[Cite as State v. Banks-Harvey, 2016-Ohio-2894.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2015-08-073
: OPINION - vs - 5/9/2016 :
JAMIE BANKS-HARVEY, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 15 CR 30660
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Kathryn Horvath, 500 Justice Drive, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for plaintiff-appellee
Thomas W. Kidd, Jr., 8913 Cincinnati-Dayton Road, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for defendant-appellant
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jamie Banks-Harvey, appeals from a decision of the Warren County
Court of Common Pleas denying her motion to suppress. For the reasons stated below, we
affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 2} On October 21, 2014, appellant was operating a motor vehicle that was
stopped for a traffic violation. During the traffic stop, drugs and drug paraphernalia were Warren CA2015-08-073
found in appellant's purse. Subsequently, appellant was indicted for possession of heroin
and possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), possession of drug paraphernalia
in violation of R.C. 2925.14(A), and possession of drug abuse instruments in violation of R.C.
2925.12(A).
{¶ 3} In May 2015, appellant moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse. An
evidentiary hearing was held shortly thereafter. At the hearing, the state presented the
testimony of Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Matthew Keener and an audio recording of
the traffic stop. The state also presented a video recording of the stop taken by the camera
in Trooper Keener's police cruiser, but, due to the positioning of the vehicles, the video did
not show appellant's automobile.
{¶ 4} Trooper Keener testified that he initiated a traffic stop on an automobile he
observed to be traveling 53 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone. Appellant was driving the vehicle and
appellant's boyfriend and appellant's friend, Ms. Holcomb, were passengers. Appellant did
not have a driver's license and instead gave Trooper Keener a Ohio identification card that
she removed from her purse. After discovering appellant did not have a driver's license,
Trooper Keener removed appellant and placed her in the back of his police cruiser.
{¶ 5} While appellant was in the back of the police cruiser, Trooper Keener ran
appellant's information through his computer and discovered that her driver's license was
suspended and that she had a felony arrest warrant for possession of heroin from
neighboring Montgomery County. Trooper Keener contacted highway patrol dispatch to
confirm the warrant. While waiting for confirmation of the warrant, Trooper Keener returned
to the vehicle and spoke with appellant's boyfriend and Ms. Holcomb.
{¶ 6} At the hearing, Trooper Keener testified that while he was speaking with Ms.
Holcomb and appellant's boyfriend, he observed a gel capsule, which he immediately
believed to contain heroin, on the vehicle's floorboard. Trooper Keener then returned to his
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cruiser and received confirmation of appellant's Montgomery County arrest warrant and that
Ms. Holcomb also had an outstanding arrest warrant. During this time, Highway Patrol
Trooper O'Neal arrived at the scene. Trooper Keener handcuffed appellant and Ms.
Holcomb and placed them in the back of his police cruiser to await transfer to Montgomery
County where they would be taken to jail.
{¶ 7} Trooper Keener explained that after he arrested appellant, he returned to the
vehicle, removed her purse, and searched it. Inside he found heroin, cocaine, needles, and
a glass pipe. After the drugs and drug paraphernalia were discovered, Trooper O'Neal
informed Trooper Keener that he observed a gel capsule on the floor of the automobile.
{¶ 8} On June 4, 2015, the trial court issued a written decision denying appellant's
motion to suppress. In denying the motion, the trial court dismissed several of the state's
theories of admissibility, including that the search of the purse was valid through the
automobile exception. The trial court found Trooper Keener did not have probable cause to
search the vehicle and the purse because his testimony that he observed the gel capsule in
the vehicle before searching the purse was not credible. However, the court found that the
search was valid under the inevitable discovery doctrine through the automobile exception.
The court reasoned that the drugs and drug paraphernalia in the purse would have been
inevitably discovered under the automobile exception because at the same time the purse
was being searched, Trooper O'Neal observed the gel capsule. Accordingly, the trial court
denied appellant's motion to suppress.
{¶ 9} Thereafter, appellant pled no contest to all counts contained in the indictment.
She was sentenced to three years of community control. Appellant now appeals, raising a
single assignment of error:
{¶ 10} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE THAT WAS SEIZED FROM HER
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PURSE IN VIOLATION OF [HER] RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
{¶ 11} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the drugs in her purse would
have been inevitably discovered under the automobile exception. The state disagrees and
argues the drugs are admissible because (1) the drugs would have been inevitably
discovered under the automobile exception, (2) the search was a valid inventory search, and
(3) the drugs would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search at the
Montgomery County Jail.
I. Standard of Review
{¶ 12} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8; State v. Jones,
12th Dist. Brown No. CA2015-05-014, 2016-Ohio-67, ¶ 8. When considering a motion to
suppress, the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence in
order to resolve factual questions and evaluate witness credibility. Jones at ¶ 8. In turn,
when reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court is bound to accept the trial
court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. "An
appellate court, however, independently reviews the trial court's legal conclusions based on
those facts and determines, without deference to the trial court's decision, whether as a
matter of law, the facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard." Id.
II. Fourth Amendment
{¶ 13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, including
unreasonable automobile stops. Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-
3563, ¶ 11. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless certain "specifically
established and well delineated exceptions" exist. City of Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d
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216, 218 (1988), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455, 91 S.Ct. 2022
(1971). Once a warrantless search is established, the state bears the burden of proof,
including the burden of going forward with evidence, to show the validity of the search. Id. at
paragraph two of the syllabus. The state's burden of proof that the search is subject to an
exception to the warrant requirement is by a preponderance of the evidence. City of Athens
v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237, 241 (1974).
{¶ 14} If an individual's right against unreasonable searches and seizures is violated,
the evidence obtained as a result of the violation is subject to exclusion. United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). While the Fourth Amendment does not
contain an express mandate that evidence seized as a result of an illegal search be
suppressed, suppression is inherent in the amendment's language. Id., citing United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613 (1974). "The [exclusionary] rule thus operates
as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.'"
Id., quoting Calandra at 348.
III. Inevitable Discovery under Automobile Exception
{¶ 15} Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, once police officers
obtain probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband, the officers may search the
vehicle. State v. Raphael, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2014-11-138 and CA2014-11-139,
2015-Ohio-3179, ¶ 23. The automobile search may extend to the occupant's belongings in
the vehicle, including a purse. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 302, 119 S.Ct. 1297
(1999). In the present case, the trial court reasoned that while the troopers did not have
probable cause to search the vehicle before the purse was removed, the drugs would have
been inevitably discovered under the automobile exception. The court reasoned Trooper
O'Neal's observation of the gel capsule inside the vehicle gave rise to probable cause to
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search the vehicle and the purse.
{¶ 16} Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the inevitable discovery
doctrine permitted the admission of the drugs and drug paraphernalia. Specifically, appellant
maintains the state did not set forth any evidence that Trooper O'Neal was pursuing an
alternative line of investigation prior to the search of the purse.
{¶ 17} Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence that is illegally obtained is
properly admitted "once it is established that the evidence would have been ultimately or
inevitably discovered during the course of a lawful investigation." State v. Perkins, 18 Ohio
St.3d 193 (1985), syllabus; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984). The
prosecution must show within a reasonable probability that police officials would have
discovered the derivative evidence apart from the unlawful conduct. Perkins at 196.
{¶ 18} There are two primary means by which the state can establish the inevitable
discovery of the unconstitutionally seized item: (1) prior to the misconduct, authorities were
actively pursuing an alternate line of investigation that would have resulted in discovery of the
evidence; or (2) authorities would have subsequently discovered the evidence through a
standardized procedure or established routine. State v. McCollough, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2013-07-021, 2014-Ohio-1696, ¶ 29. Under the "prior to misconduct" requirement,
inevitable discovery has been restricted to situations where alternative investigatory
procedures were already underway or completed. State v. Bradford, 4th Dist. Adams No.
09CA880, 2010-Ohio-1784, ¶ 56. As courts have recognized, to hold otherwise, would
permit the doctrine to apply even if police merely "could have discovered" the evidence,
rather than if they "would have discovered" the evidence. State v. Porter, 178 Ohio App.3d
304, 2008-Ohio-4627, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 19} Regarding the inevitable discovery doctrine, the trial court stated: "At the time of
the search, [Trooper O'Neal] has observed the suspicious gel cap and has shared this
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information with Trooper Keener. These observations, when coupled with the suspicious
behavior of the occupants of the vehicle, provide probable cause for a search of the motor
vehicle under the 'automobile exception' outlined above." The trial court concluded that
because the troopers "had observed contraband and conducted a lawful search of the
vehicle based on this probable cause, the search of Defendant's purse was within the scope
of that search and the drugs * * * would have been inevitably discovered."
{¶ 20} After a careful review of the record, we find that the state failed to establish that
the inevitable discovery doctrine permits admission of the evidence in appellant's purse. The
state did not set forth any evidence that there was an alternative line of investigation
underway prior to Trooper Keener's removal and search of the purse. At the suppression
hearing, the state offered Trooper Keener's testimony and a video and audio recording of the
stop. Trooper O'Neal was not called as a witness during the hearing. While Trooper Keener
testified regarding the details of his own investigation, there was no testimony as to when
Trooper O'Neal began his investigation that led to the discovery of the gel capsule inside the
vehicle. Further, due to the positioning of Trooper Keener's police cruiser, the video of the
traffic stop does not capture the vehicle appellant was driving and does not show when
Trooper O'Neal began his investigation which led to the discovery of the gel capsule.
Moreover, the audio recording of the traffic stop only establishes that after Trooper Keener
removed appellant's purse, searched the purse, and found the syringes and drugs, did
Trooper O'Neal inform Trooper Keener about the gel capsule.
{¶ 21} Based on this limited evidence, the state did not establish that Trooper O'Neal's
investigation was already underway at the time Trooper Keener removed and searched the
purse. See State v. Parrish, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-832, 2002-Ohio-3275, ¶ 39
(neighbor's tip insufficient under inevitable discovery because received after illegal search);
State v. Keith, 178 Ohio App.3d 46, 2008-Ohio-4326, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). Due to Trooper
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O'Neal's failure to testify at the hearing and the limited video recording, there is no evidence
when Trooper O'Neal began his investigation of the vehicle. Therefore, the state failed to
meet its burden of proof that the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of
appellant's purse would have been inevitably discovered under the automobile exception.
Consequently, the trial court erred in finding that the evidence was admissible under the
inevitable discovery doctrine pursuant to the automobile exception.
IV. Inventory Search
{¶ 22} The state argues that even if the drugs and paraphernalia would not have been
inevitably discovered under the automobile exception, the search was permissible under the
inventory search exception.
{¶ 23} The search of an arrestee and his or her personal effects incident to
incarceration is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in conjunction with the inventory
search exception to the warrant requirement. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,
372, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983).
The purpose of an inventory search is to (1) protect an individual's property while it is in
police custody, (2) protect police against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, and (3)
protect police from dangerous instrumentalities. Opperman at 369.
{¶ 24} Inventory searches are administrative caretaking functions unrelated to criminal
investigations. State v. Mesa, 87 Ohio St.3d 105, 109 (1999), citing Opperman at 370, fn 5.
Therefore, the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, including the
standard of probable cause, are not implicated. Id. See also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987). The validity of an inventory search is judged by the Fourth
Amendment's standard of reasonableness. Mesa at 108-09, citing Opperman and Bertine.
Inventory searches are permitted if the search was "conducted in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable standardized procedure(s) or established routine." State v.
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Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403, 405 (1992), citing Opperman; Bertine; and Florida v. Wells, 495
U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990).
{¶ 25} In Lafayette, the Supreme Court found that it is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment "for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested
person, to search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with established
inventory procedures." Id. at 648. The Court reasoned that the inventory search of the
arrestee's shoulder bag at the station-house, prior to booking and jailing the arrestee, was
reasonable because the search protects the suspect's property, deters false claims of theft
against the police, insures security, and aids in identifying the suspect. Id. at 646-47.
{¶ 26} Later, the Supreme Court addressed the inventory search exception in a
different context and emphasized that the principles underlying the exception should guide
courts in determining whether a search purportedly falling under the exception is reasonable.
Bertine at 372-373. The high court clarified that its Lafayette decision "did not suggest that
the station-house setting of the inventory search was critical" to its legitimacy. Id. at 373.
Rather, the focus is upon whether the search advanced the interests of safeguarding
property, limiting liability for lost or stolen property, and protecting police from danger. Id.
{¶ 27} In the case at bar, Trooper Keener testified that after he arrested and detained
appellant, he searched her purse pursuant to Highway Patrol standardized procedures.
Trooper Keener arrested appellant on a Montgomery County warrant and detained her until
she could be extradited to Montgomery County for incarceration. Trooper Keener explained
that it is the Highway Patrol's standard written policy that an arrested person's belongings
accompany that person to jail. When a female suspect is arrested, her purse accompanies
her to jail. He also stated that it is the standard policy that an individual's belongings are
searched before placing the items into the police cruiser. Trooper Keener explained that
belongings are searched to protect the safety of the officer and also to discover evidence of a
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crime. He explained appellant would be subject to a conveyance charge if she brought
contraband into the Montgomery County Jail.
{¶ 28} We find that Trooper Keener's search of appellant's purse after appellant was
arrested and incident to appellant's incarceration was a valid inventory search and
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Trooper Keener's testimony clearly provides that
there was a standardized Highway Patrol policy regulating the removal and search of a
person's belongings incident to incarceration, and the record indicates that Trooper Keener's
conduct conformed to this policy. While the state did not admit the actual written Highway
Patrol policy into evidence, Trooper Keener's unrebutted testimony articulating the existence
of the standardized inventory search procedures of the Highway Patrol was sufficient. State
v. Zukas, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2003-P-0005, 2004-Ohio-2792, ¶ 29. See also State v.
Hullum, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98796, 2013-Ohio-1448, ¶ 19; State v. Flynn, 3d Dist.
Seneca No. 13-06-11, 2006-Ohio-6683, ¶ 17.
{¶ 29} The governmental interests justifying inventory searches were also satisfied by
the inventory search in this case. Trooper Keener's search of appellant's purse before
placing it in the back of his police cruiser with two arrested suspects ensured that no
weapons were concealed in the purse and protected Trooper Keener from dangerous
instrumentalities. The search also safeguarded appellant's property while in police custody
and insured against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property.
{¶ 30} Among the legitimate reasons provided to justify the search, Trooper Keener
also stated that he conducted the search to discover evidence of a crime. We acknowledge
that an inventory search "must not be a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover
incriminating evidence" and must be conducted in "good faith." Wells, 495 U.S. at 4;
Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d at 405. However, we do not accept the proposition that one
statement from an officer that he was searching for contraband, as well as conducting an
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inventory search, demonstrates the search was conducted in bad faith or was a pretext for a
warrantless evidentiary search. As stated in Bertine, there is no showing that Trooper
Keener, who was following the standardized procedures of the Highway Patrol, "acted in bad
faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." (Emphasis added.) Bertine at 372. Compare
State v. Rose, 118 Ohio App.3d 864, 869 (8th Dist.1997) (valid inventory search when
purpose was to conduct an inventory and discover contraband) with State v. Seals, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 90561, 2008-Ohio-5117, ¶ 27-28 (inventory search was pretextual when
repeated testimony that opened container to search for contraband). Instead, the evidence
demonstrates Trooper Keener acted in good faith and conducted a lawful inventory search of
appellant's purse pursuant to the Highway Patrol's reasonable standardized inventory search
procedures.
{¶ 31} Lastly, Trooper Keener's retrieval of the purse from the automobile so that
appellant's personal belongings would be returned to her and accompany her to jail was
reasonable. At the time appellant was arrested and detained in the back of Trooper Keener's
police cruiser, her purse remained in the automobile with her boyfriend. It was reasonable for
Trooper Keener to believe that he should secure appellant's personal property once she was
under arrest and ensure that the property remained with appellant. If Trooper Keener failed
to secure appellant's property and the boyfriend did not return the purse to appellant or the
boyfriend went through its contents and removed something, Highway Patrol might have
been liable for the loss. As noted by United States Supreme Court Justice Blackmun while
writing in dissent:
A person arrested in a public place is likely to have various kinds of property with him: items inside his clothing, a briefcase or suitcase, packages, or a vehicle. In such instances the police cannot very well leave the property on the sidewalk or street while they go to get a warrant. The items may be stolen by a passer-by or removed by the suspect's confederates. Rather than requiring the police to "post a guard" over such property, I
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think it is surely reasonable for the police to take the items along to the station with the arrested person.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 19, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
{¶ 32} We are reluctant to impose a legal burden on police officers to decide who is
worthy of entrustment of an arrestee's personal effects on the scene. Compare State v.
Sincell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 19073, 2002 WL 538928, *3 (Apr. 12, 2002). Therefore,
we find Trooper Keener's retrieval of appellant's purse so that her personal belongings may
accompany her to jail was reasonable. However, we note that had appellant affirmatively
requested Trooper Keener to leave the purse in the vehicle or on the scene, we may have
been compelled to reach a different result. Nevertheless, under the particular facts of this
case, where appellant was arrested and awaiting transport to jail, we find that the removal of
her purse from the automobile and the subsequent search of the purse pursuant to the
standardized procedures of the Highway Patrol was a valid inventory search and reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
{¶ 33} Consequently, the drugs and paraphernalia were admissible as the fruit of a
valid administrative inventory search conducted in accordance with reasonable standardized
procedures employed by the Highway Patrol. Because the search was a valid inventory
search, we find it unnecessary to address the state's remaining argument, that the evidence
was admissible because it would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search
at the Montgomery County Jail.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 34} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
The trial court's reliance on inevitable discovery and the automobile exception in denying the
motion to suppress is immaterial because the evidence established the drugs were
discovered as part of a valid routine inventory search. See State v. Hamrick, 12th Dist.
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Madison No. CA2011-01-002, 2011-Ohio-5357, ¶ 38 ("we must affirm a trial court's judgment
that achieves the right result for the wrong reason, because such an error is not considered
prejudicial"). Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 35} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND, J. concurs.
M. POWELL, P.J., dissents.
M. POWELL, P.J., dissenting.
{¶ 36} I disagree with the majority's determination that the search of appellant's purse
was constitutionally permissible pursuant to the purported policy of the Highway Patrol to
retrieve and search an arrestee's belongings incident to incarceration ("Highway Patrol
Policy"). My concerns are two-fold. First, the trial court made no factual finding that Trooper
Keener's testimony concerning the Highway Patrol Policy was credible. Such a factual
finding is crucial if we are to rely upon the Highway Patrol Policy to uphold the search and
observe our responsibility to defer to a trial court's findings of fact in reviewing a ruling upon a
motion to suppress. Second, the Highway Patrol Policy, as described by Trooper Keener,
permits a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).
I. Trooper Keener's Testimony Regarding the Highway Patrol Policy
{¶ 37} The record provides no basis upon which we may approve the warrantless
search of appellant's purse pursuant to the Highway Patrol Policy. The majority correctly
notes at the outset of its discussion that an appellate court, when considering a trial court's
ruling upon a motion to suppress, "is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they
are supported by competent, credible evidence." Although the trial court's opinion made
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specific mention of Trooper Keener's testimony regarding the Highway Patrol Policy, there is
no indication that the trial court gave credit to this testimony and found that the testimony
established the existence and provisions of the policy.
{¶ 38} The trial court did not expressly credit Trooper Keener's testimony concerning
the Highway Patrol Policy and find the Highway Patrol had adopted such a policy.
Significantly, the trial court's sole reference to the Highway Patrol Policy discounts Trooper
Keener's testimony as follows: "The policy of the Ohio State Patrol is to transport the
individual with their property, but no written policy was offered as evidence at the hearing."
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 39} I agree with the majority that competent, credible testimony alone may suffice to
establish an inventory policy. However, if the trial court had found that Trooper Keener's
testimony concerning the Highway Patrol Policy was, standing alone, sufficient to establish
the policy, it would not have found the failure of the state to offer the written policy itself
worthy of note.
{¶ 40} Additionally, the trial court did not uphold the search on the basis of the
Highway Patrol Policy. Because the trial court did not uphold the search on the basis of the
Highway Patrol Policy, no inference arises that it credited this testimony.
{¶ 41} Finally, the trial court specifically found Trooper Keener's testimony on a closely
related issue, his discovery of the gel cap on the vehicle floorboard as establishing probable
cause for his search of the purse, not credible.
{¶ 42} Based upon this record, there is no affirmative finding of fact to which we may
defer that there was, indeed, a Highway Patrol Policy as claimed by Trooper Keener. Rather
than deferring to the trial court's findings of fact as to the existence and content of the
Highway Patrol Policy, the majority makes its own finding of fact that Trooper Keener's
testimony was reliable. This violates the basic precept that a court of appeals, in reviewing a
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trial court's ruling upon a motion to suppress, is not a fact finder and should not make first
instance credibility determinations.
{¶ 43} I have no qualms with a court of appeals finding that a trial court "got it right for
the wrong reason" as the majority has ruled here. However, that presupposes there is a
credible evidentiary basis supporting the alternative ground of affirmance. For instance, if
there was some indication that the trial court had found Trooper Keener's testimony as to the
Highway Patrol Policy reliable or if authenticated documentation of the policy had been
admitted into evidence, there would be a credible evidentiary basis supporting the majority's
finding that the search of the purse was pursuant to the Highway Patrol Policy. But here, the
majority's alternative ground for affirmance is based entirely upon moral evidence (i.e.,
Trooper Keener's testimony) that was not relied upon in any respect by the trial court. In
such an instance, there is no credible evidentiary basis supporting an alternative ground of
affirmance.
{¶ 44} In summary, I don't suggest that Trooper Keener was being untruthful in his
testimony concerning the Highway Patrol Policy. However, the issue is not whether my
colleagues in the majority and I believe Trooper Keener, but whether we can discern that the
trial court believed him. Here, there is no finding of fact by the trial court that Trooper
Keener's testimony concerning the Highway Patrol Policy was credible and, therefore,
nothing upon which we may rely in upholding the search on the basis of that policy.
II. The Highway Patrol Policy Violates Arizona v. Gant
{¶ 45} Even if we could rely upon Trooper Keener's testimony concerning the Highway
Patrol Policy, the search cannot be upheld upon the basis of the policy. Trooper Keener
testified that it is the standard policy of the Highway Patrol that an arrested person's
belongings, including a female arrestee's purse, accompany her to the jail and that the
personal belongings are searched before placement in the police cruiser. According to
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Trooper Keener, the purpose of the search is to promote officer safety and to discover
evidence of a crime. This was the totality of the evidence concerning the existence, content,
and purpose of the Highway Patrol Policy. Based upon that evidence, the majority concludes
that the search of appellant's purse was a valid inventory search.
{¶ 46} A fundamental flaw with the majority's reasoning is that they proceed upon the
incorrect premise that the Highway Patrol Policy is an inventory policy and the search of
appellant's purse was an inventory search. Scrutiny of the purposes of the Highway Patrol
Policy and its execution does not support this premise. As the majority notes, an inventory
policy is characterized by its purposes of protection of a suspect's property and avoidance of
false theft claims against law enforcement authorities. These purposes are served by
cataloging the property and obtaining verification of the accuracy of the catalogue from the
property owner. Trooper Keener's description of the Highway Patrol Policy indicates it
consists of two separate components. First, retrieving an arrestee's personal belongings to
accompany the individual to the jail. Second, a search of the personal belongings for
weapons and contraband. While retrieving appellant's purse from the vehicle may serve the
purpose of protecting her property, the search of the purse did not. There is no evidence that
Trooper Keener catalogued the contents of the purse, verified the accuracy of the catalogue
with appellant, or that the Highway Patrol Policy even provided for a verified catalogue of the
property. The search of the purse, as Trooper Keener's testimony indicates, was simply to
discover weapons and contraband and not to protect the contents of the purse or avoid false
theft claims. Therefore, the Highway Patrol Policy does not justify the search of the contents
of the purse as an inventory. That being the case, inventory search jurisprudence is not
applicable to the analysis of whether the search of the purse comports with the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, the analysis of the legality of the search must focus on whether a
search of the purse for weapons and contraband is justified under the circumstances.
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{¶ 47} In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the search of an arrestee's vehicle was a proper search incident to his arrest. The
Supreme Court, noting that the justification for a search incident to arrest is to prevent
destruction of evidence and to insure officer safety, reiterated that the areas of a vehicle
accessible to an arrested individual are within the scope of a search incident to arrest.
However, because Gant and his companions were secured outside of the vehicle at the time
police searched and discovered cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat of the
vehicle, the Supreme Court found the search of the vehicle and jacket violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court observed:
Neither the possibility of access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search in this case. Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched Gant's car. Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search.
Id. at 344.
{¶ 48} This case is similar to Gant in all pertinent respects. Like Gant, this case
involved the search of the personal effects of an arrestee. Like Gant, the personal effect
searched was not accessible to appellant at the time of the search because she was
handcuffed in the backseat of a police cruiser. Like Gant, officer safety and preservation of
evidence was the justification for the warrantless search. Based upon those circumstances,
Gant held that the search was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the interests of
officer safety and preservation of evidence were not implicated due to the inaccessibility of
the item searched to the arrestee. Like Gant, neither are those interests implicated here.
Therefore, the Highway Patrol Policy may not serve as a basis for upholding the search of
appellant's purse.
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{¶ 49} Regardless of how it may be labelled, the Highway Patrol Policy, as described
by Trooper Keener, constitutes an extension of a search incident to arrest beyond what is
constitutional under Gant. Recasting the search of appellant's purse as an inventory search
does not remove it from Gant's ambit. The import of the majority opinion is to permit local
law enforcement agencies to adopt policies authorizing searches inconsistent with Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus subordinating the
Fourth Amendment to those policies.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 50} I concur with the majority in rejecting the trial court's basis for upholding the
search of appellant's purse as proper under inevitable discovery pursuant to the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for the simple reason that
appellant's purse was no longer in the vehicle at the time Trooper O'Neal observed the gel
cap lying on the floorboard which gave rise to probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant
to the automobile exception.
{¶ 51} Based upon the circumstances there may very well have been probable cause
to search appellant's purse. However, that there may be probable cause to search the purse
does not justify a warrantless search in this context. My dissent is restricted to the on-the-
scene search of the purse by Trooper Keener.
{¶ 52} With regard and respect for my colleagues in the majority, I dissent from their
opinion that the search of appellant's purse was a constitutional inventory search pursuant to
the Highway Patrol Policy.
{¶ 53} I would reverse.
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