State v. Barnes
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Opinion
[Cite as State v. Barnes, 2024-Ohio-1737.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-23-33 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ALEX M. BARNES, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2007-CR-0198
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 6, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Alison Boggs for Appellant
Andrew Bigler for Appellee Case No. 14-23-33
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Alex M. Barnes (“Barnes”), appeals the August
24, 2023 judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him in the Union
County Court of Common Pleas. Barnes argues that the indictment against him
should have been dismissed on speedy trial grounds and that his conviction must be
set aside on the same basis. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Procedural Background
{¶2} On December 3, 2007, the Union County grand jury returned a 5-count
indictment against Barnes, charging him as follows: Count 1 – Rape, a first-degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); Count 2 – Gross Sexual Imposition, a
third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Count 3 – Gross Sexual
Imposition, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Count 4 –
Disseminating Matter Harmful to Juveniles, a fourth-degree felony in violation of
R.C. 2907.31(A)(1); and Count 5 – Rape, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b). Counts 1 and 5 of the indictment also contained sexually violent
predator specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.148.
{¶3} On December 3, 2007, the state also filed a request that a warrant be
issued on the indictment. That request listed Barnes’ address as the Wilcox State
Prison in Abbeville, Georgia. While an arraignment was scheduled to be held on
December 13, 2007, Barnes was not served and no further docketed action was taken
in the case for several years.
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{¶4} On May 20, 2013, Barnes filed a pro se “motion to indict or dismiss”,
alleging that he had been in custody in another state and had heard nothing from the
prosecution in Ohio, and arguing that he was “entitled to be indicted or dismissed
and closed out with the GCIC, within (30) days of the Motion filing.” (Docket No.
4).
{¶5} On July 18, 2013, the State of Ohio filed a response in opposition to
Barnes’ motion. The state argued that Barnes had been incarcerated in the state of
Georgia since his indictment in 2007 and was therefore “unavailable” pursuant to
R.C. 2945.72. (Docket No. 5).
{¶6} On July 25, 2013, the trial court filed a judgment entry overruling
Barnes’ motion. The trial court found that, pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(A), the time
within which a defendant must be brought to trial may be extended due to his
confinement in another state.
{¶7} Subsequently, in late 2013, 2014, and 2015, Barnes filed several
additional pro se documents, including a discovery request, an address update, a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, a motion for
a default judgment, a motion to plea in absentia, a demand for speedy trial, and a
motion for the appointment of counsel.
{¶8} On October 15, 2015, the trial court filed a judgment entry overruling
Barnes’ various motions and, as to the speedy trial issue, specifically found that
-3- Case No. 14-23-33
Barnes continued to be incarcerated in the state of Georgia and therefore remained
unavailable for prosecution in Ohio.
{¶9} On December 13, 2021, Barnes filed a notice of place of imprisonment
and a request for final disposition of his indictment pursuant to the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers.
{¶10} On December 28, 2021, the trial court appointed counsel to represent
Barnes.
{¶11} On January 6, 2023, an arraignment was held and Barnes pled not
guilty to the indictment.
{¶12} On April 28, 2023, the case was resolved with a negotiated plea of
guilty. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Barnes pled guilty to Count 1 amended to a
charge of Gross Sexual Imposition, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4), to Counts 2, 3, and 4 as indicted, and to Count 5 amended to a charge
of Gross Sexual Imposition, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2907.05(A)(4).
{¶13} On August 24, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. Barnes was
sentenced to 36 months in prison on Count 1, 36 months in prison on Count 2, 36
months in prison on Count 3, 18 months in prison on Count 4, and 36 months in
prison on Count 5. All sentences were ordered to be served consecutively, for an
aggregate prison sentence of 162 months.
-4- Case No. 14-23-33
{¶14} On September 22, 2023, Barnes filed the instant appeal, in which he
raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
Appellant’s convictions are void due to speedy trial violations because the state did not bring him to trial or otherwise resolve the case within 180 days while the trial court erred in not granting appellant’s motion to dismiss.
{¶15} In the sole assignment of error, Barnes contends that the trial court
erred in overruling his motion to dismiss and argues that his convictions must be
reversed due to speedy trial violations. In support of those claims, Barnes relies
both on Ohio’s general speedy trial statute, R.C. 2945.71, and also on the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), which in Ohio is codified in R.C. 2963.30.
{¶16} However, we do not reach the merits of the speedy trial claims raised
in this case because Barnes waived his right to contest his convictions on statutory
speedy trial grounds when he entered pleas of guilty.
{¶17} As to Barnes’ arguments raised pursuant to R.C. 2945.71, in
Montpelier v. Greeno, 25 Ohio St.3d 170, 495 N.E.2d 581 (1986), the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that a defendant’s guilty plea waives the right to raise the
statutory right to speedy trial on appeal. See also State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127,
566 N.E.2d 658 (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶18} As to Barnes’ arguments raised pursuant to R.C. 2963.30, in State v.
Bowman, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-89-18, 1990 WL 209806 (Dec. 21, 1990), this
-5- Case No. 14-23-33
Court similarly held that a plea of guilty waives the right to raise a speedy trial claim
pursuant to the IAD on appeal. “Because the plea of guilty is a complete admission
of a defendant’s guilt, it waives all non-jurisdictional defects assuming the
regularity and constitutionality of the plea itself, and the procedure by which it was
accepted by the court.” Id., at *5, citing State v. Brown, 43 Ohio App.3d 39, 40, 539
N.E.2d 1159 (1st Dist.1988). In Bowman, we noted that the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals had previously determined that the rights created by the IAD are non-
jurisdictional. Id., citing Howalak v. United States, 645 F.2d 534, 537 (6th
Cir.1981). “To permit the raising of IAD questions after a plea of guilty, entry of
judgment and the sentencing, would undercut the policy of achieving prompt and
final judgments.” Id. See also State v. Lewis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102939, 2015-
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