from the body cam video that Almeida fully complied with
the deputy’s command to step away from the door, she was not preventing his entry,15
and she was arrested only after she was told “you can either allow me to [enter] or I’m
placing you under arrest.” Almeida’s lack of consent in no way hindered the deputy’s
re-entry, and her arrest arose from her verbal refusal to consent to the re-entry after
she had already moved away from the door. Almeida’s failure to consent to the
deputy’s conduct was not unlawful and thus gave no further authority to enter the
residence or arrest her.16
13 Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 47 (2) (663 SE2d 396) (2008). 14 Cf. State v. Holtzclaw, 341 Ga. App. 639, 644 (2) (802 SE2d 254) (2017) (holding that consent was not voluntary because the resident believed she had no choice based on the fact that police had already entered her home in her absence, and an officer told her, “‘[e]ither way, we’re gonna find it, so, search warrant or not, so, if you think the search warrant’s gonna lessen the blow, I mean, it’s not’”). 15 As Almeida stood with her back to the door, another occupant actually opened the door and exited the residence as Almeida spoke to the deputy on the porch. 16 See generally Ealum, 283 Ga. App. at 805 (“In order to be guilty of the crime of obstructing a law enforcement officer, the defendant must have knowingly and wilfully obstructed a ‘law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official 11 The deputy’s initial unauthorized entry tainted his subsequent conversation
with Almeida that led to her arrest, and her refusal to consent did not justify re-entry
or her arrest. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted Almeida’s
motion to suppress evidence and statements gathered as a result of the unlawful first
entry, including any evidence relating to her arrest.
Judgment affirmed. Watkins, J., concurs. Hodges, J., dissents.
duties.’ An officer who carries out an unlawful entry into a residence or conducts an unlawful arrest is not lawfully discharging his duties, and a citizen who resists an officer under such circumstances is not guilty of obstruction.”) (citations omitted; emphasis in original), quoting OCGA § 16-10-24 (a) . 12 A24A1733. THE STATE v. ALMEIDA et al.
HODGES, Judge, dissenting.
The trial court’s order contains extensive findings of fact. As the trial court
found, the responding officer had been dispatched to investigate a “domestic issue[,]”
and when he arrived at the house, he heard “fighting, yelling, or arguing[,]”
“screaming[,]” “movement[,]” and, later, was informed that someone in the home
was “hurt and the others are trying to fix the wound.” Although these facts were
sufficient for the trial court to find that exigent circumstances justified both
warrantless entries, it made a legal error in its assessment of these facts, as does the majority. Because both the trial court and the majority failed to fully consider the
reasonableness of the officers’ actions as required by our case law, I respectfully
dissent.
(a) The first warrantless entry. It is true that “[w]hen reviewing video evidence,
we owe no deference to the trial court’s findings of fact that are plainly discernible
from the video and, thus, undisputed.” Snellings v. State, 371 Ga. App. 795 (903 SE2d
177) (2024). Our analysis, however, does not stop merely with an examination of video
evidence. We must also consider police officers’ perception of what they observe.
“[W]e review police actions from the standpoint of a hypothetical reasonable officer
and must measure those actions from the foresight of an officer acting in a quickly
developing situation and not from the hindsight of which judges have benefit.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daniel v. State, 303 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (692 SE2d
682) (2010).
Here, the officer responded to a 911 call from a neighbor who heard residents
in the yard fighting and breaking windows, and who also reported “damaged windows
and property.” The officer testified that when he approached the outside of the house,
he heard people fighting, yelling, and arguing inside, as well as “shuffling.” After a
guest opened the front door, the officer heard “more yelling and screaming” from two 2 or three people, apparently in the back of the house. The video recording, while
perhaps less audible than what the officer heard first hand — meaning the volume of
the sounds may not be “plainly discernable” from the video, see Snellings, 371 Ga.
App. at 795 — also contains sounds of arguing, yelling, and fighting.
The majority, however, focuses on the “calm” demeanor of the guest who
answered the door, and on his assertions that everything was fine and no one was
arguing or fighting. But when I view these police actions as a reasonable officer would
during a developing situation, Daniel, 303 Ga. App. at 2 (1), it is clear that the officer
in the instant case was confronted with conflicting information. He could hear, first
hand, screaming, arguing, fighting, and shuffling — contemporaneously with
protestations that everything was “fine” offered by a guest whom the police officer
might reasonably have thought could be involved in, or covering up, imminent danger
to some other person or to property.
Our appellate courts have determined that, even in the face of conflicting
information, an officer’s belief that some sort of emergency intervention is required
may nonetheless be reasonable and authorize warrantless entry. See Richards v. State,
286 Ga. App. 580, 582 (649 SE2d 747) (2007) (upholding denial of motion to suppress
and finding, where neighbors reported screaming, arguing, and a child being beaten, 3 that reasonable officers could believe exigent circumstances existed even though they
did not see physical evidence of a child and residents denied the presence of a child,
because “such factors did not override the neighbors’ ‘adamant’ claims that a child
was present”). Here, similarly, the guest’s “calm” protestations that everyone was
“fine” did not override the officer’s reasonable belief, based upon his observations,
that someone in the house might be at risk of imminent injury or in need of assistance
authorizing his warrantless entry.
Further, this Court has affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and found
that officers reasonably believed exigent circumstances existed to justify warrantless
entry where officers had, arguably, less evidence of exigency than that in the instant
case. In Love v. State, a 911 caller reported a possible burglary, but the only evidence
of exigency was the open front door of a house that appeared unoccupied, with lights
off; there was no evidence of forced entry, and apparently no reports of actual
suspicious activity. 290 Ga. App. 486, 486-489 (659 SE2d 835) (2008). Further,
officers called out several times before entering, identifying themselves as police, but
received no response. Id. at 487. Nonetheless, this Court found that “the presence of
a car in Appellants’ driveway, combined with the other circumstances confronted by
police, supported a reasonable belief that a resident of the home might be inside, the 4 victim of an accident, medical emergency, or foul play.” Id. at 489. Here, the officer
had sufficient indicia, arguably more than those present in Love, to believe someone
“might be” in danger and in need of assistance. Id.; Daniel, 303 Ga. App. at 1-2 (1)
(finding exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry of a hotel room where
officers responding to an unrelated call heard yelling coming from a neighboring room,
sounds of a struggle, and a slamming door).
Further, exigent circumstances may exist in a context broader than just the risk
of injury to persons. Exigent circumstances exist when a warrantless entry is necessary
for the police
to preserve public order, to maintain the peace, and to protect lives, persons, property, health and morals. In these cases, police do not enter a residence for the purpose of arresting or seizing evidence against an occupant; rather, they enter in response to what they reasonably perceive as an emergency involving a threat to life or property.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Love, 290 Ga. App. at 488; accord Staib v. State,
309 Ga. App. 785, 788 (1) (a) (711 SE2d 362) (2011). As the officer testified, he was
responding to a 911 report from the neighbors of property damage and windows being
broken. Even though this occurred before the officer arrived on scene and he did not
immediately observe any broken windows, he nonetheless heard fighting, shuffling,
5 and shouting inside the house, authorizing him to believe that property was at
imminent risk of harm. Love, 290 Ga. App. at 489 (finding exigent circumstances
“may be found in emergency situations where the police reasonably believe their
assistance is required to protect property”).
The trial court’s findings of fact, I note, also recognized specifically that the
officer had been dispatched to investigate a “domestic issue” and could hear fighting,
arguing, yelling, and screaming. The trial court, however, granted the motion to
suppress because it determined that “[m]ere [s]houting” does not amount to an
exigent circumstance. Here, as outlined above, there was more than mere shouting.
I would find that the officer in the instant case reasonably believed exigent
circumstances justified his initial warrantless entry.
(b) The second warrantless entry. I also believe that the majority erred in
determining that the second warrantless entry was unlawful. After the initial
warrantless entry, Almeida came onto the porch with the officer and shut the door
behind her. She blocked the officer’s entry to the home and verbally denied entry until
she was arrested.1 As with the guest who opened the door before the first warrantless
1 It is unclear from the record whether Almeida lived at the home and thus had standing to challenge the search. The State, however, “did not raise the standing issue 6 entry, however, the majority focuses on Almeida’s “calm[]” demeanor as she tells the
officer someone in the house is hurt, then explains that an old wound had been re-
opened and that people inside the house are “trying to fix their wound.” It is
important to note context. The officer had been dispatched to the scene because of a
911 call indicating a “possible domestic incident.” Almeida’s report of an injured
person — despite her contentions that it was “not . . . a police matter” — when
coupled with the officer’s simultaneously hearing yelling, fighting, and arguing, simply
added more evidence of exigency. “It has been repeatedly held that reasonable
concern for a victim’s welfare justifies a warrantless entry.” (Citation and punctuation
omitted.) State v. Driggers, 306 Ga. App. 849, 851 (1) (702 SE2d 925) (2010).
The job of law enforcement is to protect and serve. Officers cannot protect and
serve unless they first investigate. If they reasonably believe, based upon first-hand
observation, that imminent risk of injury, damage, or death exists, they are not only
authorized to enter the premises, they should enter and investigate. Why? Because if
they leave without investigating, they might later return to find a house destroyed, a
person grievously injured, or even a corpse. Here, as outlined above, there was ample
in the court below or on appeal, and so we will not address it.” State v. Ealum, 283 Ga. App. 799, 801, n. 1 (643 SE2d 262) (2007). 7 evidence of exigency. Our law clearly authorizes police, even in the face of conflicting
information from people who may be involved in perpetrating injury to persons or
property, to enter without a warrant upon the reasonable belief that a person in the
home, or the property itself, is in imminent risk of harm. In overlooking this, I believe
the majority erred, and I respectfully dissent.