[Cite as State v. Barnett, 2019-Ohio-2313.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. -vs- : : Case No. 18CA76 : RANDY KRISTOPHER BARNETT : : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2018-CR- 0014
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND JUDGMENT ENTERED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 10, 2019
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
GARY BISHOP WILLIAM CRANMER RICHLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR 470 Olde Worthington Rd., Suite 200 Westerville, OH 43082 JOSEPH C. SNYDER 38 S. Park St. Mansfield, OH 44902 Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Randy Kristopher Barnett appeals his August 9, 2018
conviction and sentence for Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A) and (C)(6)(a). Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} On January 17, 2018, Defendant-Appellant Randy Kristopher Barnett was
indicted on one count of Possession of Heroin, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A) and (C)(6)(a). Barnett was arraigned on February 20, 2018 and he entered a
plea of not guilty.
{¶3} Barnett filed a motion to suppress on May 2, 2018. He argued the heroin
seized on March 22, 2017 should be suppressed because it was obtained during a
warrantless search of his person. A hearing was held on May 29, 2018 and the following
evidence was adduced at the hearing.
{¶4} On March 22, 2017, Detective Nicole Gearhart of the Mansfield Police
Department METRICH Drug Enforcement Unit was on patrol in an unmarked car in a
high-crime area known for drug activity. (T. 7). During the patrol, Det. Gearhart observed
a known drug dealer walking in his area of residence near North Lake Park. (T. 6).
Because he was a known drug dealer, Det. Gearhart watched his activity. (T. 6). While
the known drug dealer was walking, Det. Gearhart observed a vehicle driving slowly
nearby. Barnett was in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. (T. 6). Det. Gearhart lost
sight of the vehicle, but then saw the vehicle drive out of an alley and drop off the known
drug dealer. (T. 6). Det. Gearhart followed the vehicle to the parking lot of an AutoZone
and she called Officer Kory Kaufman, a K9 officer of the Mansfield Police Department, to Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 3
make contact with the vehicle because based on her skills, training, knowledge, and
experience, she believed a drug transaction had occurred. (T. 6, 7). Barnett’s vehicle was
parked and Det. Gearhart parked her vehicle in a manner in which Barnett’s parked
vehicle could not leave. (T. 10-11).
{¶5} Officer Kory Kaufman and his canine, Denise, of the Mansfield Police
Department arrived at the AutoZone. As he parked his car, Officer Kaufman saw Barnett
exit his vehicle. (T. 14). He denied parking his marked patrol vehicle to block Barnett’s
vehicle. Officer Kaufman exited his vehicle, left Denise in the vehicle, and asked Barnett
if he could speak with him. (T. 14). Barnett did not respond. Denise had been barking
loudly from inside the marked vehicle, so Officer Kaufman asked Barnett again if he could
speak with him. Barnett came over to the front of Officer Kaufman’s vehicle and they
started speaking. (T. 14). Officer Kaufman knew that Barnett was suspected of having
been associated with a drug transaction. He was concerned about officer safety and
asked Barnett if he could pat him down. (T. 14). Barnett consented. (T. 14).
{¶6} Officer Kaufman conducted a pat down of Barnett. He had Barnett face the
marked unit and put his hands behind his back. (T. 15). Officer Kaufman grabbed
Barnett’s bottom hand, so he had control of his hands and leaned Barnett forward. (T.
15). As he conducted the pat down, Officer Kaufman saw the pocket of Barnett’s hoodie
bulge open, which made the inside of the pocket visible to him. (T. 15). Officer Kaufman
observed a small baggie containing a black or brown rock inside Barnett’s hoodie pocket,
which he thought was heroin. (T. 15). Officer Kaufman finished the pat down for weapons,
did not discover any weapons, and pulled out the small baggie from Barnett’s pocket. (T.
15). The contents of the baggie were determined to be heroin. Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 4
{¶7} On May 30, 2018, the trial court overruled Barnett’s motion to suppress.
The trial court found that the interaction between Officer Kaufman and Barnett was a
consensual encounter followed by a consensual search. On seeing what he believed to
be heroin inside Barnett’s pocket, Officer Kaufman had probable cause to remove the
baggie from Barnett’s pocket.
{¶8} A change of plea hearing was held on June 15, 2018. Barnett changed his
plea to no contest. The State recommended community control. The trial court ordered a
presentence investigation before sentencing.
{¶9} The trial court held the sentencing hearing on August 8, 2018. The trial court
stated the presentence investigation report showed Barnett owed $80.00 in lab fees to
the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab. (T. 37). The trial court found Barnett guilty
of Possession of Heroin. It sentenced Barnett to six months in prison and three years of
discretionary postrelease control. It ordered Barnett to pay restitution in the amount of
$80.00 to the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab. (Sentencing Entry, August 9,
2018).
{¶10} It is from the August 9, 2018 Sentencing Entry that Barnett now appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶11} Barnett raises two Assignments of Error:
{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANTS’ RIGHTS TO BE FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES UNDER THE U.S. AND OHIO
CONSTITUTIONS BY DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO
ORDER RESTITUTION PAYABLE TO THE LOCAL POLICE CRIME LAB.” Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 5
ANALYSIS
I. Consent
{¶14} Barnett argues in his first Assignment of Error that the trial court should
have granted his motion to suppress because the totality of the circumstances
demonstrated Barnett’s encounter with Officer Kaufman and subsequent search by the
officer were not consensual. We disagree.
{¶15} Appellate review of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Long, 127 Ohio App.3d 328,
713 N.E.2d 1 (4th Dist. 1998). During a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the
role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 661 N.E.2d 1030 (1996).
A reviewing court is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported
by competent, credible evidence. State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 675 N.E.2d
1268 (4th Dist. 1996). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must
independently determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court's
conclusion, whether the trial court's decision meets the applicable legal standard. State
v. Williams, 86 Ohio App.3d 37, 619 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist. 1993), overruled on other
grounds.
{¶16} There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress on appeal. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact. In
reviewing a challenge of this nature, an appellate court must determine whether the trial
court's findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v.
Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982); State v. Klein, 73 Ohio App.3d 486, Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 6
597 N.E.2d 1141 (4th Dist.1991). Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to
apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of fact. In that case, an appellate
court can reverse the trial court for committing an error of law. See Williams, supra.
Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate or final
issues raised in a motion to suppress. When reviewing this type of claim, an appellate
court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's conclusion,
whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State v. Curry,
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,620 N.E.2d 906 (8th Dist.1994).
Consensual Encounter
{¶17} This Court has observed the law within the State of Ohio recognizes three
types of police-citizen encounters: (1) consensual encounters, (2) Terry stops, and (3)
arrests. State v. Yacobucci, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18 CAC 07 0055, 2019-Ohio-3, ¶ 25
citing State v. Stonier, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012 CA 00179, 2013-Ohio-2188, citing State
v. Taylor, 106 Ohio App.3d 741, 667 N.E.2d 60 (2nd Dist. 1995). In this case, the trial
court found Barnett consented to the encounter and search by Officer Kaufman.
{¶18} In State v. Yacobucci, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18 CAC 07 0055, 2019-Ohio-
36, we reviewed what constitutes a “consensual encounter.” A consensual encounter
occurs when a police officer approaches a person in a public place, engages the person
in conversation, requests information, and the person is free to refuse to answer and walk
away. State v. Taylor, supra. The United States Supreme Court “[has] held repeatedly
that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). “[M]erely approaching an individual on the
street or in another public place[,]” seeking to ask questions for voluntary, uncoerced Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 7
responses, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d
145 (6th Cir. 1990). “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the
individual's identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.” Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). The person approached,
however, need not answer any question put to him, and may continue on his way. Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Moreover, he may not
be detained even momentarily for his refusal to listen or answer. Id. So long as a
reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the police and go about his business,”
California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), the
encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. Bostick, 501 U.S. at
434.
{¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a police officer’s statement, “Hey,
come here a minute,” while nominally couched in the form of a demand, is actually a
request that a citizen is free to regard or disregard. State v. Yacobucci, 5th Dist. Delaware
No. 18 CAC 97 0055, 2019-Ohio-36, ¶ 27 citing State v. Smith, 45 Ohio St.3d 255, 544
N.E.2d 239 (1989).
{¶20} In United States v. Mendenall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d
497, the United States Supreme Court made the following observation: “[w]e conclude
that a person has been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.” Examples of circumstances that might indicate a
seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 8
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching
of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating compliance
with the officer's request might be compelled. Id.
{¶21} A consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures unless the police officer has
restrained the person's liberty by a show of authority or physical force such that a
reasonable person would not feel free to decline the officer's request or otherwise
terminate the encounter. Id. at 747-48.
{¶22} Barnett argues that under the totality of the circumstances, he was seized
by Officer Kaufman because there were multiple officers present, Officer Kaufman was in
a marked cruiser and wore his uniform, and Officer Kaufman asked to speak with Barnett
twice, the second time raising his voice because Denise was barking loudly from the
cruiser. The appellant in State v. Yacobucci raised a similar argument under comparable
circumstances, stating such an encounter could not be consensual. State v. Yacobucci,
2019-Ohio-36, ¶ 31. We disagreed with the appellant, finding under the totality of the
circumstances, the appellant’s encounter was consensual such that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated. Id. at ¶ 32. “While Patterson displayed his lights and had
on a uniform, he did not physically touch or threaten appellant, did not order appellant
into the cruiser, did not draw his weapon, did not indicate non-compliance would lead to
arrest, and did not block appellant's way. Appellant did not ask if he was free to leave.”
Id.
{¶23} In the present case, there was no testimony that Officer Kaufman displayed
the lights on his patrol unit. There was no evidence that Officer Kaufman threatened Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 9
Barnett, drew his weapon, or indicated that non-compliance would lead to arrest. Officer
Kaufman asked to speak with Barnett twice, the second time raising his voice to be heard
over Denise barking in the patrol unit. Denise was secured inside the vehicle and there
was no evidence that Officer Kaufman threatened to release the dog from the vehicle if
Barnett did not comply with his request. The encounter took place in the parking lot of an
AutoZone, a public area. Det. Gearhart was present, but record does not indicate that she
was close to Barnett or was behaving in a threatening manner.
{¶24} Under the totality of the circumstances, we find this was a consensual
encounter such that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated.
Protective Search
{¶25} The trial court next found that Officer Kaufman’s protective search of
Barnett was likewise consensual.
{¶26} It is well-established that warrantless searches, i.e., “searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Orosz, 11th
Dist. No. 2016-L-057, 2017-Ohio-707, 86 N.E.3d 50, ¶ 25 quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.E.2d 576 (1967).
{¶27} One such exception to a warrantless search is known variously as a
protective search, “patdown,” or “stop and frisk.” The exception entails “a reasonable
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe
that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id. at ¶ 26 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 10
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “The officer need not be absolutely
certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in
danger.” Id. “And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience.” Id.
{¶28} Officer Kaufman responded to the scene based on information from Det.
Gearhart that a possible drug transaction involving Barnett had taken place. The location
he was responding to was a known high crime area with drug activity. (T. 7). Officer
Kaufman testified that based on his skills, training, and experience, he was aware that
people involved in drug transactions often carry weapons. (T. 14). When he spoke with
Barnett, Officer Kaufman was concerned about officer safety. (T. 14). Officer Kaufman
testified he asked Barnett if he minded if he patted him down. (T. 14). Officer Kaufman
stated Barnett told him to go ahead. (T. 14).
{¶29} In this case, we find the trial court did not err to find the protective search
was consensual. We next find that if not consensual, the protective search was
reasonable based on the circumstances of the scene. Officer Kaufman was speaking with
an individual possibly involved in a drug transaction in a known high crime area. The
inferences drawn by Officer Kaufman based on his experience were reasonable under
the circumstances.
{¶30} Barnett’s first Assignment of Error is overruled. Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 11
II. Restitution vs. Costs
{¶31} At the August 8, 2018 sentencing hearing, it appears from the transcript that
the trial court reviewed Barnett’s presentence investigation report that showed Barnett
owed $80.00 in lab fees to the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab. (T. 37). While not
specifically stated in the record, the parties do not contest the inference that the lab fees
were the cost of testing the black or brown rock in the plastic baggie found in Barnett’s
hoodie pocket on March 22, 2017. The rock was determined to be heroin, leading to
Barnett’s charge, conviction, and sentence for Possession of Heroin.
{¶32} In its August 9, 2018 Sentencing Entry, the trial court ordered Barnett to pay
restitution in the amount of $80.00 to the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab. Barnett
argues in his second Assignment of Error that the trial court was without authority to award
restitution to the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab for the cost of lab fees because
the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab is not a “victim.” We agree but find the error
harmless pursuant to R.C. 2925.511.
{¶33} As part of a defendant's felony sentence, R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) allows a trial
court to order restitution “by the offender to the victim of the offender's crime * * * in an
amount based on the victim's economic loss.” If the court imposes restitution, the statute
further provides that restitution may be made “to the victim in open court, to the adult
probation department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, to the clerk of courts,
or to another agency designated by the court.” State v. Cartwright, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2016-11-018, 2017-Ohio-7212, ¶ 10, appeal not allowed, 152 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2018-
Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 880, 2018 WL 1093936, ¶ 10 (2018). R.C. 2929.18 does not define
“victim.” Id. at ¶ 12. Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 12
{¶34} It has been held that law enforcement or other governmental agencies are
not entitled to restitution on the ground the agencies are not victims under R.C.
2930.01(H)(1) or are simply expending funds or incurring expenses in the performance
of their duties. Id. at ¶ 16 citing State v. Toler, 174 Ohio App.3d 335, 2007–Ohio–6967
(3rd Dist.) (sheriff's office not entitled to restitution for costs incurred in extraditing
defendant; restitution available only to the actual victim of the offense); State v. Steward,
6th Dist. Lucas No. L–14–1083, 2015–Ohio–3081 (state conceded restitution to dog
warden for defendant's dogs' boarding and medical expenses was improper; dog warden
was not a victim under R.C. 2930.01 [H] ); State v. Samuels, 4th Dist. Washington No.
03CA8, 2003–Ohio–6106 (sheriff's office not entitled to restitution for voluntarily spending
its own funds to pursue a drug buy); Hunter, 2013–Ohio–3759 (fire department not
entitled to restitution for arson investigatory expenses; fire department was not a victim
under R.C. 2930.01[H][1] ); and State v. Wolf, 176 Ohio App.3d 165, 2008–Ohio–1483
(3rd Dist.) (fire departments not entitled to restitution for expenses incurred in conjunction
with an arson fire; fire departments were not the victims of defendant's arson offense).
{¶35} In this case, the parties do not dispute the lab fees due to the Mansfield
Police Department Crime Lab were based on expenses incurred in the performance of its
public duty. While the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab was not a “victim” under
R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) for the purposes of restitution, the trial court had statutory authority to
order Barnett to reimburse the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab for the lab fees.
R.C. 2925.511 authorizes a sentencing court to order an offender to reimburse law
enforcement agencies for the costs of tests to identify the controlled substance at issue
in a drug possession offense, so long as the test comes back positive. The statute reads: Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 13
In addition to the financial sanctions authorized or required under sections
2929.18 and 2929.28 of the Revised Code and to any costs otherwise
authorized or required under any provision of law, the court imposing
sentence upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a drug
abuse offense may order the offender to pay to the state, municipal, or
county law enforcement agencies that handled the investigation and
prosecution all of the costs that the state, municipal corporation, or county
reasonably incurred in having tests performed under section 2925.51 of the
Revised Code or in any other manner on any substance that was the basis
of, or involved in, the offense to determine whether the substance contained
any amount of a controlled substance if the results of the tests indicate that
the substance tested contained any controlled substance. No court shall
order an offender under this section to pay the costs of tests performed on
a substance if the results of the tests do not indicate that the substance
tested contained any controlled substance.
The court shall hold a hearing to determine the amount of costs to be
imposed under this section. The court may hold the hearing as part of the
sentencing hearing for the offender.
R.C. 2925.511.
{¶36} Pursuant to R.C. 2925.511, the trial court was permitted to order Barnett to
reimburse the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab for the costs of the tests performed
on the contents of the baggie found on Barnett’s person because the tests indicated the
contents of the baggie were a controlled substance, heroin. We find it was error for the Richland County, Case No. 18CA76 14
trial court to order Barnett to pay “restitution” instead of “costs” to the Mansfield Police
Department Crime Lab because it was not a “victim” entitled to restitution under R.C.
2929.18(A)(1). The error, however, was harmless considering R.C. 2925.511.
{¶37} We vacate the portion of the trial court’s August 9, 2018 sentencing entry
ordering Barnett to pay restitution in the amount of $80.00 to the Mansfield Police
Department Crime Lab. Pursuant to our authority under App.R. 12(B), we enter judgment
that Barnett shall pay court costs and fees permitted pursuant to R.C. 2929.18 and R.C.
2925.511, including $80.00 to the Mansfield Police Department Crime Lab.
{¶38} Barnett’s second Assignment of Error is sustained and overruled in part.
CONCLUSION
{¶39} The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed
in part, vacated in part, and judgment rendered pursuant to App.R. 12(B).
By: Delaney, J.,
Hoffman, P.J. and
Baldwin, J., concur.