State v. Barrio

District Court of Appeal of Florida

State v. Barrio

619 So. 2d 389, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5888, 1993 WL 179429

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 28, 1993

DocketNos. 92-01637, 92-01638 and 92-01621

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 619 So. 2d 389 (State v. Barrio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Barrio, 619 So. 2d 389, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5888, 1993 WL 179429 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us from an order granting a motion to suppress physical evidence. The trial court found, and appellees argue on appeal, that the stop for driving at a speed eight miles per hour over the posted limit was pretextual because Officer Lee had a drug dog with him; the officer had only issued a few tickets in previous months; and the officer conceded that his purpose in being on 1-75 at 10:00 p.m. with a drug-sniffing dog in his car was to locate drugs. We reverse.

Appellees’ vehicle was “clocked” at 73 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone. They do not dispute that fact. In Springle v. State, 613 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA1993) (en banc), the court stated that a stop for speeding 73 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone was not pretextual, holding that “[i]f the speed limit is 65 m.p.h., then a stop is lawful at any speed in excess of that figure.” Thus, the stop for speeding was not rendered invalid because the officer was also seeking to apprehend drug carriers. Springle, supra.

Accordingly, the order granting the motion to suppress is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

BOOTH and MINER, JJ., and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us from an order granting a motion to suppress physical evidence. The trial court found, and appellees argue on appeal, that the stop for driving at a speed eight miles per hour over the posted limit was pretextual because Officer Lee had a drug dog with him; the officer had only issued a few tickets in previous months; and the officer conceded that his purpose in being on 1-75 at 10:00 p.m. with a drug-sniffing dog in his car was to locate drugs. We reverse.

Appellees’ vehicle was “clocked” at 73 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone. They do not dispute that fact. In Springle v. State, 613 So.2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA1993) (en banc), the court stated that a stop for speeding 73 miles per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone was not pretextual, holding that “[i]f the speed limit is 65 m.p.h., then a stop is lawful at any speed in excess of that figure.” Thus, the stop for speeding was not rendered invalid because the officer was also seeking to apprehend drug carriers. Springle, supra.

Accordingly, the order granting the motion to suppress is reversed and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.

BOOTH and MINER, JJ., and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

619 So. 2d 389, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5888, 1993 WL 179429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-barrio-fladistctapp-1993.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack