State v. Banfield

Opinion

No. 807 August 26, 2026 523

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ERIC CHARLES BANFIELD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Clatsop County Circuit Court 23CR35011; A183610

Dawn M. McIntosh, Judge. Submitted November 25, 2025. Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Daniel C. Silberman, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant.

Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Adam Holbrook, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge.

ORTEGA, P. J. Affirmed.

524 State v. Banfield

ORTEGA, P. J. Defendant appeals convictions for driving under the influence of intoxicants (Count 2), recklessly endangering another person (Counts 3 and 4), reckless driving (Count 5), and failing to perform the duties of a driver (Count 6). Those convictions were based on evidence that defendant, while driving intoxicated, collided with a parked car near a Mini- Mart and then struck a person with his car and endangered another person while attempting to drive away. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained after police stopped him for speeding. During the stop, the officer asked defendant whether he had been at the Mini-Mart, which defendant denied. That questioning was not an unlawful extension of the traffic stop because, by that point, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was the perpetrator of the hit-and-run. Accordingly, we affirm.

This court reviews the denial of a motion to suppress for legal error and is bound by the trial court’s factual findings if constitutionally sufficient evidence supports them. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 74-75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). We briefly summarize the facts pertinent to our review.

Officer Carrera received a dispatch call about a hit-

and-run that had “just occurred” at a Mini-Mart nearby. The report described the car involved, based on the word of an informant, who was a witness to the hit-and-run, as a dark-colored Nissan with Washington plates and the suspect as a white man wearing glasses. Carrera was also informed that the Nissan was heading westbound toward his location . Carrera spotted a car matching that description and also observed that defendant was speeding. Carrera decided to pull defendant over and observed that defendant missed several opportunities to pull over before finally doing so on the New Youngs Bay Bridge, partially blocking traffic.

Carrera then approached defendant and asked for his license and registration. Carrera noted that defendant matched the description he had received of a white man wearing glasses. Having observed that both the car and driver matched the description he had received, Carrera

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 523 (2026) 525

also asked defendant if he had been involved in the incident at the Mini-Mart, which defendant denied. Carrera could smell alcohol coming from defendant and observed that he had glassy, watery eyes and was slurring his speech.

Carrera then contacted his partner, who was at the Mini-Mart and had spoken with the informant. His partner told Carrera that the suspect had black-rimmed glasses and a receding hairline and that there might be damage to the car’s rear passenger-side bumper. Defendant met his partner ’s description and Carrera observed corresponding damage to defendant’s car.

Carrera then read defendant his Miranda rights.

He asked defendant if he had been drinking, which defendant denied. Defendant agreed to perform field sobriety tests, which showed various signs of intoxication, and Carrera ultimately took defendant to jail where a breath sample revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.17 percent, well above the legal limit.

Defendant argues that the state failed to prove that Carrera had subjectively or objectively reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop by asking defendant about the Mini-Mart incident. An officer is generally “limited to investigatory inquiries that are reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic stop,” but is permitted to expand the investigation based on facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. State v. Arreola-Botello, 365 Or 695, 712, 714, 451 P3d 939 (2019).

Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer “actually suspected that the stopped person had committed a specific crime” and that subjective belief was “objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the stop.” State v. Maciel-Figueroa, 361 Or 163, 182, 389 P3d 1121 (2017). To support that objective reasonableness , an officer must “point to specific and articulable facts that support the officer’s belief that the person stopped may have committed * * * a specific crime or specific type of crime[.]” Id. at 186. The articulated facts need not “give rise to a conclusion with certainty that a crime has occurred”

526 State v. Banfield

but only “that the officer’s subjective belief could be true, as a matter of logic.” Id. at 184 (emphasis in original).

The trial court found Carrera to be “extremely credible” and concluded that he had reasonable suspicion to inquire about the Mini-Mart incident. We agree that reasonable suspicion supported the officer’s inquiry.

The trial court necessarily found as fact that Carrera subjectively suspected that defendant was responsible for the hit-and-run at the Mini-Mart, and we are bound by that finding because evidence in the record supports it. When asked at the supression hearing why he questioned defendant about that incident, Carrera responded that the car and driver matched the description given to him—that is, a dark-colored Nissan with Washington plates driven by a white man with glasses.

Carrera also testified to articulable facts that made his subjective suspicion objectively reasonable. He explained that he received a report that a hit-and-run had “just occurred” at a Mini-Mart a mile or two east of his location, and that the car involved was a dark-colored Nissan with Washington plates driven by a white male wearing glasses. Carrera also knew that the car had fled the Mini-Mart headed in his direction. As Carrera was turning around to drive towards the Mini-Mart, he saw a car driving over the speed limit towards him. When he signaled the car to stop, the driver did not immediately comply despite opportunities to do so. Carrera confirmed that the car and driver met the description he had been given before asking defendant about his involvement in the Mini-Mart hit-and-run.

“Where * * * the officer’s suspicion is based solely on a citizen informant’s report, that report must contain some indicia of reliability.” State v. Hames, 223 Or App 624, 628, 196 P3d 88 (2008). We have identified three nonexclusive factors for gauging such reliability: (1) whether the informant is exposed to possible criminal and civil prosecution if their report is false; (2) whether the report is based on the informant’s personal observations; and (3) whether the officer ’s own observations corroborated the informant’s information . State v. Bybee, 131 Or App 492, 495, 884 P2d 906

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 523 (2026) 527

(1994). Here, two of those three factors are satisfied and provided sufficient indicia of reliability.

As an initial matter, the record does not indicate whether the informant identified themselves or spoke to an officer in person, which would satisfy the first factor. See e.g. State v. Hames, 223 Or App 624, 629, 196 P3d 88, 91 (2008) (“That factor is satisfied if the informant gives his or her name to law enforcement authorities or if the informant delivers the information to the officer in person.”). The absence of that first factor is not necessarily determinative; however, if the report is otherwise sufficiently reliable. See State v. Simpson, 245 Or App 152, 157, 261 P3d 90 (2011) (finding an unnamed informant’s report sufficiently reliable despite the officer not knowing whether the informant had identified herself).

The second factor was satisfied because the informant ’s report was sufficiently detailed to allow the officer to infer that it had not been “fabricate[d] * * * out of ‘whole cloth’ ” but was “based on [their] personal observations.” Id. The description of the car and driver and direction of travel was sufficiently detailed to infer that the informant was not fabricating it and that it was based on the informant’s personal observations. See id. (so determining where an informant reported that the driver of a yellow Corvette had been in a traffic collision and provided the license plate number); State v. Koester, 117 Or App 139, 141, 843 P2d 968 (1992), rev den, 315 Or 644 (1993) (same where an unnamed informant reported a white male pointing a pistol while driving a silver-gray Honda; provided the license plate number; and estimated that driver was three miles farther south); State v. Lindstrom, 37 Or App 513, 515, 588 P2d 44 (1978) (same where the informant reported that the driver of yellow Ford pickup had been driving recklessly, appeared intoxicated, and had drawn a firearm).

As defendant does not appear to dispute, the third factor was satisfied because Carrera corroborated the informant ’s report. See Bybee, 131 Or App at 495 (“The officer may corroborate the tip * * * by finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the informant.”). Carrera encountered defendant driving westbound—as 528 State v. Banfield

reported—just as he was turning around to respond to the Mini-Mart call. He corroborated the descriptions of both the car and the suspect. He also observed defendant speeding and failing to immediately pull over despite safe opportunities to do so. That corroboration increased the reliability of the informant’s report. See id. at 496 (the third factor was satisfied where officer observed a blue convertible sports car in the same area it had been reported to be going). That corroboration, together with the other evidence, provided sufficient indicia of reliability to show that Carrera’s suspicion that defendant was involved in a hit-and-run was objectively reasonable. See Simpson, 245 Or App at 157 (finding sufficient reliability where the first factor was not satisfied, second factor satisfied, and third factor only partially satisfied ). The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.

Affirmed.