State v. Baldwin

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Baldwin, 2026-Ohio-2822.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115716 v. :

BRANDON BALDWIN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 23, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-21-665692-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney and Chauncey Keller, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Stahl and Stephenson and Michael H. Stahl; Law Office of Michael G. Aird, LLC, and Michael G. Aird, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

Defendant-appellant Brandon Baldwin (“Baldwin”) appeals from the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas decision denying, without hearing, his petition for postconviction relief, raising one assignment of error for our review,

which states:

The trial court erred when it dismissed [Baldwin’s] Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) Petition without a hearing, prejudicing [Baldwin] and violating his 5th, 6th & 14th Amendment rights to the U.S. Constitution and violating his rights under Article I, Section 1, 10 & 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

After careful review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

After a bench trial, on January 12, 2023, Baldwin was found guilty of

one count of rape in violation on R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).1 Two days later, the trial

court sentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after serving a 25-year

prison sentence. The trial court also declared Baldwin to be a Tier III sex offender.

Baldwin appealed his conviction, which this court affirmed in State v.

Baldwin, 2023-Ohio-3795 (8th Dist.) (“Baldwin I”). The following is a summary of

the facts adduced at trial.

I.C., then ten years old, was sleeping on the floor of the living room in

her home. In the early morning hours, Baldwin, who was married to I.C.’s mother,

returned home from Michigan where he worked and cared for his ailing father. I.C.

awoke around 4:00 a.m. to Baldwin digitally penetrating her. Baldwin stopped and

asked if she was okay. I.C. testified that she recognized his voice. She testified that

when Baldwin left the room, she texted her friend in Arizona because she was afraid

1 Baldwin was found not guilty of four counts of gross sexual imposition of a victim

under the age of 13, as well as the sexually violent offender specifications. One count pertained to I.C., and three counts pertained to A.C., I.C.’s twin sister. and she knew her friend could calm her down. She also told her sisters and her best

friend the following day. According to her best friend, while they were on FaceTime

I.C. revealed that Baldwin had touched her. Her best friend told her mother, who

eventually revealed the information to I.C.’s mother. After I.C. disclosed the abuse,

her sister claimed to have been sexually abused by Baldwin in the past as well.

I.C.’s mother called police, and I.C. reported to the officer that

Baldwin’s “hand was in her underpants.” (Tr. 298.) After further questioning of

I.C., the officer testified that he “determined there was penetration with a digit inside

of [I.C.].” (Tr. 299.)

Baldwin denied the allegations. He told the Children and Family

Services worker (“CFS worker”) that he was in the house that evening and

remembered seeing I.C. asleep on the couch. Baldwin claimed he was looking for

the remote control for the television when I.C. awoke.

At trial, Baldwin argued that I.C.’s older brother had potentially

sexually assaulted I.C.; however, there was no evidence the older brother was home

at the time. In addition, Baldwin argued that I.C.’s mother was lying on the witness

stand about her relationship with her 19-year-old fiancé, who was introduced to the

family as first becoming friends with I.C.’s sibling. Baldwin speculated that mother

wanted a divorce, so she manipulated I.C. to blame Baldwin.

In his direct appeal, Baldwin raised three assignments of error for

review, challenging the trial court’s decision excluding evidence implicating another

suspect, evidence that would impeach a witness, and evidence of a witness’s misconduct. Baldwin also challenged the trial court’s decision denying a mistrial

based on the witness’s misconduct. Finding no merit to Baldwin’s appeal, this court

affirmed his conviction for one count of rape. Baldwin I at ¶ 22.

Baldwin appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Court

declined jurisdiction. State v. Baldwin, 2024-Ohio-555.

In January 2024, Baldwin timely filed with this court an App.R. 26(B)

application to reopen his appeal asserting the following five proposed assignments

of error:

First proposed assignment of error: The appellant was denied due process and a fair trial pursuant to U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV and Ohio const. Art 1, Sec. 10 where there was insufficient evidence of penetration to the rape charge he was convicted of.

Second proposed assignment of error: The trial court’s nunc pro tunc sentence entries were without jurisdiction, or alternatively the court committed Preserved and Plain Error when it sentenced the Defendant to a term of imprisonment that is contrary to the Ohio Revised Code Sentencing Provisions.

Third proposed assignment of error: The Appellant was denied due process and a fair trial pursuant to U.S. Const. Amend V, VI, and XIV and Ohio Const. Art. I Sec 10 when there was insufficient evidence of force to the rape charge.

Fourth proposed assignment of error: The Appellant was denied due process and a fair trial pursuant to U.S. Const. Amend. V, VI and XIV and Ohio Const. Art. I Sec. 10 when the trial court amended the dates of the indictment at trial.

Fifth proposed assignment of error: The trial court committed error when it issued a Nunc Pro Tunc Order changing the original sentencing entry from 10 years to life to a new sentence of 25 years to life.

State v. Baldwin, 2024-Ohio-6177 (8th Dist.) (“Baldwin II”). The State opposed the

motion to reopen. According to App.R. 26(B), an application for reopening shall be

granted if there exists a genuine issue as to whether an applicant was deprived of the

effective assistance of appellate counsel on appeal. This court denied Baldwin’s

application to reopen finding that appellate counsel was not ineffective because (1)

“evidence of penetration, entering the vulva or labia, is sufficient to support a rape

conviction” therefore, Baldwin was not prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to

raise the first proposed assignment of error; (2) “the trial court’s nunc pro tunc

entries issued during the pendency of Baldwin’s direct appeal were solely clerical in

nature” and trial courts retain jurisdiction to correct clerical errors; therefore,

Baldwin was not prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise the second

and fifth assignments of error; (3) “the record clearly demonstrates that the element

of force was established because Baldwin held and maintained a position over the

minor child victim that did not require demonstration of any explicit threats or

display of force for the jury to determine that the element of force was present to

commit the offense of rape”; therefore, Baldwin was not prejudiced by the failure of

appellate counsel to raise the third assignment of error; and (4) Crim.R. 7(D) allows

the trial court to amend an indictment any time before, during, or after trial to

correct a defect that does not change the name or identity of the crime charged;

therefore, Baldwin was not prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise the

fourth proposed assignment of error. Id. at ¶ 7-9, 14-15, 19-20, 23-25. Baldwin appealed the denial of his application for reopening to the

Ohio Supreme Court. The Court again declined jurisdiction. State v. Baldwin,

2024-Ohio-4713.

In April 2024, Baldwin filed, in the trial court, a timely petition to

vacate or set aside sentence and conviction pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. The State

opposed the petition, and the trial court denied Baldwin’s motion without a hearing

stating that

[Baldwin] has failed to state substantive grounds to establish that he is entitled to [relief]. Specifically, [Baldwin]’s Petition fails to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced thereby in that the victim’s initial disclosure was made prior to any claim of improper conduct by the government.

(J.E. July 15, 2024). Baldwin filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of

law, which the trial court denied.

Baldwin appealed the denial of his petition challenging, among other

things, that the trial court failed to issue proper findings of fact and conclusions of

law. This court agreed and remanded the case for the trial court to issue findings of

fact and conclusions of law in compliance with R.C. 2953.21(H). State v. Baldwin,

2025-Ohio-1260, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.) (“Baldwin III”).

Upon remand, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions

of law in accordance with this court’s order. The trial court found that

[d]efense counsel had the opportunity to and did conduct a thorough cross-examination of each witness. On cross-examination with the victim, counsel questioned her with respect to being coached, from where did she learn some of her terminology that she used (e.g., the internet), whether she was dreaming, what was said to investigators, and whether the actual perpetrator was her brother. Counsel cross- examined the victim’s mother on alternate motivations and credibility. Counsel cross-examined the CFS witness [Children Family Service worker] with theories of suggestibility and/or manipulation, alternate offenders, improper questioning, and investigative techniques and best practices. Counsel, through questioning and argument, did raise or address most, if not all, of the items that Dr. Jacobs suggests were the basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

...

In light of the evidence and testimony presented, there is not a reasonable probability that the trial would have ended with a different result had defense counsel hired an expert. The victim’s testimony, the corroborating testimony, and the record as a whole demonstrate that the defendant did not support his petition with sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.

(J.E., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Sept. 25, 2025.)

Baldwin timely appeals.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

In Ohio it is well-established that we review a trial court’s decision to

deny a postconviction-relief petition without conducting a hearing for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Grier, 2025-Ohio-2529, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Smith,

2010-Ohio-1869, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.); accord State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 38

(“We review a decision to grant or deny a petition for postconviction relief, including

the decision whether to afford the petitioner a hearing, under an abuse-of-discretion

standard.”). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in

an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.”

Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. B. Petitions for Postconviction Relief

A petition for postconviction relief is a civil collateral attack on a

criminal judgment that allows a defendant to establish a violation of his

constitutional rights, including a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

which is alleged in this case. Grier, ¶ 5, citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279,

281 (1999); R.C. 2953.21. A petition for postconviction relief is a means to resolve

constitutional claims that cannot be challenged on direct appeal because the

evidence supporting the claims is outside the record. State v. Gray, 2021-Ohio-

2446, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Milanovich, 42 Ohio St.2d 46 (1975).

A criminal defendant seeking to challenge his conviction through a

petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 is not automatically

entitled to a hearing. Grier at ¶ 5, citing State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 110

(1980). “To warrant an evidentiary hearing on a petition for postconviction relief,

the petitioner bears the burden of producing evidence that demonstrates a

cognizable claim of constitutional error.” Hatton at ¶ 37, citing State v. Sidibeh,

2013-Ohio-2309, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).

In State v. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified

the standard for granting a hearing on a petition for postconviction relief,

particularly when the claims involve ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To grant

a hearing, the trial court must “‘determine whether there are substantive grounds

for relief.’” Id. at ¶ 23, quoting R.C. 2953.21(D). If the petition “‘is sufficient on its

face to raise an issue that the petitioner’s conviction is void or voidable on constitutional grounds, and the claim is one which depends upon factual allegations

that cannot be determined by examination of the files and records of the case, the

petition states a substantive ground for relief.’” Id., quoting Milanovich at

paragraph one of the syllabus. In determining whether there are substantive

grounds for relief, the court must consider the petition, the supporting affidavits,

and the documentary evidence, as well as all the files and records pertaining to the

proceedings. R.C. 2953.21(D). “Unless the petition and the files and records of the

case show the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the court shall proceed to a prompt

hearing on the issues even if a direct appeal of the case is pending.” R.C. 2953.21(F).

C. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Standard

When a postconviction-relief petition alleges ineffective assistance of

counsel, the petitioner “‘bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary material

which contains sufficient operative facts to demonstrate a substantial violation of

defense counsel’s essential duties to his client and that this ineffectiveness operated

to the client’s prejudice.’” Grier at ¶ 4, quoting Jackson at syllabus. In other words,

Baldwin must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial.

State v. Trimble, 2009-Ohio-2961, ¶ 98, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). The failure to prove either prong of this two-part test makes it

unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio

St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing Strickland at 697. Baldwin argues that for the trial court to properly evaluate his

counsel’s deficient performance, and whether that deficiency prejudiced him, thus

depriving him of a fair trial, it was necessary that a hearing be held. He points out

that he included in his petition an affidavit of Dr. Katherine Jacobs (“Dr. Jacobs”)

that highlights the importance of scientific knowledge about child psychology,

memory, and interview techniques in evaluating allegations. He argues that Dr.

Jacobs is a clinical and forensic psychologist with specialized training; she

emphasizes the unreliability of child testimony because of factors like suggestibility,

source monitoring errors, and developmental limitations; scientific research shows

children can confuse actual experiences with imagination or external influences;

proper forensic interview techniques and expert testimony are essential to assess the

reliability of child statements. Dr. Jacobs avers that the absence of such expert input

and scientific discussion at trial prejudiced Baldwin’s case because it could have

assisted the court in understanding the potential flaws in child testimonies, possibly

affecting the outcome.

The State counters that the trial court made sufficient findings

supporting that a hearing was not required because Baldwin did not prove his

counsel’s deficient performance and that it prejudiced him in that he did not prove

that the outcome would have been different. The State further argues that the

affidavit of Dr. Jacobs, suggesting that expert testimony was necessary, was not

sufficient to establish deficient performance. The record the State contends,

including I.C.’s testimony and corroboration, supported the conviction and that the cross-examination by defense counsel was sufficient for the trial court to deny

Baldwin’s petition on the record it had before it.

In this case, the crux of Dr. Jacobs’s affidavit is that “[i]t is [her]

opinion that statements made by — or purportedly made by — the children lack[ed]

indicia of trustworthiness and were elicited under circumstances which are known

to adversely influence children’s perception, interpretation and memory of

events[.]” (Petition exhibit No. 1, p. 3.) Specifically, Dr. Jacobs suggests that I.C.’s

allegations are not reliable because when she was interviewed by the police officer,

mother interjected and elicited details that were not originally reported by I.C. to

her friend. Dr. Jacobs insists that the formation of memories is outside a layperson’s

general knowledge and experience and cross-examination is insufficient to address

these issues.

First, we find no merit to Dr. Jacobs assertion that mother influenced

I.C.’s story. According to the transcript attached to Baldwin’s petition, mother only

interjected during the initial police interview with I.C. in an effort to determine when

the incident took place. Contrary to Dr. Jacobs’s accusations, mother did not

provide or elicit details from I.C. in an effort to frame Baldwin or to make the

accusations more salacious. Rather, it was clear from the transcript that mother was

beside herself with shock and could barely comprehend what was happening, much

less destructively influencing what I.C. was reporting. In addition, trial counsel

thoroughly cross-examined mother regarding how she handled the accusations and

mother’s incentive to enhance or influence the accusations. Furthermore, I.C.’s best friend testified that I.C. told her that Baldwin

touched her inappropriately and that she relayed that information to her own

mother. The best friend did not elaborate on whether I.C. gave her specific details.

Therefore, Dr. Jacobs’s assertion that I.C.’s story was exaggerated, with the help of

her mother, by the time I.C. reported the incident to the police is purely speculation

because we do not know exactly what I.C. told her best friend.

Next, contrary to Baldwin’s assertion, I.C. was questioned extensively

about her memory of the incident and whether she was “coached”; where she

learned words like “sexual assault,” “vagina,” and “clitoris”; what her internet

browsing history included; and whether she could have dreamed the incident.

Furthermore, this was not a case of delayed disclosure; I.C. reported the incident to

her sisters and her best friend within a day of the incident and spoke with the police

officer soon thereafter. I.C. remained steadfast in her report of what happened to

her and who sexually assaulted her even after a rigorous cross-examination.

Finally, assuming for the sake of argument that the police officer and

the CFS worker failed to follow proper protocol when interviewing I.C., a review of

the record shows that trial counsel skillfully cross-examined them about how they

interviewed the children and how their investigation unfolded.

For instance, trial counsel questioned the CFS worker about her

initial interview with I.C., which occurred at home. The CFS worker testified that

mother was not present in the room when she spoke with I.C. because she wants to

create a safe environment for the child to describe what happened. The CFS worker confirmed that she speaks with children alone to avoid manipulation by a parent.

She also confirmed that parents have in fact manipulated children, especially during

custody battles. The CFS worker also admitted that if mother was in the room when

I.C. was interviewed by police, that could pose a problem if mother was not

supportive or answering for I.C. She said that it is best practice to interview children

by themselves to avoid undue influence. However, she was not surprised that

mother was present when I.C. spoke with the male police officer and suggested that

I.C. may not have been comfortable enough to speak with a male police officer.

In addition, trial counsel questioned the CFS worker regarding I.C.’s

sexual terminology and she explained that the words children use are dependent

upon how the parents raise the children. The CFS worker admitted that she was not

aware of prior allegations of sexual abuse within the family; however, she testified

that it had no bearing on this case because the accusations did not involve the same

individuals.

Likewise, trial counsel established that the police officer did not have

any special training or much experience with interviewing sexual-assault victims.

After careful review of the record, we find that trial counsel was able

to establish the circumstances surrounding I.C.’s disclosures so that the trial court

could evaluate I.C.’s memories properly. We also note that this was a bench trial

and that the same judge who presided over the trial and determined the credibility

of the witnesses and guilt of Baldwin also reviewed the postconviction-relief petition

and Dr. Jacobs’s affidavit. The trial court concluded, and we agree, that Dr. Jacobs’s expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Any flaws

pointed out by Dr. Jacobs in her affidavit could be properly evaluated by the trial

court without holding an evidentiary hearing.

We now turn to Baldwin’s reliance on Bunch, wherein a divided Ohio

Supreme Court held that Bunch met the standard to be entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to engage an expert

regarding eyewitness identification and the phenomenon of unconscious

transference. Bunch, 2022-Ohio-4723, ¶ 15, 52. Based on the facts of this particular

case, we find Baldwin’s reliance on Bunch misguided.

In Bunch, although the victim positively identified three out of four

perpetrators, the victim did not definitively identify Bunch as the fourth perpetrator

in the initial lineup. It was only after seeing his picture in a newspaper article over

a week later describing him as a suspect that she became certain that he was her

attacker. Id. at ¶ 6. Bunch’s first attorney secured funds to hire an expert witness

regarding eyewitness identification. After that attorney withdrew, however, Bunch’s

second attorney did not consult with any experts for trial. Id. at ¶ 10. Notably, the

second attorney later received a stayed suspension from the practice of law for

neglecting a different criminal matter around the same time as Bunch’s trial. Id. at

¶ 14.

In concluding that Bunch’s trial counsel may have been ineffective,

the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished other cases that involved “a trial counsel’s

choice between eliciting expert testimony through the cross-examination of the state’s expert witness or eliciting expert testimony by presenting a defense expert.”

Id. at ¶ 34.2 The Bunch Court explained that the State did not have an expert witness

for Bunch to cross-examine, and “[t]he only way for Bunch’s counsel to present

expert testimony to the jury regarding the psychology behind eyewitness

identification would have been through an expert for the defense.” Bunch at ¶ 34.

Unlike the victim in Bunch, who was repeatedly raped by a group of

strangers and was initially unsure whether Bunch was one of the assailants, I.C.

knew Baldwin because he raised her since she was a little girl. Even when Baldwin’s

trial attorney cross-examined her on the possibility that it was someone else who

assaulted her, I.C. never faltered in her accusation that Baldwin had sexually

assaulted her. Her story was consistent from the first time she reported the incident

to her friend until her trial testimony nearly two years later. There is no evidence,

unlike in Bunch, that the perpetrator was suggested to I.C. I.C. on her own, almost

immediately reported what happened to her friend and identified Baldwin as the

perpetrator. Indeed, Baldwin placed himself at the scene of the offense.

2 See State v. Nicholas, 66 Ohio St.3d 431, 436 (1993) (“[T]he failure to call an

expert and instead rely on cross-examination does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 10-11 (1987) (holding trial counsel not ineffective where they “decided not to request the appointment of a forensic pathologist, choosing instead to rely on their cross-examination of the state’s expert in order to rebut the evidence of rape”); see also State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274, 299 (2001); State v. Foust, 2004-Ohio-7006, ¶ 97-98 (finding trial counsel’s failure to request funds for a DNA expert, an alcohol and substance-abuse expert, a fingerprint expert, and an arson expert did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because appellant’s need for experts was “highly speculative” and counsel’s choice “to rely on cross-examination” of prosecution's expert was a “legitimate tactical decision”). However, the Bunch Court stated that “[a]lthough rare, there are

some instances in criminal cases when ‘the only reasonable and available defense

strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence.’” Id.

at ¶ 39, quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 106 (2011). We find that this is

not one of those cases where an expert is necessary to establish a defense because

Baldwin’s theory from the moment he spoke with the police and the CFS worker was

that someone else in the home sexually assaulted I.C. and that mother persuaded

I.C. to blame Baldwin because mother wanted a divorce. In essence, Baldwin argued

that I.C.’s memories were tainted by her mother’s animosity towards Baldwin.

Baldwin’s theory was established at trial through cross-examination, as well as

through witnesses who testified for the defense.

Although the formation of memories may not be common knowledge,

it is a well-known fact that children may be improperly influenced by the people

around them. Therefore, it was not necessary for trial counsel to hire or consult with

an expert to establish the theory when it was easily tested by cross-examination.

Furthermore, I.C. testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. Any issue

with the “reliability” of the I.C.’s statements were developed without difficulty

during cross-examination, so that the trial court could evaluate I.C.’s credibility.

Finally, even if Baldwin hired an expert, we cannot say that the result of the trial

would have been different.

After careful review of Baldwin’s petition, the accompanying affidavit

and transcripts, as well as the entire record of the proceedings, we find that Baldwin did not establish substantive grounds for relief in order to warrant a hearing on his

petition. In other words, Baldwin’s petition, on its face, has failed to allege facts

sufficient to warrant a hearing. As a result, we find that the record does not support

Baldwin’s allegation that trial counsel was deficient or that Baldwin was prejudiced

by trial counsel’s performance. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Baldwin’s petition without hearing.

Accordingly, Baldwin’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________ MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR